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This study investigates and proves the continuity between Tsarist, Soviet, and
current Russian military thought which is predicated on the twin conceptual
pillars of voennyi nauk (military science) and budushchaia voina (future war);
identifies the integral military-civilian commission consensus/decision process;
defines the context for Aleksandr Svechin's 1920s works; and contributes original
General Staff source materials. The continuity of process for developing Russian
military doctrine is documented in three parts:
1) The Imperial Russian Army Reforms 1856 to 1914 are linked with the issues
of forming and training a standing "professional" conscript army that first
became significant in the mid-19th century. The Ridiger and Miliutin Reforms
advanced the process of creating a modern Russian military establishment in the
wake of humiliating Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the
Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). The decade of the 1890s and the years immediately
prior to World War I are of singular importance to understanding the conceptual
continuity retained by the present Russian military because these decades marked
a renaissance of theoretical thinking and debate which resulted in the
development of the voennyi nauk methodology for forecasting budushchaia voina;
while the Russian Army began attempting to integrate emerging technologies.
Today this same technological modernization issue is at the forefront of Russian
military thought and hence of efforts to create a new military art.
2) Lessons from the The 1921-1923 Interregnum, and the 1924-1930 Frunze
Reforms are pertinent due to the striking economic and geo-political similarities
between this time period and the present Russian situation. For a decade up to
1930 within the Red Army there transpired an open debate -- the first and only
such open debate for nearly 60 years -- about the nature of budushchaia voina.
That 1920s debate, which climaxed around differences between the strategies of
"destruction" and "attrition" illuminated in General A. A. Svechin's 1927 Edition
of Strategiia. reemerged in the late 1980s as the dialectic foundation for the
development Russian military doctrine for the 21st century.
3) Findings: Past, Present. Future investigates the nature of the current
Russian budushchaia voina concept which must reflect the vastly altered
political-military, geo-strategic, social, economic, and technological situation
in which Russia finds itself in the aftermath of the December 1991 disbanding of
the Soviet Union; and then project into the 21st Century the type of threats, the
most likely nature of warfare, and hence the deployed military force structure
required to defend Russia. By documenting 150 years of Russian military
transformation from an ineffectual raid-19th century feudal peasant conscript army
into a highly capable "professional" modern array at the end of the 20th century,
this study proves the continuity of the Russian future war forecasting process,
and of the military-civilian commission consensus-building and decision-making
process, that are the foundations upon which the Russian military establishment
is built -- and periodically dialectically renewed.
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War
We are watching an unprecedented spectacle:
revolution coming from above and not from below.
- Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich, 1917
PREAMBLE
Today the struggle to save the army is the last struggle
for the state system, for nationality, for Russia.
- A. Prokhanov, 1990
In the aftermath of the November 1989 destruction of the Berlin
Wall, the subsequent unification of Germany, the demise of the Warsaw
Pact, the collapse of Communism in Europe, the continuing withdrawal
of the former Soviet Western Group of Forces from Eastern Europe, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the declaration of independence
by the former Soviet republics, so-called Western conventional wisdom
and popular public sentiment assert that 'the Soviet Union is dead,'
'we won the Cold War,' and the former Soviet Union no longer
constitutes a 'threat.' It is beyond any doubt that the events since
late 1989 constitute a seminal change in the international security
environment -- what the enduring Russian military theorist General
Aleksandr A. Svechin definitively analyzed in the 1920s as a
"completely new strategic landscape."
Regardless of the immensity of these strategic changes, such
absolute and unquestioning assertions about the total demise of the
'Russian threat' are a long leap of faith from reality, given the
great uncertainty that remains about the eventual outcome of reform
2
programs in Russia and in the surrounding newly independent states.
The eventual success of the democratic political and market economic
reforms, which were initiated in January 1992 by President Boris
Yeltsin, is by no means guaranteed. This uncertainty is due to the
enormous magnitude of the problems faced by his fledgling government,
let alone those of the highly nationalistic and traditionally
oriented newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Even if these democratic political and market economic reforms
eventually succeed, Russia and three of the 'Newly Independent
States' (NIS), Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine -- in the absence of
parliamentary ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START) and of actual physical nuclear weapons and delivery system
destruction -- will continue to be the only nations on Earth with the
military capability of utterly destroying the United States of
America. Russia also continues to maintain a formidable conventional
military force, which it is incrementally in the process of
attempting to modernize and upgrade with emerging technologies.
Research and development for some of these advanced technologies has
been prioritized by the Russian military to eliminate the least
promising. For the remainder, funding continues unabated -- even
with the dire civilian economic straits through which Russia is
currently attempting to navigate.1
Ideally, the range of political-military alternative futures
for the former Soviet republics might be considered as unlimited.
1 Author's discussion with General-Colonel Viacheslav
Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition and Procurement Office,
Russian Ministry of Defense, in Washington, DC,
September 29, 1993.
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But, in fact, their future is restricted by the socio-political
culture of the Russians and of their neighbors, by their domestic
historical precedents for problem resolution and, not least, by the
virtual collapse of their 'war communism' command economies and by
their seeming inability to reach a political consensus about the type
of economy which should replace the failed socialist model economy.
Aleksandr S. Kapto, Head of the Ideological Department of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (KPSS/TsK),
highlighted the first requirement for the success of reconstruction
(perestroika) and renewal (obnovleniia) of socialist society:
The sociopolitical and economic transformations
presuppose a creative and thorough comprehension of the
country's historical past, the experience of world
development, and the achievements of non-Soviet social
thought, science, and technology, and the inclusion of
these achievements in the strategy of renewal, taking
into account the specific features of our traditions and
social psychology.2
Beyond question, the Great Russians now face a geo-strategic,
political, economic, and military situation that is unique in their
history. The collapse of the Communist dictatorship has returned the
Russian Empire to inside state borders unseen since the mid-18th
century during the rule of Catherine the Great, and has created the
possibility of further disintegration of the Russian state, as
distinct ethnic groups from the autonomous districts that were
created during the 74 years of Communist rule seek rights of national
self-determination. The huge Communist bureaucracy that controlled
and operated the Soviet command economy, top-down, through the
Kapto, Aleksandr S., "The Ideology of Renewal: Realism
of Thought and Action," Kommunist. No. 6, May 1990.
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principle of 'democratic-centralism' has been eviscerated by six
years of Mikhail Sergeivich Gorbachev's perestroika reforms, and
especially by the 'shock therapy' economic changes, implemented after
the failed August 1991 coup d'etat attempt that brought to power the
'radical democratic reformers', led by Boris Yeltsin. The result is
near economic chaos, with the old command economic system inoperable,
but without a viable market system to replace it. In particular, the
former Soviet military establishment -- now firmly controlled by the
Russian Ministry of Defense -- is faced with the absolute requirement
for renewal (obnovleniia)3 in order to fulfill its historic and
patriotic duty of defending Russian national security interests.
The renewal of the Russian military is not, however, without
precedent. Repeatedly, throughout the last 140 years, the Russian
military has been afflicted with 'times of trouble.' Each time the
Russian military managed to reform itself, and to prevail, by
learning from mistakes, by retaining 'fundamental laws of war' from
past international experience, by adopting applicable aspects of the
latest military art and technology from abroad, by integrating these
factors into a synergistic new military doctrine, and then by
developing and deploying a force structure that the General Staff
forecasted would be adequate to achieve victory over projected
national security threats in a 'future war.'
Historically, this General Staff analytical and forecasting
process has proven to be quite successful and highly accurate in
Author's discussion with General-Colonel Viacheslav
Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition and Procurement Office,
Russian Ministry of Defense, in Washington, DC,
September 29, 1993.
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identifying Russian and Soviet defense requirements and in
establishing the required doctrinal concepts, military art, and
strategy. The conceptual basis for Russian defense policy always
must be created first. However, implementing and applying these
concepts has consistently been the major difficulty faced by both the
Russian and Soviet General Staff, largely due to the bureaucratic
impediments inherent within their respective autocratic and socialist
political and economic systems.
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the December 1991 formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) -- and particularly the establishment of the Russian Ministry
of Defense on March 16, 1992 -- the dialectic and iterative process
of debating the creation of a new Russian military doctrine and
national security posture began again. General-Colonel Viktor
Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces,
summarized the severity of the current Russian military situation
most succinctly:
It's going to be difficult to defend ourselves in the
event of a military conflict. The first strategic
echelon is completely destroyed and this is not a secret.
The reason is that to create the forces of the first
echelon we put everything into the border areas -- Kiev,
Carpathian, Baltic military districts, etc. That's why
we wanted to include the air defenses in the Strategic
Forces and count them as collective security means. But
it unfortunately didn't happen, so everything collapsed.
And, in the Trans-Caucasian district, we dismantled all
radar posts because they were attacked more often than
combat units. ... Our defenses, especially in the South,
are tremendously weakened. And, if we have to fight,
this can be done only by forces deployed in the Center.
The centralized defense system doesn't exist any more.4
Samsonov, General-Colonel Viktor, Krasnaia zvezda.
March 18, 1992.
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One should not assume from General Samsonov's very pessimistic
statement of the serious problems facing the Russian military --as
it is now politically popular in the West to do -- that the territory
of the former Soviet Union is 'defenseless' because, in fact, the CIS
retains an immensely powerful and potentially dangerous, though
temporarily disorganized, military capability. Nor should one assume
from the severity of the problems facing Russia that the General
Staff must perform a 'zero-based' analysis of their new military
requirements. More practically, the Russian Ministry of Defense,
through the General Staff and General Staff Academy, will conduct a
'scientific' analysis of historical lessons, and debate those
lessons, in the process of creating a military doctrine upon which to
develop and deploy the required force structure for 'future war.'
A. D. Borshchov strongly implied in 1990 that historic lessons
remain pertinent to contemporary conditions:
Fulfillment of all defense programs under present-day
conditions, and especially measures for preparing to
repulse a possible external attack, must be based on a
scientifically grounded theoretical concept and be
conducted on a purposeful, planned basis without any
conditionalities or manifestations of subjectivism and
dogmatism.5
Borshchov continued:
... Everything previously accumulated must not be taken
unequivocally and transferred to modern conditions in its
initial form. ... Any past experience requires
continuous creative study and practical application only
with consideration of the entire set of changes which
have occurred since the war, and which are occurring now,
will not be superfluous even today.6
Borshchov, A. D., "Otrazhenie fashistskoi agressii: uroki
i vyvody," Voennaia mvsl'. No. 3, March 1990, p. 20.
Borshchov, p. 22.
7
The extent of these changes and the current turmoil within
Russian society were underscored in a February 23, 1993 broadcast
statement by Russian Defense Minister General Pavel S. Grachev.
Following a weekend meeting of pro-Communist and nationalist officers
that called for Grachev's resignation and a mass demonstration that
day in Moscow by an estimated 20,000 pro-Communist military veterans,
General Grachev denounced the military participation in "political
experiments and battles": "The high command will not permit any
split in military ranks.... The [Russian] military want, above all,
stability."' He asserted:
They want to shake up, split the army, blow it up from
inside to achieve their well-known ambitions. These
people, striving for power, should understand once and
for all [that] any attempts to draw the armed forces into
the political struggle are criminal and fraught with
danger.8
That same day, in Tbilisi, Georgia, the leader of the Georgian
Republic and former USSR Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
called for the removal of all Russian troops from the Black Sea
Coast, Abkhazia and Adzharia; threatened mobilization of Georgian
military forces; and told his parliament that if the Russians did not
leave Georgia, Georgians would have to "rise up with weapons in our
hands to defend the country." Once again, so serious had become the
potential for domestic strife throughout the former Soviet empire --
and not at all unlike the historical precedents of the late-19th and
early-20th centuries -- that Grachev felt compelled to warn that the
7 "Dissident Officers Warned in Russia Against Power Bid,"
International Herald Tribune. February 24, 1993, p. 2.
Grachev, P. S., quoted in "Dissident Officers Warned...,"
International Herald Tribune. February 24, 1993, p. 2.
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forced removal of the Russian President (Boris Yeltsin) could lead to
a "reign of terror."9
The fulcrum of the present Russian senior officer corps, about
90 percent, are former Communist Party or Komso mol members who have
been reared and educated for the last two generations on the
'historical and dialectic materialism' of Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, as elaborated by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, et al. This ingrained
Russian 'military culture' virtually demands that an investigation of
historical lessons be accomplished to establish a 'thesis' against
which can be opposed an 'antithesis' to be 'negated' in order to
create the new Russian military doctrine -- which eventually will
consist of an evolutionary 'synthesis' of the old lessons from
history, new technologies, military science, military art, strategy,
and tactics based upon the Russian General Staff forecast of 'future
war' probabilities. This new military doctrine -- the conceptual
basis for future Russian force development and deployment -- will
likely be very different from the World War II 'stereotyped'
offensive Soviet force structure, with its highly centralized
command, forward deployment, and masses of heavy tank formations to
which Western analysts have become accustomed over the last forty
years. But, the new military doctrine will retain a distinct
continuity from past Russian historical experience.
It is that continuity of process for developing a new Russian
military doctrine and force structure that this three-part study
seeks to investigate.
Grachev, op. cit., p. 2.
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In Part I -- The Imperial Russian Army Reforms 1856 to 1914 --
the reform precedents are of interest since the issues of forming and
training a standing 'professional' conscript army first became
significant after Tsar Aleksandr II 'freed the serfs' in 1861. The
Miliutin Reforms that spanned the decades of the 1860s and 1870s
sought to create a modern Russian military establishment in the wake
of humiliating Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853-56) and
Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). The decade of the 1890s is of
particular importance to understanding the conceptual continuity
retained by the present Russian military. During this decade severe
political and economic constraints precluded the deployment of the
force structure that the Imperial General Staff forecast as required
for 'future war,' while Russian military thought began attempting to
integrate modern technology --at that time, railroads, machineguns,
rapid-fire artillery, electro-magnetic communications, and
airplanes -- into the existing force structure. Today this same
issue of technological modernization is at the forefront of Russian
military thought and hence of efforts to create a new doctrine,
strategy, and operational art. The repeated defeats suffered by
large and relatively modern Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905 also taught the Russian military new, fundamental
lessons about the importance of morale and military education.
After the 1905 Revolution, which followed hard on the heels of
Russia's military defeat by Japan, and right up to the 1917 'October
Revolution,' the Imperial Army was faced with domestic terrorism and
nearly continual nationalist insurrections around the periphery of
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the Russian Empire. Three issues remain important contemporary
problems that the new Russian Ministry of Defense must take into
consideration as it reorganizes: (1) the judicious application of the
military science process for the development of a new military
doctrine; (2) the existence of warring factions within and around
Russia; and (3) the necessity for technological modernization.
In Part II -- The 1921-1923 Interregnum, and the 1924-1930
Frunze Reforms -- the lessons are particularly pertinent to this
study due to the striking geo-political similarities between this
time period and the present Russian situation. Then, as now, the
Russian state had suffered a cruel and crushing military defeat; a
political revolution had brought a new socialist form of government
to power in 1917; the borders of the Russian Empire had collapsed
onto the shoulders of the Russian heartland; and Russia remained
surrounded by active national independence movements. By the end of
the Russian Civil War in 1920, the Russian economy was devastated,
necessitating Lenin's experiment with the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)
market reforms. The new Red Army, faced with the political and
economic imperatives of drastically reducing its force structure,
also desperately required technological modernization, trained
officer cadres, and a new military doctrine with which to defend the
nascent Soviet state. Therefore, during the decade up to 1930,
within the Red Army there transpired an open debate -- the first and
only such open debate for nearly 60 years -- about the nature of
budushchaia voina (future war). That 1920s debate, which climaxed
around differences between the strategies of 'destruction' and
'attrition,' illuminated in General A. A. Svechin's 1927 Edition of
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Strategiia (Strategy), reemerged in the late 1980s as the dialectic
foundation for the development of Russian military doctrine.
Part III -- Findings: Past. Present. Future -- investigates the
nature of the Russian budushchaia voina (future war) concept, which
must reflect the vastly altered political-military, geo-strategic,
economic, and technological situation in which Russia finds itself in
the aftermath of the August 1991 Revolution and the December 1991
disbanding of the Soviet Union, and then project into the 21st
century the types of threats, the most likely nature of warfare and,
hence, the deployed Russian military force structure required to
defend Russia. Even under the most stable of domestic and
international conditions, the required holistic and comprehensive
forecasting is a daunting task. But with the uncertainties and
turmoil of the present Russian economic and political situation, the
emergence of the international 'new world order,' and the explosion
of emerging technologies, predictions of the nature of budushchaia
voina become all the more problematic. Because the Russian General
Staff forecasting process is now -- as in the past -- dialectic,
iterative, and evolutionary, ample evidence now exists, based on the
November 1993 announced new Russian Military Doctrine, to initially
determine the theoretical precepts upon which the future Russian
military will be based.10
The foundation upon which the 'military-technical aspect' of
the new Russian military doctrine has been based, for the 1990s, and
10 See Appendix VI: Osnovnve polozheniia voennoi doktrinv
rossiiskoi federatsii. Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi
Federatsii ot 2 noiabria 1993 goda, No. 1833, pp. 1-21.
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beyond, is the vision of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff
Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov's 'revolution of military-technical
affairs.' Shortly after becoming Chief of the General Staff in 1977,
Marshal Ogarkov, with the approval of the KPSS Central Committee,
initiated a comprehensive study of future Soviet international
security requirements.11 In 1982 Marshal Ogarkov published some of
the initial results of this study in Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite
Otechestva (Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland) and expanded upon
the implications of emerging technologies on modern warfare in his
1985 book, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti (History Teaches Vigilance).12
Since these visionary works were first published, their implications
and significance for international security have been debated
inconclusively, but vigorously, both within the Soviet Union and
abroad. Regardless, since 1985 the Soviet Army, and now its
successor the Russian Army, has continued to make halting incremental
Existence of this "global forecast" was confirmed to the
author during a 1989 personal discussion in Washington,
DC, with Academician Yuri Ossipian, President of the USSR
Academy of Sciences. According to Dr. Ossipian, Marshal
Ogarkov and the General Staff were key proponents of
initiating this "twenty-five volume study for the CPSU
Central Committee International Department that
incorporated inputs from throughout the Soviet government
-- political, social, economic, military, scientific,
foreign affairs, and psychological -- that revealed the
domestic and international trends into the 21st century."
Ossipian said, "The initial drafts were completed during
the Brezhnev government in the early 1980s and revised
during Andropov's brief tenure to create the analytical
basis and conceptual foundation for President Gorbachev's
perestroika (transformation) program."
For a comprehensive and most useful analysis and
discussion of these two Ogarkov works, see Mary C.
FitzGerald, Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977-1985.
Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, November 1986.
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progress toward realization of Marshal Ogarkov's conception of a "new
quality" of defense capability. The startling success of precision-
guided weapons employed by the United States and the Allied coalition
in the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, reportedly the fourth largest
military force in the world, served to reinforce strongly on the
Russian military the veracity of Marshal Ogarkov's predictions. The
lightening speed of combat operations also reinforced the necessity
for the Russian Army to act on their plans for renewal (obnovleniia),
or be left hopelessly behind in the arena of military technology,
possessed and being deployed by the rest of the world powers. The
fundamental question remains, just as it did in the 1920s and
earlier, of whether or not the Russian economy can create and sustain
the capability to produce the sophisticated, technologically
modernized type of military force structure that the budushchaia
voina methodology forecasts -- and perhaps even necessitates.
What the Russian military now envisions is a complete military
reform, an obnovleniia, that must go way beyond any tinkering with
the old socialist political, economic, and military system as
originally planned under Gorbachev's perestroika.13 Prior to this,
during a round table discussion between senior Soviet commanders in
February 1990, Colonel Danilov of the Defense Ministry Information
Directorate pointed out the requirement for a "comprehensive
transformation of the most important aspects of the entire system of
Author's discussion with General-Colonel Viacheslav
Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition and Procurement Office,
Russian Ministry of Defense, in Washington, DC,
September 29, 1993.
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state defense organizational development."1'1 General-Colonel Bayev,
Chief of the Defense Ministry Central Finance Directorate, concurred
that most significant was the question of what military reform was
designed to achieve, namely, "a modern, trained, well armed, strong
army dedicated to the Soviet people."15 General Manilov attempted to
summarize the "principles of military reform" as political,
organizational, and social. The political principle must relate the
state's military organization to the "degree of actual military
threat." The second principle of military reform should be
understood as being based upon a cadre organization with universal
military service, but with an increasing number of "professional"
military personnel. And the third principle entails "guaranteed
provision of social protection" for all servicemen plus the assurance
of openness in "defense organizational development."16
During the September 27-29, 1993 United States-Russian
Military-Technical Policy Conference, General-Major Viktor Mironov of
the Office of the Russian Minister of Defense, put forward three
basic premises of the 'military-technical aspect' of the "emerging
Russian military doctrine" as the following: "1) optimize research
and development of advanced military technologies; 2) modernization








achieve a 'new quality' of combat capability."1' At that same
conference, Dr. Sergei Kortunov of the Russian Foreign Ministry
observed that "without clearly defined borders and a unifying
ideology, the development of a coherent military doctrine is
impossible." He opined: "We must now work together in order to make
Russia technologically competitive against her emerging regional
security threats."18 General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov, Chief of the
Acquisition and Procurement Office, Russian Ministry of Defense,
described Russian military procurement as focused on "obtaining the
latest technologies, especially in the area of command and control
communications." He explained that "based on the trends revealed by
future war models in the 1990s, [the Russian Army] could not allow
enemies to attain military-technical superiority."19 In closing,
General-Colonel Mironov sagaciously asserted: "Technology alone is
not a total answer to effective military capability. Rather, the
desired capability is the result of a synergism between technology
and military art."20
Author's notes, "U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy
Conference," sponsored by the U.S. Department of State
and the National Defense University, Hyatt Regency Hotel,
Crystal City, Virginia, September 27-29, 1993; details,
see Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, January-March 1994, pp. 11-17.
Author's notes, "U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy
Conference," Hyatt Regency Hotel, Crystal City, Virginia,
September 27-29, 1993.
19 Author's notes, "U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy
Conference," Hyatt Regency Hotel, Crystal City, Virginia,
September 27-29, 1993.
20 Author's notes, "U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy
Conference," Hyatt Regency Hotel, Crystal City, Virginia,
September 27-29, 1993.
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The statements of General-Major Viktor Mironov, General-Colonel
Viacheslav Mironov, and Dr. Sergei Kortunov provide conclusive
evidence of the continuity between Tsarist, Soviet, and current
Russian military thought, which is predicated on the twin concepts of
voennyi nauk (military science) and budushchaia voina (future war).
It is precisely that continuity of the Russian military science
future war forecasting process, and of the commission/conference
consensus-building and decisionmaking process, which leads to the
implementation of those forecasts, that this study seeks to document.
The army's ailment lies in the fact that society at large cannot define its
concept of an army, why it is needed, what functions it must perform and,
finally, just what is it to be like?
- Igor Kononov, 1989
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War
PART I
THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY REFORMS 1856 to 1914
The [soldiers'] oath is a vow, given before God, to serve God and Sovereign
with faith and truth, to obey commanders uncomplainingly, to bear patiently
cold, hunger, and all the needs of a soldier; to spare not even [one's] last
drop of blood for Sovereign and Fatherland, to go to battle boldly and
cheerfully for the Tsar, [for] Holy Rus, and [for] the Orthodox faith.
- Chtenie dlia soldat. 1857
"Pulia dura, a shtyk molodets" —
(The bullet is a fool, but the bayonet is a fine lad.)21
The Crimean War Experience: Lessons and Legacy
The long-held European myth of the 'invincible' Russian Army
was dispelled through repeated, costly military defeats, but the
Russian Army -- for all its multitudinous problems -- had not been
broken, despite the loss of Sevastopol and the destruction of the
Black Sea Fleet. Paradoxically, after the Crimean War ended, the
Russian Army was greatly admired by European military leaders for its
stalwart defense of Sevastopol and for the tenacity of its soldiers.
Overall, Russian international prestige was diminished greatly with
the revelations that her army was awkwardly organized, technically
backward, and poorly led; and dependent on an inefficient and
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv 1860-1870 godov v
Rossii. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952), p. 186; see also
Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial
Russian Army. 1861-1914. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1992), p. 3.
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underdeveloped state infrastructure with primitive industries, almost
no railways, and weak finances.22 Yet, by the sheer magnitude of her
territory and population, Imperial Russia remained imposing. Russia,
however, was no longer a leading power in Europe -- nor would she
become one again for nearly another century.
The Crimean War provided the Russian military with abundant
evidence that the sheer weight of frontline manpower, coupled with
drilling perfection on the parade ground, was no substitute for
modern equipment, efficient organization, sound training, and
competent leadership on the battlefield. Russian commanders had
tended to concentrate so intensely on preparation for parades and
reviews, emphasizing the spotless appearance of their troops and
parade-ground precision movements, that their soldiers had received
negligible preparation for the rigors of actual combat.23 With the
Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War. (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1979), p. 529. Curtiss provides a
meticulously documented account of the diplomatic and
military actions that transpired before and during the
Crimean War. For a rather 'jingoistic' British account
of military operations during the war, including the
legendary 'Charge of the Light Brigade,' see Hamley,
General Sir Edward, The War in the Crimea. (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), Third Edition reprint
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971). Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 16-33, provides excellent
detail from the Imperial Archives about the composition,
armament and tactics of the Russian Army. For additional
discussion of Crimean War campaigns, see Wirtschafter,
E. K., From Serf to Russian Soldier. Princeton University
Press, 1990) and van Dyke, Carl, "Culture of Soldiers:
The Role of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff in
the Development of Russian Imperial Military Science,
1832-1912," [Unpublished M. Phil, dissertation],
University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, 1989.
23 Wirtschafter, pp. 71-72.
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prudent judgment indicative of a future Chief of the Main Staff,
General-Adjutant Nikolai N. Obruchev contributed these thoughtful
words:
The Crimean War revealed that army organization at that
time did not satisfy the state defense goals. For
defense purposes there were too few tactical units; these
units did not have sufficient [command and] control,
material support, [and] allotments of people.2''
As a result of these deficiencies, victory eluded the Russian Army,
while Russian manpower losses were enormous.
For Russia, the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was an all out effort.
Before the war Russia fielded an army with 980,000 officers and
soldiers, plus a significant, though indeterminable, number of
Cossack irregulars. At the conclusion of the war in January 1856, in
spite of an estimated 450,000 casualties owing to combat and
disease,25 the Russian army numbered 1,802,500 regulars, 370,000
militia, and 170,000 irregulars -- an immense army of 2,343,500 men.
With the inclusion of navy personnel the total Russian wartime force
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii,"
(St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1873), p. 2,
in TsGVIA. f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv CVUA). Materialv
sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'stvom
Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia. 3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta
1873 g.. p. 74.
Russian and British accounts of war casualties differ
markedly; however, John Shelton Curtiss' estimate of
450,000 casualties, based upon official documents from
the Russian War Ministry Medical Department, would appear
to be the more reliable -- as is Curtiss' assessment that
"the Crimean War was more costly for Russia in terms of
manpower than any war between 1815 and 1914." For
specific additional details, see Curtiss, pp. 470-471.
20
structure rose to between 2,400,000 and 2,500,000 troops/6 Although,
for this time, such a gigantic fighting force was assembled because
of the contingency of a Europe-wide war in 1856, typically, most
Russian soldiers were not engaged in the rigors of actual combat.27
General Obruchev concluded:
But, in spite of these 2.5 million troops we were weak.
Many were old soldiers. By increasing the levy masses of
recruits poured into the army, the formation of
[recruits] into hastily formed units was unstable.28
The critical lessons of the Crimean War were that the social
disruption and enormous expense of maintaining all these troops in
the field ruined the Russian economy and that the disastrous military
performance in combat dictated the need for fundamental army reform.
Curtiss, pp. 470-471; Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia
otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," (St. Petersburg:
[Unpublished Manuscript], 1870), pp. 1-2, presents this
table with a somewhat higher total number of troops.









27 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 3, in
TsGVIA. VUA. Materialv sekretnogo soveshchaniia.... p. 75
gives the Imperial Army's revised force structure table.













Obruchev, op. cit., p. 3.
2,390,785
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The Ridiger Commission on Military Reform
The most telling and didactic critique of Russian military-
system failings during the Crimean War came from a distinguished and
trusted Russian nobleman and commander. While the war was still in
progress, in a June 4, 1855 note, addressed to Tsar Aleksandr II and
delivered to the Emperor through the War Ministry, General-Adjutant
Count A. F. Ridiger, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and the
Grenadier Corps, dispatched the first official document criticizing
the Russian military system. He pointedly accused that the main
reason for the failures of Russian arms was the military command.
Convinced that "excessive command centralization led to the oblivion
of the foundation of military art," Count Ridiger wrote:
First, the abuse of power by the central administration
damaged the independence of lower command channels,
throwing the latter into the role of transmitting reports
and orders.... These duties, essentially, occupied
mediocre personnel; nothing is easier than being gadflies
executing standing orders..., and it is impossible to
demand from these marionettes integrity, responsibility,
or knowledge about people and circumstances...."
Ridiger's biting words revealed his frustration with the incompetent
leadership and retinue of the existing Russian military system:
The second reason, which turns out to be influenced in no
small measure by the absence of capable people in the
military service, is degenerated people, whose military
spirit, knowledge of tactics and warfare, and about
people, allows them to occupy themselves with only one
military practice, the scope of which is limited to
regulations and parades.30
Stoletie Voennogo ministerstva. trans, from French,
(St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 20; cited in Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., I/oennve reformv. . . . p. 45.
Stoletie Voennogo ministerstva. trans, from French,
(St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 21; cited in Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 45.
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Through a subsequent series of personal notes, after he
successfully 'had gotten the Tsar's attention,' Ridiger urged Tsar
Aleksandr that "worthless commanders," who had displayed "almost
criminal faults and negligences," be removed and advised that
"talented commanders" be given wider authority. Count Ridiger
particularly cited the mismanagement of the 1853 and 1854 Danube
campaigns (an undisguised condemnation of the gross failings of Field
Marshal Paskevich) and the command negligence before Sevastopol,
Eupatoria, Balaklava and Kerch, when the enemy's Crimean expedition
had been predicted three months in advance.31 Count Ridiger's notes
also repeatedly criticized the "excessive centralization of authority
in the military administration, which deprived the lower officials of
all initiative and turned them into mere agencies for forwarding
instructions.1,32
On June 23, 1855 General Ridiger summarized his analysis for
the Tsar with a series of five proposals for improving the Russian
military system:
1) He urged the elimination of excessive centralization;
2) insisted on changing the nature of training of the
troops so as to emphasize preparation for battle,
including careful individual instruction of the soldiers,
with parades and reviews to play a secondary role;
Curtiss, p. 468; see Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob
oborone Rossii," pp. 27-28, in TsGVIA. f. VUA. MaCerialv
sekretnogo soveshchaniia.... p. 87, which severely, and
openly, criticizes Field Marshal Paskevich and the
Emperor Nikolas I for "holding forces to defend the
Baltic and Poland" to the extent that "nothing was left
for strengthening infantry defenses or fortifications
elsewhere in the Empire."
32 Curtiss, p. 469.
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3) stressed raising the intellectual level of the
officers;
4) proposed the creation of special commissions to
resolve these problems; and
5) urged improvement of the quality of the commanders
by requiring strict periodical attestation of their
suitability, by the drawing up of lists of candidates
for positions, careful selection of the appointees,
and the weeding out of the unfit.33
By his marginal notations Tsar Aleksandr II approved Ridiger's
recommendations and, on July 20, 1855, with Ridiger as chairman, and
with General P. A. Dannenberg, the 'Hero' of the infamous Battle of
Inkerman, serving as his deputy, the "Commission for Improvement of
Military Units" was inaugurated for the specific purpose of changing
the Russian military system by implementing Ridiger's recommendations
to the Tsar. Other members of this select commission included
General-Adjutant Prince Bariatinskii; General-Lieutenants Maksimovich
and Merkhelevich; Count Baranov; General-Majors Barantsev, Glinka,
Gechevich, Kurdiumov; and Colonels Kartsov and Loshkarev.34 The
Ridiger Commission was assigned six broad, and very important, tasks:
1) to change and to simplify regulations; 2) to improve
armaments; 3) to introduce within the military knowledge
concerning the physical development of soldiers and
officers; 4) to create a new peacetime troop training
program; 5) to change the system for selecting officers
for command positions; and 6) to establish new principles
for officers joining the candidate register in order to
obtain an advancement in rank through military service.35
Curtiss, p. 469; see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... p. 45.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 45-46.
35 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy.. . . p. 46.
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To assist with the immense task that this military perestroika
envisioned, in February 1856 General-Adjutant D. A. Miliutin was
summoned to join the Ridiger Commission, where he contributed
significantly to both its deliberations and the solutions adopted.36
The Commission members directed implementation of what would be
labeled, not always with admiration and approval from within the
Russian military, the 'Ridiger Reforms' that incrementally paved the
way for the total reorganization of the Russian military system. This
transformation would be conducted in the succeeding decades by future
War Minister General-Adjutant Dmitrii A. Miliutin.37
Count Ridiger and his commission members certainly were not
alone in their condemnation of the existing Russian military system.
At the end of 1856, General-Adjutant Glinka criticized the entire
system of Russian military education, even more sharply than had
Ridiger, by enumerating flagrant scandals and extremes in his note to
the Tsar titled "About elevating the level within the military of
meritorious command and officer personnel." General Glinka almost
stridently urged that officer education be improved and command
functions be separated from logistic and supply duties:
The main concern of many unit commanders is not about
correct and formal troop education in order to reach the
desired perfection, but about finding means to succeed
and besides to profit from the delivery of the supplies
which are given to them.... Regimental commanders have
become largely some kind of unit suppliers, cleverly and
sharply ceding nothing to civilian traders....38
36 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 46.
37 Curtiss, p. 469.
38 Stoletie Voennogo ministerstva. trans, from French,
(St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 63; cited by Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 46.
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Noted Russian military historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii
summarizes the unique significance of the Ridiger and Glinka notes,
writing that these letters were "the first in 25-30 years that
criticized the existing military order, [and] informed [the Tsar]
about the impossibility of maintaining the current military system."35
Still, the proposed 'Ridiger Reforms' were not universally
accepted within the Russian military. Quite the contrary, both for
personal selfish as well as genuine professional reasons, the Russian
officer corps became divided, with some individuals supporting
change; with others vehemently opposed to any alterations; and with
some adding further to the confusion by advocating the adoption of
elements of both military systems. The initial result, therefore,
was great turmoil, as 62 of the total 282 War Ministry directives for
1855 pertained to reorganization of the Russian Army. Then, in April
1856, General N. 0. Sukhozanet succeeded Prince Dolgorukov as Russian
War Minister, with the specific tasking from Tsar Aleksandr II to
lead an army reform program, which Sukhozanet neither personally
understood nor actively supported. To further complicate the
situation, Tsar Aleksandr II assigned Sukhozanet two contradictory
main tasks:
1) reduce the army in accordance with peacetime
conditions, namely by this seeing to all measures for
curtailing expenditures; and, 2) transform the military
forces, their armament, construction and command toward
the new principles, shown by the course and experience of
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 46.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 47.
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General Sukhozanet chose to maximize implementation of the
Tsar's first task, and proceeded to do so without either a definite
plan or without any consideration of state defense requirements.
Sukhozanet virtually ignored Aleksandr's second task. General
Dmitrii A. Miliutin later would confirm Sukhozanet's actions in a
March 4, 1859 letter in which Miliutin wrote:
All measures taken by General Sukhozanet have the
exclusive objective of reducing military expenditures:
one after another are curtailed, abolished, reduced....
Everything done in this period of time has a negative
character. Continuing along this path can lead the state
to complete impotence, at a time when all other European
powers are strengthening their armaments.41
Regardless of General Sukhozanet's incompetence and his best
efforts to ignore the task of reforming the Russian military, as a
result of the Ridiger Commission efforts, immediately following the
Crimean War some of the very worst conditions of imperial military
service were gradually altered, with the reduction of compulsory
service to fifteen years; with the elimination of the most harsh
forms of corporal punishment, such as flogging, except in the penal
battalions; and with the provision to soldiers of better quarters and
sustenance ,42
Only after the emancipation of the serfs on February 19, 1861
by Tsar Aleksandr II, however, did it become ever more apparent that
a military system of recruitment drawing solely upon the lower
classes, and accompanied by conditions of service that could only be
41 D. A. Miliutin, Pis'mo ot 4 marta 1859 g.; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 47.
42 Florinsky, Michael T., Russia: A History and an
Interpretation. (New York: MacMillan, 1953),
Vol. 2, pp. 906-907.
27
described as penal servitude, could not be continued/3 Prior to
this, between 1825 and 1854, under the rule of Tsar Nikolas I, the
Russian Empire was besieged by 674 peasant revolts. This astonishing
total grew both in intensity and frequency throughout this thirty
year period -- from 16 each year during the initial decade to over 38
each year in the last decade, and particularly during the Crimean War,
Almost immediately following the emancipation of the serfs,
fresh, sporadic insurrections flared throughout the Empire, attaining
particular violence in Penza and Kazan, where thousands of former
serfs refused to work and attacked the manor houses of the major
landowners. Ironically, it was the Imperial Army, itself composed
largely of these same conscripted peasants, that was called upon to
quell the riots -- a duty which they quite ruthlessly discharged with
courts-martials, summary executions, floggings, and deportations to
the frozen wastelands of Siberia. In 1861 there were 1176 reported
cases of serf insubordination to former masters. The following year
the number dropped dramatically to 400 cases. In 1863 there were 386
reported cases. And by 1864, as tensions abated, acts of violence on
estates had dropped to 75.45 Following the Crimean War and the
emancipation of the serfs, the Imperial Army largely succeeded in its
internal repressive mission. However, this 'victory' was greatly
diminished by the temporarily hidden cost of alienating the army from




Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformv.... pp. 12-13.
Florinsky, p. 922.
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In retrospect, the Russian government and its aristocratic
leaders understood full well that the humiliating defeats suffered by
the Russian Army during the Crimean War were the result of their poor
leadership, severe logistical problems, obsolete and even antiquated
weapons technology, and a weak economic infrastructure. But the
Autocrat and his courtiers took great pride in the fact that their
poorly armed and inadequately supplied conscripts -- the peasants --
displayed an unbreakable courage.46 They knew that the individual
Russian peasant soldier, ever faithful to his service oath to the
Tsar, demonstrated a "capacity for suffering and his courage and
steadfastness in battle were legendary in Europe."'17 N. F. Dubrobin's
analysis summarizes that "the reasons for the failures of the Russian
armed forces were unskilled battlefield commanders, in the absence of
a reciprocal force level, and the backwardness of unit material-
technical equipment in relation to the enemy weaponry."48 Thus, "the
Crimean War represented the psychological break after which it became
clear that fundamental reform was imminent" in order to transform not
only the Russian military, but Russian social institutions.4'
Only the national qualities of the Russian soldiers — bravery, steadfastness,
and endurance — prevented further success of the Anglo-French aggressors.50
- Pavel A. Zaionchkovskii
Wirtschafter, pp. 72-73.
Wirtschafter, p. 72.
Dubrovin, N. F., Istoriia Krvmskoi voinv i oboronv
Sevastopolia. 3 vols., (St. Petersburg, 1900),
Vol. 3, p. 268.
Wirtschafter, p. xvi.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 39.
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The Miliutin Reforms (1861-1881)
Occupied with its own internal regeneration
— above all Russia searched for peace.51
- General N. N. Obruchev
Professionalism begins with education.52
- War Minister Dmitrii A. Miliutin
General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, who held the full confidence of
Tsar Aleksandr II, 'The Great Reformer,' was appointed the Russian
Assistant Minister of War in August 1860, following the summer 1859
recommendation by Field Marshal Prince Bariatinskii that Miliutin,
his Caucasian Army Chief of Staff, become the next Minister of War.
Beginning in May 1861 Dmitrii A. Miliutin de facto was put in charge
of the Russian War Ministry, was officially named Minister of War on
November 9, 1861,53 and served in this distinguished capacity until
shortly after the March 1881 assassination of Tsar Aleksandr II.
General Miliutin was an ardent Russian nationalist who sincerely
acknowledged the profound influence of the Russian military past --
particularly the contributions to the concepts of modern warfare made
by the great Russian commanders Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Kutuzov.54
In General Miliutin's logical and experienced judgment:
51 Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1870), p. 54.
52 William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in
Imperial Russia. 1881-1914. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), p. 8.
53 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv 1860-1870 godov v
Rossii. (Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952), p. 49.
54 Zhilin, P. A., ed. , Russkaia voermaia mysi ': konets XIX -
nachalo XX v.. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. 5.
30
Suvorov stood supreme in relation to military affairs for
his century, and no one could then grasp that he had
created an entirely new type of war, even before Napoleon
gave Europe lessons on new strategies and tactics.55
But General Dmitrii Miliutin was also the man of vision and 'new
thinking' who implemented the much overdue basic reform of the
Russian military system --at times literally dragging this most
conservative, tradition-bound, awkward, ignorant, and backward
institution out of medieval times and into the late-19th century.
The Miliutin reforms constituted the first attempt during the
19th century to 'professionalize' the Russian military, with the goal
being "the infusion of efficiency and competence into every aspect of
Russian military life."56 Miliutin's fundamental philosophy
toward Russian military reform is contained in his 1839 article
entitled, simply, "Suvorov," in which he discussed in considerable
detail his belief in "the genuine genius of the military art of this
colossal eighteenth century commander."57 Miliutin then wrote:
In military art there are two sides: material and moral.
Troops are not only the physical strength [and] mass,
which are combined with weapons for military operations,
but together with these [are] the unity of the people
which endow wisdom and heart. Moral force plays an
important role in all considerations and calculations of
the commander and, consequently, the worst deficiency is
to see the army only as a machine. He must know how to
lead men, to attach the troops to himself, and by his
moral power over them to intensify that relative power.58
55 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 49.
56 Fuller, p. 7.
57 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy.... p. 49.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 49-50.
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Given Miliutin's identification with Suvorov's leadership
style, it is quite understandable that the military training system
which Miliutin implemented was not entirely dissimilar to that
employed by Generalissimo Suvorov a century before. Both training
systems were predicated on the principles of tactical depth,
individual initiative, and a complete understanding by the troops of
their military tasks.59 The first of the Miliutin reforms was
introduced on January 15, 1862 when, after a rather protracted
internal military debate, the War Ministry plan for military
transformation (preobrazovanii) was approved by the Tsar.60 The last
Miliutin reform was adopted on January 1, 1874 when Aleksandr II
signed the 'special declaration' on military conscription.61
Throughout the dozen vital years of the Miliutin reforms, it is
important to understand at the outset, as William C. Fuller, Jr. so
meticulously describes, that 'professionalism' per se could not then,
and cannot now, be equated with excellence, or even with military
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.. .. p. 50.
Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii,"
pp. 11-15, describes the reasons for the new Russian Army
organization ordered by the Tsar in 1862 and analyzes the
army force structure.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv 1860-1870 godov v
Rossii. pp. 6, 51, and 331. For force structure details
of the 1862 army reorganization which incorporated the
recommendations of the Ridiger Commission into "five
improvements", see Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob
oborone Rossii," pp. 3-4, in TsGVIA. VUA. Materialv
sekretnogo soveshchaniia.... p. 75.
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competence and proficiency." The majority of Miliutin's new
'professionals' spent their military careers preoccupied with
training, stockpiling war materials, and planning for 'short war'
scenarios -- just as they had been taught by General M. Dragomirov,
Commander of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg,
through his Lectures on Tactics that emphasized morale as the
decisive factor in warfare. This 1864 work was used as the principal
handbook on tactics until 1905. Many of these new 'professional'
Russian military officers consciously chose to ignore the rapid
changes in combat potential, which were being introduced at the turn
of the century by other European armies through their incorporation
of emerging military technologies.63 Major factors behind this
Imperial Army reluctance to adopt new combat methods and equipment
were the entrenched military education and officer seniority systems.
At the end of the 1840s, the Imperial General Staff Academy
annually matriculated only 25-27 very select officers into a strict
formal curriculum that was steeped in the heroic battlefield
traditions of Suvorov and Kutuzov. This tiny, elite officer cadre
served as junior staff officers in the Crimean War, bridling under
the leadership incompetence displayed by their superiors and the
sting of repeated military defeats. They would emerge in leadership
positions during the decades up to the turn of the century. Thus in
For a comprehensive and most revealing discussion of the
subtle Russian meanings of "military professionalism",
see William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in
Imperial Russia. 1881-1914. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), pp. 1-46.
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Zaionchkovskii's opinion: "The command art of Suvorov and Kutuzov,
therefore, still was disseminated in the Russian Army at the end of
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries as new
tactics, so called 'depth,' were added to the linear attack
formation. "6''
- The Reserve Cadre Army Concept
The prevailing mid-19th century Russian Army organizational
principle called for the maintenance of a huge standing peacetime
army. Basic to Miliutin's military reform concept was the idea that
there was no requirement for such a large peacetime force because a
trained reserve cadre could be used to expand a small regular army in
wartime. Following the Crimean War, as a member of General-Adjutant
Count Ridiger's military reform commission beginning in 1856,
Miliutin first expounded his reserve cadre ideas. The reserve cadre
concept did not originate entirely with Miliutin, but was founded on
the writings of Astaf'ev, Goremykin, and Teliakovskii a decade
earlier, from which Miliutin appropriated ideas for a paper titled
"Thoughts on the Disadvantages of the Military System Existing in
Russia and on Means to Eliminate Them."65 It would be, however,
another five years before the reserve cadre army concept was
incorporated in the 1861 draft plan of the general military reform
commission by a special commission on army organization chaired by
the Nikolas General Staff Academy Commander, General Baumgarten.
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The initial Imperial Army reform plan, after a considerable delay,
was finally presented to Tsar Aleksandr II on January 15, 1862. This
plan listed "eight difficult tasks associated with the possibility of
fulfilling [the Tsar's] two requirements"66 which were: 1) that
internal security be maintained, and 2) that army expenditures be
reduced, dramatically.
Most taxing of all the difficulties in attempting to implement
this Russian military reform plan was the antithesis existing between
the Tsar's two requirements. The Russian revolutionary movement --
particularly the Zemlia i Volia (Land and Will) group
-- grew so rapidly following the Crimean War that
General Miliutin noted in June 1861: "Reliable information has been
received that in all forces located in the western and southwestern
provinces a very serious decay of discipline has been observed, both
among officers and also among the lower ranks."67 As discipline
within Russian Army units continued to deteriorate during the ensuing
year, in July 1862 Miliutin addressed the issue in a secret circular
to all commanders by stating categorically: "I consider it Your duty
to pay special attention ... to the dangerous revolutionary
propaganda beginning among the lower ranks."68 Of particular concern
to War Minister Miliutin was the vitality of the "Committee of
Russian Officers in Poland," which was closely associated with the
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call, "Kto zhe spaset Rossiiu?" -- "Who will save Russia?" -- to
which the boisterous reply was: "Voisko!" This seditious idea that
'the troops' would free the Russian people was the harbinger of
revolutionary events that would transpire a half century later. Also
of concern to Miliutin was the fact that in St. Petersburg
revolutionary propaganda was gaining credence and support among the
military academy cadets and students, which indicated that the
movement to overthrow the Tsarist government would neither be quickly
nor easily extinguished.69 Because of the increasing intensity of the
internal revolutionary movement, the Tsarist government was now
reluctant to allow Miliutin to decrease the size of the army at all,
yet still demanded sharp reductions of army expenditures. By the end
of the Crimean War, the Russian government had run up an enormous
debt, totaling nearly a billion rubles, which crippled its capability
to develop economically and necessitated the extreme military
expenditure retrenchment ordered by Tsar Aleksandr II. The extent of
that deficit, nearly 80 percent of which was created to finance the
Crimean War, is shown in the following table:
Crimean War (1853-1856) Russian Debt
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Therefore, Miliutin was restricted, in fact, to reducing array
spending within only two elements of the whole military budget: 1) by
eliminating the acquisition of new weapons and equipment -- clearly
the top military priority, or 2) by curtailing the creation of the
army reserve cadre. Miliutin reluctantly chose the latter alterative
and sought to devise another way to form the reserve cadre army,
which he considered to be of "huge significance."71
The January 1862 military reform plan, as approved by the Tsar,
called for a peacetime Russian Army with 765,532 active-duty soldiers
that could expand by nearly 80% during wartime to 1,377,365 men.
Officially, however, financial constraints dictated that only 242,000
men in the reserve cadre could be equipped and trained, and General
Miliutin suggests in his memoirs that the real size of the reserve
army was only 210,000 soldiers.72 Miliutin's path out of this dilemma
was to raise the number of recruits inducted annually from the 80,000
pre-Crimean War level to a post-war level of 125,000 men, while
simultaneously shortening the length of their required service to
between seven and eight years. Over the course of seven years, this
scheme potentially would generate a total trained reserve cadre of
750,000 men --a reserve force some 20% larger than the one approved
by the Tsar on January 15, 1862 . 73 Still, Miliutin was faced with the
considerable problem of providing well-trained and educated officer
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cadres for both the active-duty and reserve forces which he judged to
be the "decisive condition" for transforming the Russian Army."
- Military Education: A Reform Priority
In the 'junkers' schools are the future of our army.73
- General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, January 1, 1865
At the heart of what General Miliutin sought to accomplish
throughout the 1860s and 1870s was "to create a broadly educated,
socially responsible officer corps." This priority objective would
be accomplished mainly through a course of instruction for the
intellectually most capable officers at the Nikolaev Academy of the
General Staff in order that the Imperial General Staff would be
transformed eventually into a true intellectual and 'professional'
elite. At the same time, educational opportunities would be expanded
for the rank and file military throughout the Empire by the
introduction of the military 'Gymnasium,' staffed with civilian
instructors to teach liberal arts, as well as the more traditional
specialized military subjects of strategy and tactics.76
Although immediately after the Crimean War the Ridiger
Commission studied the considerable failures of the military
education system and had proposed the reorganization of the entire
education establishment, General la. I. Rostovtsev, who had been
appointed personally by Tsar Nikolas I to head the military education
74
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system as Chief of the Main Staff, stubbornly refused even to think
about any major changes in the existing system. To his credit,
Rostovtsev did initiate in 1858 a series of specialized courses for
topographers, engineers, and artillery officers. Due to the
consistent support that Rostovtsev received from the Imperial Court,
along with War Minister Sukhozanet's indifference to fundamental
military reform, for Assistant War Minister Miliutin the possibility
of affecting major changes was held in abeyance. It was not until
after Rostovtsev died in 1860 and was replaced by Grand Duke Mikhail
Nikolaevich, who was much more amenable toward education reforms,
that Miliutin realistically could begin to change the manner in which
Russian Army officers and soldiers were educated."
Fundamental to General Miliutin's military education concept
was his conviction: "Discipline is the foundation of military
service: it inevitably also must be the basis for military
education."79 The disruptive and rebellious attitude that plagued the
cadet corps throughout 1860 stood in heinous contradiction to
Miliutin's deeply held beliefs about military service, and hence also
played a large role in focusing his efforts to reform the entire
military educational system.79 Miliutin was absolutely convinced that
"The military's own schools can have only one goal -- to provide
scientific specialized education to those young people who personally
feel a calling to military service."80
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Based on the force structure projections for the January 1862
reform plan, Miliutin quickly discerned that both the quantity and
quality of available officers was grossly insufficient to create his
desired reserve cadre81 -- even in peacetime -- since the existing
Russian military educational system produced principally junior
officers, and not particularly well-educated junior officers at that.
On February 10, 1862 War Minister Miliutin issued his "Opinion about
Military Education," which he began by stating:
In recent years the opinion has been expressed most
strongly that at the present time the military education
establishment, in their own view, has no contemporary
requirements to properly control state education of
society and of the military and that they even are not
satisfied with their own special assignments.82
Miliutin seriously criticized the deficiencies of the existing cadet
corps officer educational system that took between seven and eight
years to graduate a junior officer, since the future army officers
entered the program as children. Miliutin especially emphasized the
necessity to radically reform the cadet corps because the education
of one officer through the program cost nearly 10,000 rubles --an
exorbitant sum, especially for a brand new, inexperienced junior
officer with limited specialized training. The fact that each year
the cadet corps expended 4,712,000 silver rubles to educate 494 young
men, or 9538 rubles per cadet, was a waste of army financial
resources that the War Ministry could not tolerate, particularly at a
Obruchev, "Dannye cilia otsenki...," pp. 8-10.
Miliutin, D. A., "Menenie o voenno-uchebnykh
zavedeniiakhStoletie Voennogo ministerstva. 1802-1903.
(St. Petersburg, 1914), Book 10, pp. 188-195.
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time when Tsar Aleksandr demanded a severe curtailment of all army
spending.83 Yet, Miliutin recognized that between 1825 and 1855 less
than thirty percent of all Russian commissioned officers had any
specialized military education. He therefore made education a
mandatory requirement for all officers.8'1
Military schools were brought under the central control of the
Ministry of War on January 21, 1863 when General-Major Isakov was put
in charge of all Russian military education with two explicit tasks:
1) correct the educational failures that had led to the Crimean War
disasters and; 2) eliminate the intensifying revolutionary activity
among the youth who formed the cadet corps.85 Then, on May 14, 1863,
Aleksandr II disbanded the entire cadet corps -- with the exception
of the Pazhesk, Finland, Sibir, and Orenburg cadet schools -- and,
using the old cadet corps as a foundation, directed the creation,
of three principal military schools -- Pavlovsk and Konstantine in
St. Petersburg, and Aleksandrovsk in Moscow.86 The academic
faculties and two-year curricula of these three military schools
subsequently were reorganized to conform with prevailing civilian
educational standards.87
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In 1864 the first 402 junior officers were graduated, but this
small quantity rose only gradually to 486 new officers by 1876, which
was far short of the number required to begin changing the manner in
which the Russian Army operated. Besides, of these new military
school graduates, only fifty percent were assigned to operational
infantry or cavalry field units which fulfilled less than fifteen
percent of the total army new officer requirement. The remainder of
the new graduates manipulated their first assignments in order to
remain in more lucrative administrative billets located in the cities
or major provincial capitals.88 To correct this junior officer
deficiency, Miliutin wisely chose not to fight the ingrained
manipulative Russian social system directly. Instead, in 1865, he
opened twelve new 'junker' military schools, located in cities
primarily to attract members of the nobility into the officer corps.
Miliutin's plan was to establish a two-year-long 'junker' school in
each military district with a total enrollment of 3000 students so
that each year 1500 new officers would be added to the Russian Army.89
Between 1865 and 1872 there were a total of 11,536 'junker' military
school graduates, who made up the shortfall of junior officers in the
Russian Army. Eighty-six percent were nobility.90
In 1862, when Miliutin began to change the Russian military
education establishment, there already existed three military
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and Engineering. Here, too, Miliutin sought to improve the education
system, but not as radically as he had done with the cadet corps.
In January 1863 the Nikolaev General Staff Academy was removed from
control of the military education establishment and assigned to the
general-administrator of the General Staff. Following the
reorganization of the General Staff the academy would be assigned
directly to the General Staff." Miliutin, however, was not satisfied
with purely cosmetic organizational changes. Rather, he had long
been convinced, as evidenced in his September 5, 1851 note titled
"Eshche mysli o Voennoi akademiithat the curriculum was "too
academic, theoretical, and pedantic" and that it "had to be made more
practical" so that the course materials would relate more directly to
the requirements of military service.®2
Therefore, beginning in 1865, course changes were implemented:
1) to expand the officers' understanding of operational command and
control beyond the battalion level; 2) to broaden their knowledge of
all aspects of the Russian military, for example, administration,
logistics, engineering, whereas previously studies had been confined
to the individual officer's branch of arms; 3) to learn more about
physical sciences, especially cartography and topography; and, 4) in
1869 the first war games were conducted at the Nikolaev General Staff
Academy employing the tactics of Dragomirov and Leer.93 At the
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course changes designed to increase the officers' practical knowledge
of sciences that would be of battlefield use -- ballistics,
metallurgy, and explosives as well as construction materials and
techniques. All were new subjects added to the curriculum in an
effort to modernize the Russian Army.94
General Miliutin was absolutely determined to create a
'professional' officer corps with the specialized knowledge and
skills acquired both from military schools and from command
experience. He was equally determined to instill a commitment to
upgrading performance standards; a group identity characterized by
high self-esteem and confidence; the ability to recognize and
articulate military special interests; and, autonomy to control both
entry to and advancement within the officer corps.95 To the extent
that Miliutin succeeded in this quest -- which was to a very
considerable degree --he not only modernized and reformed the
Russian Army, but also, transformed Russian society as well.96
One of the principal ways that General Miliutin sought to
transform Russian military education, and thereby Russian society
itself, was by the initiation of a broad program of public journals
and periodicals through which military knowledge could be expanded,
current issues discussed, and mass public support for the military
generated. Perhaps the best known, and most authoritative, of these








in 1858 at Miliutin's initiative and in 1861 became the official
publication of the Russian War Ministry. Voennvi sbornik quite
successfully acquainted its readers with the military thought and
discussions of the most distinguished Russian educators of the time
-- Dragorairov, Puzyrevskii, Leer, Martynov, Mikhnevich, and many
others -- while informing a broad public readership of the latest
military-scientific problems and providing a rich source of military
historical materials. By the turn of the century, the content of
Voennvi sbornik increasingly would become more openly critical of the
leadership of the Russian Army and the organization of the Russian
military system and, at times, stridently advocated the necessity of
reform.®7
Voennvi sbornik was not alone in this quest to educate both the
Russian military and public. Between 1878 and 1905 over 100 military
journals and 25 military newspapers were in publication. Some of the
most influential of these military publications included:
Artilleriiskii zhurnal: Morskoi sbornik (1848-1917); Inzhenernvi
zhurnal (1857-1917); Oruzheinom sbornik (1861-1909); Pedagogicheskii
sbornik (1863-1917); Voennye besedv. ispolnennve v Shtabe voisk
gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okrug (1885-1901); and Razvedchik
(1889-1917).98 The first Russian military newspaper to be published
was Russkii invalid (Russian Veteran), founded by P. P. Pezarovius in
1813. During its first years the paper was used to circulate decrees




began covering Russian Army history, and by the end of the 19th
century a significant amount of the paper was dedicated to current
issues concerning army and military education reform. As Russia's
largest military newspaper Russkii invalid published: 1) official
decrees, domestic news, and foreign news; 2) articles covering
internal events, military maneuvers, and General Staff meetings and
conferences; and 3) discussion of the latest issues concerning
Russian Army education, armaments, and equipment.'9 All this newly
available information served to elevate the educational level of both
the Russian military and Russian society at large.
- War Ministry and Force Structure Reorganization
During Miliutin's long tenure in office, important technical
improvements were introduced in the Ministry of War organization.
Between 1862 and 1867 Miliutin conducted his principal reorganization
of the War Ministry. In 1862 two new directorates -- artillery and
engineering -- were created with the objective of unifying the
engineering departments and the headquarters of Field Marshals and
Inspector-Generals. At the beginning of 1863, military education was
assigned to the War Ministry as a main directorate, and later in that
same year the Main Staff was reorganized with the addition of a
military topography department and oversight of the Nikolaev General
Staff Academy. In 1864 the provisions and commissary departments
were merged into one new commissary department. Then, at the
beginning of 1866, the General Staff Main Directorate and the
Zhilin, p. 79.
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Inspectorate department were merged under the Main Staff, thus
concentrating under Main Staff supervision all matters concerning
troop control.100 With these structural changes in place, in 1867
Miliutin turned to making the staff function more efficiently by
reducing the number of assigned officers by 327 men and the number
of soldiers by 607 men, which cut by one-half the tide of paperwork
flowing in unending waves in and out of the War Ministry.101
According to the new War Ministry Regulations, which had been
in draft since early 1868 and were published January 1, 1869, with
the objective to broaden greatly the War Ministry functions and
powers, the Ministry consisted of the following sections: "the
Imperial Main office; the Military Council; the Main Military Court;
the War Ministry Secretariat; the Main Staff; and seven main
directorates."102 The seven main War Ministry directorates were: the
Commissariat (Intendant); Engineering; Military-Medicine; Military-
Education; Irregular Troops; Artillery; and Naval.103 As of January
1, 1869 the Main Staff responsibilities included: "1) complete
information about troops...; 2) all personnel and force structure
matters...; and 3) all matters concerning construction, service,
housing, training, and troop finances."104 Together with these duties
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the Main Staff was given responsibility for overall army strategic,
fiscal, and service policy. The Main Staff was now composed of six
departments plus naval and Asiatic sections, while the Imperial Main
Office, although it continued to exist, was isolated from any
operational control of forces. Miliutin's initial reorganization of
the War Ministry was a most commendable advance over the Byzantine
labyrinth that had preceded it. However, the continuing ability of
the nobility to interfere with military administration by going
directly to the Tsar wreaked havoc on the Miliutin's intended
improved staff efficiency.105
When the January 15, 1862 War Ministry paper on "The Basis for
Troop Organization" was approved by Tsar Aleksandr II, the goal was
to transform the Russian Army. The plan directed the formation of a
regional military system, fielding a smaller peacetime army of just
748,194 soldiers, by creating a reserve force in which all lower
ranks were put on leave in peacetime and received military training
while in the reserve. All active Russian Army units were placed in
"cadre status" ready for wartime augmentation by the reserves. The
active regiments were "always required to be in readiness to
transition to wartime conditions," while the reserve regiments,
formed with only two battalions each, were maintained at considerably
lower readiness levels. Additionally, the 1862 plan called for the
deployment of local troop formations, called "rezervnyi" or "mestnyi
voiska", composed of 96 battalions, each with 880 soldiers and junior
officers -- a total of 84,480 trained soldiers -- who would be
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . .. p. 106.
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responsible for maintaining internal security, performing guard duty,
and training recruits, during both war and peace.106
Miliutin's new organization plan was unsettling, to say the
least, to many Russian Army officers and enlisted men alike who
passionately wrote to the Tsar that Russia would be unable to defend
herself in the event of another war and, in the process, ignited a
firestorm of differing opinions that inundated military headquarters.
Nineteen general officers, who were mainly corps and division
commanders, openly protested the reorganization. An interesting
exception to the overall opposition to the proposed four-battalion
regiment structure was presented by General-Adjutant N. N. Murav'ev
who wrote: "The four battalion composition is large enough for
administration and logistics, [but] for purposes of maneuver a three
battalion [regiment] would be better...."107 As a result of all the
bitter dissension, in September 1862 Tsar Aleksandr II convened a
special 31-member commission, with General Dannenberg as Chairman,
"for the purpose of looking into the suggestion of changing the
existing troop organization." As the Dannenberg Commission set to
work at the end of December 1862, the commission members were
divided into four sub-committees -- infantry, cavalry, artillery, and
"investigation of general issues" -- each with the task to look into
Murav'ev's suggestion about the 'correct' size of infantry regiments.
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After over a year of deliberation, in mid-March 1863 General
Dannenberg presented a new troop organization plan. The Dannenberg
Commission concluded that a reserve cadre army was inappropriate and
that the creation of locally-based, 'Prussian-style,' territorial
army corps was indispensable for Russian defense requirements.108
General Miliutin was diametrically opposed to this finding. In his
March 13, 1863 reply to General Dannenberg, a very angry Miliutin
openly threatened to take the issue to the Tsar for resolution, if
Dannenberg did not withdraw his "abnormal proposal."109 Although
Dannenberg's rejoinder was both terse and intentionally ambiguous, a
closed commission session quietly made major changes in the plan that
was presented to the Tsar as the "majority membership opinion," with
the following rather contradictory recommendations: 1) it would be
"inexpedient" to change from five infantry battalions to three per
regiment even though three-battalion regiments on the battlefield
would be "most expedient;" 2) assuming that peacetime regiments all
would have three battalions, the formation of new wartime battalions
should be avoided; 3) the previously planned strength of reserve
battalions should be decreased to 340 men while active battalions
should be increased to 800 soldiers and junior officers; and 4) the
creation of four-battalion regiments should require those want this
structure to prove how it will benefit the Russian Army.110
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War Minister Miliutin shrewdly, and perhaps a little smugly,
agreed with the Commission recommendations. The international
situation had changed during the fifteen months that Dannenberg's
commission members had dallied, pondering laboriously over how to
reorganize the Russian Army. Miliutin now recognized that it was
essential to increase the size of the active standing army -- which
was exactly what the Dannenberg Commission proposed.
Throughout 1863, the insurrections in Poland, coupled with the
increasing threat of entanglement in another European war, prompted
Miliutin to reevaluate the active army force level required to
preserve Russian security. By the time Dannenberg finally presented
his findings, Miliutin had already decided that the active force
should be increased by 350,000 troops, or 19 infantry divisions plus
several fortress regiments, and had begun to take measures to expand
the active army by recalling troops that had been released on leave.
The main force augmentation was accomplished, however, by conducting
a new recruit levy, since Miliutin concluded in a January 1, 1864 War
Ministry note that calling up the reserve cadres would denude the
country of internal security troops and instructors for the recruits.
Besides, the immediate combat readiness of the reserve cadres was not
much greater than that of the new inductees, and both groups would
require extensive training before becoming truly combat ready. These
realizations caused Miliutin to begin army reorganization anew in
1864, with the dual objectives of simultaneously restructuring the
army while reducing the number of active-duty troops required.111
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Owing to Miliutin's resolute actions to increase the active
army, by the spring of 1864, the regular army stood at 1,132,000
troops, organized into 47 infantry divisions. With the outbreak of
peace, however, by the end of July 1864, 28 of the 47 divisions were
reduced to the ambiguously defined "substantial peace" manning level
and 12 to the "ordinary peace" level -- a total reduction of 264,000
men -- swiftly accomplished by releasing mainly all soldiers who had
entered army service before 1856 and by retaining only the younger
soldiers. The price paid for this rapid reduction in force was the
loss of dearly gained and virtually irreplaceable combat experience
--at least without fighting another war.112
Then, on August 2, 1864, the War Minister Miliutin began the
implementation of his new organization plan by ordering the further
reduction of active infantry battalion combat manpower. Cadre
infantry units also were ordered to reduce their manpower to 380
soldiers per battalion, but still maintain 15 senior officers and one
or two staff officers in each regiment, regardless of war or peace.
Miliutin's new organizational structure called for maintaining the
existing 47 infantry divisions -- 40 army, 4 grenadier, and 3 guards
-- each fielding four regiments composed of three battalions, each
with four companies. Of the latter, three were 'line' companies and
one was a 'firing' company.113 Finally, Miliutin's plan called for
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the formation of 30 separate 'firing' (musket/rifle) battalions and
40 'line' (bayonet) battalions, along with an increase in fortress
troop strength.114
During the course of 1865 and 1866, even further major force
reductions were accomplished, so that on January 1, 1867 the Russian
Army stood at 742,000 troops -- "the lowest numerical level in the
last 25 years,"115 according to official War Ministry records.
Following some additional minor tinkering to eliminate extraneous and
redundant "non-combat elements" by some 25 percent, or 50,000 men,
the War Ministry very proudly proclaimed on January 1, 1869 that the
reorganization of the Russian Army was complete.116 Here, the
official War Ministry comparison between the 1860 and 1868 force
structures from the Russian Central State Military-Historical
Archives (TsGVIA), is a most instructive means to understand the
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STRENGTH OF THESE UNITS: 1868 1860
Officially in wartime 1,154,000




Reserve troops on leave 500,000
included in above numbers
242,000
Peacetime reserves to be
called up in wartime 72,000
Reserve shortfall to be
filled by new recruits:
257,000 117
- Army Mobilization: An Unsatisfactory Capability
At the very height of Miliutin's army reorganization, 1867,
the War Ministry suddenly began to take the first steps to develop a
genuine mobilization plan for the new Russian Army. The avowed
objective of the Main Staff was a complete wartime mobilization of a
half-million men that would require only 30-40 days to bring all
units up to full combat strength. In reality, six months were
required to fully mobilize an army corps -- the same length of time
as had been required in 1859.118 The principal reasons for this
disconnect between Russian military theory and practice were: first,
shortfalls in war reserves of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and
supplies with which to equip the reservists; second, an insufficient
number of infantry officers to command and to manage new or expanded
117 TsGVIA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L),
No. 11, p. 25; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... p. 79.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 8, in
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units; third, an absence of enough horses to move supplies, let alone
to expand the cavalry or artillery units; and finally, inadequately
developed railroads throughout Russia to enable rapid regrouping
(peregruppirovka) of army forces.
The primary motivation behind this new emphasis on Russian
force mobilization was the fact that four Prussian army corps clearly
had demonstrated an ability, between May 7 and May 19, 1866, to fully
mobilize in twelve days -- three times more quickly than the Russian
Main Staff had planned for, let alone could execute, a wartime
mobilization.119 The Main Staff analysis revealed that:
The new system of troop organization was, doubtless, a
step forward in comparison with its predecessor. Its
fundamental advantages resulted in a capability to deploy
the army, without having to resort to the formation of
new tactical units. ... However, this new troop
organization system had extremely limited capabilities.
In the case of war, increasing the size of the army by
60% from the peacetime level could hardly be achieved
within the same timeframe that Prussia and Austria were
increasing the size of their deployed armies by more than
three times.120
It is important to note that in peacetime the Prussian and Austrian
armies each maintained standing armies numbering somewhat less than
500,000 troops, and each had the capability to expand its wartime
army to around 1,500,000 soldiers.121 Consequently, the Russian
military's concern about mobilization was genuine, since Prussia and
Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhermykh...p. 79;
and Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 79-80.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 80.
Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh...p. 72;
see also Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik na 1868 god.
(St. Petersburg, 1867); cited by Zaionchkovskii,
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Austria were likely to mobilize simultaneously which would result in
nearly a three to one force superiority against Russia1" -- even if
Russia could mobilize her army as quickly as her likely opponents,
which she could not. The additional concern of the Main Staff was
this: Should Russia have to mobilize to its full 1,154,000 wartime
end-strength, no reserves whatsoever would be left, either for
internal security or for any other contingencies.
In P. A. Zaionchkovskii's considered judgment, the following
major deficiencies existed in Miliutin's new military structure:
first, the 'line' attack concept was retained and new tactical
principles of conducting warfare were not applied; second, the
artillery brigades were not incorporated within infantry divisions
and therefore the artillery and infantry continued to function
independently rather than as combined arms; third, within each three -
brigade cavalry division, only the dragoon brigade was armed with
other than sabres and lances, at a time when the entire cavalry
of all other European powers were equipped with pistols; and finally,
the logistic system for supplying active forces was not worked out
satisfactorily.123
But, in 1868, these deficiencies were not apparent to War
Minister Dmitrii Miliutin and the Main Staff. They were transfixed
by the significant progress they had made, despite internal army
resistance and financial restraints, in modernizing the Russian Army.
Only some ten years later, in the aftermath of the bloody 1877-1878
122 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 5, in
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Russo-Turkish War, would the breadth of these serious omissions begin
to come to light. Although General Miliutin clearly foresaw major
problems in the case of war, and characteristically would attempt to
find solutions, he would be unable to rectify the causes in time to
avoid another Russian disaster.
- The Military District System
The most long lasting of Miliutin's reforms was the initiation
of the territorial military district system, which is still in use to
this day -- albeit in repeatedly and extensively modified form. The
genesis for General Miliutin's concept of a military district system
can be found within his 1856 notes, written at the end of the Crimean
War, titled "Mysl' o territorial'noi sisteme voennogo upravleniia"
and "Mysli o nevygodakh syshchestvuiushchei v Rossii voennoi sistemy
i o sredstvakh k ustraneniiu onykh". In the latter, Miliutin
succinctly defined his basic thought underlying the creation of a
military district system: "The Empire should be divided into military
districts, of which one [portion] would be frontier, and the other
internal.... Troops also should be divided into two categories:
active and reserve."124
Although these diary notes go on to describe in some detail the
rationale for and advantages of a new command and control system,
Miliutin's initial conviction about the necessity to decentralize
military decisionmaking and to alter totally the manner in which the
Russian Army was organized and directed was reinforced by his service
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 84.
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experiences, between 1857 and 1860 in the Caucasus, as Chief of Staff
for Field Marshal Prince Bariatinskii. These ideas gradually were
refined by the end of 1861, after he became Assistant War Minister.
As a result, the creation of a military district system was one of
the main military reform proposals -- if not the key proposal --
presented to Tsar Aleksandr II on January 15, 1862.125
General Miliutin followed up this official January proposal
with an early May 1862 note to Tsar Aleksandr II that was entitled
"Glavnye osnovaniia predpolagaemogo ustroistva voennogo upravleniia
po okrugam" and in which Miliutin strongly urged the creation of a
military district system, both in peacetime and in wartime. He
contended that the army corps, on which the existing Russian military
system was based, was too large a tactical entity for theater
operations and therefore had to be divided, formed into detachments
from various corps, and new detachment headquarters created before
the army corps system would be capable of conducting wartime
operations. Miliutin went on to enumerate three reasons, learned
through the painful experience of war, why the existing Russian
military system had to be changed. First, the division, not the
corps, had proven to be the superior tactical battlefield formation.
Second, military districts would improve military readiness and
eliminate having to reorganize forces before entering into combat.
And third, the consolidation of command of all active and reserve
units within a military district, including artillery and engineering
troops, under one military district commander would greatly simplify
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 84-85.
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control and unity of action. In his conclusion Miliutin averred:
"The most important advantage of the suggested arrangement will be
the elimination of the existing unsatisfactory military command and
control [which is characterized by] the utmost centralization in one
ministry."126 Miliutin declared that he had come to the conclusion
that decentralization was essential from the fact that independent
command already existed in the Caucasus, Orenburg, Western and
Eastern Siberia regions (krai), which functioned quite effectively
without the "small change tutelage of the ministry."127
Miliutin's military district concept envisioned the creation of
a total of fifteen military districts. Each district would be formed
with a military district commander's headquarters, composed of a
command center and four administrative directorates -- supply,
artillery, engineering, and medical -- under the overall supervision
of a Council of the Main District Directorate that would be chaired
by the military district commander, but also have assigned a War
Ministry representative.128 The military districts that General
Miliutin envisioned in 1862 were: 1) Finland; 2) St. Petersburg;
3) Baltic (Riga); 4) North-West (Vil'no); 5) Poland (Warsaw);
6) South-West (Kiev); 7) Southern (Odessa); 8) Moscow; 9) Khar'kov;
10) Upper Volga (Kazan'); 11) Lower Volga (Saratov); 12) Caucasus
(Tiflis); 13) Orenburg; 14) Western Siberia (Omsk); and 15) Eastern
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 85.
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Siberia (Irkutsk).129 As part of his rationale for initiating the
military district system, Miliutin had in mind making the Russian
military system "economically profitable" and a means of
accomplishing two important goals:
First, to eliminate the excessive centralism of the
military directorates, freeing the War Ministry from a
series of secondary functions. The military districts,
concentrating in their hands the command and fiscal
functions, will ensure troop combat preparation, and also
direct all organizations of local military directorates.
Second, the military districts, by substituting their own
designs to disband the internal guards corps, will
facilitate the consolidation of state 'internal peace.'130
The brilliance of the Miliutin concept was this: The military
district would function essentially the same, whether Russia was at
war or at peace. However, the important questions concerning how an
array would continue to function should its military district fall
into enemy hands, or how the military district would continue to
support its army should that army advance against an enemy outside
its assigned district, were left unresolved. Nevertheless, so
convinced was Miliutin that the Tsar favored his military district
proposal that he specifically asked for the Tsar's decision by August
1, 1862 so that the War Ministry could begin to implement military
district organizations that fall.131
War Minister Miliutin noted in his memoirs, however, that
without waiting for the Tsar's formal response, development of his
129 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 86.
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military district concept proceeded between May and August 1862, with
the consolidation of active and reserve administrative functions
under the as-yet-not-officially-named military district (MD)
commanders. As a result, during the summer of 1862, the first
Russian military districts -- Warsaw, Kiev, and Vil'no -- were
created, with the Odessa MD established by the end of 1862. On the
territory of these MDs, all Russian troops were placed under the
command of the MD commander. Not surprisingly, this watershed change
in the manner in which the Russian Army operated was not universally
welcomed, either within the army or by the provincial governors. Of
211 senior general officers who commented to the War Ministry about
the new arrangements, a clear majority, 117, favored the military
district concept and only 10 officers were adamantly opposed. The
remainder supported the concept with reservations or with the
alteration of minor details.1"
The St. Petersburg Governor-General, Prince Suvorov, openly
praised Miliutin's military reform proposals, exuberantly commenting:
Of the numerous War Ministry arrangements in its fifty
year existence, the proposed and already partially
executed construction of military command and control by
districts is one of the most remarkable attempts to
improve military administration and strength.133
But Prince Suvorov took exception to the decentralization aspects of
the plan, asserting that, in his opinion, the War Ministry had to be
the sole center for military command and administration and that he
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 88.
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therefore did not support the changes. General-Lieutenant Baumgarten
of the Main Staff also took exception to decentralization of power
and opposed the military district concept, in its entirety, because
of the loss of authority by the army corps commanders. Several of
the corps commanders concurred with this objection and affirmed that
the army corps had to be maintained because the division was "too
weak" to be considered the principal wartime tactical unit.134 The
'army corps versus the division' issue thus became the focus of an
intense senior-level military and government debate, while the many
advantages that both the military and the state might accrue through
the formation of military districts was virtually ignored.
Gradually, however, the army corps commanders came around to the
majority general officer opinion, based on the experiences of the
Crimean War, that the army corps "did not have any independent
significance.1,135
In an effort to resolve the conflicting general officer
opinions and to expedite moving the military district formation
process forward, in February 1863 Miliutin convened a commission to
create "Regulations about Military Districts," initially staffed with
two sub-committees: the first, on unit command, chaired by General
Count Geiden; and the second, concerning administrative-fiscal
matters, chaired by Ustrialov. As the commission deliberations
continued through 1863, three additional sub-committees on artillery,
engineers, and military medicine were added. At the beginning of
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 90-91.
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1864 the final commission findings were transferred to a military-
codification committee which in August 1864 published the first War
Ministry directive defining the structure, command relations, and
responsibilities within military districts.
By this directive unity of command was ensured by placing the
MD commander in charge of all forces within his district, with the
exception of the active troops inspectorate. The military district
command and control functions were vested in a council and six
departments: 1) district headquarters; 2) commissariat; 3) artillery;
4) engineering; 5) military medicine; and 6) military hospital
inspectorate. The major omission in the directive, however, was that
no single department or commander had responsibility for financial
management. Rather, the MD Council was assigned fiscal
responsibility, which would result in ferocious, interdepartmental
budget battles, fought out at the Council, where the War Ministry
representative quickly became the arbitrator, with his rulings
elevated to the War Ministry itself for final decision. Since each
military district headquarters structurally mirrored the War Ministry
organization in St. Petersburg, individual MD departments tended to
refer their 'unfavorable' MD Council decisions to their counterparts
at the War Ministry, where the bureaucratic battle for funds and
resources was renewed, seemingly 'ad nauseam. ,136
Miliutin thus succeeded in 1864 in abolishing the antiquated
Corps of Internal Defense, created in 1811, and replaced it with a
military district system based upon two troop classifications:
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. ... pp. 94-95.
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1) active field forces, whose primary purpose was combat during war
and during peacetime training for the wartime defense of Russia; and
2) local reserve forces, composed of 70 infantry, 19 rifle, and three
sapper (engineering) battalions, subordinate to the commander of
local forces in each military district for quelling disturbances, but
also mainly responsible for inducting, training, and equipping active
field force recruits. Through this organizational reform Miliutin
intentionally shielded his prized combat troops from local civilian
use for internal defense against "pernicious enemies of the state" by
effectively inserting the local forces between the active field
troops and the local civilian authorities.137
Through the implementation of the military district system,
Miliutin succeeded in reversing centuries-old Russian common practice
-- that had become a routine of army life by the mid-19th century, at
the discretion, or lack thereof, of local civilian authorities --
namely, the use of army troops for thankless guard duty, bandit
chasing, dispersing unruly crowds, and repressing any rebellious
peasant villages.138 During the course of 1864, six additional
military districts -- Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Khar'kov,
and Kazan' -- were formed; and subsequently the Caucasus, Turkestan,
Orenburg, West Siberia, and East Siberia military districts were
organized. This completed the formation of a total of fifteen
military districts, much as Miliutin first had envisioned.135
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Irrespective of such an important, visible success, Miliutin
was not a leader who was willing to rest on his laurels. On the
contrary, he knew that the military district system, if it were to
survive and become institutionally established, would have to be
continually nurtured and refined to satisfy ever changing military
and political requirements and trends. Therefore, in 1865 the War
Minister created the "Special Commission for Investigating Questions
concerning Use of the Regulations about Military District Command and
Control," headed by General Nepokoichitsk, the chairman of the
Military Codification Committee.140 The singular success in reforming
the long-established Russian military system, that was achieved
through the implementation of the territorial military district,
is perhaps best revealed in Miliutin's own words contained in his
January 1, 1867 report to the Tsar:
Now directly and boldly I can say that the new local
administrations are acquitting themselves fully as was
expected, when the ministry entrusted them with their
formation. All central government orders are executed
now with such an energy as is possible only through the
existence of a durable organization in all parts of the
local administrations. The power of the district troop
commanders and the founding of the military district
councils established unexpected communication and unity
in the activity of the various military administration
departments, and the strengthening of local control and
the new organization for fiscal management have acted, on
one side, to significantly reduce expenditures for huge
military department stockpiles, and on the other, to
improve the quality of articles satisfying the
troops....141
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Neither was Miliutin blind to the imperfections in the new
system, nor self-satisfied with his accomplishments. Certainly the
decentralization of command and control that accompanied formation of
the military district system improved unity of action, created
greater efficiency within the military administration, and enabled
the Russian Army to mobilize more effectively and to deploy more
quickly in the case of war. However, certain deficiencies were
beyond Miliutin's power to correct immediately. First, the army
corps, which was retained as the basic tactical unit, was too large
to be maneuvered in a timely manner on the battlefield. Second, each
military district commander, by regulation, was responsible to the
Tsar alone and, therefore, the commanders' decisionmaking powers were
constrained by dependence on the whims of the Imperial Court,
ministers, and government bureaucrats, which prevented decisive
action. Third, in the European military districts, the coexistence
of both civilian and military local administrations set the stage for
unending, acrimonious, personal and institutional disagreements over
priorities, authority, and power, which would severely erode the
intended simplified, efficient functioning of the new military
district system.142
During the course of 1868, opposition to the new military
district system coalesced around a group led by Miliutin's former
commander in the Caucasus, Field Marshal Prince A. I. Bariatinskii,
and his henchman, General R. A. Fadeev. Bariatinskii originally had
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recommended to the Tsar in 1859 that Miliutin be appointed War
Minister, while concealing an ulterior motive of diminishing the
Tsar's, and hence the Imperial Court's, authority over the army.
Bariatinskii believed that Miliutin would put in place a 'Prussian-
style' territorial military system, in which the Chief of the General
Staff had full command authority over the army. Naturally, Prince
Bariatinskii expected to receive that appointment as Chief of the
General Staff. When Miliutin's 1862 reform plan did not correspond
to Bariatinskii's private scheme, the Prince turned into Miliutin's
most determined and persistent anti-reform foe, both personally and
substantively.143
Throughout the 1860s Bariatinskii continued to see that
particularly vicious anti-reform articles were published in the
"reactionary aristocratic" newspaper Vest' . Then, in 1868, General
P. A. Fadeev took up the cudgel in his book Vooruzhennve silv Rossii.
criticizing the entire post-reform Russian military system as
"unsatisfactory" and advocating the adoption of the Prussian general
staff arrangement, under which the General Staff operational command
authority was separate from the War Ministry administrative
functions. Inspired, prodded by, or perhaps even with the complicity
of Prince Bariatinskii, with whom he had spent the winter, in the
spring of 1869 General Fadeev wrote a note to the Tsar complaining
about the April 17, 1868 War Ministry Regulation which, in his
opinion, "diminished the role of the Emperor as supreme commander of
the Russian Army that had first been established in 1716" by Peter
Vitte, S. Iu., Vospominaniia. Vol. 3, (Leningrad, 1924).
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the Great.144 The invidious Fadeev note achieved its desired effect
of restricting the further implementation of Miliutin's military
reforms because it struck at the heart of a most sensitive royal
subject -- the power of the Autocrat -- and called into question
Miliutin's personal motives. Tsar Aleksandr's attitude toward
military reforms always had been contradictory: on the one hand,
as a result of the Crimean War army fiascos, the Tsar supported army
modernization -- within his prescribed strict financial constraints;
on the other hand, Tsar Aleksandr II was suspicious of Miliutin's
reforms because their fundamental character ran against his
autocratic ideal of a feudal military order, with himself as the
supreme commander-in-chief.145
As a result of such pernicious imperial suspicions, a rising
general condemnation of the reforms by the nobility, and demonstrated
systemic failures during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, by the
end of Miliutin's tenure of office the number of military districts
contracted. In 1881 there remained in being only thirteen military
districts -- Petersburg, Finland, Vil'no, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa,
Khar'kov, Moscow, Kazan, Turkestan, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia,
the Caucasus -- and the Don Cossack Army territory (oblasC) which was
treated as a fourteenth military district following the elimination
of the Riga and Orenberg MDs. By law, the authority of each military
district commander was constrained and he was held personally
responsible only to the Emperor. De facto the military district
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commander still was directly subordinate to the War Minister. The
administrative organization of each military district purposely
continued to be an exact duplicate of the War Ministry Military
Council and Main Staff organization in Saint Petersburg which,
despite the bureaucratic 'turf battles' this arrangement engendered,
greatly facilitated military communications and resulted in improved
overall military command and control.146
- Rearmament and Weapons Modernization
All organization and combat methods of the army, together with its victory or
defeat is dependent on material, i.e., economic conditions: on human material
and on weaponry.147
- Frederick Engels, Anti-During
The most important problem of 1860s and 1870s Russian military
reform -- the solution of which determined troop organization and the
entire system of combat preparation -- was re-equipping the army with
modern weaponry.148 An official War Ministry report called attention
to this top priority military concern:
Under existing military art conditions artillery
technology has achieved extraordinary importance.
Weaponry improvements give today's decisive preponderance
to that army which in this aspect outweighs the other.
To this truth we are convinced by the bitter experience
of the last [Crimean] war. Our troops, at last equipped
with rifled weaponry, quickly recovered from their poor
morale caused by heavy casualties and regained their
normal steadfastness to redeem the imperfection of their
weaponry.145
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During this period, under Miliutin's leadership the obsolete Imperial
Army weaponry from the Crimean War gradually was replaced with more
modern arms and equipment -- not only once, but twice -- as the
grossly inaccurate, and ineffective, flintlock musket first was
replaced with the muzzleloading rifled musket and then with the
breechloading rifle, to improve the rate and accuracy of fire.150
Between 1856 and 1862 the Russian Army purchased 286,331
smoothbore assault muskets for 'line' infantry, while designated
'firing companies' were reequipped with rifles having an improved
range and accuracy out to 1200 steps. By 1862 a total of 260,106
Russian soldiers were armed with '6-line' rifled muskets, that had
been imported principally from German and Belgian factories. By the
direction of Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich, however, the Russians' own
famous Tula Armory did produce 25,000 of these rifles. During these
years neither field nor fortress smoothbore artillery changed
appreciably.151 General Miliutin noted on January 15, 1862:
War has led us to realize the unsatisfactory nature of
our most active measures to supply our troops with modern
weapons. We must now openly acknowledge that in material
composition of artillery and troop weapons we lag behind
other European states.152
Despite Miliutin's identification of the problem, during the
first half of the 1860s, fully half of the active regular Russian
infantry -- let alone any of the new reserve cadres -- still did not
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with smoothbore cannon. The fortress and siege guns were obsolete as
well. Miliutin gave priority to Russian domestic production of both
military weapons and equipment, even though he considered the quality
of indigenous workmanship to be inferior to the prevailing European
standards: "Other European powers by far have left us behind in
matters of military construction."153
In 1862 --at the beginning of the Miliutin reforms -- the
combined annual Russian firearm production of the Tula, Izhevsk, and
Sestroretsk arsenals was only 90,000 muskets and pistols, which was
not even adequate to arm each new recruit, let alone to build up any
war reserves. It was Miliutin's novel idea to commercially lease
these government-managed arsenals in order to increase the level of
domestic production while lowering firearm costs.iy' And it was
Miliutin's decision to increase domestic firearm production while
simultaneously importing foreign weaponry to offset the domestic
production shortfall. He succeeded. By January 1, 1865 all infantry
units were equipped with muzzleloading '6-line' rifled muskets.
But European states at this time already were introducing metal
cartridges and breechloading rifles with significantly improved
range, accuracy, and rates of fire -- which once again left the
Russian Army equipped with 'new' obsolescent weapons. The Russian
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Perhaps most frustrating of all to General Miliutin was the
fact that even after his investment of thousands of rubles on arsenal
modernization, and the successful introduction of new production
equipment and techniques, at the end of the 1860s, the quality of
indigenously produced Russian weaponry remained inferior to
contemporary European standards.1" General Miliutin was still
struggling with the problem of Russian firearm quality as late as
November 5, 1868, when he wrote: "We must build our own factories in
order to produce our own rifles in the future...."157
Daunted, but undeterred, by his failed efforts between 1862 and
1865 to rearm the Russian Army with modern weaponry, Miliutin set out
again to rectify what he clearly considered to be the unsatisfactory
combat capability of the Russian military. To a significant extent,
the impetus for Miliutin's renewed effort to modernize Russian
military equipment and weaponry came, not only from the recognition
of weapons developments in Europe, but from Imperial General Staff
analysis of technological developments and their impact on
battlefield tactics and war strategy during the United States' Civil
War between 1861 and 1865. True to Russian form of establishing
military commissions to study, discuss, and provide solutions to
recognized problems, in 1864 the Imperial Armaments Commission found
that the firearms employed by foreign infantry had created
"completely new conditions" on the battlefield.158
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Thus, after the conclusion of the American Civil War in April
1865, in early 1866 two Russian Army officers, Colonel Gorlov and
Captain Gunius, were sent to the United States with the mission of
evaluating the weaponry employed and determining "a superior firearm
for the Russian Army" with which to replace the obsolete '6-line'
rifled musket.159 As a result of their preliminary investigation, the
Russian War Ministry concluded in 1867 that the most cost-effective
solution would be to reconstruct the existing '6-line' rifled muskets
into breechloading Terri-Norman rifles, and later into Karl rifles,
which utilized paper cartridges.160
Unfortunately for the Imperial General Staff, time and
technological progress wait for no man, and certainly not for the
laborious Russian bureaucratic commission decisionmaking process.
At the very time that the Russian War Ministry decided on the
transition to Terri-Norman and Karl rifles, the much more durable,
reliable, and powerful metal rifle cartridges were being introduced
into Western armies. Then, in 1868, a special commission on weapons
conversion revealed that progress at the Russian arsenals was not at
all proceeding smoothly. The November 20, 1868 report on the Izhevsk
arsenal, written by the Commander of the Caucasus Military District,
General-Adjutant Glinka-Mavrin, concluded that the conversion was
neither "profitable" nor produced the desired "superior firearm."161
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War Minister Miliutin responded quickly with a series of
decisions favoring the acquisition of rifles which utilized metal
cartridges, and noted in his diary:
It is unfortunate that it (the rifle business) began to
go through because of an unnatural situation, and I
thought about a means to give it a new direction.
Fortunately, a satisfactory occasion presented itself:
one Guards Colonel.... Gan, who was returning from leave
abroad, proposed to me that he bring with them from
Vienna Krnk model rifles, that had been offered to him
there.... It was preferable that the Krnk models
returned with Gan himself arriving before any others
turned their attention to our easily acquired property;
we came to the thought that using this system might
perhaps be more satisfactory than conversion of our
'six-line' muskets.162
Ballistics data on the Krnk rifle proved to be significantly
better than that of the Russian Karl models -- which was exactly what
Miliutin told the Tsar at the beginning of February 1869 -- and, as a
result of the Tsar's decision, a 'special commission of experts,'
chaired by General-Lieutenant Rezvogo, was formed to evaluate the
suitability of the Krnk and Varanov rifles, that utilized metal
cartridges, for Russian Army use. The Rezvogo Commission, after
extensive tests and comparisons, selected the Krnk rifle as being
"25 percent superior" to the Varanov model rifle. The final decision
to reequip the Russian infantry, however, was referred to a second
commission, chaired by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. On March 15,
1869 this second commission, formed to evaluate the results of the
Rezvogo Commission, recommended to War Minister Miliutin that the
Russian army be equipped with the Krnk rifle. Then two further
commissions were set up. The first of these commissions was assigned
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 175.
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the responsibility to organize the production of 500,000 Krnk rifles;
the second, to produce 150 million rifle cartridges for delivery by
March 1, 1870.163 But the 'Great Russian Rifle Debate' did not end
with the 1869 selection of the Krnk rifle.
In early 1868, Colonel Gorlov and Captain Gunius returned with
their final evaluation of the firearms used during the American Civil
War. They recommended the small-caliber rifle, officially designated
the Berdan No. 1, as a "superior infantry weapon." By the end of
1868 the War Ministry managed to purchase 30,000 of these rifles.
However, in 1870, it was decided to modify these Berdan rifles into
cavalry carbines which were designated the Berdan model No. 2. Then,
following an 1874 decision to produce only small-caliber rifles, the
Berdan model No. 2 was produced in quantity.164
Thus, on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War, on January 1, 1877
the Russian Army was equipped with a total of 375,754 small-caliber
infantry rifles; 14,365 cavalry carbines; 15,000 Dragoon rifles; and
72,272 Cossack rifles. However, the St. Petersburg state cartridge
factory, managed by the Main Artillery Directorate, failed to supply
the army with adequate quantities of rifle cartridges: producing in
1872 only five million of the 31 million cartridges ordered; in 1873
only 18 million of 37 million; in 1874 only 18 million of 60 million;
in 1875 only 38.5 million of 60 million; and, at last, in 1876 the
80 million as planned -- for an enormous five-year total production
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By 1877 only a third of the Russian infantry was equipped with
small-caliber Berdan rifles, while the remainder carried obsolescent
Krnk rifles or obsolete Karl rifled-muskets into combat. The
following archival data document the quantity of Russian firearms
produced between 1872 and 1876 as well as the total firearms with
which the Russian Army was equipped, or held in the war reserves, as
of January 1, 1877:
QUANTITY OF FIREARMS BY TYPE
BERDAN SMALL DRAGOON COSSACK
YEAR KARL KRNK No. 2 CALIBER SM-CAL SM-CAL.
1872 4819 4430 5210
1873 10000 10564
1874 _ _ 91851 2000 5372
1875 123718 2000 36900
1876 145191 5155 15000 30000 166
TYPE FIREARM No. WITH UNITS No. IN RESERVE
Karl infantry rifle 150868 51096
Krnk infantry rifle 372700 192866
Dragoon rifle (Krnk mod. ) 40597 2658
Berdan No. 1 Model 1868 17810 10104
Berdan No. 2
(Small-caliber infantry rifle) 253152 103616
Small -caliber Carbine 12102 6388
Dragoon rifle (Small-caliber) 2352 7648
Cossack rifle (Small-caliber) 60000 10000
Smith & Wesson revolvers 70275 6490 167
Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nostL Voennogo
Upravleniia.... Vol. 6, (St. Petersburg, 1881), p. 105.
"Vsepoddanneishego doklada po Voennomu ministerstvu
19 fevralia 1877 g■ TsGIVA. Kantseliarii Voennogo
ministerstva. No. 1 (L), No. 23, p. 167.
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Of a total 48 Russian infantry divisions at the beginning of
the Russo-Turkish War, 27 were armed with the Krnk rifle; 16 had new
small-caliber rifles; and the 5 remaining divisions, which were
deployed in the Caucasus, carried the reconstructed Karl rifled
muskets. Strelkovyi ('shooting' or 'fire') battalions all had the
rapid-firing small-caliber Berdan No. 1 Model 1868 rifle, but in the
Turkestan and the two Siberian military districts troops remained
equipped with the Karl musket. Dragoon regiments generally were
armed with the Krnk rifled musket, although a few regiments had
received their small-caliber rifles. Hussar and Ulan regiments were
armed with small-caliber carbines in 1875, while the Cossack
regiments had been reequipped with the small-caliber 'Cossack
carbine.'168 Thus armed, the Russian Army would enter into war and
stand the test of battle against the Turkish Army.169
The main soldiers' weapons are the bayonet and rifle butt. The bullet helps
him only to reach the enemy better, more surely.170
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 178-179.
For an exceptionally clear description of Russian
infantry battlefield tactics as well as artillery and
cavalry concepts at the outset of the Russo-Turkish War,
see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The
Imperial Russian Army. 1861-1914. (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 39-48; see also
Menning's quite comprehensive chapter explaining the
military campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War, pp. 51-86.
His inclusion of theater maps is particularly helpful
for understanding the flow of combat action.
The prevailing Russian Army training philosophy and
officer attitude, with which the Russo-Turkish War was
entered, is perhaps best reflected by this 1874 Order
No. 245 issued by the 27th Infantry Division Commander,
General-Lieutenant Kridner; cited in Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 197.
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- The Obruchev Plan for Future War
Significantly, in relation to the 1860 requirements, have they begun to be
fulfilled, or do there remain requirements which bear on our new offensive
capability? European society and political life is developing with such
speed that such a question cannot be answered without sound discussion.171
- General Nikolai N. Obruchev
Throughout the 1860s, and even onward toward the turn of the
century, the most vexing problem General Dmitrii Miliutin faced as
Imperial War Minister was how to establish effective and secure lines
of communication. As custodian of this enigma, he needed to maintain
precise command and control while moving huge numbers of troops and
enormous quantities of war supplies in a timely manner, southwestward
from St. Petersburg and Moscow, to defend Russia's borders against
the anticipated aggression by Austria and Prussia. Supply problems
and command arrangements had not been resolved by the creation and
implementation of Miliutin's military district system. Indeed, they
may even have been exacerbated by the new system -- and he knew it.
The initial idea about army logistics followed a perspicuous plan.
In peacetime, each military district (MD) commander was responsible
for supplying the one army located on the territory of his own
district. In case of war, should a theater of war (TV) be created on
the territory of a given military district, that MD commander was
responsible for supplying the one army operating within the TV that
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1870), in TsGVIA. f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv (VUA):
Materialv sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minvm
predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia.
3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g.. p. 20.
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corresponded, basically, with the territory of his military district.
This seemingly straightforward and fairly simple command arrangement
was complicated, however, by serious omissions.
Each army had a separate commander who was not subordinate to
the MD commander, but reported to the supreme field commander of the
TV, as supposedly did the MD commander. However, because the MD
commander was responsible only to the Tsar, just like the supreme
field commander, in practice, a dual chain-of-command (dvoenachalie)
existed. And neither of these twin command channels communicated
with the other, and the authority of the War Minister was not
specified, even as late as 1868. No provisions were made for more
than one army operating in a given military district. Nor were
supply arrangements clarified for the situation of an army operating
simultaneously in two military districts, since control of logistics
and supply was vested in the MD commanders and not the supreme field
commander. Further, the MD administrations had neither any peacetime
functional arrangements to supply the field army in wartime; nor any
requirement to establish such arrangements. Finally, should a field
army, during the course of conducting wartime operations, either move
out of its originally assigned MD to another MD or beyond the borders
of the Russian Empire, no provisions were made for that army to
continue to receive supplies. Miliutin's MD system called for the MD
commander to supply the army only within his own military district.163
This was the complex command and control issue that Miliutin
attempted to redress through the 1868 and 1869 Field Regulation
revisions that would generate a conflagration of opposition.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 116-117.
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The problem that General Miliutin saw as "the most urgent
military requirement" in 1868 was to rectify the inadequacy of
strategic railroads in the western and southwestern provinces of
Russia.164 The issue of insufficient railroad infrastructure had been
first addressed in 1864 through a series of articles published in
Ezhenedel'noe pribavlenie and Russkii invalid, entitled "Set'
russkikh zheleznykh dorog. Uchastie v nei zemstva i voiska," which
were inspired by Miliutin, and written by Colonel N. N. Obruchev.
Obruchev discussed the fact that between central Russia and the
western provinces of the Empire there existed only "three strategic
railroads: 1) from Warsaw to St. Petersburg; 2) from St. Petersburg
to Moscow; and 3) from Moscow to Sevastopol. But a quarter of the
country within the space between the Black Sea and Warsaw remains
closed. "165
Colonel Obruchev predicted that a future war was likely to
occur in these poorly developed southwestern and Black Sea border
regions of Russia and, consequently, attention had to be paid to
strengthening their infrastructure. He recommended that the first
priority should be given to constructing a railroad between Kiev and
Odessa, as well as to the construction of parallel north-south
railroads inside the western Empire borders. In subsequent articles,
Obruchev proposed the construction of 5000 kilometers of railroads in
European Russia at a cost of 200 million rubles and that the work
could be performed by military railroad units. But in 1864 the
164 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 120.
165 Russkii invalid. No. 22, 1864, p. 3; cited by
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 120.
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timing of Obruchev's proposal was not propitious, given the huge
budget deficit hanging over the Russian government. As a result,
nothing was done .166
After a four-year delay, at the end of 1868 Miliutin became so
absolutely convinced that Russia's ability to conduct a future war
successfully was critically dependent on the development of lines of
communication and military infrastructure in western Russia that he
instructed now General Obruchev to write an official War Ministry
report to document the strategic condition of Russia. Obruchev's
report, dated November 12, 1868 and entitled "0 zheleznykh dorogakh,
neobkhodimykh v voennom otnoshenii," laid out in detail the weakness
of Russia's defenses, the areas which were vital to actively defend,
and the nature of Russia's strategic requirements:
Our western provinces are geographically less defensible
and politically most weak. Here are the flat fields of a
land, still far from being amalgamated with Central
Russia.... Clearly, it follows, that by attacking us in
the west and not even dreaming about reaching the heart
of Russia, an enemy can injure us greatly along our
borders.... The Polish kingdom is the key to our western
defenses. But also in the case of war against us, in all
likelihood, an entire coalition will take part....
Therefore, of some importance to us, among other things,
is to secure ourselves in the [Polish] kingdom, of great
importance is to connect its defenses with the northern
and southwestern defenses, which would prepare us for all
eventualities and give us the capability to regroup
troops freely through all the western provinces.16'
Obruchev went on to note that the railroads of Austria and Prussia
ran directly to the Russian western border, which gave these
potential enemies a great advantage -- the capability to rapidly
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 120.
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concentrate their armies along the border against Russia. He then
characterized the Russian railroad lines of communication and
defenses:
There is only one line for rapid communication between
Dvina and Warsaw. But reserve units of our defenses
remain at his time without solid communications with the
central government, and [without] means to concentrate
their troops in the border regions -- [in capability] to
transfer them [troops] between regions, we are greatly
inferior to the enemy.168
General Obruchev next spelled out the four Russian strategic
requirements as "essential decisive tasks":
1. Unite the central Russian regions with the Crimea.
2. Secure solid communications between Poland and the
Russian center in order that Pri-Baltic region troops
could be transferred not only from the north-east on the
Petersburg-Warsaw railroad, but also from the east and
south-east.
3. Construct railroad lines of communication connecting
the operational bases on a line along Dnestr-Western
Dvina [rivers],
4. Ensure the rapid transfer of troops from one region
to another by constructing parallel railroads along the
western borders.169
Continuing this line of logic, Obruchev stipulated, in detail,
exactly which critical defensive points should be connected by
railroads and which western and southern Russian cities needed to be
added to the railroad network. He enumerated a secondary category of
railroads to be built solely for the purpose of strengthening
defenses. For economic and defensive purposes, he concluded Russia's
development of its railroad system was "unsatisfactory." Obruchev's
report was presented to the Council of Ministers and discussed by
them on February 11, 1869, but in General Miliutin's own words:
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 121.
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"Arguments and quarrels were prolonged. Only a few of the members
concurred with the War Ministry statement."170
Despite all the dissension, and after much deliberation, the
Council of Ministers decided to build two critical railroad lines,
recommended in the Obruchev report -- Brest-Smolensk and Brest-Kiev
-- but all the remaining 'required' railroad lines were rejected.
Only later, at the prodding of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, did
the Ministers decide to give top priority to constructing the
Transcaucasus railroad connecting the Caspian and Black Seas.
Although this railroad was not specifically part of the Obruchev plan
for Western Russian infrastructure development and defense, upon its
completion the Transcaucasus railroad was of "extraordinarily
important significance to the improvement of army [mobilization
capabilities] and also for the rapid concentration of the army in
that, or any other point, in the theater of military operations."171
So critical were railroads to effective mid- and late-19th
century military operations as the principal means of rapid
transportation and communication that in late 1868 the Main Staff set
up a special committee "On the transfer of troops by railroad and
water means," directed by General-Major Annenkov. The War Ministry,
and hence the Main Staff, considered this committee to be of such
great importance to the functioning of both the military districts
and field armies that Count Geiden, the Chief of the Main Staff,
chaired the committee meetings. As a direct outgrowth of this
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 123.
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committee's work, in 1870 the railroad troops were created as a
separate command to exploit the use of railroads; especially enemy
railroads, should a war lead to military operations outside Russia.
This command was based on the 'military-worker' companies that
originally had been formed during 1851 for the purpose of regulating
the use of railroads to expedite the transfer of military cargoes.1'2
The initial Obruchev report on Russian strategic conditions and
plans for future war resulted in an exceedingly significant, if only
incremental, and grudgingly accomplished, movement forward of Russian
Army logistic, mobilization, concentration and maneuver capabilities.
For War Minister Miliutin the partial implementation of the Obruchev
strategic plan was unsatisfactory, despite the rather remarkable
progress that he had made, personally and quite literally, in forcing
through the expansion of the Russian railroad network during the
1860s. According to War Ministry statistics, in Istoricheskii ocherk
razvitiia zheleznvkh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia do 1897 god
vkliuchitel'no. 2nd ed., (St. Petersburg, 1898), Tables 1 & 3:
In 1861 the general extent of Russian railroads was 1492
'versti,' [one verst equals approximately 2/3 of a mile
or one kilometer] and by 1871 it grew to 10,900 verst.
During the period of the 1860s important rail lines were
constructed: Moscow-Kursk-Khar'kov-Rostov; Moscow-Kozlov-
Voronezh; Orel-Riga; Moscow-Nizhnii. Construction of the
Petersburg-Warsaw railroad was completed.173
As a result of this rapid expansion of the Russian railroad network,
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 123.
Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznvkh dorog v Rossii
s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 god vkliuchitel'no. Second
Edition, (St. Petersburg, 1898), Tables 1 and 3; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... footnotes 4,
5, and 6, p. 254.
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there was a significant increase in transportation of cargoes by
rail: "If for the five year period from 1865 to 1869 total cargo
transported was 377 million pud, then for the following five years
(1869-1874) the transportation of cargo rose to 978,601,00 pud.""''
Still, Miliutin saw around him only an ever-accelerating
deterioration of the Russian domestic and international situation.
By the late 1860s peasant disorders were increasing in intensity and
frequency, and factory workers were beginning to organize. Both were
changes which resulted in a palpable increase in revolutionary
activity within Russia that was accompanied by the marked expansion
of violent crime. Concerning the international situation, Miliutin
reported to the Tsar on January 1, 1869 that it was "essential to
increase the wartime strength of the army in view of the colossal
armament [stockpiles] of the other European states."1" Miliutin's
initial warning went unheeded. Russian military expenditures
continued to be constrained by Finance Ministry niggardliness. On
January 1, 1870 Miliutin again made his case about growing armament
disparities to the Tsar even more stridently:
This question is so important and relates to so many
state interests, that it requires broad investigation,
and therefore, if it pleases your imperial highness to
command, that a commission be formed of several people,
with whom you entrust the most important affairs of
state, who could verify through discussions all sides of
this note's subject proposal.176
Bilimovich, A., Tovarnoe dvizhenie na russikh
zheleznvkh dorogakh. (Kiev, 1902), p. 2.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . .. p. 257.
TsGVIA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L),
No. 13, p. 10; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... pp. 257-258.
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Next to this sentence Tsar Aleksandr II just penned, "Soglasen" --
"Agree" -- thereby setting in motion a wholesale Tsarist government
re-evaluation of Russia's defense requirements, and subsequently a
most heated debate over military reform progress and purposes.
- Re-evaluation of Defense Requirements (1870-1872)
During the first half of 1870, a huge, singular handwritten
memorandum, authored primarily by General Nikolai N. Obruchev, titled
"Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," was put together
within the War Ministry. Intended as background data with which the
senior leadership could appraise the condition of the Russian Army,
this unique document contained an invaluable compilation of
information on the composition of the Russian Army1" and the armies
of the major European states.178 "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh
sil Rossii" also described in trenchant depth the changes in the
state of European military-political relations for the twenty-year
period between 1850 and 1870, and reported the current status of
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1870), in TsGVIA. f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv (VUA).
Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minvm
predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia.
3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g.. pp. 195-197.
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," Part III, "Transformation of the European
Military System," pp. 61-164. Current (1870) force
structure tables for the following 'Russian enemies' are
detailed on the pages indicated: German and Prussian
armies, p. 84; North German Union forces, pp. 88-89;
French Army, p. 103; Italian Army, p. 118; Austrian Army,
pp. 137-138; Turkish Army, p. 156; Swedish Army, p. 163.
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those relations.179 Obruchev's perspicacious analysis observed that
these changed political relationships posed "an extremely serious"
threat to the Russian Empire due to the numerical superiority of a
potential alliance of "Russia's avowed enemies Austria, Prussia,
Turkey, and Sweden," combined with the "large standing armies
maintained in peacetime by Austria, Prussia and the Northern German
Union." In seeming contradiction, he judged: "The significant
advancement of the Russian people summons for us new friends and
allies in Europe, but even more greatly increases the masses of our
enemies.... "18°
Because of this incipient, but expanding, political threat
posed by nationalism, combined with the continuing growth of the
massive armament stockpiles of the western European states, Obruchev
concluded that Russia had no logical choice but to increase the
strength of her standing active army and reserves, to increase the
deployment of reserve forces, and to lengthen military service
obligations.181 But Obruchev envisioned, and emphasized, that these
force structure increases should be restricted to the extent "that
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," Part II, "Changes in European Political
Aspects," pp. 24-60. Part II emphasizes throughout that
the "national element" is the "new European political
foundation," charges that the French under Napoleon III
are at the "forefront of this movement" (p. 25) and warns
of the "growing post-1866 influence of the German Union"
(p. 38).
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," Part V, "Comparison of European Forces to
Russian Forces," pp. 189-194; see also Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 258.
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki...," pp. 165-170.
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our array only should be recognized as fully sufficient for defense
and perhaps less for offensive purposes."182 As a direct result of
Obruchev's definitive recommendations -- with which War Minister
Miliutin agreed completely -- in August 1870 the War Ministry's
"highest imperative" was given to initiating the work of the
'commission on conscription regulations' to prepare new directives
concerning personal military obligations. These new regulations were
considered to be essential to expanding the state recruit base, from
which the army could mobilize in order to expand to its wartime
strength, and constituted the initial staff work that would lead to
the landmark 1874 Law on Military Conscription.
Impetus toward further reform of the Russian military system
was also propelled by international developments. France and Prussia
mobilized for war in the fall of 1870, causing Miliutin to reflect:
"Then we understood how tardy it was to worry ourselves excessively
about our economy, the development of which had been neglected and by
which our military forces were to be improved."183 Adding fuel to the
momentum toward army reform was the report of State Council member
P. A. Valuev, who returned to St. Petersburg after observing the
Prussian mobilization and the opening military engagements between
France and Prussia. At General Miliutin's suggestion Valuev wrote to
Tsar Aleksandr II explaining that the Prussian mobilization success
was the result of the existence of trained reserves from "a
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki...," p. 204; also
cited by Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 258.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 259.
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significant portion of the population having completed military-
service," which in the Prussian governmental system constituted "one
form of elementary public education." Valuev concluded his letter by
asserting: "Russian security demanded that her construction of
military forces not lag behind the level of military forces of her
neighbors. "18''
On October 5, 1870 War Minister Miliutin delivered Yaluev's
letter to Tsar Aleksandr II, who evidently understood most clearly
the vital importance of Valuev's report, because on October 7, 1870
Tsar Aleksandr directed Miliutin to study ways to improve the Russian
armed forces and to submit a formal reform proposal. Personally, as
well as professionally, Dmitrii Miliutin must have been most pleased
to have successfully engineered the bureaucratic outcome he desired;
especially since General Obruchev and his staff had already prepared
the necessary background information and the War Ministry commission
on new recruit regulations had been underway since August. Thus,
during the remainder of the month of October 1870, the Chief of the
Main Staff, Count Geiden, with the assistance of Generals Obruchev
and Meshcherinov, polished up the final details of their military
reform proposals for formal presentation to the Gosudar Imperator.185
During the first days of November 1870, this 'all-inclusive'
War Ministry report was presented and on November 4 the Tsar issued a
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. ... pp. 259-260;
see also Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," Part III, "Transformation of the European
Military System," pp. 61-89, for a complete discussion of
Prussian and German conscription and mobilization system.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. ... p. 260.
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"supreme command," that was published the following day in the
newspaper Pravitel'stvennii vestnik. In this historic order the Tsar
explained the unsatisfactory preparation of reserve and replacement
troops for call-up by the army during wartime, and suggested the
necessity of implementing universal military service, albeit with a
shortened period of service for each recruit. To this end the Tsar
directed the War Ministry to create: "... a proposal about the
formation of replacement array units and the broadening of direct
participation by the entire population of the state in military duty
through the observance of several conditions."186 Obviously expecting
just such an Imperial order, on November 7, 1870 Miliutin delivered
to Tsar Aleksandr II two additional War Ministry reports, titled
"0 razvitii nashikh vooruzhennykh sil" and "0 glavnykh osnovartnakh
lichnoi voennoi povirmostiin which were defined the Russian Army
requirements and the means by which universal military service could
be implemented.187
In the "O razvitii nashikh vooruzhennykh sil" memorandum,
Miliutin characterized the authorized wartime army as consisting of
738,000 soldiers, including irregular troops.188 The troops stationed
in the Caucasus, Orenburg, Turkestan, and two Siberian military
districts were excluded from this figure. He considered that it was
Pravitel'stvennii vestnik. No. 237, November 5, 1870;
cited in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv. . . . p. 261.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 261.
Obruchev uses the figure of 730,000 soldiers as the basis
for the 1862 plan for a wartime Russian Army composed of
553,000 active duty soldiers and 177,000 reservists. See
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki...," p. 15.
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essential to keep these forces in place in order to maintain internal
security within the Empire and, besides, the inadequately developed
transportation system allowed them to be redeployed only with the
greatest difficulty. Further, Miliutin demonstrated that because of
the existing structure of local and reserve forces, coupled with the
transportation system deficiencies, only between 500,000 and 600,000
troops could be concentrated within the main theater of war along the
western borders --a quantity which he deemed to be grossly
insufficient to defend against a fully mobilized million-man German
Army, let alone contain Germany's likely allies.
Miliutin then continued to explain in explicit detail how, over
a period of 15 years, a Russian reserve army of 1,900,000 men and an
active army of 1,263,000 soldiers could be created by increasing the
annual recruit induction from four to six men per thousand population
while reducing the period of recruit active service. Miliutin's key
element for rapidly expanding the Russian Army was to be the creation
of 120 identical local cadre reserve battalions, each of which would
be manned with 500 soldiers in peacetime, that in wartime could
become 120 three-battalion regiments fielding 3500 soldiers each for
a total of 30 new infantry divisions. Miliutin's proposal also
called for the local artillery batteries to expand in wartime to 96
batteries, or 24 reserve artillery brigades, fielding 768 cannon and
27,576 men. No changes, however, were purposed for either the
cavalry or engineer branches.
Miliutin estimated that 15 years following implementation of
this reform proposal, in wartime, the Russian Army would be able to
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field: 1,234,460 combat troops (active and reserve); 136,920 border
fortress troops; 100,720 local troops; a 240,000-man state militia;
and 49,330 men in "general assistance units" for an army total of
1,761,430 troops that could be augmented further by a 1,910,000-man
trained reserve. Since only 1,708,000 of the trained reservists
could be equipped by the army, a 202,000-man general state manpower
reserve would be created simultaneously.189 Miliutin concluded by
stating that execution of this "program requires significant
resources" -- to say the least, an understatement of the enormous
financial and material commitment necessary to train and equip so
large an army -- but that without its implementation "the danger
remains that the state is unprepared to defend itself."190 The
military reform proposals found in Miliutin's "0 razvitii nashikh
vooruzhennykh sil" memorandum, as well as Obruchev's "Dannye dlia
otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," eventually, if belatedly, would
become the foundation for the 1870s Russian Army reorganization.
In January 1871 the War Ministry created the powerful
Organizatsionnaia Commission to oversee the work of restructuring the
Russian Army. In order to carry out its enormous task effectively,
These same Russian Army force structure figures appear
in Obruchev's "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," pp. 195-197; along with a breakout by branch
of arms and their deployment strength in each military
district.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 261-266;
see also Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki...," p. 198,
with a slightly different emphasis, echoes that in
wartime 700,000 troops deployed in European Russia
"are only enough for defense."
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the Commission was subdivided into nine sections: 1) organization of
infantry units; 2) artillery and engineering units; 3) cadre guards
units; 4) cavalry cadre; 5) the priority in which to calculate troop
requirements and to call-up reserve members; 6) commissary and
artillery reserves and trains; 7) Cossack troops; 8) irregular police
(militsia); and 9) state militia. Progress in building the army's
strength, however, was slow, but significant, as noted by Miliutin in
his August 1871 diary entries, and then again in the 1872 Main Staff
memorandum concerning troop formations. The latter documents that
the level of peacetime active troops increased by 112,816 in 1872 to
create a total force of 650,989 men; while in wartime the increase
would be 119,132 for a total of 1,095 ,045 ,191
As a result of what Miliutin could only consider to be
unsatisfactory reform progress, on November 28, 1872 the authority of
the Organizatsionnaia Commission was reinforced by the inclusion
within its membership of six military district commanders --
Gil'denshtubbe, Kartsov, Drentel'n, Potapov, Khrushchov and Chertkov
-- along with a group of frontline operational commanders. All were
tasked to expedite the Russian Army reorganization.192 At their first
meeting in November, the new Commission members concluded that it was
impossible to meet the required wartime active force levels by the
mobilization of reserves alone because the gigantic amount of men and
TsGVIA. f. VUA 79013. "Zapiski Glavnogo shtaba ob
ustroistve voisk 1872 g-,", pp. 71-72, Table Nos.
4 and 6; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P, A.,
Vpennye reformv.... p. 271.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . .. p. 276.
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materials that had to be moved to the European theater of war was
totally beyond the capability of the Russian transportation system.
By a vote of 35 to 1, the Commission members agreed that the only
viable solution was to increase the size of the peacetime active
standing army and, thereby, to reduce the number of reservists who
would have to be mobilized. The reservists would be placed in two
categories: 1) voisk reservnykh, "for the purpose of rear services,
fulfilling secondary military activities and occupying fortresses;"
and, 2) voisk zapasnykh, "for the purpose of preparing the wartime
supplies of other troops and for use in internal and local
service."193 Through these Organizatsionnaia Commission consensus
decisions, at the end of 1872 a major long-term goal of the Imperial
Main Staff -- to establish and to maintain a standing, territorial
Russian Army -- was advanced significantly; but was not yet ready for
implementation.
Perhaps the most influential member of the Organizatsionnaia
Commission, overall, was General N. N. Obruchev who, at the beginning
of 1873, eloquently described the strategic condition of the Russian
state and the critical necessity to reconstruct the Russian Array in
his "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii" ("Considerations concerning the
defense of Russia"). Obruchev's enlightened opening statement could
just as well have been written now, at the end of the 20th century,
as been penned over a hundred years ago, when Russia was entering the
last quarter of the 19th century. The memorandum began:
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . .. pp. 276-278.
94
All European powers alike profess their desire for peace,
but, at the same time, all continue to develop their own
armed forces: strengthening army cadres and reserves,
preparing for their rapid mobilization, constructing new
fortresses and strategic railroad lines. To preserve
peace, all prepare themselves for war. Therefore, we
also must take urgent measures to guarantee the security
of the Empire, all the more so, because at present the
transition from peace to war takes place, as is said,
instantaneously.1,4
Obruchev posed for the first time and suggested quantifiable answers
to what have become, over the last century of conflicting state
ideological precepts, enduring, vitally complex security questions:
How much is enough military force in order to defend the state?
How quickly can the army be mobilized? How rapidly, and where, do we
need to concentrate forces against the enemy? Have we adequately
prepared the defense infrastructure in the projected theaters of
military operations?195
General Obruchev logically explained the high probability of
coalition warfare against the Russian Empire. Not only could Germany
and Austria -- the most likely antagonists -- join forces, but they
could obtains the assistance of Turkey and Sweden as well. Russia
absolutely had to increase the size of her active standing army. Not
counting the officer corps, the 1873 wartime Russian Army could field
1,006,000 troops, while Germany had an army totalling 1,270,000 men;
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii,"
(St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1873), p. 1,
in TsGVIA. f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv (VUA): Materialv
sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minvm predsedatel'stvom
Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia. 3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta
1873 g.. p. 74; see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennye reformv.... p. 280.
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 1;
also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 280.
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Austria, 1,020,000; Turkey, 230,000 (without militia); and Sweden,
168,000. Russian Army manpower was outnumbered nearly three to one
against likely European coalitions, and by some 2.3 to 1 against her
avowed enemies -- Germany and Austria -- even before the other
critical military questions of mobilization time, concentration, and
state infrastructure adequacy were considered.196
The success or failure of mobilization virtually predetermined
the ability of the Russian Army to concentrate defensive forces along
her European borders. Obruchev held forth: "Mobilization of troops
in the number that is required is completely new for us."197
Reflecting this concern, a 'special commission' on the readiness of
the Russian Army in 1866 concluded that the army's ability to
transition to a war footing was "unsatisfactory."198 The Russian
Army thereafter made progress in reducing the amount of time required
to mobilize troops: down from the five-and-a-half months that it took
to field four army corps in connection with the Franco-Austrian War
in 1859; to two-and-a-half months in 1863 for the Polish Rebellion;
to an estimated range of 25-111 days in 1867; and between 8 and 39
days in 1872.199 Still, the Russian Army mobilization capability
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 5-6,
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
p. 76; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 280.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 7, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 77.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 8, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 77.
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 8,
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
p. 77; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 281.
96
remained unsatisfactory; the principal reason: Germany was able to
mobilize ber entire army in only nine days. 200 The following table
documents by military district the progress the Russian Army made
between 1867 and 1872 in improving mobilization capability:
Time Required to Call-up People in the Military Districts
Military District Name 1867 1872 (in days)
Petersburg 50 from 10 to 32
Finland 50 from 9 to 16
Vil'no 37 from 10 to 19
Warsaw 30 from 10 to 20
Kiev 25 from 11 to 20
Odessa 45 from 8 to 16
Khar'kov 42 from 10 to 15
Moscow 45 from 10 to 25
Kazan 60 from 16 to 23
Caucasus 111 from 19 to 39
201
General Obruchev's concluding analysis of the Russian Army's
mobilization capability demonstrated his foresight and understanding
of the holistic social, political, economic, and military nature of
future war:
From this it follows that Russia still with great energy
must conduct a shortening of the time required for its
own troop mobilization. However, the measures required
for this depend not only on the War Ministry alone, but
primarily on taking charge of the entire state, since the
main way to solve [the problem] is by the introduction of
an obligation [to provide] horses (or to requisition
them) and the development of railroads.202
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 14
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
p. 80; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 282.
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 9,
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: MaCerialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
p. 78; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 281.
Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 15
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchanii....
p. 81.
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The mobilization of logistics, especially supplies of weapons
and ammunition, had not kept pace with the ability to mobilize
manpower,201 hence the Russian Army could not concentrate forces
rapidly enough in the anticipated European theater of war. Although
the time to move supplies forward had been significantly reduced,
from an average of 45 to 90 days in 1867 to 16-18 days in 1872, the
main limiting factor was an inadequate reserve of horses for field
transportation during the first 30-60 days following the mobilization
order. According to General Obruchev: "The wartime supply of horses
is our most difficult mobilization problem."204 This serious
deficiency was complicated further: first, by the army's wide
dispersal to provinces outside the expected primary theater of war
along Russia's European borders, and second, by the absence of
sufficient strategic road and railroad infrastructure throughout the
Russian Empire. 205 Obruchev resolutely defined the requirement for
progress: "The speed of array concentration mainly depends on its
general distribution and the routes leading to the theater of war."206
Russia had five railroad lines running from the interior to her
western borders: Petersburg-Warsaw; Moscow-Warsaw; Kursk-Vil'no;
Odessa-Belostok; and Riga-Rovno. In sharp contrast, Germany had
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 10, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 78.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 12, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 79.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 282.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 16, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 81.
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completed construction of 10 strategic railroad lines, oriented
mainly in a west-east direction; Austria had six such strategic
railroad lines; and Turkey had one rail line extending through
Romania toward the Russian border. 207 Analyzing these facts, General
Obruchev came to the generous conclusion that the Russian Empire had
"twice less means to concentrate troops than her enemies"208 because
the Russian Army would require some 63-70 days to mobilize and
concentrate, while the Austrian Army would require only 30-33 days.
In a war against Germany, the Russian situation was deemed to be much
worse. The Russian Army could mobilize and concentrate forces in 54-
58 days, while Germany would require only 20-23 days. 209 This would
mean that Germany could seize all of Poland and most of Latvia before
the Russian Army could even take the field to give battle, most
likely in the region of Minsk.210 This was a completely unacceptable
prospect for the Russian Empire. Therewithal, Obruchev made an
exceedingly gloomy, but entirely accurate prediction: "Now when the
entire strategic assessment, and state defense itself, must be based
on railroads, the strength and linkage of our main bases has been
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 17, in
TsGVIA. VUA: HaterLaly sekreCnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 82.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 18, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 82.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 19-20,
in TsGVIA. f. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
p. 83, details the full Russian mobilization tables
against Austria and Germany; see Zaionchkovskii, Voennve
reformv.,.. p. 283, for a summary of these tables.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 26, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnykh soveshchanii.... p. 86.
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lost."211 General Obruchev forewarned about the inadequacy of the
Russian Empire's defenses:
Based on the presented survey of the means to defend the
Empire in relation to those of its opponents, it is
impossible not to arrive at the conclusions that at the
present the condition of the Russian armed forces is
unsatisfactory for ensuring its [the Empire's] security;
that the mobilization and concentration of our army,
owing to the long distances, to the uneven distribution
of horses, and to the limited lines of communication,
especially railroads, takes place more slowly than that
of our opponents; finally, that engineering preparations
in relation to the Empire's border expanse do not meet
contemporary requirements. . . ,212
Obruchev's remedy for this dangerous state security condition was to
recommend a plan for increasing the number of active duty infantry
battalions from the existing 516 to between 820 and 840 battalions,213
stationed in the anticipated theater of war -- European Russia
because: "Here is our primary danger, and in order to escape it, we
must be ready to establish equal forces against these neighbors."214
In General Obruchev's view: "Everything depends on securing the
flanks of Poland."215 It was particularly essential that an expanded
Russian Army be concentrated to defend the western and southwestern
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 33, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Haterialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 90.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 35, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 91;
quoted in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 284.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 39, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnykh soveshchanii.... p. 93.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 36, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnykh soveshchanii.... p. 91.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 49, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnykh soveshchanii.... p. 98.
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flanks of Poland and Galicia from attacks launched from Eastern
Prussia.216 Russia had to defend along the Polish borders, rather
than continue to distribute troops piecemeal throughout the Empire's
far flung military districts, where the lack of transportation
infrastructure did not permit their timely forward concentration.
Further, Obruchev argued that these new Russian troop concentrations
in the Southern and Southwestern theaters217 had to be supported by
the construction of a network of fortresses and railroads216
sufficient to allow for stubborn and persistent point defense against
any attack, the regrouping (peregruppirovka) of forces laterally to
the decisive point of battle, and the uninterrupted shipment of
supplies and reinforcements to the front.21'
Obruchev's unique strategic "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii"
("Considerations concerning the defense of Russia"), which today we
would describe properly as a strategic assessment and future war
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 42-45,
in TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii. ...
pp. 94-96, details Obruchev's plan for the defense of
the Polish Kingdom, along with a prioritized listing
of required new strategic railroad construction.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 38, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 92
presents Obruchev's proposed increased troop dispositions
in European Russia by military district and army corps.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 47, in
TsGVIA. VUA: MaCerialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 97
gives a prioritized listing of 6780 km of new railroad
construction, with Poland topping the list with four new
lines totaling 1000 km.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 49-53,
in TsGVIA. f. VUA. Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii....
pp. 98-100; see also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv....
pp. 284 and 288.
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(budushchaia voina) forecast, formed the foundation for the Tsar's
1873 'secret society' deliberations on the creation of a Russian
national military doctrine. The 'secret society' participants would
debate Obruchev's recommendations in counterpoise to the existing
Miliutin military system and to the recommendations of other senior
military and aristocratic leaders of the Russian Empire.
- The 1873 'Secret Society': 'Dimitum' and Decisions
Between 1870 and 1872 all the proposals and counterproposals
for reorganizing the Russian Army generated great, emotionally
intense, substantive rifts both within the War Ministry and the Main
Staff, between their respective members, and among the military
branches of arms, other government ministries, and individual members
of the nobility -- each of whom sought to protect their individual
fiefdoms and to preserve their inherited, or traditional, rights and
privileges. The substantive vital necessity to improve the defensive
capabilities of the Russian Empire became increasingly entwined in an
impenetrable mangrove swamp of personal animosities, competing
opinions, and bureaucratic failures to execute government directives,
originally intended to improve military capabilities.
In the vanguard of the opposition to the Miliutin reform plan
to create a 1,900,000-man wartime army based on the mobilization of
reservists, the insidious General Fadeev surfaced again. This time
he emerged with the support of the politically well-connected, hence,
powerful, St. Petersburg Police Chief General-Adjutant Shuvalov,
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who "thought the Miliutin system pernicious for the army and
dangerous for the dynasty."220 In an 1872 letter to Tsar Aleksandr,
written with the fecund, duplicitous editorial assistance of Field
Marshal Prince Bariatinskii, General Fadeev achieved the penultimate
in demagogy. With unprincipled personal insult to Miliutin, while
trying to maintain the traditional feudal military order, to dispense
with the hated military districts, and to expand significantly the
active standing army, Fadeev charged:
All institutions of Peter the Great, of Catherine,
of 1812, all traditions, the entire way of life of the
Russian Army are fossilized like old wild grass; from
this rubbish heap, which is signified by the graves of
two centuries of Russian military experience, rises
only the professional heads of Mr. Miliutin and his
idealists.221
Once more Fadeev's emotional bandwagon appeals had their desired
effect. Reform opposition intensified and approached a zenith
between February 28 and March 31, 1873 with the activation of the
novel royal 'secret society,' personally chaired by the Tsar, to
investigate the implications of social and military reform for the
purpose of creating a Russian national military doctrine.222
General-Adjutant Dmitrii Miliutin had foreseen that the
accelerating intensity of opposition to his military reforms could
not be resolved through the compromises of competing positions.
221 Zaionchkovskii, P. A. , . Voennve reformv... p. 289.
222 Zaionchkovskii, P. A. , . Voennve reformv... P. 293;
see Appendix II for the TsGVIA. f. VUA: 1873 Sekretnoe
Soveshchanie Meetings Index of background materials and
the names of the key discussion participants.
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He knew, truly, that to the Russian psyche compromise was then, and
is now, a barely tolerable indication of weakness. Miliutin also
knew that the only way to resolve the military reform impasse was, in
the typical Russian fashion, through the formation of a special,
select group of senior policymakers who could persuade the Tsar to
issue an Imperial decree. Therefore, according to Miliutin's
memoirs, in the War Minister's summer 1872 report to Tsar Aleksandr,
the following intentionally provocative, obsequiously veiled
suggestion was posed:
I consider it my duty to turn your Highness' earliest
attention to these new proposals which are required by
the State ... based on the general conviction about the
unsatisfactory increases of Russia's military forces
considering the threatening armaments of all Europe.
Inevitably it must be said ... in connection with the
supreme strategic and political considerations that ...
the decision of so many important matters should not be
laid on the responsibility of one war minister; it
requires joint discussion with the other ministers and
their cooperation. Therefore, I suggest an idea to your
Highness -- call together a conference of several of the
most select people who are authorities about state and
military affairs. This idea was submitted to your
Highness in complete loyalty.223
As a result of Miliutin's plea His Majesty, Tsar Aleksandr decided to
form the 'secret society' at the end of 1872. However, because the
War Ministry was unable to prepare immediately all the background
materials that were necessary for the members to consider in order to
make informed decisions, the actual 'secret society' meetings were
delayed until the beginning of 1873.224
GBL. f. D. A. Miliutin. M. 7851, pp. 163-164; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 288.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 289.
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Prince Bariatinskii, meanwhile, with his usual persistence made
sure that the forthcoming commencement of the Tsar's 'secret society'
deliberations concerning military reform were well publicized. Now
with the backing of the prospective future Tsar, Grand Duke Aleksandr
Aleksandrovich, he promoted a series of strongly-worded opposition
articles in the newspaper Russkii mir. One such article stated:
The Russian defense establishment requires neither more
resources nor a major overhaul. The present task of the
military directorates is to understand how to use the
immense resources of Russia for the creation of a
powerful vital force ... for which the present military
budget is more than sufficient....225
Obviously, the vituperation of the opposition's continuing tirade did
not endear its membership to the Miliutin reformers, especially since
the expansive public debate (glasnost') impugned the military
reformers' loyalty to the state and their professional competence.
With Tsar Aleksandr II personally chairing the meetings, the
'sekretnoe soveshchanie' sessions began on February 28, 1873 and
concluded one month later on March 31. The rather large official
society membership included the ministers of foreign affairs, war,
finance, the Imperial Office, internal affairs, and members of the
State Council: Chevkin, Count Stroganov, and Count Ignat'ev.
Imperial family representation included the Tsarevich Aleksandr, the
heir apparent, and Grand Dukes Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Konstantin
Nikolaevich, Mikhail Nikolaevich, and Nikolai Nikolaevich. Army
representatives included the Field Marshals, Count Berg and Prince
Bariatinskii, the commanders of the military districts, and the
Russkii mir. No. 312, 1872; cited in Zaionchkovskii,
P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 293.
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Military Council."6 The Tsar commanded that all discussions be held
in "complete secrecy" and that no working materials or official
reports be maintained.
According to the military historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii, there
are none but "extraordinarily insignificant" records of the 'secret
society' proceedings in the Moscow Central State Military-Historical
Archives (TsGVIA): only two documents, "Voprosakh, podlezhashchikh
obsuzhdeniiu" (Questions, presented for discussion) and
"Zakliucheniiakh Sekretnogo soveshchaniia" (Conclusions of the
'Secret Society'). Fortunately, Miliutin's Vospominaniia. and the
diaries of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich and Tsar Aleksandr II
provide some details concerning this important series of meetings.227
The Index to Materialv sekretnogo soveshchaniia... in Appendix II is
of particular importance because it reveals the existence of somewhat
more numerous archival documents than Zaionchkovskii first described.
The initial 'secret society' session opened on February 28,
1873 with the first of two questions to be discussed concerning the
appropriate size of the Russian Army: "Are the armed forces which
Russia presently has at its disposal in the event of a European war
TsGVIA. f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv CVUA): Materialv
sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minvm predsedatel'stvom
Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia. 3. 8. 10 1 31 Marta
1873 g.. "Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod
minym...(St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1873), p. 1; see Appendix II, p. 23, for the complete
list of "Sekretnoe soveshchanie" participants.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 293-294.
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sufficient?"228 The society members were instructed that if they
determined that the existing Russian army forces were not sufficient,
they were to recommend ways to strengthen the army as well as the
measures required to increase the military budget.
According to General Miliutin, as the discussions began, and
as might have been expected, Prince Bariatinskii at once took the
offensive, charging that increases in the military budget were not
required in order to strengthen the army and that all that was needed
was to "curtail superfluous expenditures." Aleksandr perceptively,
if rather curtly, noted in his February 28 diary entry only:
"Bariat[inskii] protiv voenfnogo] min[istra]" -- "Bariatinskii is
against the war minister."22'
Finance Minister Reitern, naturally, supported Bariatinskii,
calling attention to the "uninterrupted growth of the War Ministry
budget; the impossibility of further increases in military
expenditures; and the strain on the financial condition of the state"
if army expenditures were increased by 15 million rubles a year, as
requested by Miliutin. As the 'secret society' consensus coalesced
around the need for a larger army, Reitern conceded, eventually and
seemingly quite reluctantly, that an additional 10 million rubles
TsGVIA. f. VUA. "Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia
pod minym...," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1873), p. 1; see also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv....
p. 294.
TsGIAM. f. Aleksandra II. No. 678, opis' 1, d. 61, Zapis'
28 fevralia 1873 g.\ cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformy. . . . p. 295.
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annually could be available for army expansion beginning in 1875.230
At the conclusion of the discussion of the first question, the
Tsar issued his recommendation to the War Minister, which was
accepted without any objections. Tsar Aleksandr's decision stated:
In view of the danger presented by the uninterrupted
expansion of European armed forces, it is considered
necessary, following even to this day a peaceful policy,
to increase those peacetime forces that Russia has at its
disposal. ... Measures to expand the armed forces are
not to be taken any earlier than are determined to be
normal, and are to conform directly with those financial
means, which can be allotted to this purpose without harm
to the other economic and moral state needs. ... The most
profitable distribution of expenditures in relation to
troop organization is that which achieves the possibility
for the greatest development of the armed forces without
special excessive expenses for maintaining them against
present death.231
Overall, this clear Imperial decision to expand the Russian Army
essentially was that which Miliutin had desired and requested. But,
the implementation of the Tsar's instructions, with their numerous
limitations, in practice, would prove to be most difficult indeed.
The second 'secret society' question, discussed during the
initial session on February 28, 1873, dealt with the rearmament of
fortresses and the construction of additional separate border
fortifications, particularly in the Warsaw military district and on
its flanks. 232 Concerning this most important question about
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 294-295;
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym...,"
p. 6, confirms this 10 million ruble increase in the 1874
total military budget to 174,290,000 rubles; and projects
for 1875-1879 a staggering 179,290,000 rubles annually.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia.pp. 6-7;
also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... pp. 295-296.
232 "Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia.. .," pp. 7-8.
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strengthening Russia's western defenses, the society members reached
an impasse, with general agreement only on the need to improve the
major Polish fortresses, but without consensus on the requirement for
additional fortifications on the flanks of the most probable avenues
of attack. 233 Thus, the strengthening of Russia's border defenses was
"extended for an extraordinarily lengthy period."234
At this point, into the fray hurtled Prince Bariatinskii.
This time he resoundingly proposed to Tsar Aleksandr the creation of
a "special financial ways and means commission" to look into methods
for generating savings within the existing military budget that could
be applied to army expansion and the strengthening of defenses. Tsar
Aleksandr approved. The membership of the Bariatinskii Commission,
which the duplicitous Prince himself chaired, prominently included
State Comptroller Greig; State Council members Chevkin and Ignat'ev;
"several other persons"; and a few representatives from the military
departments. Almost to a man the financial ways and means commission
members were strident opponents of Miliutin's military reforms.235
Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine
utverzhdennym zakliucheniiam, sostoiavshimsia v sekretnom
soveshchanii pod minym predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria
Imperatora, na Glavnii Shtab vozlagaetsia,"
(St. Petersburg: pis'mo, 28 Haia 1873 goda.), in TsGVIA.
f. VUA. Materialv sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym
predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia.
3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g.. pp. 27-30, asserted that:
"The security of the Empire requires the following
construction" before explaining the rationale for the
first priority fortresses Novogeorgivsk, Ivangorod,
Zerchev, and Brest; followed by the Grodno, Osovets,
Rovno, and Dubno fortresses in the Southwest Theater.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformv.... p. 296.
235 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformv.... p. 296.
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The second 'secret society' session took place on March 3, 1873
to discuss and decide questions about strategic railroad construction
requirements.236 According to Miliutin's Vospominaniia the members
had no fundamental objections to the requirement for expanding the
strategic railroad network in Western Russia and "affirmed the
objectives proposed by the War Ministry."23' On the subject of
strategic railroads, the 'secret society' concluded:
The final determination of the direction of these
[rail]roads, equalizing the consistency of their
construction in connection with the general improvement
of a consolidated network, is assigned to the Railroad
Committee, first, in order to look urgently into this
question concerning the possibility, welcomed by the War
Ministry, of eliminating troop dispersal, stockpile
distribution, and elevated investment difficulties and,
second, in order to designate roads for construction,
keeping in mind the special importance of accelerated
completion for the line, planned through Poland.238
Unfortunately for the War Ministry, and especially for the Russian
soldiers, the Tsar's assignment of determining which railroads to
build to a committee -- especially one subject to the influence of
the powerfully connected 'anti-reform' Bariatinskii Commission --
virtually guaranteed that no immediate action would be taken to
construct the strategic railroad network that Miliutin and Obruchev
had so meticulously determined, and proven, to be essential for
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...p. 1.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 296.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 9-10;
see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv....
pp. 296-297.
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Russia's defense in a future war. 235 Still, the railroad committee
bureaucrats deliberated; but no new railroad construction orders were
issued.
The third session of the 'secret society' was convened on
March 8, 1873 to consider and discuss two most important questions:
"measures to accelerate army mobilization and concentration in the
theater of war."240 Included within the subsets of these questions
were: 1) the difficulties of troop dispersal (dislocation) throughout
the expanse of the Empire; 2) the status of troops assigned to the
border regions; 3) the measures necessary to supply the army with
horses; 4) the requirement for building new troop barracks; and
5) the quality of unit military training. Surprisingly, none of
these major issues became the basis of dispute. Here, the 'secret
society' was generally in agreement concerning the actions required.
The members concluded that it was necessary to strengthen peacetime
army and cavalry concentrations in the western military districts in
order to ease the mobilization difficulties caused by existing army
dispersal. This determination to 'forward base' the Russian Army
logically led to the requirement to build new barracks in the western
military districts and to improve training.241
Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine
utverzhdermym zakliucheniiam, sostoiavshimsia...p. 34,
explains the rationale for and lists the top priority
railroad construction requirements for defending Poland.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...p. 2; see
also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 297.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 10-11;
also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 297.
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The fourth 'secret society' session met on March 10, 1873.
The principal questions scheduled for discussion were the size of the
annual conscript draft and the appropriate length of active army
service obligation.'" Tsar Aleksandr, however, began the session by
telling Miliutin to skip the conscription question and to proceed
with the sixth discussion topic concerning structure of the army,
which subsumed all eight remaining issues about troop organization
and weapon requirements.2''3 The Tsar proffered that it was impossible
for him to understand the conscription issue without first
determining how the army was to be organized.
Prince Bariatinskii, with Byzantine guile and supported by
Count Berg, seized on the opportunity this change in the scheduled
agenda presented. He proposed eliminating the existing military
districts in European Russia and replacing them with four armies:
Petersburg, Warsaw, Kiev, and Moscow.244 According to General
Miliutin's diary entry, for the following three hours Miliutin
suffered in egregious silence through venomous attacks on the
military district system that he had labored so diligently for twelve
years to establish. When at last Miliutin spoke, he bitterly
proclaimed with deepest conviction:
The destruction of the military districts will lead to
the return of the former disorder, to the former
commissariat and its wasteful consumption of provisions.
All this was said emotionally and sharply and in
242
243
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 2-3.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 4-5.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 298-299.
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conclusion this phrase appeared: 'All would be as it was,
but I intensely feel [that] the present requires a
radical transformation, which must be developed and
completely achieved2'*5
At the end of Miliutin's outburst, Tsar Aleksandr immediately
terminated further 'secret society' discussions on army organization.
Aleksandr's rather peeved diary entry for March 10, 1873 cryptically
recorded his opinion of the discussions that day: "1/2 1 voen[nyi]
Komi[tet] raznfye] proekt[y] skhoditsia s moim. Sokprashch[enie]
okrug[ov]. Ob Ida Voen[nogo] mini[stra]. Otlozhfil] do podrob[nykh]
raschet[ov]" -- "half of the full military Committee's various plans
agree with mine. Reduce districts. Insulted by the War Minister.
Defer until a detailed account."2'*6
That very night the Tsar dispatched a note to Dmitrii Miliutin
requesting his presence at the palace on Sunday morning, March 11, to
explain his behavior. Of this meeting Aleksandr recorded only that
he had an "unpleasant" conversation with Miliutin, while the latter
stated that they "shook hands, embraced, and with an embarrassed
voice [the Tsar] asked: 'Why did you take to heart that which was
said yesterday? Seldom do I hear such dissension....'"247 What
actually transpired between the two men at that Sunday morning
meeting may never be known, given the sparsity of detail in the only
GBL. f. D. A. Miliutina. M. 7851, pp. 235-236; cited
in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 299.
TsGIAM. f. Aleksandra II. opis' 1, d. No. 61, zapis'
10 marta 1873 g.; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... pp. 299-300.
GBL. f. D. A. Miliutina. M. 7851, p. 238; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 300.
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accounts, but the evidence of subsequent events strongly indicates a
rare appeasement. The Tsar and his War Minister seemingly managed to
strike a compromise that preserved the Emperor's authority over
Prince Bariatinskii's dissident 'anti-reform' group of nobles by
reducing the number of military districts and by limiting the
expansion of the military budget. This confidential franchise also
satisfied the Miliutin reformers by authorizing the reorganization of
the Russian Army structure into six regiment divisions, sub-divided
into two brigades each; by increasing the military budget by 13
million rubles annually; and by expanding the standing army, using
the justification that reservists could not be properly equipped upon
mobilization to reinforce the active army. The operational command
hierarchy for corps and military districts, however, remained
ambiguous, with the Tsar continuing to assert his authority, and
personally to intervene, down to the division level.248
For the next three weeks, no 'secret society' meetings took
place, while the details of the compromise were vetted in private
among individual members. After two weeks of factional maneuvering,
Miliutin recorded that on March 24 the army organization and command
questions were "conclusively decided" in the Tsar's apartments at a
meeting attended by Grand Dukes Nikolai and Mikhail Nikolaevich:
The Emperor explained, that they wanted to discuss the
proposed army reorganization further. Here for the first
time I was commanded to give an explanation for my
objection to the system that they considered to be
already decided. ... I explained in conclusion that if
in peacetime preparation of the corps commander chain of
command is recognized as essential, then it is better to
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 300.
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introduce this hierarchy into the existing army
organization rather than under other conditions
disrupting the division as the fundamental military
administrative and structural entity. These last words
of mine would serve to loosen the knot that had been
forged. The Emperor, I saw, reversed himself, opening
the way out of this intricate situation.249
At this point the Tsar decided not to change the existing
number and structure of divisions and to have four battalions in each
regiment, with four companies in each battalion. However, the
critical question of corps commander subordination -- to the Tsar, to
the War Minister, or to the military district commander -- which
would determine the wartime effectiveness of the military districts
was left open, with the Grand Dukes suggesting that "only corps
commanders who were not members of the royal family should be
subordinated to the military district commander.""0 Tsar Aleksandr
was inclined to accept the proposal of his fellow nobles as a
satisfactory compromise; but did not explicitly do so at this time.
On March 31, 1873 only the thorny issue of military district
command authority remained to be resolved at the fifth, and last,
'secret society' session.251 Tsar Aleksandr opened the discussions by
explaining the solution worked out the week before and recommending
it to the assembly. Immediately, however, Prince Bariatinskii arose
to challenge the proposal to subordinate corps commanders to military
district commanders as "an unsatisfactory waste of personnel" that
GBL. f. D. A. Miliutin. M. 7851, pp. 251-253; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 300-301.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy.... p. 301.





would only cause "the bureaucracy to predominate." The Grand Dukes
Mikhail and Nikolai Nikolaevich, quickly falling into line with
Prince Bariatinskii, then withdrew their previously agreed compromise
proposal.252 No documentation apparently exists detailing the ensuing
discussions, but the decisions reveal the fact that Organizatsionnaia
Commission recommendations, except about reserve and local troops,
were accepted. 253 In peacetime, army divisions would be subordinated
to the Emperor rather than to the corps commanders. The number of
war ready active troops deployed in the border regions would be
increased and the War Minister would have "supreme authority on all
military matters."254
The 'secret society' resolved that it was necessary to expand
the size of the active army "primarily by increasing the number of
new military units." New reserve units would be formed to help
mainly with rear services in wartime, but in peacetime only the
active units would have full cadres of personnel, while the reserve
units would have only an officer cadre along with all required
equipment. Local troops would be used in peacetime to maintain
internal security, and in wartime for logistics and reserve unit
training. 255 The 'secret society' avoided its avowed aim of creating
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 301.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy.. . . p. 302.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia.pp. 24-25.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 12-14;






a standing territorial array but, most importantly, established the
necessity for organizing the armed forces deployed throughout the
Empire in peacetime in the same manner as they would be employed in
wartime.
In the aftermath of the 'secret society' intrigues, the number
of active infantry divisions remained unchanged, with the exception
of the addition of one active division to the Caucasus Army. Each
division henceforward would be composed of two brigades, with two
regiments, each fielding four battalions of four companies. 256 This
left the size of the active Russian army unchanged, because each
regiment previously fielded three battalions with five companies
each. Save for one active division in the Caucasus Army, all other
divisions were maintained in peacetime cadre status, mainly due to
persistent severe financial constraints. The number and size of
cavalry divisions also remained unchanged, but each cavalry division
was separated into two brigades, with the first brigade led by the
division commander and the second by a designated brigade commander.
Artillery units were reformed into eight-battery brigades, with four
batteries assigned to each division. 257 Concerning the key issue of
the appropriate length of conscript active military service, the
'secret society' participants concluded that six years was the
appropriate length of time for military service.258
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...p. 14.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 15-17;
also Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... pp. 302-303.





While the 'secret society' determined that it was necessary in
peacetime to have active army corps in place in the border regions,
the members stipulated: "The corps commander in all relationships and
in all units is subordinate to the Supreme Commander [the Tsar] and
to the commander of the military district."25' For Miliutin, his
pyrrhic victory embodied in this decision must have been a real
disappointment, since the unity of command problem was not resolved.
However, his new system of army organization was preserved, albeit in
a modified form, and the overall role of the military district
commanders was strengthened260 -- for the interim.
Crown Prince Aleksandr Aleksandrovich's prophetic diary entry
on the concluding day of the 'secret society' meetings confirms the
persistence of the opposition that had coalesced against the Miliutin
military reforms. The future Tsar wrote: "I believe that there will
be changes still and that this decision has not been resolved
entirely."261 The distinguished Russian military historian General
P. A. Zaionchkovskii offers a most succinct, yet very telling,
conclusion about the Russian military transformation process:
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," p. 25;
see also Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno
Vysochaine utverzhdennym zakliucheniiam,
sostoiavshimsLa.p. 48, which reinforces this
important conclusion for the Main Staff; see also
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 303.
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 24-25;
see also Miliutin, "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine
utverzhdennym zakliucheniiam, ...," pp. 48-50.
TsGIAM. f. Aleksandra III, d. No. 77, Zapis'
31 marta 1873 g., p. 241; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... p. 303.
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... As a result of the secret society decisions, the
existing military organization system and command of the
army were maintained. However, all further measures to
strengthen the armed forces and to fortify the border
regions were brought to nought by severe financial
considerations .262
- The 1874 Military Conscription Law
Miliutin's reform program was consistent and comprehensive due
in large measure to his consummate bureaucratic skills and to the
continuity of his twenty-plus years in office, but owing as well to
his very progressive ideas concerning social equality, the importance
of mass education, and individual human dignity -- much of which was
codified implicitly within the late-18th century training manual by
Generalissimo Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov entitled Nauka pobedv.
Suvorov's enduring canon, Science of Victory, may be summarized in
seven main points:
1. In war morale is of immense importance. The principal
weapon is the man. All the men must strive for victory and
understand how to achieve it. ("Every soldier must understand
his maneuver.")
2. Victory is achieved by attacking and defeating the main
forces of the enemy.
3. One of the most essential conditions of victory is a swift
and sudden blow. ("Victory is decided by the legs; and the arms
are only instruments of victory.")
4. The bayonet charge plays the decisive role in crushing the
enemy.
5. A soldier must be trained only for what will be useful to
him on the battlefield. Everything likely to overburden him
must be cast aside. On the other hand, the soldier must be
trained to perfection. ("Hard on the training ground, easy in
battle.")
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. ... p. 304.
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6. Commanders must pay the utmost attention to the men's needs.
7. Soldiers must be trained to treat civilians and prisoners of
war kindly. ("Don't offend civilians. Treat prisoners kindly
and humanely. " )263
The preceding Suvorov principles had been misinterpreted and
denigrated by Russia's ruling nobility for nearly three-quarters of a
century. 264 Historian Michael Florinsky therefore judges that
"Miliutin's greatest achievement was the humanization of discipline,
the betterment of conditions of service, and the introduction of
conscription borne equally by all social groups."265
Despite, or perhaps in part because of, the deeply entrenched
civilian and military Imperial bureaucracy, Dmitrii Miliutin sought
to rectify the contradiction between the social stature of the
Russian military and the army's capability to effectively perform its
national security responsibilities. The principal mechanism for
making the required sharp break with past Russian social policy
-- described by William C. Fuller, Jr., as "Miliutin's greatest
achievement" -- was the Conscription Law of January 1, 1874. The
impetus for initiating Russian universal military conscription
derived neither from humanitarian concerns nor from libertarian
idealism. Rather, after Prussia decisively crushed Austria in 1866,
military pragmatism dictated that a failure to imitate Prussia,
Osipov, K., Suvorov. (Moscow: Foreign Language
Publishers, 1945), p. 60. This book presents an excellent
short English language biography of the legendary Russian
commander -- Generalissimo Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov.
Osipov, K., Suvorov. (Moscow, 1945), pp. 58-61.
265 Florinsky, p. 907.
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which would emerge as the dominant military force in the German
Empire by 1871, would risk future military disaster for Russia.266
The 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War had a most illustrative and
edifying impact on Russian thinking about future war. During the
course of that war, the decisive influence of improved-accuracy,
longer-range artillery on the outcome of battle repeatedly was
demonstrated. 267 The war also revealed that massive employment of
individual rifle fire succeeded in stopping infantry bayonet charges.
However, these revelations only belated would began to seriously
influence Russian military thought and combat operations.268
On November 7, 1870, War Minister Miliutin first suggested to
Tsar Aleksandr II the need to alter the Russian conscription laws in
a note entitled "O glavnykh osnovanniakh voennoi povinnosti" (About
the Main Basis for Military Duty). In the introduction of this
letter, Miliutin described his rationale for initiating universal
military service:
Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil
Rossii," p. 38 and pp. 61-71; see also Obruchev, N. N.,
"Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 14, in TsGVIA.
f. VUA: tiaterialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minvm
predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia.
3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g.. p. 80; also Fuller, p. 11.
For a War Ministry report, dated January 1, 1873, about
"the decisive significance, which artillery has shown on
battle results in the latest Prussian-French war," see
TsGVIA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L),
No. 18, p. 103; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.. . . p. 162.
Zeddler, V. , "Vliianie oruzhiia, zariazhaiushchegosia s
kazny, na boevuiu podgotovku pekhotyVoennvi sbornik.
No. 1, 1876, pp. 62-84; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.. .. p. 189.
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In recent years the occurrence of changes in almost all
European states in the organization of their armed forces
presents to them the capability, of not increasing the
numerical size of their armies in peacetime, [but] to
elevate them in wartime to enormous levels, raises the
question of accordingly strengthening our troops also.269
After developing this logic in detail, the conclusion of Miliutin's
letter offered a seven-point proposal, which Miliutin called "Proekt
osnovykh nachal polozheniia o lichnoi voennoi povinnosti" ("Draft
Basis to Begin Regulations on Personal Military Obligations").2'0
Upon review of Miliutin's proposal, on November 17, 1870
an Imperial Order was published announcing the formation of two
commissions: 1) for working out Regulations concerning Military
Obligations; and 2) for composing Regulations concerning Reserve,
Replacement, and Local Troops. Oversight of this new taxis, with its
potentially far-reaching implications, was vested in the War
Ministry, with Chief of the Main Staff Count Geiden chairing both
commissions. Membership included representatives from all main state
ministries. The Military Obligations Commission had as members War
Ministry representatives General-Majors Klugin, Obruchev, Anichkov,
and Annenkov; Navy representatives -- Kontr-Admiral Stetsenko and
Kapitan Pervogo Ranga Sveshnekov; Internal Affairs -- Semenov and
Makov; Finance Ministry -- Girs and Demontovich; and, somewhat later,
TsGIAL. f. Soveta ministrov. No. 1275, opis' 1,
d. No. 83, 1879 g., p. 25; see also GBL. f. D. A.
Miliutina. M. 10499; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennve reformv.... p. 304.
For a detailed enumeration of the seven points proposed
in Miliutin's "Draft Basis" for initiation of new
regulations on universal military service, see TsGIAL.
f. Soveta ministrov. d. No. 83, 1870 g., pp. 29-30; cited
in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... pp. 305-306.
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several army unit representatives joined in the discussions --
General-Adjutant Shnitnikov, Prince Masai'skii, General-Lieutenant
Sukhodol' skii , and General-Ma jor Zeime.271 As these commissions set
about their deliberations, on December 10, 1870 the issues of
universal military service and army reorganization initially were
discussed by the Council of Ministers. Miliutin noted about this
meeting in his Vospominaniia that the ministers "were not opposed to
the basic idea of the plan,"272 however, over the ensuing months and
years leading up to the 1873 'secret society' decisions, intense,
substantive opposition developed to proposed conscription reforms.
The first indications of the depth of this opposition to change
within the Council of Ministers came on December 20, 1870 in their
"fundamental directive": "... Substitution or excusal from military
service is not conceded. On what basis the presently existing
substitutions temporarily can be retained as a transition measure is
subject to decision.1,273
On January 5, 1871 the renamed "Commission for Creating New
Regulations Concerning Personal Military Obligations in the Empire
and in the Polish Kingdom" set to work with expanded civilian
representation, including industrialists Sazikov and Morozov, the
chief St. Petersburg politician Pogrebov, provincial representatives,
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 306.
GBL. f. D. A. Miliutina. M. 7850, p. 103; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. ... p. 306.
TsGIAL. f. Soveta ministrov. d. No. 83, 1870, p. 55;
cited in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 307.
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the director of the St. Petersburg Conservatory Azanchevskii, doctor
of philosophy Zeiberling, Professor Khvol'son, and Baron Gintsburg.
To facilitate their efforts to draft a recommendation for the Tsar,
the Commission was divided into four subcommissions and each were
assigned separate topics to investigate: 1) the length of service and
the privileges for fulfilling military duty; 2) induction age for
service, the call-up system, and conditions for initiating induction;
3) financial expenses of the induction system; and 4) voluntary
service and military substitutes. The essential issue the
Commission sought to resolve was the possibility of reducing the
existing army service obligation from 15 years, down to six years,
active duty (seven years for the navy), followed by nine years of
reserve duty.2'4 For two years this commission deliberated, labored
and pondered over its task of reforming the conscription system and
on January 19, 1873 finally concluded its efforts by presenting to
the State Council a broad recommendation for a plan to implement
"Statutes (Ustava) concerning military obligations and Regulations
(Polozheniia) concerning the state militia [territorial army]."275
The State Council, in turn, distributed the commission report
'for comment' to the ministerial departments and to senior-level
administrators. The planned statutes were subjected to extensive
individual modification -- depending on the whims and personal
proclivities of the individual reviewers -- as each 'fiefdom' sought
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 307-308.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 314;
For an account of the deliberations leading up to
the commission recommendation, see pp. 308-314.
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to protect its own interests. At the forefront of opposition to the
1873 draft statutes was Education Minister, Count D. A. Tol'stoi,
with whom War Minister Miliutin conducted an extensive dialogue in an
effort to ameliorate Tol'stoi's objections and to incorporate his
recommendations concerning the curtailment of military service
obligations in exchange for completion of education.'76 Miliutin at
long last was able to deliver the revised statutes concerning
military duty to the State Council on March 6, 1873. Along with the
statutes Miliutin sent a brief note stating that he concurred in the
changes which, in reality, altered only minor details and not the
overall substance of his proposed conscription reform.277
On April 2, 1873 the War Ministry's revised plan for military
service statutes evoked a "heated debate" during discussions in a
'special session' of the State Council that was chaired by Grand Duke
Konstantin Nikolaevich, and which included important members of the
royal family, along with State-Secretary Baluev, the ministers of
court, war, finance, internal affairs, education, navy, the chief of
police, the counselor for Polish Kingdom affairs, and the state
internal affairs counselor, Prince Gorchakov. 278 Prince Gorchakov
called the proposed "gradual implementation" of the conscription
reforms a "dangerous reversal of the people's existence" which would
"rapidly raise the education level of the population." Gorchakov
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educated nor as amenable to change as the Prussians and that, in his
opinion, it was preferable to "call into the army ranks young people
who were not bound by thoughts about the necessity to fulfil military
duties, [who] never have any anxiety about their unsatisfactory new
situation....
General Miliutin's rejoinder apparently eliminated concerns
about any adverse impact on army discipline that might be caused by
broadened educational opportunities, and Gorchakov received no
support from the other meeting participants. At the conclusion of
the State Council 'Osobogo prisutstviia,' the most important changes
to the commission plan for introducing new military service laws and
regulations were: 1) the period of service in the navy and separate
localities was established at 10 years, following seven years of
active service and three years in the reserves; 2) for individuals
who completed a higher course of education, the period of active
service was shortened from 10 to 6 months; 3) for volunteers who had
completed middle school, the service obligation remained at 6 months;
4) the retirement age was reduced from age 40 to age 38; 5) the
special restrictions concerning military service by people of the
Jewish faith were removed; and finally, the total length of active
and reserve duty for those individuals who completed middle or higher
education courses was set at 15 years.280
TsGIAL. f. Osobogo prisutstviia o voinskoi povinnosti,
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Tsar Aleksandr still had to approve the Gosudarstvenii Sovet
decisions and, unfortunately, Education Minister D. A. Tol'stoi was
not particularly well satisfied with the outcome of the 'special
session.' Tol'stoi renewed his struggle against the statutes by
blatantly contriving an outrageously lengthy list of conditions and
requirements that he wanted incorporated before he would support the
conscription reform law. Baron Del'vig recalls in his memoirs that
Count Tol'stoi started with "52 printed pages of demands."281 The
essence of Tol'stoi's objective -- which delayed initiation of the
conscription law by over six months, in a running battle of letters
and arguments -- was to preserve the existing educational system,
which intentionally denied to the broad masses of the Russian
population the opportunity for more than basic reading and writing
skills, while excluding individuals with higher education from any
military service obligation.
As the dispute with Count Tol'stoi protracted and stalemated,
War Minister Miliutin's recourse was to write to Grand Duke
Konstantin Nikolaevich, the 'special session' chairman, charging that
Tol'stoi's demands "contain so much incorrect data and unfounded
arguments that it will be completely impossible to prepare
refutations in the short time available." 282 Konstantin Nikolaevich
apparently had experienced enough of Count Tol'stoi's maneuvering
delays, acted swiftly, and the very next day, on the morning of
281 Del'vig, Polveka russkoi zhizin.
(Moscow: Akademia, 1930), Vol. 2, p. 503.
282 GBL. f. D. A. Miliutina. M. 10502, Pis'mo Miliutina
vel. kn. Konstantinu Nikolaevichu ot 2 dekabria 1873 g.;
cited in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 327.
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December 3, 1873, Tsar Aleksandr II approved the planned universal
military service statutes -- before the whole State Council could
even began discussions on them later that day.283 Since Miliutin
could not have been looking forward to the bitter confrontations and
imminent contested defense of his conscription reform proposal before
the whole State Council, he obviously was quite relieved to have the
deadlocked military service issue decided, and exclaimed in his
Dnevnik this day: "Dai bog, chtoby tak bylo!" --("Thank God, that
this was so! " ).284
Still, throughout the month of December hearings before the
State Council were held -- even though the Tsar's decision made them
largely irrelevant, save as a political stage and public rostrum --
and it was not until January 1, 1874 that Tsar Aleksandr II confirmed
his approval of the "Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti" (Military Service
Law) before the assembled State Council and signed the manifesto
putting that law into effect.285 As a result of the 1874 law on
universal military conscription, General Miliutin individually, and
the entire Russian people more particularly, won an epic battle for
social progress and equality.
The fundamental concept of Miliutin's 1874 military service law
was to substitute the large and costly standing Imperial Army with a
considerably smaller cadre force, possessing significant trained
reserves that could be mobilized for wartime service. Under the new,
283 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . . . p. 328.
284 GBL. f. D. A. Miliutina. M. 7852, p. 66; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy..., p. 328.
285 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy.... p. 331.
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universal conscription law, Russian military service became the
personal legal obligation of every able-bodied male, regardless of
social status, upon reaching age twenty. Six years of active service
were to be followed by nine years of service in the army reserve,
followed by five more years of service in the militia --a total of
twenty years of mandatory service to the state. The reserve and
militia units, however, only would be called to active duty in the
case of national emergencies. 286 Unique to these lengthy terms of
service, the 1874 law deducted time from the required service period
based upon the educational level attained by the recruit:
The higher the level of education, the shorter the term
of service with the colors. The conscription law, then,
was both an act of military reform and an act of social
reform, since Miliutin hoped with its aid to drive the
peasantry of Russia into the schools. The act of 1874
was the quintessential illustration of Miliutin's
reformism: while using the resources of the Empire to
modernize the army, Miliutin also wished to use the
resources of the army to modernize the Empire.28'
In practice, there were numerous loopholes in the 1874 Law
on universal military service. Not all twenty-year-old males were
drafted. Instead, each individual was categorized according to his
family status (for example: single, married, only son), and selection
for active service was made by a lottery drawing that inducted men in
the order in which their number was drawn until the annual quota was
filled. Special privileges were given to 'educated' individuals who
held academic diplomas. Elementary school graduates were required to
"Zakliucheniia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...pp. 3-4
and pp. 13-14; see also Florinsky, p. 908.
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serve only four years; secondary school graduates served from three
years down to eighteen months, depending on the stature of the
institution at which they had been matriculated; and completion of
higher education was rewarded with a brief six-month service
obligation. Further, if graduates of secondary and higher schools
volunteered for military duty, their terms of service were halved
--a very brief three-month military service 'respite' for the
university graduates who, anyway, tended to belong to the nobility
and proprietary classes.288
Therefore in reality, and despite Miliutin's best intentions,
which did in fact give to the only-recently-freed serfs an incentive
and opportunity for some upward social mobility, the obligation for
military service continued to fall most heavily upon the uneducated
peasantry. Yet, during the first seven years after its
implementation, the 1874 Law on Military Conscription succeeded in
raising by over 50 percent the number of individual Russians who
received a basic education and in creating an expanded military
reserve available for wartime mobilization289 -- just as Generals
Miliutin and Obruchev originally had intended and proposed. The
following table documents this progress:
288 Florinsky, p. 908.
289 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 334;
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DATA on 1874 Universal Military Service Law Implementation
TOTAL RELEASED RELEASED
YEAR CALLED-UP (familv reasons) (exam receiptI
1874 724648 369570 935
1875 693367 353990 747
1876 677096 348298 842
1877 689825 349975 756
1878 758750 399492 750
1879 774661 401962 556
1880 808683 422136 516
DEFERRED DEFERRED INDUCTED INTO
YEAR (training) (marriage) ARMY RANKS
1874 1752 310 150000
1875 1904 276 180000
1876 2239 291 196000
1877 2545 277 218000
1878 2616 311 218000
1879 2626 214 218000
1880 2780 195 235000
Moreover, in 1875 General Miliutin initiated a training program for
new recruits that schooled them not only in the martial arts and unit
tactics, but also began to give them rudimentary reading and writing
skills. This new military emphasis on the completion of an
education, accompanied by the softening of brutal discipline, the
shortening of terms of service, and the improvement of living
conditions, made the Imperial Army into an experimental vehicle for
the betterment of the Russian masses.
Stoletii Voennogo ministerstva. 1802-1903.
(St. Petersburg, 1914), Vol. 4, Part 3, Book 1,
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By the end of Draitrii A. Miliutin's distinguished and lengthy
term of office in 1881, the Imperial Russian Army was no longer a
hated penal institution. Indeed, men with criminal records were
specifically excluded from military service. Although hardly
universally welcomed by members of the old Russian military
aristocracy, the significance of the Miliutin reforms cannot be
exaggerated. Professor Michael T. Florinsky summarized the
contradictory significance of these innovative military reforms most
clearly when he wrote: "Strange as this may seem, it was in the
army, that stronghold of tradition and conservatism, that Russian
democracy scored one of its first modest, yet real, successes."291
The best examination of military reform is, naturally, war.292
- General P. A. Zaionchkovskii
... Against us will be all of Europe.293
- General N. N. Obruchev
Florinsky, p. 909.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 338.
Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 35, in
TsGVIA. VUA: Materialv sekretnvkh soveshchanii.... p. 91.
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The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878):
The Outcome and Lasting Significance
The 1877 failures perhaps yielded more uses than would have been brought forth
by one brilliant success, which would have hidden our deficiencies.29'
- Colonel Pavel A. Geisman
As indicated by Colonel Geisman's pensive statement, the
greatest long-term significance of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War
lay in the influence that a series of crushing defeats had on the
thinking of the Russian Army leadership -- even though, ostensibly,
Russia 'won' the war, which was concluded by the Treaty of San
Stefano on February 19, 1878.295 As a result, Bulgaria was freed from
the 'Ottoman Yoke,' while Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro obtained
their full independence, but at a truly frightful cost of Russian
lives and the virtual destruction of the Russian economy.
During the remainder of the 19th century and well into the
beginning of the 20th century, the military failures inflicted major,
detrimental political, diplomatic, and economic consequences on the
Russian Empire. However, within the War Ministry and Main Staff, the
military defeats ignited an unprecedented introspective comprehensive
Voennve besedy. isvolnennve v Shtabe voisk gvardii i
Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga v 1895-1896 gg. . No. XVI,
(St. Petersburg, n.d.), p. 158; cited in Zhilin, P. A.,
ed., Russkaia voennaia mysi': konets XIX - nachalo XX v. .
(Moscow, Nauka, 1982), p. 44.
For an excellent, concise, and well-documented analysis
and description of Russian combat operations during the
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, complete with maps of the
major campaigns, see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets
before Bullets: The Russian Imperial Army, 1861-1914.
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992),
pp. 51-86.
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investigation and analysis, not just of the causes of these Russian
military failures, but of the very nature of warfare itself. The
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 thus constituted a virtual turning
point in Russian military thinking, after which previous 'ad hoc'
preparation for warfare was no longer acceptable and systematic,
dialectic historical research was adopted as essential for the
discovery and rigorous application of 'fundamental laws of warfare'
to all military activities.
In 1879, at the instigation of General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, the
General Staff Historical Commission was created under the direction
of General-Major Zykov (after 1885, under General-Major Domontovich).
For 32 years, between 1879 and 1911, the historical commission
conducted exhaustive investigations of Russian military preparation
for war. Sbornik materialov po russko-turetskoi voine 1877-1878 gg.
no Balkanskom poluostrove. the largest publication ever printed in
Tsarist Russia, was completed in 1911, incorporating 500,000
documents culled from the army division level to the General Staff
level and compiled into 97 volumes and 112 books. The underlying
assumption concerning future war preparation was then, and continues
to be to the present day, that only through the 'correct'
interpretation and application of 'laws of warfare' can Russian
security be ensured."6
Russian involvement on the Balkan Peninsula stemmed from its
long historic, political and religious ties with their fellow Slavs,
particularly with the Serbs. In the 1860s and 1870s, especially to
Zhilin, p. 38-39.
134
the time of the assassination of Serbian Prince Mikhail Obrenovic in
1868, a rising wave of Pan-Slavism actively promoted the creation of
an enlarged Slavic state in the Balkans by incorporating Montenegro
and Bulgaria under Serbian auspices and Russian protection. In 1875
the Balkan crisis erupted anew, when Slavic peasants in Bosnia-
Herzegovina revolted against their Muslim landlords, and Turkish
troops forcefully suppressed them. In Russia, this action by their
longstanding Turkish enemy caused angry indignation and swelling
public pressure for the independence of the Balkan Slavs. Thus,
"during the spring of 1876, when Turkish irregulars massacred as many
as 30,000 Bulgarians,"297 who had joined the insurrection against the
Turks, Russian Pan-Slav "agitation reached a fever pitch" as "retired
and furloughed Russian officers entered Serbian military service."298
Although Serbia and Montenegro went to war with Turkey in the
summer of 1876, the Serb resistance quickly collapsed, which caused
Russia to force an armistice on Turkey in October 1876. In January
1877 Turkey rejected outright the recommendation of the 'Great Power'
conference held in Constantinople at the end of 1876, which proposed
the creation of autonomous Christian provinces in European Turkey.
Despite ensuing, frantic diplomatic activity to preclude war, which
resulted in the London Protocol of March 1877, Romania agreed to
permit Russian troops to transit across its territory on April 4.
On April 12, 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey.299
Menning, Bayonets before Bullets.... pp. 51-52.
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In 1877 the Russian Army was not numerically inferior to the
Turkish Army, but the Russian Army suffered from very grievous
shortcomings. Neither the 1873 'secret society' army reorganization
decisions nor the 1874 conscription reforms, which sought to improve
both the quality and effectiveness of the Russian military system,
had been implemented fully by the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War.
This resulted in a severe shortage of Russian reserve officers and
trained cadres. Russian Army rearmament had not been completed
either. This caused the majority of the infantry to continue to be
armed with the old-fashioned muzzleloading rifles and the field
artillery to be equipped with antiquated smooth-bore cannon. The
majority of Turkish units had modern rifled weapons. 300 In Bruce W.
Menning's considered judgement, the extended Battle of Plevna was,
... an epic confrontation ... between Russian and Turk
for Balkan hegemony. More than any other set of
circumstances, it was Plevna that would reveal the
yawning gap between offense and defense opened by changes
in technology, including chiefly the widespread adoption
of breechloading rifles.301
Russian medical and supply services were still as inefficient
as ever, even with Miliutin's reform efforts. These organizational
failures were compounded by inadequate railroads and highways in the
theaters of operations, and by ever-lengthening communication lines,
which naturally increased as the Russian Army pushed forward into the
Balkan Peninsula. Not least among the multitude of Russian Army
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv 1860-1870 godov v




difficulties was their lack of good military leaders arid the absence
of unity of command. 302 Between June and December 1877, with Tsar
Aleksandr himself, and the Imperial Court, continuously present at
the European Front, field commanders deferred all complicated
strategic decisions to Imperial Headquarters, where the 'power
politics' of court intrigue tended to take precedence over sound
military decisions, or to winning the war.303
The most glaring deficiency of the Russian Army -- and
certainly the one that caused the most casualties to the maneuver
columns and the attack 'lines' -- was in applied tactics. The
Russian field commanders pressed the offensive, misapplying their
rote erroneous interpretations of Suvorov's attack formations, by
using 'decisive' infantry bayonet charges, unsupported by artillery
or rifle fire, against fortified enemy positions defended with
superior weaponry. The Russian high command ignored the impact that
technological innovation had made on warfare during the century which
had elapsed since the time when Suvorov's aggressive tactics had
succeeded so brilliantly.30"
The army reorganization approved by the 'secret society' had
not been implemented -- save for the development of a mobilization
plan. At the end of 1875, a special army mobilization committee was
created, composed of heads of all main directorates of the War
Ministry and chaired by Chief of the Main Staff Count Geiden, for
302 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . pp. 345-346.
303 Florinsky, pp. 1002-1003.
304 Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv. . . . pp. 346-348; see
also Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets.... pp. 39-48.
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the sole purpose of resolving three specific tasks: first, to clarify
systematically all data and information concerning the preparation of
active army personal and unit equipment; second, to investigate
problem areas and to direct corrective measures that had to be taken
in order to remove any deficiencies discovered; and third, to create
a "complete mobilization plan."305
During the early months of 1876, the mobilization committee
completed its first two tasks, and, not later than May 1876, was to
present to the War Ministry its final "complete mobilization plan."
However, in the spring of 1876, the exigencies of the growing threat
of war caused the committee to redirect its work from mobilization
planning toward actual war preparations. In the summer of 1876,
Mobilization Directive No. 6 was published as a plan for calling up
and equipping reserve units as well as for moving soldiers, horses,
and equipment to forward concentration areas by railroad. Included
in this directive was a compilation of data on the wartime logistic
requirements for ten of the military districts. The most important
measure taken to ensure a successful mobilization, however, was the
October 16, 1876 publication of the "Law concerning Military-Horse
Obligations" which stipulated that in the case of war "all horses fit
for military service were subject to mobilization with corresponding
compensation to their owners."306
TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva.
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At the end of 1876 -- in accordance with the 'secret society'
decisions -- the Russian Army was organized into six army corps and,
with the completion of the mobilization, during the course of 1877 an
additional nine army corps were formed. Each of the 15 active army
corps fielded between two and three infantry divisions, one cavalry
division, and an artillery brigade. The greatest command difficulty
was not in forming the army corps themselves -- plenty of raw peasant
'line' (riadovoi) manpower was available -- but in finding qualified
reserve officers to lead the troops of the newly formed units into
battle.
In anticipation of the increased wartime requirement for
officers, at the end of 1875, Miliutin initiated three measures that
resulted in expansion of the officer corps by a total of 5805 men.
Miliutin ordered: 1) the call-up of 2555 retired officers; 2) the
early graduation of 2515 students from the junker schools; and 3) the
promotion of 700 sergeants and non-commissioned officers to the
officer ranks, without an examination. Still, throughout the war the
Russian Army suffered from a severe officer shortage -- all officers,
let alone 'qualified' officers -- particularly in the 'line' infantry
battalions, which incurred the heaviest combat casualties.30'
Miliutin's efforts to establish a functional reserve officer
cadre failed because insufficient manpower and financial resources
were committed to the objective until it was too late to be
accomplished, at any cost. He had first proposed a reserve officer
TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii. Voennogo ministerstva.
No. 1 (L), opis' 2-La, d. No. 25, pp. 40-42; cited in
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cadre in his January 15, 1862 report to the Tsar. That the Russian
mobilization succeeded in organizing such a large force so quickly
was primarily the result of the existence of the military district
system and the fact that in 1874 Miliutin formed in each military
district a "mobilization institute" and required all unit commanders
to attend the course.308
Paradoxically, the most glaring deficiency of the mobilization
process also originated from the manner in which the military
district system was organized. The Field Regulations directed that
all supplies for an army would be provided through the frontier
military districts:
With the movement of the army beyond the borders of the
Empire, when management of bringing in supplies through
the frontier military district directorates will be
inconvenient for the field directorates, as a matter of
necessity local intendancy, artillery, and engineer
directorates will be established in areas occupied by the
army, which are to be titled appropriately for that city
or point where they are located.309
Unfortunately, the Field Regulations neither stipulated how, nor by
whom, these field logistics and supply directorates would be created
nor to whom they would be subordinated --to the military district
commander or to the War Ministry? And, as a result, "during the
initial period of war no local directorates were created and the
field armies had no supply bases."310
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It was not until the end of September 1877 -- nearly ten months
after the Russian Army initially began its mobilization -- that
General Drentel'n succeeded in organizing the 'rear services'
directorate. Only in November 1877 was a local supply directorate
established in Bucharest, Romania; and in December 1877 -- when the
war was within a month of conclusion -- was a supply directorate
organized in northern Bulgaria. In sum, throughout the Russo-Turkish
War, the Russian Army logistics system, if indeed it remotely could
be called a system, was in chaos.311 Yet, Professor Bruce Menning's
description of the significance of the final campaign of the war is
most illuminating regarding the innate ability of the Imperial Army
to improvise and to learn from its experiences:
Overall, in the trans-Balkan campaign the Russians had
recouped their fortunes by accomplishing one of the most
daring feats in modern military history. They had driven
the elements of three large columns (Gurko, Kartsov,
Radetskii) through the Balkans under conditions which saw
trails covered with ice and snow measuring up to four
meters in depth. They had utilized surprise and turned
to their advantage both superiority in numbers and
failure of the Turkish field forces to assure one another
mutual support. In most cases the Russians had overcome
strong defensive positions either by envelopment or by
maneuver. In a word, the Russians had convincingly
overcome the paralysis of Plevna.312
General Dmitrii A. Miliutin's January 1, 1879 annual report to
Tsar Aleksandr II genteelly summarized the gravely deplorable combat
condition of the Russian Army. The War Minister wrote:
Any war, essentially, summons forth a striving toward
transformation and improvement in the construction and
upkeep of the armed forces: it suggests the best means in
order to control [that which] already has been done and
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 350.
Menning, pp. 77-78.
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the best indications of those notions that are still to
be done. In this regard the experience of the
immediately past war must not pass without leaving a
trace for our army. . . ,313
As early as January 1, 1878, however, General Miliutin had rather
candidly expressed his dissatisfaction with what could only be
labeled politely as "serious deficiencies in combat capability" when
he wrote: "The present campaign also revealed several imperfections
of our troops' tactical training."3U In another report Miliutin
stated his misgivings somewhat more objectively and forcefully:
It is impossible not to confess, that our infantry,
although with a glorious concluding campaign, and taught
'by the book' using information published up to the
Franco-Prussian War, displayed [its] customary 'first
class,' not considering rapid-firing weapons tactics.315
Revised and improved troop training became a main focus of the
Russian Army leadership at the end of the war, and therefore between
1879 and 1880 the "Main Committee for Troop Formation and Training"
was tasked to prepare new infantry and cavalry combat regulations
concerning "instruction of active companies and battalions in
battle." In 1879 the committee recommended that the company become
the "principal tactical entity" in combat and that all companies in
the attack 'line' fire once at the enemy from a distance of 800 paces
TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva.
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before initiating the 'decisive' bayonet charge. This was heresy to
the traditional Russian infantry attack concept and the pages of
Voennvi sbornik subsequently became the battleground of a debate
between the reformers of the committee and General M. I. Dragomirov,
the stalwart proponent of the traditional Russian 'line' tactics and
frontal bayonet assaults.
Dragomirov was renowned for his emphasis on three key elements
of combat tactics, as enshrined in his book Zapiski taktiki dlia
voennvkh uchilishch. (St. Petersburg, 1866), which were close order
maneuver, decisive bayonet attack, and soldier self-sacrifice.316
Characteristically, at a time when technological change had revealed
new conditions of warfare that demanded far greater independent
action by individual soldiers to achieve battlefield success,
Dragomirov evaded the issue of combat casualties and advocated the
maintenance of the existing Russian combat tactics -- employing the
same stereotyped infantry formations that he had dictated in his
book. Dragomirov wrote:
The customary performance by our troops in the last war,
which did not fully account for rapid-firing weapons
tactics, is unjustly described by the regulations....
It is impossible not to remark about a matter that is
not in the regulations, such as the use of troops for
peacetime occupations.31'
Other authors, published in this same Voennvi sbornik. No. 3,
1879, such as 28th Division Commander, General-Lieutenant Brand,
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suggested that the new regulations did not go far enough in changing
infantry combat tactics to account for rapid-fire weapons and for
their impact on the changing nature of warfare. Without exception,
however, the authors disagreed with the committee's proposal for the
infantry to shoot only once at a distance of 800 steps as being
"unacceptable." As a result of this blatant, continuing lack of
Imperial Russian Army leadership consensus, neither new infantry nor
new cavalry regulations were officially adopted before 1881.318
Despite changes in the overall manner of infantry training, the
combat preparation of the Russian Army continued to have serious
deficiencies that were demonstrated during the 1880 field maneuvers
of the Warsaw and Vil'no military districts. The War Ministry
report stated:
By outward appearance, combat training, material
equipment, and general technical preparation the troops
in both districts are in excellent condition; concerning
the actual maneuvers, the majority of senior commanders
up to and including the regimental commanders showed
unfamiliarity with command functions, not knowing how to
use local objects, the peculiarities of special weapons
types, the special characteristics of cavalry, and to
maintain constant communication with the combat units.319
As demonstrated by these maneuvers, at least, twenty-four years of
Miliutin's military reform efforts and the humbling Russo-Turkish war
experiences were all for nought -- the Imperial Russian Army remained
bound by tradition and seemingly was totally incapable of adapting to
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 357.
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a new military art. Emerging technologies were dictating that for
soldiers to survive, let alone to win, on the battlefields during any
future war, a transformation was vital.
The immediate aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War experience
revealed clearly that the Russian Army was incapable of conducting
successful wartime operations against an alliance of opponents in a
'big European war.' The most important change indicated was in the
organization and employment of reserve forces, which the 1873 'secret
society' decisions had determined would be formed only in wartime for
providing logistic support to the active army. The Russo-Turkish War
demonstrated that reserve units were required to reinforce active
units during combat operations and that, in peacetime, it was
essential to maintain an active reserve cadre upon which to expand
the army in wartime. 320 This determination resulted in the
introduction on August 15, 1878 of new "Regulations on Reserve
Infantry Troops," which stipulated that the reserve infantry would be
employed to "reinforce the active army by maintaining garrisons in
fortresses and other fortified points and by employment for local
internal service."321
Further, the 1878 "Regulations" provided for the maintenance,
in peacetime, of 96 separate infantry battalions with five companies
of 80 soldiers each -- a total of 400 men per battalion. In wartime,
it was planned that each company would expand into a whole battalion
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformy. . .. p. 351.
Polnoe sobranie zakonov. 2-e sobranie, 1878, No. 58805;
cited in Zaionchkovskii, Voennve reformv.... p. 351.
145
forming a total of 480 battalions; of which 384 battalions would be
organized into 96 infantry regiments, creating a total of 24 reserve
infantry divisions. Thus, the new regulations planned for the
expansion of the Russian Army from 48 active peacetime divisions to
72 wartime infantry divisions -- a 50 percent increase in strength,
or some 500,000 soldiers. Then between 1878 and 1880 all infantry
regiments were reorganized into the four-battalion structure, as
originally approved by the 'secret society' in 1873. In January 1879
Miliutin proposed that a total of 2,100,000 reservists were required
in order to reinforce the active army and to defend Russia in the
event of a 'big European war.' Later the State Council revised this
figure downward to 1,700,000 reservists because the Council judged
that a larger reserve force would have necessitated the "complete
reconstruction of the cadre array."322
At the end of 1880 a new mobilization plan, designated No. 8,
was published which specified the order in which 825,000 reservists
would be called to active duty, forming a wartime army of 1,425,000
soldiers. This same plan provided for the further expansion of the
wartime Russian Army to a grand total of 2,350,000 troops through
subsequent mobilizations. The main problem with Plan No. 8 was that
by the end of 1880 there were only 1712 officers and generals in the
whole Russian Army and the new mobilization plan required 19,000
officers for its execution. 323 This terrible plan deficiency was
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 352.
TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva.
No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 31, pp. 13-14; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 353.
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recognized in advance by the War Ministry, and at the beginning of
1880 new "Regulations concerning Officer Reserves" were introduced
that required all officers to serve in the reserves following
completion of their active tours of duty. There continued, however,
to be a severe shortage of officers, and the new 1880 "Regulation"
did not even begin to address the most serious problem, which was the
continuing poor quality of reserve officers. Overall, during the
immediate post-war period many of the 1873 'secret society' decisions
were belatedly implemented -- with one major exception. By the time
War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin left office in 1881, not one of the
recommended strategic railroad lines, so meticulously designed and
justified by General N. N. Obruchev, for connecting the European
military districts had been constructed -- not one.32"
For the Russian military the costly, indeed embarrassing,
'victory' over Turkey presaged an extended period of extreme fiscal
austerity. After the inauguration of Tsar Aleksandr III in 1881, the
priority of army equipment modernization, which the senior military
leaders so strongly desired and the Russian Army so badly required,
was reduced and became exceedingly difficult. Immediately after the
Russo-Turkish War, however, during the three years while Tsar
Aleksandr II still ruled the Empire, the Russian Army retained its
top priority in the state budget queue.
Combat action during the Russo-Turkish War had proven that the
Russian artillery, in particular, was inferior in range and rate of
fire to that of contemporary European states. Thus, only half way
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv. . . . p. 353.
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into the war, on July 24, 1877 a special commission, chaired by
General Barantsev, was organized to address the problem of weapons
modernization. General Barantsev's commission quickly came up with a
three-year plan on October 2, 1877 to modernize the whole Russian
field artillery by replacing the existing four-pound cannon with 3550
new nine-pound Maievskii cannons that had a superior range and rate
of fire. 325 However, because of production difficulties and inferior
workmanship at the Obukhovsk factory, by January 1, 1881 only 276 of
the 358 active artillery batteries were rearmed. None of the reserve
artillery batteries had received the new cannons. 326 Barantsev's plan
also called for increasing the quantity of heavy fortress artillery
to 4567 cannons, but in the January 1, 1881 inventory of fortress
artillery there were only 3838.327 The major success of the Russian
Army rearmament program was due to the mechanization of domestic
rifle production process in the late 1870s, which greatly increased
annual rifle production output. As a result, by 1881 all active and
reserve infantry units were reequipped with new small-caliber
firearms with greatly improved the accuracy and rate of fire. At the
end of 1880 the Russian Army firearm inventory was as follows:
TsGVIA. f. komissii do perevooruzheniiu polevoi
art illerii. No. 514, d. No. 1, pp. 140-150; cited in
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TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennopo ministerstva.
No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 31, p. 133; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy. .. . p. 355.
327 TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva.
No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 31, p. 142; cited in
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1880 Russian Army Firearm Inventory
In Military Units In Reserve
Small-Caliber rifles




















nBrand New" Rifles 40,817 116,943
328
Because of the imminent military austerity period, it is important to
note that by 1881 not all army units were standardized with the
small-caliber Berdan rifles and that the rapid-firing magazine-fed
infantry weapons, which then were being introduced into the armies of
the other European states, still had not been purchased for the
Russian Army -- nor would they be for some time.329
In sum, following the assumption of the Russian throne and the
historic 'Crown of MonomakA'by Aleksandr III, in 1881 a financially
constrained period for the Russian Army was ushered in. During the
last two decades of the 19th century, the Russian officer corps was
caused to turn inward and introspectively to look at their entire
method of conducting military operations. In turn, this intellectual
investigation of alternatives led to innovative, even brilliant,
328 TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennopo ministerstva.
No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 31, p. 126; cited in
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... p. 355.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv.... pp. 355-356.
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Russian military conceptual thought, especially within the General
Staff and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. 330 Military
theoreticians investigated the entire spectrum of military strategy,
science, art, and tactics that, in essence, continue to be the basic
foundation for current Russian military thinking.331
At the end of the XIX - beginning of the XX centuries,
special branches of military-scientific knowledge
developed significantly: military administration,
military geography and military statistics, military
pedagogics, military-technical disciplines. Russian
military theoreticians engaged themselves very broadly
concerning the question of military administration.
Through their determination, this branch of military
scientific knowledge began to investigate the following
questions: array organization, its composition, military
command arrangements, individual service requirements,
measures for securing internal order and discipline in
the troops and, finally, satisfaction of army material
requirements.332
The dependence of army composition, organization, and
continuation of military service on state and social
order and economic reserves was perceived.333
The question of army mobilization and mobilization work
in unit departments received great attention in the study
of military administration.334
For a comprehensive history of the Russian General Staff
and analysis of the military intellectual debates during
the last half of the 19th century, see Erickson, John,
"'New Thinking', Old Habits," in "Tsars, Generals,
Commissars: The Russian General Staff 1716-199?,"
(Edinburgh, Scotland, [Unpublished Manuscript], 1994).
Zhilin, pp. 172-173.
Makshcheev, F. A., "Voennaia administratsiia kak predmet
izucheniia v akademiiRusskii invalid. No. 231, 1901,
p. 232.
Lobko, P., Organizatsiia voisk. (St. Petersburg, 1883),
p. 2.
334 Ridiger, A. F., Komplektovanie i ustroistvo vooruzhennoi
silv. (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 543-565.
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It was the failures of the Russian Army against the Turkish
Army in 1877-1878 -- coming as they did some twenty years after all
too similar Crimean War disasters, and, during the intervening years,
General Dmitrii A. Miliutin's army reform efforts -- that prepared
the stage at the close of the 19th century for the determined
intellectual effort by the Russian military to find and to alleviate
the causes of these gross failures that continually undermined
Russian national security.
The 1890s Russian Military Renaissance:
Technological Modernization and Military Science
Tekhiiicheskii progress revoliutsioniziroval vse voennaia delo.
(Technical progress revolutionized all military matters.)
- Frederick Engels
Hindsight usually sharpens perceptions, and in retrospect the lessons of the
Russo-Turkish War seem neither so obscure nor so controversial that they could
not have been systematically studied to foster additional productive change
within the tsarist army. However, the complexities of modern armies are such
that perception of need is only one of a series of preconditions necessary for
constructive change and adaptation. To begin, some kind of permanent mechanism
must exist to study the past systematically for whatever lessons it might hold
for future combat. Then, another mechanism must exist to translate lessons
learned into changes of regulation and organization. Next, the political and
military leadership has to display sufficient awareness of the need for
constructive evolution in order to support change. Further, the leadership
must exhibit the will and determination to implement and supervise change. A
final important factor would be the existence of a disciplined and educated
corps of military professionals, officers and noncommissioned officers, to
oversee at all levels the actual implementation of change.33j
The initial investigations of the Russo-Turkish war focused on
the tactical battlefield changes required by all branches of arras,
the need for combat engineers, and the requirement to improve the
soldiers' level of training. By the turn of the century, the focus
expanded, under the rubric of military science, to include a broad
335 Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial
Russian Army. 1861-1914. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1992), p. 88.
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historical investigation of the influence of social, economic, and
political factors on the conduct of warfare. Particular initial
concerns were the alteration of military art for the conduct of
combat operations, the methods of accomplishing attacks, and the
proper role for accurate rifle and artillery fire during the course
of battle.
Writing in 1893 A. M. Zaionchkovskii discussed the results of
his studies of Russian infantry tactics before Lovchei, Plevna, and
Sheinovo. He found that the 'firing lines' were too crowded
together; that there had been only "weak preparation for the attacks
by rifle fire"; and especially, that "the infantry had begun
continuous bayonet attacks too early - - at a distance [from the
enemy] of nearly two versts."336 These antiquated tactics exposed the
advancing infantry to continual, withering defensive rifle and
artillery fire and resulted in enormous, unsustainable casualties.
Zaionchkovskii concluded, along with the other influential
Russian military theorists of that time such as Epanchin and
Martynov, that the most important tactical lesson of the war was the
need to reorganize infantry units so that attacks could be conducted
with the help of covering fires against enemy positions.33' Epanchin
espoused the critical requirement for better educated commanders who
knew how to concentrate their forces and to control the battle, since
Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Nastupatel'nvi boi do opvti
deistvii generala Skobeleva v srazheniiakh pod Lovchei.




at Plevna "huge masses of troops did not participate, occupying
themselves with work in the rear or -- in even greater error -- did
not participate in the main attack direction.""8
E. I. Martynov went even further, charging that the Russian
Army High Command was so incompetent and negligent that it wasted
forces and "practically had given up active operations on the Balkan
Peninsula during the siege of Plevna." 339 As a result of these
analyses, and others like them, new tactics were introduced into the
Russian Army which thinned out the infantry 'firing lines' so that
the soldiers did not make such a concentrated target for gunfire.
Improved communications were introduced between the commanders and
their troops. A growing ground-swell began to build within the
military intellectual cohort as "the majority of authors ... rejected
the decisive role of the bayonet attack."340 Unfortunately, neither
the Tsar nor his aristocratic senior military leaders understood the
necessity for change that emerging military technologies dictated.
Consequently, it would not be until the beginning of World War I that
appreciable changes in Russian Army tactics could and would be made.
At the end of the 19th century the Industrial Revolution was
well underway. With it came transmutations, which promoted a rapid
increase in scientific knowledge and elevated industrial production,
especially in the fields of railroad transportation, chemistry,
Obzor voin Rossii ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei.
(St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. 191-192.
Martynov, E. I., Blokada Plevnv: (Po arkhivnvm
materialam). (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 24-25.
Zhilin, p. 175.
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physics, electricity, radio, telegraphy, aeronautics, and metallurgy
-- all of which then were 'emerging technologies' to which the
Russian military, along with all other armies, had to adapt. Whereas
earlier in the 19th century the descending order of importance of the
military branches of arms was infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the
1.890s witnessed the accelerated ascending role of artillery and other
technically trained troops, as more effective, and lethal, forms of
combat were investigated, developed, and deployed. In addition, the
range, accuracy and firepower of infantry weapons began to increase
with the introduction of more powerful, smokeless gunpowder and the
improved ballistics of pointed bullets to small caliber (7.62mm),
magazine-fed (five rounds), bolt-action, rapid-firing rifles like the
1891 Mosin.
In 1895 the Russian Army began receiving the Belgian 7.62mm
Nagan revolver system and the development of an infantry automatic
weapon was initiated with machine pistols designed by V. G. Fedorov
and F. B. Tokarev. Also in 1895 the Russian Army adopted the French
Maxim machinegun system, but due to financial and political
constraints the field deployment of this 'emerging technology'
proceeded very slowly, almost leisurely, so that it was not until the
eve of the First World War that the Russian Army was able to deploy a
full total of eight machinegun regiments organized with 32
machineguns in each infantry division, and between six and twelve
machineguns per cavalry division.341
Zhilin, pp. 16-17.
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Russian "artillery was perfected" during the 1890s with the
development and initial deployment of more modern weapon types such
as the 3-inch (76ram) rapid-firing field cannon Model 1902, which had
a range of eight kilometers and a rate of fire of ten rounds per
minute. Both the Model 1902 field cannon and its predecessor, the
first Russian rapid-firing cannon, initially were developed at the
Mikhailovskii Artillery Academy, which had been founded in 1855
during the Crimean War.342
Additional Russian artillery systems under development at the
turn of the century included the 122mm light field howitzer Model
1909, and heavy field artillery such as the 107mm cannon Model 1910
and the 152mm howitzer Model 1910. Mountain artillery was also under
development, but only after the Russo-Japanese War revealed the
requirement for this artillery type was it deployed as the 76mm
cannon Model 1909. New fortress and siege artillery systems were
being investigated but, again, it was not until after the 1904-1905
Russo-Japanese War fiasco that they were placed into production
during the pre-World War I armaments build-up as the 152mm fortress
howitzer Model 1909; the 152mm siege cannon Model 1910; the 203mm
siege cannon Model 1911; and the 280mm siege mortar Model 1912.343
During the last decades of the 19th century, Russian scientists
-- along with a great number of renowned scientists world-wide --
were involved with the investigation, invention, and development of
Zhilin, p. 53.
Istoriia artillerii: Ot drevnikh vremen do Velikoi
Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii v Rossii.
(Moscow, 1952), p. 242.
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numerous technological breakthroughs that eventually would change
dramatically the entire form, nature, and means of future warfare:
V. V. Petrov created the electro-magnetic telegraph;
A. N. Lodygin developed the incandescent lamp;
P. N. Iablochkov invented the electric light. Russian
physicist A. S. Popov invented the radio. In 1895 he
demonstrated in St. Petersburg the world's first working
radio station and radio receiver. A. F. Mozhaiskii
patented the world's first aircraft in 1881.
N. E. Zhukovskii presented the basis for modern
hydro-aerodynamics. K. E. Tsiolkovskii developed
the theory of jet engines. N. N. Benardos and
N. G. Slavianov discovered the capability to arc-weld
metals. D. K. Chernov laid the foundation for modern
metallurgy.344
While such boastful Russian claims to the invention of all these
technological innovations cannot be factually proven, it would
perhaps be more objectively correct to state that noted Russian
scientists were participating in the investigation of these new
branches of science in last decades of the nineteenth century.
The invention of the gasoline-powered internal combustion
engine, however, altered irrevocably the future course of warfare.
The application of this new technology to vehicles opened the way,
not only for previously unattainable army maneuver capabilities, but
for the creation of armored vehicles and airplanes. In Russia the
development of armored vehicles did not begin until immediately prior
to World War I, but as early as 1902 motorized transport was deployed
with the Kursk and Kiev maneuver armies and then employed during the
Russo-Japanese War for purposes of communications, troop transfer,




principally, the integration of internal combustion engines into
airborne vehicles that truly revolutionized warfare by creating the
possibility for armed combat within a whole new dimension, wherein
time and space were compressed. The well-documented "world's first
manned, powered, sustained, and controlled flight by a heavier-than-
air vehicle" on December 17, 1903 by Dayton, Ohio's Orville Wright at
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina3''6 aside, the Russians continue to claim
that "A. F. Mozhaiskii invented and constructed the world's first
airplane. On August 1, 1882 the Mozhaiskii aircraft took off and
flew over the field."347
Mozhaiskii's apparent early Russian aeronautical success was
not, somehow, followed-up by any indigenous aircraft development.
Rather, Russian aeronautics tended to focus instead on the use of
tethered balloons (aerostati) for battlefield reconnaissance and the
use of dirigibles for ocean reconnaissance until well after the
Russo-Japanese War.
In 1884 a military commission chaired by General M. M. Boreskov
was established for the purpose of investigating "aeronautical
applications, pigeon-carried mail, and out-of-reach observation for
military objectives," and the first Russian aerostat development
program was undertaken. In 1890 Boreskov's commission issued its
report on "The Condition of Aeronautical Units," and only thereafter
was the deployment of aerostati begun within the army, initially for
Rhodes, Jeffrey P., "Up From Kitty Hawk,"
Air Force Magazine. December 1993, p. 23.
Zhilin, p. 21.
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observation purposes, and later to correct artillery fires.3'8
In the meantime, in 1885 the first military aeronautics command
cadre of twenty soldiers and two junior officers was created, and
these aerostat units began taking part in large-scale military
maneuvers in 1893 at Krasnoe Selo; the Kiev Military District in
1899; and at Kursk in 1902. Between 1894 and 1904 aeronautical units
were manned by a grand total of 2085 soldiers, and between 1888 and
1904 training was provided to 163 officers, of whom six were naval
officers, seven were from the Bulgarian Army, and one was a
Serbian.3''9 It was not until 1910 -- nearly thirty years after
Mozhaiskii's reported historic first flight and some seven years
after the Wright brothers' 1903 documented first flight -- that the
first Russian military aviation unit and officers' aeronautical
school was formed at Gatchina near Moscow.350
By the last decades of the 19th century, the fledgling field
deployment of new telegraph, telephone, and radio communications
technologies began to change the entire conduct of battle by greatly
facilitating 'real-time' military command and control. These new
communications technologies enabled the field commander to stay in
direct contact with his higher headquarters, and expanded the
information available both to the field commander and to his higher
Istoriia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR:
Po apkhivnvm materialam i svidetel'stvam sobremenikov.
Period do 1914 g.. (Moscow, 1944), p. 270.
Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk voennogo vozdukhoplavaniia
v Rossii. (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 144.
Zhilin, p. 20.
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headquarters upon which to make decisions, to issue direct orders to
subordinate units, and thereby to control the course of battles in a
more timely manner.
The first Russian Army application of these new means of
communication was during the Russo-Turkish War -- over twenty years
after the British and French succeeded in establishing a telegraph
link between London, Paris, and the Crimean Peninsula -- when a
100-verst-long (60 km) telegraph system was activated to link Russian
forward fortresses with their higher headquarters. In 1880 the first
Russian line to carry both telegraph signals and voice was
introduced. In 1884 telephones were first included in the Russian
communication units' table of equipment (ToE). And during the
ensuing years, telephones were installed inside the border fortresses
to direct artillery fire. By 1890 the Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk,
Novgorod, and Ivangorod fortresses had a total of 54 permanent and
22 temporary telephones. Although by 1904 each Russian division
deployed in the Far East had assigned four field telephones, and some
six kilometers of wire, it was only following the Russo-Japanese War
that telegraph and telephone communications entered into general
field use in the Russian Army.351
Since radio was the newest of the emerging communications
technologies, only during the winter of 1899-1900 was its Russian
inventor, A. C. Popov, able to put his radio to its first practical
use by establishing contact with the shipwrecked Russian battleship
IsCoriia otechestvennoi artillerii. (Moscow and
Leningrad, 1970), Vol. 2, Book 5, pp. 63-66.
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"General-Admiral Apraksin"; and then, following Popov's success,
between 1900 and 1904 a total of 54 radio sets for communication with
the Russian Fleet were installed at Kronshtadt.332
Combat engineering also received increased emphasis in Russian
military-technical thought. In 1893 the Nikolaev Engineering
Academy, which had been founded in 1855, was tasked to create a
military engineering educational program that would include in the
curriculum not only construction and demolition of fortifications,
but physics, chemistry, electricity, and mechanics. The Academy was
also tasked to study methods for integrating combat engineers
(sappers) with the other Russian Army branches -- infantry, cavalry,
and artillery.353
During this same time frame, totally new types of explosives
such as smokeless gunpowder, dynamite, and plastic were developed by
chemists. Both pressure-sensitive and insensitive demolition mines
were developed, as were anti-personnel shrapnel mines and electronic
detonators, which allowed for mine detonation on command at the
desired time without endangering one's own people. As a result of
the increased combat effectiveness of these new explosive
technologies and the increased educational emphasis that combat
engineering received, the number of sapper battalions in the Russian
Army slowly began to expand. By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese
War the Russian Army had 2500 sappers, and ended the war with some
Ocherki istorii tekhniki v Rossii. 1861-1917..
(Moscow, 1975), p. 184.
Zhilin, p. 54.
160
3500 engineering troops.35'* All these aforementioned 19th century
technical and weapons systems developments would have an immense
impact on the means of combat and on the organization of Russian
military forces -- eventually.
Stagnation of Applied Russian Military Art
Immense scientific and military-technical progress of the
Industrial Revolution increasingly was unveiled on the world's
battlefields. Yet, prevailing Russian military principles throughout
the 1890s, and well beyond the turn of the century, adhered to
General M. I. Dragomirov's badly misapplied interpretations of
Suvorov's 18th century maxims. Paraphrasing Suvorov, Dragomirov's
overarching basic principle was: "In war the main role belongs to
man. 1,355 As commander of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy between
1881 and 1890, Dragomirov successfully corrupted the minds of nearly
a whole generation of Russian officers who, later as field
commanders, would mechanically attempt to apply Dragomirov's rules:
All troop education and training must be done to instil a
very few ideas: 1) put upbringing above education; 2)
proceed from analysis to synthesis, i.e., drill subjects
to the sections, but do not stop at this, but permanently
unite these sections into one, so that they are united by
activity against the enemy; 3) drill expediently;
4) develop people's attention to military assignments;
5) train them to meet the unexpected quickly, but not
fussily; 6) conduct training so that not one step by them
is contrary to your orders; 7) be familiar with the
mutual peculiarities of various types of weapons;
Baluev, B. K., Razvitie voenno-inzhenernoi
elektrotekhniki: KraCkii istoricheskii ocherk. .
(Moscow, 1958), p. 62.
Zhilin, p. 196.
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8) conduct maneuvers so that [paraphrasing Suvorov] "each
soldier knows his own maneuver"; 9) eliminate everything
which promotes the development of self-preservation, and
encourage everything which praises self-sacrifice, and
then give them practice in overcoming the sensation of
danger; 10) drill using demonstrations, and not by
descriptions; 11) principally beware of using measures
which would not be allowed in peacetime practice --
that is it, everything. All these ideas can be combined
into one single idea: in upbringing and training conform
the will and the minds of the men to yours.356
General Dragomirov continually, and most certainly until after
the Russo-Japanese War, denied the possibility of the existence of a
military science. In 1881, as he was assuming command of the General
Staff Academy, he wrote: "At the present time no one in command can
give confirmation whether or not military science can exist; it is
inconceivable, exactly as are the inconceivable sciences: poetry,
painting, music."35' With such a closed, troglodyte mentality rampant
in the army leadership ranks, it was small wonder that the visionary
military thinkers within the General Staff and General Staff Academy
experienced grave personal and intellectual difficulties in
attempting to reorient and to transform the Russian Army.
Among those who, in their own inimitable, if somewhat flawed
way, attempted to introduce scientific analysis to Russian military
thinking was Dragomirov's successor as Nikolaev General Staff Academy
Commandant -- General A. G. Leer. Leer was convinced that in all
military operations and experience there were 'fundamental laws'
which, if discovered through rigorous historical research, and if
Dragomirov, M., 14 let. 1881-1894: Sbornik original'nvkh
i perevodnvkh statei. (St. Petersburg, 1895), p. 135.
Dragomirov, M. I., Sbornik original'nvkh i perevodnvkh
statei. (St. Petersburg, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 444.
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studied, learned, and applied in the proper battlefield context, led
inevitably to victory. Leer's two most influential publications in
this regard were Metod voennvkh nauk (The Method of Military Science)
in 1894 and Korennve voprosv (Current Questions) in 1897.
As early as 1869, General Leer had written:
Military science, as the theory of military art, has the
task of establishing and clarifying laws, which create
the foundation of military art, through the investigation
of their elemental qualities, their influence on each
other individually and in combination, depending on
continually changing conditions.358
Later, in Korennve voprosv he would perceptively observe that
"without science there can be neither sound thought, nor inspiration,
nor experimentation."359 General Leer emphasized that it was in the
arena of military strategy that the "objective laws of warfare" had
their greatest significance:
Strategy in the broadest sense is a synthesis, an
integration of all military subjects, its generalization,
its philosophy. It presents information about warfare
in one general channel from all scientific departments
-- it is the science of all military sciences.360
By searching for, and discovering, the 'eternal principles of war,'
he was convinced that it was possible to strengthen the general
understanding and fabric of Russian society at large. This he
believed to be essential, because he had determined through his
Leer, A. G., Opvt kritiko-istoricheskogo issledovaniia
zakonov iskusstva vedeniia voinv: CPolozhiCel'naia
strategiia).. (St. Petersburg, 1869), p. 18.
Leer, A. G., Korennve voprosv: Voennve etiudv)..
(St. Petersburg, 1897), p. 25.
360 Leer, A. G. Strategiia: (Taktika teatra voennvkh
deistvii).. 6th Edition, (St. Petersburg, 1898),
Vol. 1, p. 2.
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research that, it was only when the entire Russian people understood
their history and supported the state's goals that they would be
capable of being dependably trained as soldiers who would defend the
state.361 Ironically, to the bitter end, Leer obstinately "continued
to ignore the command genius of the great Russian commanders,"362
believing that all one needed to know about military strategy and
warfare was written in the historical classics.
One of Leer's contemporaries, General A. K. Puzyrevskii, who
would eventually become the Imperial Army Chief of Staff, pursued
Leer's same general scheme of historical analysis by emphasizing the
comprehensive nature of military history, but he stressed historical
investigations as the means through which war was revealed to be the
revolutionary vehicle of civilization. Although Puzyrevskii
considered that "past forms and capabilities for conducting war were
out-of-date for modern conditions," 363 he wrote:
In the history of military art there is not an era which
does not have scientific significance; temporary small
decays of military art are addressed as such, as are
temporary broad developments of all elements; and only
by studying these and others is it possible to discover
the principles that facilitate the development of
military art.366
Puzyrevskii, along with A. K. Baiov and D. F. Maslovskii, was at the
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singular greatness of Russian military art as demonstrated by the
most successful 18th century army commanders -- particularly Peter
the Great, Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Bagration. Puzyrevskii not only
demonstrated Tsar Peter the Great's skillful uses of active defense
and passive defense during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), but
emphasized that throughout that war Peter required that "the entire
army [135,000 soldiers at that time] had to be in constant readiness
to go wherever it was needed."365 Puzyrevskii thereby established
that maneuver on interior lines was a key ingredient for strategic
success, along with decisive offensive action, such as that which
Peter displayed at Poltava in 1709. Maslovskii's studies of the
1756-1763 Seven Years War depicted Rumiantsev's successes against
Frederick the Great's Prussians as being the result "not of maneuver,
but of decisive action straight at the established goal,"366 using
'line' tactics and bayonet attacks to achieve outright victory.
Through historical works such as these the principles of attack
and the offensive as the way to ensure victory became enshrined in
Russian military art and thought at the end of the 19th century
-- regardless of the changing forms of warfare implied by emerging
technologies. These military historians, in general, considered
"the most important task of military-historical science to be the
clarification of national [Russian] peculiarities in the conduct of
365
Puzyrevskii, A. K., "Nachalo postoiannykh reguliarnykh
armii i sostoianie voennogo iskusstva v vek Liudovika XIV
i Petra VelikogoVoennvi Sbornik. No. 1, 1889, p. 242.
Zhilin, p. 162.
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war and battles; for example, the Russian army is at its very best
when the people know they are defending themselves."36'
Other Russian military theorists took a different approach to
the application of scientific analysis and thought to the problems of
warfare. E. I. Martynov envisaged that "the development of military
art was dependent on the level of civilized society and showed this
using concrete historical examples."368 Martynov wrote:
The strategic art of each era is only the child of its
own time, and consequently, the product of a certain
civilization; it is inspired by its ideas; receives
general operational rules from it; and from its main
characteristics takes its features. About this
dependence usually nothing is said, but meanwhile it
shortly strikes the eye that the most correct and broad
understanding of military events is greatly facilitated
by the generalization of the development of military art
with the social progress of mankind.369
Upper most in Martynov's mind was the influence on modern warfare of
the new factors connected with the rapidly expanding industrial
production capabilities of society; the introduction of these new
technologies into the army; and the size and type of military force
that would be necessary to employ these new technologies.
Preoccupied by a topic that is as pivotal today as, it was 100 years
ago, Martynov first identified and began to explore the impact of
emerging technologies on military command and control. He was
certain that on the battlefields of the future timely information
flows between the commanders and their troops would become critical
Zhilin, p. 150.
Zhilin, p. 84.
Martynov, E. I., Strategiia v evokhu Napoleona I i v
nashe vremia. (St. Petersburg, 1894), p. v.
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to the execution of the commander's battle plan and orders, and hence
to the commander's ability to control the course of battle. Martynov
understood that these unheard-of scientific developments pointed to
an absolute overall requirement to elevate the educational level of
the Russian officer corps, not just from a theoretical and academic
standpoint, but through practical 'hands-on' experience using these
new technologies.3'0
To E. I. Martynov as well belongs the distinction of being the
most probable author of a series of anonymous 1893 Voennvi sbornik
articles entitled "Mysli o tekhnike voin budushchogo."3n The great
significance of these "Thoughts about the Technology of Future War"
was that the author(s) sought to integrate technological and
organizational changes "into a coherent series of projections about
the nature of future war within an entire theater." 372 In so doing he
(they) established budushchaia voina (future war) as a legitimate and
generally accepted analytical category for assessing training,
supply, reconnaissance, and technical army requirements.
Another approach to the development of Russian military art as
a science, which was rather critical of Martynov's standpoint, was
taken by A. N. Petrov who emphasized that "science, as a rule, has no
principles, but knows only laws."373 Petrov averred:
Zhilin, pp. 84-85.
"Mysli o tekhnike voin budushchogo," Voennvi sbornik.
211, No. 5, May 1893, pp. 38-39; 212 No. 8, August 1893,
pp. 222-223.
Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets, p. 129.
Petrov, A. N., K voprosam strategii: (Kriticheskii
ocherk). (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 45.
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Military science reveals numerous examples, laws, that
victory is always on the side of those who know how to
combine conditions of force, time (of one's own
choosing), and place (locality and space). These
elements of victory have the quality of fundamental laws
and therefore always remain permanent.3"1
Earlier, Petrov had charged Martynov with overstressing the influence
of social development and state economic prowess on an army's ability
to achieve victory by writing that "... the genius of one man who
demonstrates his capability by delivering creates military art."375
Nevertheless, Petrov also clearly recognized the importance of the
changes that emerging technologies were introducing to army combat
capability when he wrote: "Military affairs of necessity demand
serious scientific preparations which must be as serious and deep as
is the priority role established for the military in wartime."3"
It can be justly argued that General N. P. Mikhnevich was the
singularly most influential and greatest Russian military theorist at
the end of the 19th century. He was the first to conceptually
integrate the divergent 'Academic' and 'Russian historical' schools
of thought (i.e., Leer, Martynov, Geisman, et al., v. Dragomirov,
Puzyrevskii, Miliutin, et al.) into a general theory of military
science. 377 In the course of publishing more than thirty works
discussing military science, spanning the period from the end of the
Petrov, op. cit., p. 118.
Petrov, A. N., "Zadachi sovremennoi strategii,"
Voennvi sbornik. No. 5, 1894, p. 43.
Petrov, A. N., K voprosani strategii:
CKriticheskii ocherk). p. 118.
377 Zhilin, p. 90.
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19th century through the beginning of the 20th century, Mikhnevich
consistently affirmed that military science "concerned itself with
the study of wars -- this is the science about war."378
Although his later works assumed a more political tone that was
none-too-subtly critical of the Tsarist government, already in the
1890s General Mikhnevich recognized the dependence of a nation's
military capability on the level of its social and economic
development (its material basis) while positing that, over the course
of more than three thousand years of human experience, laws and
principles of war are "broad empirical generalizations, derived from
a multitude of factors."375 Thus, the task of military science,
according to Mikhnevich, was to identify those broad ideas, to study
the changes in them over time, and to discover the reasons why
certain of those laws and principles remained unchanging.
Mikhnevich's fundamental conclusions were that "natural (man,
space, time, forces, and the initial period of combat) and artistic
(means of combat) elements of the combat environment have decisive
significance on the course and outcome of wars"; that the "correct
consideration of these [elements] allows the commander to work out
decisive, most completely suitable conditions"; and finally, that
"the new technical combat means demanded decisive transformation
[perestroika] of all military systems."380
Mikhnevich, N. P., Voennaia nauka i stepen' tochnosti
ee vvvodov. (St. Petersburg, 1899), p. 1.






The force of General Pavel A. Zhilin's valedictory statement
concerning Russian military-scientific discussions and technological
progress during the transition from the 19th to the 20th century is
so succinct and revealing that it is deserving of quotation in its
entirety:
The end of the XIX and beginning of the XX centuries was
characterized by tempestuous growth of industrial forces,
by the development of production, transport, and other
sectors of the economy. Technical progress had an
enormous influence on the development of military
affairs. The army was equipped with new, more modern
weapons and military equipment. These increased its
combat power and maneuverability. The invention of
smokeless gunpowder, the introduction of magazine-fed
rifles, machineguns, and rapid-firing artillery provided
increased range and density of fires. The developments
in military technology evoked an increase in artillery
and special types of weaponry in the composition of the
armed forces. Aeronautics, aviation, and technical means
of communication were rapidly developed. The army's
equipage with new, more modern weapons and military
technologies led to a fundamental change in the
capabilities and forms of conducting military operations.
Before the war [World War I] military thinking was
occupied with many complicated questions. It was of
critical necessity to estimate the influence of these
new factors on operational military forms and
capabilities, to work through the views on the most
expedient [efficient and effective] use of armed force
in warfare.381
Were one to change the text only by adding the types of 'emerging
technologies' currently under consideration -- information systems,
precision-guided weapons, space-based reconnaissance, robotics, and
anti-missile defenses -- the essence of Zhilin's farewell to the
19th century becomes a flawless introduction for the Russian military
transition from the 20th to the 21st century.
Zhilin, pp. 33-34.
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Between 1881 and 1904, then, the Imperial Russian Army would confront the
challenge of retaining evolutionary momentum under one war minister of limited
vision who would fight only grudgingly to retain the status quo and a second of
great vision who would fight for relatively little. Meanwhile, at the hands of
Dragomirov and Leer, tactical and strategic thought first blossomed, then
ossified. At the same time, the accelerating pace of technological change and
the expanding tasks of the army would impose greater competition for fewer
resources. Together, these ingredients added up to a recipe for intellectual
and organizational stagnation — even in a period of ostensible growth — which
could easily lead to military disaster.382
382
Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets:
The Imperial Russian Army. 1861-1914.
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 94.
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Aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War:
Lessons and The Ridiger Reforms (1905-1909)
From the first major conflict at Tiurenchensk (April 1904) through the battles
of Liaoyang, Shakhe River, the siege of Port Arthur, and the final bloodbath at
Mukden (February/March 1905) the Russian army did not win a single significant
victory in the war.383
Machines more and more will become superior to the muscular power of men.38'
- General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, 1912
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was an unmitigated military-
disaster for the Russians.385 The repeated stinging defeats left
analysis of the causes politically very sensitive -- both for the
Russian Army high command and for the Tsarist government. Therefore,
investigation was controlled directly, and very strictly, by the War
Ministry. In September 1906, a full year after the formal conclusion
of the war by the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Imperial War Ministry
elected to follow the precedent established in the aftermath of the
Russo-Turkish War and created a Military-Historical Commission,
attached to the Main Directorate of the General Staff, for the
specific purpose of discovering lessons of the Russo-Japanese War.
Fuller, William C., Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in
Imperial Russia. 1881-1914. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), pp. 132-133.
Miliutin, D. A., Starcheskie razmyshleniia o sovremennom
polozhenii voennogo dela v Rossii," Izvestiia
imperatorskoi Nikolaevskoi voennoi akademii.
No. 30, 1912, p. 858.
For a superb discussion and analysis of the campaigns and
battles of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, complete
with maps and diagrams, see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets
before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army. 1861-1914.
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In October 1906 this 'special military-historical commission'
began the task of writing the official history of the Russo-Japanese
War with General Vasilii Iosifovich Gurko, the son of the famous
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War hero, as its chairman. After sorting
through "more than 10,000 volumes" of archival materials, the nine
volumes and 16 books of this official history would not begin to be
published until 1910, with completion of the full history in 1913.386
It would be nearly three years after the Russo-Japanese War concluded
that the Vil'na Military District published the first serious study.
Throughout the winter of 1907, an intense review of Russian Army
combat performance was conducted to try to determine the reasons for
the disastrous wartime failures in the Far East.
In part this delay in attempting to uncover the causes of
defeat was the result of the necessary preoccupation of the Tsarist
government and its military leaders with the great turmoil of the
1905 Revolution and its aftermath. Initiation of the Vil'na Military
District study also coincided with an overall attempt at Russian Army
reform. What the Vil'na Military District study revealed was a
biting indictment indeed of the Russian military leadership and
command system for strategic and tactical mistakes, lack of decisive
military action, poor use of available static communications,
dishonest staff work, weak central command direction, and unskilled
field commanders. In the spring of 1908, the Vil'na study uncloaked
Menning, p. 201; for details of the commission findings,
see Russko-iaponskaia voina 190A-1905 gg.: Rabota
Voenno-istoricheskoi komissii po opisaniiu russko-
iaponskoi voinv. 9 vols., (St. Petersburg, 1910).
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insufficient leadership concern with troop welfare, education, and
training.387
A large share of this indictment fell squarely upon the
Nikolaev General Staff Academy. As the highest military educational
institution of Russia, and since 1832 the "home of the Russian
military intellectuals," this august body was supposed to exquisitely
prepare the Army elite for command and staff duty. Between 1878 and
1889 the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, under the direction of
General M. I. Dragomirov, had become, in effect, the 'central brain'
of the Russian Army directing the development of military thought and
military science.
It was Dragomirov himself who first introduced into the
curriculum mandatory scientific research studies which required
senior students to investigate systematically military-historical or
military-scientific themes in order to be graduated. However, when
General A. G. Leer assumed command of the Academy in 1890, the
practical preparation of officers for field command and senior staff
duties was de-emphasized, and he discouraged the faculty from seeking
'real world' solutions to actual military science problems. Leer was
an authority on the Napoleonic Wars who pushed the Academy toward a
much more 'academic' curriculum, focusing on European history, the
Middle Ages and the military classics. Consequently, the military
historic and 'scientific' lessons, and the even more pertinent
SbornLk sistematicheskikh soobshchenii po LstorLL russko-
iaponskoi voinv. sdelannvkh v Vilenskom voennom sobranii
v techenie zimnego perloda 1907-1908 gg.. (Vil'na, 1907-
1908); for a study summary, see Zhilin, pp. 44-45.
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practical experiences, of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War were
neither studied nor investigated.388
Not until 1902 did War Minister A. N. Kuropatkin begin to focus
his personal attention on these educational deficiencies. Leer had
been replaced in 1898 as Commander of the Nikolaev General Staff
Academy by General N. N. Sukhotin, who promptly began changing the
curriculum to emphasize more practical military subjects, such as
statistics and military administration. But the reparative Academy
curriculum changes occurred too late to influence the leadership
capabilities of that generation of Nikolaev General Staff Academy
graduates who ineffectually occupied command positions during the
Russo-Japanese War.389
Thus, in 1906 a General Staff special commission again changed
the Nikolaev General Staff Academy curriculum to focus on applied
strategy, tactics, and military history -- especially the burning
lessons of the Russo-Japanese War -- as part of the overall Russian
military reform effort between 1906 and 1912.390 To underscore the
historical importance of the General Staff Academy within the Russian
military system -- both then and now -- it should be noted that at
the start of the First World War of a total of 36 corps commanders,
29 were Nikolaev General Staff Academy graduates; and of the 70
division commanders, 46 had finished the academy course; and an even
Zhilin, P. A., ed., Russkaia voennaia mvsl': konets




higher percentage of graduates were serving in senior staff positions
at the War Ministry and on the General Staff.391
During the war with Japan, inordinate casualties were suffered
by the Russian infantry -- the 'Queen of Battle' -- which composed
the majority of the Russian Army. Therefore, between 1906 and 1910
the General Staff Military-Historical Commission focused considerable
attention on the 1904 Field Service Regulations that officially
codified the tactical views of General M. I. Dragomirov. After two
amendatory Imperial Army attempts, in 1881 and 1895, to improve the
infantry regulations by endeavoring to incorporate the lessons of the
Russo-Turkish War, in 1900 Chief of Staff Dragomirov first published
his version of the field regulations, which he revised in 1902.392
Dragomirov's tactical concept, sadly for the 'line' soldiers,
consisted of infixed rote application of General Suvorov's brilliant
18th century bayonet charges, without consideration of Suvorov's
selective genius of knowing when, and most importantly, when not, to
use this tactic. 393 The tautological use of these stereotyped tactics
against the fortified Japanese field positions, from which defenders
could sweep the attacking Russian infantry with magazine-fed rifle,
rapid-fire cannon, and especially machinegun fire with impunity, was
the main cause of the slaughter of so many brave Russian soldiers
391 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., "Ofitserskii korpus russkoi armii
pered pervoi mirovoi voinoi," Voprosv istorii. No. 4,
1981, pp. 24-25.
392 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, pp. 137-139.
393 Osipov, K. , Suvorov. (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing
House, 1945), p. 18; see also Zhilin, p. 162.
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and, consequently, of the disgraceful defeat of Russian arms.394
One of the clearest war lessons was that "the preponderance of
fire is the principle condition for success in modern battle."395
During the last quarter of the 19th century, military-technical
developments, particularly the deployment of rapid-firing weapons
with increased accuracy and range, changed the entire nature of
warfare by eliminating the tactical effectiveness of the infantry
'firing line' and of the massed bayonet attack. The necessity for
mutual support between infantry and artillery on the battlefield was
a most critical lesson, since the combined fires of the two branches
could be superior to that of the enemy.396
With the objective of increasing the firepower of the 'firing
line,' V. G. Fedorov succeeded in creating his first automatic rifle
in 1905. Alas, when Fedorov briefed Tsar Nikolas II on the greatly
improved rate of fire, Nikolas rebuffed this remarkable new weapon:
"He personally was against the development of automatic rifles since
there would not be enough cartridges in the country for them."39'
Consequently, the first of Fedorov's automatic rifles would not be
produced until 1912.
Other lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were far less clearly
defined, nonetheless important, but much more difficult to correct.
Zhilin, p. 119.
Cheremisov, V. A., Osnovv sovremennogo voennogo
iskusstva. (Kiev, 1912), pp. 11-12.
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The quantity of weaponry on the battlefield alone was determined to
be insufficient to insure successful army operations, even if it
became possible to equip the Russian Army with the most modern
weaponry. Special attention was directed to the training of command
personnel who had prepared their troops inadequately for battle; to
eliminating the often very cruel relationship that officers had with
their troops; to elevating extremely low troop morale and inhumane
living conditions; to resolving the absence of popular support for
war aims; and to dispensing with the failure of military discipline.
The failure of discipline in the Russian Army was considered
to be inseparable with overall lack of Russian social discipline,
and the result of "the increased number of illiterate soldiers (up to
60 percent) who were incapable of independent thought and declined
to analyze events."3'8 In 1901 the Russian Army inducted 122,000
illiterate recruits who were incapable of learning new military
technologies or of taking independent action on the battlefield.3"
The General Staff Military-Historical Commission conclusion was that
the army had failed for "deep social reasons," which necessitated the
"improvement of the quality of the entire army."400 As a direct
result, during the few years before World War I began, mainly at the
Nikolaev General Staff Academy, military education received renewed






The Russo-Japanese War investigations unveiled, overall, a stunning
disconnect between Russian military theory and its actual battlefield
practice. Military technology had changed the entire concept of
warfare. The Russian Army had changed fundamentally neither its
technology nor its tactics. The result had been another disaster.
For a wide range of reasons, but particularly because Tsar
Nikolas II and his inner court circle did not wish the publication of
critical articles which might identify the Romanov Dynasty with the
wartime disasters, one of the most influential analyses of the
military failures was not published until 1912. General Miliutin,
the famous military reform War Minister under Tsar Aleksandr II,
wrote that there was a growing influence of army technical equipment
and weaponry on successful military activity. Miliutin firmly
believed that recent military-technical developments required an
increase in the quantity of what he termed "special weapons" in the
armed forces and close attention to troop training. Because of the
changed character of battle, he considered it essential to elevate
the knowledge and initiative of each soldier so that individual
soldiers, as well as divisions, corps, and armies, might operate
independently. Miliutin emphasized that the increased role of
weaponry and technology in warfare absolutely demanded the
modernization of the Russian Army.402
Miliutin's ideas stood in sharp contradiction to the majority
opinion among Russia's senior military leadership, who had been so
thoroughly indoctrinated during Dragomirov's tenure as General Staff
Zhilin, pp. 110-111.
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Academy Commandant to believe unquestioningly that "the decisive role
in warfare [is that] of man [due to] his moral force."403 The more
visionary Russian military thinkers -- such as Mikhnevich, Neznamov,
Geisman, and Martynov -- had by this time come to the firm conclusion
that "modern warfare is not only military, but a political and
economic composite of the opposing sides."404
On the eve of the First World War, most of the Russian military
intellectuals were looking into the abyss of 'total warfare,' but the
old Russian Army leadership could not, and would not, see it because
of their preoccupation with the 'fundamental laws of warfare.'
To further compound the difficulties that the Russian military
leadership was experiencing, these proud 'professional' officers
were subjected to a wave of anti-military literature which, in the
aftermath of their Russo-Japanese War fiasco, denigrated and
ridiculed the Russian Army as sadists, incompetents, fools, and
madmen. In the latter months of 1906 this situation of civilian
interference in military affairs, declining prestige, and eroding
army discipline became intolerable -- and to this 'identity crisis'
the Russian army leadership began to react strenuously with a
"burning desire" to upgrade army quality and prestige.405
War Minister General A. F. Ridiger consistently espoused the
idea of national military reform -- that upon a solid foundation of








consecrated to the singular mission of defending the Empire against
all external enemies/'06 The concept at the root of Ridiger's vision
was the ability to mobilize the entire nation for military service in
order to form "a homogeneous patriotic army drawn fairly from all
classes and nationalities in the Empire."407
General A. F. Ridiger was the son of General-Adjutant Count
A. F. Ridiger, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and Grenadier Corps,
who took the precursor actions in 1855 that led to initiation of the
Miliutin military reforms following the Crimean War disasters.
As early as June 1905, War Minister Ridiger wrote to the Interior
Minister asserting that troop dispersal on police duty was
"completely incompatible with the interests of the military."408
Then, in December 1905 -- at the very crest of the revolution --
Ridiger insisted upon, and a rather panicked Council of Ministers
approved, additional finances to improve his soldiers' living
conditions, to increase their pay, and to augment their diet. At
Ridiger's insistence, the Council even provided each soldier with a
government-issue blanket, overturning the longstanding custom of
requiring soldiers to buy their own blankets.409
A June 20, 1906 War Ministry circular clearly warned military
district commanders that "continuation [of the policy of helping










army and the loss of it as an organized military force."''10 General
Ridiger's attitude toward civilian authority and toward army internal
repressive service was best revealed in his early 1906 letter to
General-Major Kryzhanovskii, 2nd Cavalry Division Commander:
I had no desire at all to turn the troops into
executioners or punitive commands as I calculated that
this was not their job at all, and, moreover, thought
that it was very dangerous; under such conditions the
troops would easily run amok and would simply turn into
bandits, while the population would come to hate the army
and would refuse funds for satisfaction of its needs.''11
Throughout 1906 Ridiger gradually began to reinsert the military
district (MD) commanders into the chain of command by concentrating
back in the provincial and district capitals the army detachments
that had been deployed on repressive service. Once these troops
returned to military control, the MD commanders were under strict
War Ministry instructions not to part with them. To counteract the
strident protests from local civilian authorities when their requests
for troops were met with intransigent refusals by MD commanders,
Ridiger initiated a glasnost' campaign demanding that the Interior
and Finance Ministries strengthen their own police and guard forces
and that army units be released from disruptive police duties.412
The Russian military 'identity crisis' approached its pinnacle
during an August-September 1906 exchange of letters between Ridiger
and the Prime Minister, P. A. Stolypin. Following Ridiger's repeated





Stolypin rebuffed Ridiger's appeal, averring that the survival of the
government was more important than army training or army survival.
General Ridiger's September 13 rejoinder bordered on insubordination.
Essentially accurate, but rather curt and angry, it stated:
All organs which enjoy the support of the troops have
completely forgotten that the army is not a machine but a
living organism which can be threatened, and which acts
as a real support only if certain qualities are present,
qualities inculcated by suitable education and the
preservation of internal order and discipline.413
Apparently such blunt language was exactly what senior Russian
government officials needed to focus their attention, for, in early
November 1906, just as Ridiger was preparing to take the issue of
continued army police and guard duty to the Council of State Defense,
Tsar Nikolas II summoned the commanders/governors-general of the key
Warsaw, Vil'no, Kiev, and Moscow military districts to St. Petersburg
for a special conference on the subject of using military detachments
for internal security. To a man -- with the sole exception of
General Skanlon from Warsaw -- the military district commanders
strongly urged the Tsar to eliminate the use of the array for
repressive service. Fully keeping in character, however, Tsar
Nikolas issued but a weak and indecisive declaration at the end of
the conference that "he expected all governors-general to help in
reducing detachments."414
Consequently, the Tsar's decision went virtually unheeded and






guard duty by civilian authorities did not decline appreciably:
Main Staff data revealed that from January to the end of
October there were 1058 civilian summons for aid; 997 and
1/2 companies, 4 training commands, 7 local commands,
42 scouting commands, 340 and 1/4 squadrons or sotnias,
16 field guns, 4 machine guns, and 4704 soldiers in
separate commands took part. The army used weapons at
civilian request 48 times/'15
While these numbers were considerably lower than during the previous
two years, they were still far too high to satisfy the War Ministry,
and besides, the accuracy of civilian reporting on their use of the
army was quite suspect. In December 1907 General Palitsyn, Chief of
the General Staff, determined that ten infantry regiments, five
reserve battalions, four cavalry regiments, and one artillery brigade
were outside their assigned military districts on repressive service,
which seriously degraded army mobilization capability.416
General A. F. Ridiger was successful in introducing significant
military reforms, despite all the impediments caused by the taxing
and disruptive internal security requirements. Following the
humiliating army defeats of the Russo-Japanese War, he attempted to
establish a more modern and effective Russian military capability.
Between 1905 and 1908 General Ridiger persistently fought for, and
obtained: 1) the creation of the Higher Attestation Commission, which
on paper had the power to select only the most highly qualified
officers for command positions; 2) increased pay for his soldiers;
3) better housing; 4) a shortened period of mandatory military




regimental purchasing system; 7) greater emphasis on the technical
training of soldiers; and 8) expanded officer educational
opportunities.417 Owing to Ridiger's concerted efforts to instill
greater 'professionalism' in the army, General Staff officers,
who had matriculated at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy and
demonstrated operational command competence and expertise, gradually
replaced the old privileged Guards and cavalry officer elites in
command positions. "In particular, General Staff officers came to
occupy the majority of field command posts: by 1912, 62 percent of
all corps commanders and 68 percent of all infantry division
commanders wore the black insignia of the Staff."418
Had it not been for Tsar Nikolas II's decision in June 1905 to
sever the General Staff from the War Ministry, Ridiger might have
been able to accomplish even more far-reaching military reforms. In
the name of 'managerial efficiency,' the crass, politically-motivated
June 1905 decision raised General Palitsyn's organization to equal
ministerial status and imposed the Council of State Defense over both
the War Ministry and General Staff. Communications between the War
Ministry and the General Staff broke down, War Minister Ridiger lost
control of the General Staff, and the State Defense Council became an
exceedingly unwieldy institution, incapable of its intended purpose








One of General Ridiger's most consistent goals was to
reorganize the Ministry of War in order to eliminate redundant and
nonessential bureaucratic offices and privileges which, to his
thinking, were counterproductive to a 'professional' military
organization. To this end, in 1906 Ridiger attempted to shed the
civil administration of Turkestan by turning this responsibility over
to the Interior Ministry. He also proposed abolishing the Main
Administration of Cossacks and absorbing the Cossack formations into
the regular army. Bureaucratic opposition to these proposals, in
particular from the Finance Ministry, was sufficient to block any
action on these badly needed reforms.420
To further complicate the task of reforming the Russian army,
the Finance Ministry consistently denied to Ridiger the 2.14 billion
rubles which the army estimated it needed to replenish the war
materials consumed during the Russo-Japanese War. Even worse, due to
continuing internal security taskings, Ridiger was powerless between
1904 and 1908 to increase army training levels. Essential basic
command skills and marksmanship were not only diminished, but
seriously began to deteriorate.421
The Russian Army held no mobile training exercises between 1904
and 1906; and in 1907 only 504 battalions, 331 cavalry squadrons, and
306 and 1/2 artillery batteries received training. Throughout 1907
only 52 percent of the troops in the Caucasus military district






military districts the percentage receiving training was an even
lower, and completely unacceptable, 37 percent and 30 percent,
respectively. During 1908 Russian Army training levels finally
returned to a more "normal" number, with 751 batteries, 487
squadrons, and 439 batteries participating. However, with mass
officer resignations throughout this period resulting in a serious
20 percent shortfall of officers by 1907, army leadership and command
experience at the unit level was severely impaired. When called upon
as reservists to mobilize for World War I on July 18, 1914, these
very poorly trained officers and soldiers would be all that Russia
had available. 422 Professor William C. Fuller, Jr., aptly summarizes
the situation:
Ironically, at the very moment that a military consensus
on the urgency of reform, increased army spending, and
expansion of training had coalesced, the civilian
government was denying the army the requisite money,
manpower, and opportunity. This frustration, heaped on
top of the fundamentally adversarial position of the War
Ministry toward the civilian government with regard to
internal repressive service, is the backdrop for the
obstructionist conduct of the War Ministry during the
revolution.423
As a reformer, General Ridiger was faced with one additional,
and critical, flaw in the Russian social and military system -- the
failure to motivate individual soldiers and officers. Despite the
prolonged exposure to the General Staff Academy teachings of General
M. I. Dragomirov concerning morale as the decisive factor in warfare,






the 1905 Revolution, "if Russia was to be victorious in the future,
... the nation and the Empire had to be morally regenerated in some
way."""
The 1906 revision of the Fundamental Law (Constitution), which
"reserved to the Emperor the formulation and direction of military
policy," blocked Ridiger's path toward any meaningful restoration of
army morale."25 To the end of the Romanov Dynasty, Tsar Nikolas II
would maintain adamantly that the army was his 'personal fief' which
entitled the Romanov family to by-pass the military chain of command
and to interfere directly with military affairs where and when they
chose. Since Tsar Nikolas considered army officers to be his
'personal vassals,' he had no compunction about overturning officer
appointment recommendations of the Higher Attestation Commission and
continuing an Imperial patronage system that promoted his personal
favorites, while simultaneously preventing General Ridiger and the
War Ministry from discharging these very same officers, who had
displayed such mediocrity and ineptitude as field commanders during
the Russo-Japanese War.'26
It was precisely because of the Tsar's continuing interference
in military matters -- coupled with the obstruction of military
goals and financial parsimony of the civilian bureaucracies -- that
the Russian military leadership increasing became 'politicized.' The







support for army positions from the new legislature, the State Duma,
which Tsar Nikolas had 'allowed' to be inaugurated, but which he
abhorred, since the Duma never ceased to seek further restriction of
his power as Autocrat. It was General Ridiger's failure to defend
the Imperial family 'adequately' against the repeated condemnation by
the Duma members of senior military officials, the nobility, that
tried the Tsar's patience and led the Autocrat finally to lose
confidence in Ridiger, to remove him from office as War Minister on
March 10, 1909, and to replace him the very next day with General
V. A. Sukhomlinov.1,27 To General Sukhomlinov, a shameless though
highly capable Imperial sycophant, fell the unenviable task of taking
a poorly prepared and demoralized Russian Army into World War I.
Prelude to World War I: Is There Enough Time
to Transform the Russian Army?
...Only a general upsurge of national life — cultural and economic — could
appropriately elevate the military potential of the country.
General Anton I. Denikin
Railroads and electric telegraph already give to the talented general or War
Minister the means for entirely new combinations in a European war.
- Frederick Engels
Neither Russia nor the other European powers were prepared for
war when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian
throne, was assassinated on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, Bosnia by a
Bosnian student with Serbian terrorist connections, one G. Princip.
Fuller, p. 235.
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In the early 20th century European alliance system armies had
to be mobilized before the states could prepare to defend themselves.
Historically, from the beginning of the 19th century, no European
state could mobilize more than five-to-seven percent of its total
population. But, on the eve of the First World War France could
mobilize 58 percent; Germany, 43 percent; and Russia, 46 percent/28
Russia's mobilization capability was circumscribed by some 19th
century territorial and bureaucratic fences, however. The peacetime
Russian Imperial Army fielded 1,423,000 troops composed principally
of workers and peasants from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The
formation of "national military units" -- for example, Uzbek,
Turkmen, Kirgiz, and Latvian, -- was strictly forbidden by Imperial
policy. Also, the total number of 'non-Russian' soldiers was
restricted by Imperial policy to one-fifth of any unit in peacetime
and to one-third in wartime. Yet the population base from which the
Tsarist government had to conscript in order to mobilize, of
necessity, had to include 'non-Russian' nationalities/25
Moreover, Russia's mobilization problem was compounded by the
fact that Russia had no partial mobilization plan. Yet, the Russian
government was committed by treaty to come to Serbia's assistance
against Austria, which Russia could not do without mobilizing forces.
General Ianuskevich, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General
Sukhomlinov, the War Minister, initially agreed with Foreign Minister
Zhilin, p. 14.
Iakushkin, V. S., ed., Voennve organizatsii rossiiskogo
proletariata i opvt ego vooruzhennoi bor'bv: 1903 -1917.
(Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 162.
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Sazonov, to partially mobilize Russian forces. Their General Staff
subordinates convinced the generals, however, that such an action was
impractical -- if not impossible. The staff planners asserted that a
territorial system for augmenting peacetime forces was required for
partial mobilization, and that Russia had no such territorial system.
When the Russian government officials, after much turbulent
soul-searching, revoked their attempted partial mobilization and
decreed a general army mobilization on July 18, 1914, they were well
aware that their decision effectively ruled out the preservation of
peace. In their minds the only alternative to mobilization was
unacceptable -- Russia's total vulnerability to Austrian and German
aggression. On July 27, 1914, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British Foreign
Office permanent under-secretary, insightfully described this
unfortunate situation:
I am afraid that the real difficulty to overcome will be
found in the question of mobilization. Austria is
already mobilizing. This ... is a serious menace to
Russia, who cannot be expected to delay her own
mobilization, which, as it is, can only become effective
in something like double the time required by Austria and
Germany. If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned that
Germany will do the same, and German mobilization is
directed almost entirely against France, the latter
cannot possibly delay her own mobilization for even a
fraction of a day. ... It seems certain that Austria is
going to war because that was, from the beginning, her
intention. If that view is correct, it would be neither
possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain
Russia from mobilizing/30
For Russia mobilization was all or nothing -- and so it turned out to
be for the other European powers as well.
Florinsky, p. 1319.
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Russian government concern over possible German and Austrian
hostile intentions toward Russia had been building since the 1880s.
German encroachment into the Near East began by sending diplomatic
missions to Turkey and by building the Baghdad Railroad through the
Balkans and Asia Minor -- both of which were deemed to be a direct
infringement on Russian political, military-strategic, and economic
interests. The Tsarist government did not want the Baghdad Railroad
approaching its Caucasian frontiers; Great Britain did not want that
same railroad to begin interfering with its ship-borne Indian trade;
France, which was also heavily involved in Near East affairs, had
become all the more anti-German since the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian
War. As a result, for divergent reasons, Russia, Great Britain and
France all shared a common interest to constrain German expansion
toward the Near East.
Also in this same time period, the Hapsburg monarchy of
Austria-Hungary, with considerable German encouragement, was
attempting to acquire the neighboring Southern Slav lands -- Bosnia,
Serbia, and Greece -- which it intended to consolidate as a Balkan
component of the Hapsburg Empire.''31 Austria-Hungary and Germany had
been allied by treaty since October 1879, and Italy joined them in
1882 to create the 'Central Powers,' the so-called 'Axis.' A formal
Russian-French union was not created until the years 1891-1893.
Diplomatically Great Britain was brought closer to that union in 1904
by the British-French Agreement on colonial questions. And only in
1907 did the British-Russian Agreement to regulate mutual policies
Zhilin, p. 10.
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toward Tibet, Afghanistan, and Iran lead to the creation of the
'Entente' uniting Great Britain, France, and Russia."2
During the 1908 Bosnian war scare, when Russia and Austria
stood on the brink of open conflict, Russian concerns over the
progressive German and Austrian expansion into the Balkans and the
Near East -- to say nothing of their hostile intentions toward Russia
-- became exceedingly intense. War Minister Ridiger would later
credit this 1908 confrontation with changing the opinions of Russian
civilian officials about the threat of war in the West, which
subsequently resulted in abolishing the Finance Ministry limitations
on the military budget. Later that same year the Russian military
budget was increased to 299 million rubles. This enabled Ridiger to
begin expanding the army machinegun arsenal -- an army objective that
General Sukhomlinov, his successor in early 1909, continued to
implement. 433 Also, partly as a result of the Bosnian war scare, the
Russian Third and Fourth State Dumas were especially solicitous to
the army. The Dumas demanded that Article 96 of the 1906 Fundamental
Law, which defined the Tsar's powers over the army and navy, be
revised to allow the Duma to consider the military budget. Finally,
in April 1909 Tsar Nikolas II conceded to the Duma on supervision of
the military budget, but withheld oversight of military organization,
planning, or administration. The Imperial Decree of August 24, 1909








The events that unequivocally focused the attention of the
Russian Army, government, and Duma on Russian national security needs
were the 1911-1912 Italian-Turkish War and the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars,
which set the stage for direct Axis-Entente conflict.435 As a result
of these growing international tensions and as a direct consequence
of the Duma budgetary intervention, Russian military expenditures
rose from 643 million rubles in 1909 to 965 million rubles in 1913,
an increase in state expenditures from 24.8 percent to 28.5 percent.
From 1900 to 1913 Russian military expenditures increased from five
percent of national income to seven percent. This meant that by 1913
Russia was out spending all other European states for military
preparedness.''36 In 1910 the Duma passed the 'Small Program' to spend
714 billion rubles over ten years, and subsequently authorized the
1913 'Big Program' to spend 433 billion rubles annually between 1914
and 1917. The 'Big Program' projected a 40 percent increase in army
manpower to nearly two million troops by adding 480,000 soldiers
during those four years."7 Regrettably for the rank and file
soldiers, Russia began its military build-up so late and from such a
serious position of obsolescence -- and had such enormous social,
structural, and institutional obstacles to overcome -- that even with
these aggressive military construction programs, the Russian Army
came into World War I at a most significant, comparative disadvantage








War Minister Sukhomlinov tried to prepare the Russian Array for
war -- even though his efforts led his detractors to accuse him of
treason and negligence following the debacle that occurred during the
opening months of battle; mainly the shortage of artillery shells
that developed in 19 1 5 . 438 The principal flaw -- that Sukhomlinov was
either disinclined to or was incapable of rectifying -- was the
almost total fixation with a European 'short war.' The General Staff
predicted that war would last no more than six to eight months and
could be fought with war materials and munitions initially on hand.
In 1910 the Polivanov Commission on Supply Norms "definitively"
judged that a "long war" in Europe was impossible -- which was very
much in keeping with Tsar Nikolas II's predilection to rule out the
possibility of any war at all. The Commission did not rule out the
requirement to modernize army weaponry. In 1909 Sukhomlinov had
begun introducing new quick-firing artillery into the inventory,
"while 214 mountain guns (model 1909) and 122 six-inch Schneider
howitzers were on order. In 1910 the Russian Army acquired 864 new
heavy machineguns and the Vickers light machinegun was adopted for
standard use."''39 After 1911, Russia's ally, France, insisted on
Russian military modernization, especially the upgrading of railroads
in European Russia, which by 1913, along with the growing perception
of a Central Power threat, facilitated War Ministry efforts to obtain








Technology and Aviation "Revolutionize" Warfare
Between 1908 and 1914 the internal combustion engine was a
sufficiently advanced emerging technology to allow the Russian Army
to begin development, and then production, of armored cars and tanks,
armed first with machineguns, and then with cannon. A total of
forty-five armored cars were produced by Russian factories during
this pre-World War I period and in 1910 the first Russian Army
automobile unit was formed; followed in 1911 by the beginning of the
first eleven-month-long automotive class for 45 officers and 273
"technical specialists" (mechanics).441 Also in 1911 V. D. Mendeleev,
son of the famous Russian chemist who invented the periodic table of
elements, began development of the first Russian "bronekhodom"
(tank); to which A. A. Porokhovshchik added machineguns in 1914.
These developments led to the production in 1915 of the first true
// ,
Russian tank, the VeiQE khod," which weighed-in at four tons, but
could travel 25 to 40 kilometers per hour, with a two-man crew
consisting of a driver and a machinegunner. Despite these
technological improvements, throughout World War I the use of tanks
and armored cars by the Russian Army would be limited primarily to
reconnaissance missions and flanking attacks into the rear of enemy
positions. The lightness of the armor and the small quantity of
armored vehicles that were produced precluded employing armored






Motorized transport also expanded as part of Sukhomlinov's
build-up of the Russian Army. The first Russian motorized units had
been introduced into the Kursk and Kiev maneuver armies in 1902 and
saw service in the Russo-Japanese War. By 1914 the Russian Army
employed 475 trucks and 3562 light cars to execute its peacetime
mobilization plan/'''3 Also, by the outset of World War I, the Russian
Army fielded some 6000 quick-firing field guns to Germany's 5500, but
only 791 of these artillery pieces were heavy guns in comparison to
Germany's 2000 pieces of heavy artillery/"4
Aviation units were introduced into the Russian Army, beginning
in the summer of 1910 with the formation of the first aviation school
at Gatchina outside Moscow. Later, additional military aviation
schools were located at Sevastopol and the outskirts of Warsaw. 445 In
St. Petersburg the Higher Aeronautics course was initiated in 1911
and graduated 270 pilot officers during its first three years. 446 In
the fall of 1911 the first Russian aviation units began participating
in army field maneuvers. Six aircraft and their pilots were assigned
to the St. Petersburg military district exercises, two aviation
detachments (12 aircraft and pilots) reported to the Warsaw military
district, and another detachment was assigned to the Kiev MD. These
Rostunov, M., ed., Istoriia pervoi mirovoi voinv.
1914-1918. 2 vols., (Moscow, 1975), Vol. 1, p. 112.
Fuller, p. 227.
Zhilin, p. 225.
Istoriia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR:
Po arkhivnym materialam i svidetel'stvam sovremennikov.
Period do 1914 g.. (Moscow, 1944), p. 531.
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first aviation units were attached directly to the corps headquarters
and performed near-by reconnaissance missions that included "locating
enemy troop concentrations, correcting artillery fire, dropping bombs
and exploding shells, maintaining communications between units,
executing airborne drops, and convoying ships. "44/
The first combat employment of Russian military aviation took
place during the 1912-1913 Balkan War, when a single volunteer
aviation detachment joined the Bulgarian Army.4''8 A most impressive
early Russian aeronautical accomplishment -- while not entirely
effective or successful due to underpowered engines -- included the
1913 creation of a heavy, four-engine aircraft, euphorically labeled
the "Ruskii vitiaz'" (Russian Hero), which could carry seven
passengers aloft for one hour and 54 minutes. The next year the
"II'ia Murometswhich had a flight duration of six hours with a
crew of six, was constructed. The "II'ia Muromets" was accepted by
the Russian armed forces and equipped with a mechanical bombsight
which, for its time, enabled it to target enemy positions with
considerable accuracy.44' Of even greater immediate importance,
especially to the flight crews of this early, experimental bomber,
was G. E. Kotel'nikov's 1911 development of the Russian parachute.450
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Also, between the fall of 1912 and April 1914 three new Russian
aircraft factories produced a total of 315 aircraft.''51 As a result,
by the beginning of the First World War the Russian Imperial Army
deployed 263 aircraft, 39 aviation detachments, and six aviation
companies .452
Although aeronautics was a new science, it was given inordinate
attention by Russian military intellectuals because of its potential
to radically alter the forms of combat and the means to achieve
victory in future war. In the words of Neznamov, reconnaissance was
initially seen as the principal mission for aircraft
... in order to find the true enemy force, in order not
to strike deserted positions in vain, in order to give
corresponding concentration of our own columns by means
of maneuver, since the army command (army group) does not
need details, but needs to know the movement of the main
mass of enemy forces, the extent of the front on which he
is attacking (disposition), and the required location for
our most courageous groups (or their absence -- sometimes
this is even more important).453
N. Borozdin, however, thought that aircraft, and particularly
dirigibles, had a potentially great role to play in warfare through
their wide employment as bombers to destroy enemy targets, rather
than just to find them and to report on their location. He wrote:
"They [aircraft] will need to act, not only against enemy troops that
are ready for battle, but against troops that are completely
Istoriia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR: Po
arkhivnvm materialam.... (Moscow, 1944), pp. 492-493.
Rostunov, I. I., Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voirmv.
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unexpecting and unprepared for it. 1,454 What Borozdin foresaw was the
fateful application of airpower to strike suddenly at enemy reserves,
maneuver columns, concentration points, rear headquarters, and
bivouacs -- virtually anywhere that enemy force concentrations were
located, in order to destroy their operational effectiveness.
B. F. Naidenov was another Russian aviation pioneer who divined
the future immense impact of aviation on warfare:
Recently airplanes have reached such a stage in their
development that the whole state is now interested in
them because they are an entirely new technology which
can have an gigantic significance on military affairs."5
V. Faibishchevich was at the forefront of early Russian thinking
about the creation of special military aircraft for the conduct of
air battles. His analysis prompted the General Staff to become
involved in the actual development of fighter aircraft.
At the present time when flying apparatus are becoming
such a normal, necessary part of the huge army organism,
just like all other types of weapons, hardly anyone is
amazed by the suggestion about the possibility of air
battle. If modern flying apparatus are to undertake such
a difficult task, then the appearance of a new type [of
aircraft] should not be long awaited.... We can say
affirmatively that at the present time Earth does not
have a good means for defeating flying apparatus ... the
single means would seem to be the creation of military
squadrons, which could destroy all enemy forces that
appear in the air.456
Borozdin, N., Zavoevanie vozdushnoi stikhii. (Warsaw,
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early applications of airpower, see also Patronov, I. F.,
Itogi sovremennogo vozdukhoplavaniia v primenenii k
voennomu delu. (St. Petersburg, 1911).
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On the very eve of the First World War, the General Staff
leadership finally would come to recognize the import of these
Russian military thinkers' writings about the applications of
airpower to combat. Official documentation contains this statement:
In order to inflict damage on the enemy, special sections
of combat airplanes attached to the army are designated.
The main mission of these airplanes is the destruction of
enemy air reconnaissance means, i.e., intelligence
collection airplanes and dirigibles, for which they are
equipped with machineguns and bombs ... the principal
purpose of which is to combat the enemy in the air.457
That same year, on September 9, 1913, pilot officer and General Staff
Captain P. N. Nestorov was credited with the first vertical flight of
an aircraft. As a consequence of his intellectual and physical
preparations for air combat, in the opening days of the war, this
daring inventor of the demanding 'Nestorov Loop' (outside loop)
aerobatic maneuver, "for the first time in the world on September 8,
1914 rammed an enemy aircraft while airborne, properly beginning air
battle."458 The first true Russian fighter aircraft, however, was not
developed and introduced into the order of battle until 1915 ,459 which
E. N. Kruten' judged to be "the beginning of true air warfare" -- the
creation of the military ability "to break through by force into the
depth of the enemy and to defend one's own airspace."460
Kratkie rukovodiashchie dannve dlia pol'zovaniia
aeroplanami. kak sredstvom razvedki i sviazi. a takzhe
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Additional technological advances adopted by the Russian Army
included the deployment in 1909 of the first sound-measuring station
for intelligence collection purposes. In September 1914, with the
help of this station, two German artillery batteries successfully
were located and destroyed.''61 Engineering support also was expanded
by the inclusion within each army corps of an engineering (sapper)
battalion, composed of three to four specialized sapper companies,
which included fortifications, mines, demolitions, bridging, and
searchlights. Generally one sapper company was assigned to each
division, with one or two companies held as corps reserve/62
At the outset of World War I, the Russian Army fielded 18
automobile-mounted searchlights and 43 cavalry-drawn searchlights,
along with 39 transportable searchlights and 40 searchlight stands/63
The applications of radio technology by the Russian Array also
expanded prior to World War I. During the initial mobilization, in
July 1914, the Russian Army had seven communications companies with
some 100 field radio sets, 30 light-cavalry radio sets, along with
12 base stations and eight fortress radio stations, while the Russian
Navy was using 120 radios aboard ships/64
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The Russian Navy, moreover, was at the forefront of the
investigation of the whole spectrum of emerging technologies for
application in future war,''65 and in particular led the way toward the
development and military application of radio technologies. In large
part this was due to the considerable weight and mass of early radio
transmitters and receivers which were not compatible with army field
deployments, but were very suitable for ship-to-shore communications.
By 1907, at Baltic Sea installations the Russian Navy had in "active
service 14 coastal radio stations and 53 observation posts; on the
Black Sea, two coastal radio stations and 19 observation posts; and
on the Pacific Ocean, one coastal radio station and seven observation
posts."466 The Russian Navy even experimented somewhat with the use
of radios aboard naval observation aircraft in order to improve the
timeliness of intelligence communications. 467 It was in 1911 that
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S. A. Beknev wrote about the possibility of using wireless telegraph
for communications with aircraft, and in 1913, he added that the
first successful air-to-ground communications were accomplished.''68
The Sukhomlinov Reforms (1909-1914)
General Sukhomlinov had many detractors who were exceedingly
fond of ridiculing his 1910 plan to dismantle the majority of
Russia's fortresses on the Western Front as "idiocy." Regardless,
Sukhomlinov leaves a legacy of pointed military organizational
reforms that were introduced between 1909 and 1914 in order to make
better use of the emerging technologies to improve army combat
capability. By abolishing in 1910 the reserve and fortress troops,
which comprised fifteen percent of the Russian Army and were
stagnating in static defensive positions, he made available for
front-line duty seven new infantry divisions and one rifle brigade
(the 3rd Finlandskaia). He standardized the Russian infantry brigade
structure at eight battalions, divided equally between two regiments.
Consequently, this uniform system enabled field commanders to know,
with some certainty, the number of troops they were committing to
battle when they inserted an infantry division or a regiment:
"Instead of 63 field divisions and 18 rifle brigades consisting of
1110 battalions, it became possible to have 70 divisions and 17 rifle
brigades, i.e., 1232 battalions."465 Further, infantry divisions were




field artillery was created; and the number of engineering and
railroad troops was increased. Finally, the composition of each
infantry regiment was altered to include a raachinegun section with
eight machineguns as well as communications, intelligence, and
educational units.470
Sukhomlinov initiated in the European districts of Russia a
simple, less expensive, and more equitable territorial system of
recruitment, modeled along the lines of the British, French, and
German systems. Each territory had a specific quota of recruits.
Upon mobilization, localities would be required to provide manpower
to fill out army corps, divisions, and regiments. These reserve
forces were divided into two categories: 1) the younger recruits who
would reinforce the field troops; and 2) the older soldiers who would
perform rear (logistic) services. Simultaneously, a new service law
was introduced which decreased the length of required active service
for the infantry and field artillery, from 5 to 3 years; for the
other service branches, from 5 to 4 years; for the navy, from 7 to 5
years; and for reasons of age or service deficiencies, nearly 7000
officers were dismissed.471
Under Sukhomlinov's direction, mobilization planning was
improved so that the six-month supply of artillery ammunition
stockpiled in August 1914 was exactly the planned requirement for the
'short war' that all Europe expected. As a first major step toward




by War Ministry order 13404, dated March 20, 1912, Sukhomlinov ended
"guarding civilian institutions in towns or areas outside the
immediate vicinity of general headquarters."6'2 Sukhomlinov,
doggedly fought to free the army from police duty: in
fact, under his leadership the Russian army came close to
realizing the old dream of professional officers -- the
total commitment of the army to external defense and its
emancipation from the burden of internal repression.673
Ironically, he achieved a decades-old Russian Army objective that
occurred too late to have any positive impact on Russian professional
military development, or on the outcome of the World War.
The virtual explosion of new military technologies at the turn
of the century, caused Russia's military theoreticians to believe
that equipment, administrative, and organizational changes alone --
such as those implemented by General Sukhomlinov -- would not be
adequate to cope with the entirely new methods of warfare these
changes portended. It was therefore necessary for the General Staff
and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy to determine: first, exactly
what the likely nature of the imminent European war would be; second,
to develop the military art, strategy, and tactics necessary to
achieve victory that would incorporate both the new technologies and
the changed nature of warfare; and finally, to teach these
revelations to the Russian officer corps.
While the senior Russian Army leadership and government inner
circles remained preoccupied with a 'short war' scenario, lasting






Neznamov, Mikhnevich, Elchaninov, and Martynov thought that "the
coming European war would be inevitably intense and would develop a
protracted character."474 The reason these learned military officers
held their convictions so strongly was because their analyses showed
the sharply growing role in warfare of state economic development.
Expanded economic capabilities would provide massive, million-man
armies with rapid-firing weapons, virtually 'unlimited' quantities of
technical equipment, and the means of moving troops more widely and
quickly along railroads -- all of which would greatly intensify
combat and broaden the theaters of active operations.
A. A. Neznamov, in his 1909 work entitled Oboronitel'naia voina
^Defensive War). was among the first to discuss the fact that under
the new conditions of warfare the entire state population would have
to fight the war, and not the army alone. The outcome of warfare was
now becoming increasingly dependent on the whole state's internal
economic production and the morale of the country:
Now, in war, not only the army of the state fights, but
the entire people; the burdens and excesses of war are
carried not only by that portion of the population which
directly serves under the flag and is located on the
battlefield, [but] the whole population carries them.475
What concerned Neznamov most, 476 however, was not generalizations from
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"embryonic form of a theory of successive operations,"
upon which M. N. Tukhachevskii subsequently would build,
see Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, pp. 212-215.
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past experience about the nature of future war, but "analysis of the
probable means and methods of waging future war."''77 Concerning the
importance of this emphasis in military affairs, Neznamov stressed:
Even the past does not provide a full idea of the
present, especially in our fast-moving century.
... Past military thought cannot be ignored, but must
constantly make corrections because of present technical
advances and, where possible, also peer ahead.478
Nikolai P. Mikhnevich, like Neznamov, used budushchaia voina as
a common point of departure for seeking a "unity of theory and
practice," but placed his emphasis in a somewhat different direction
by investigating the protracted nature of future wars employing
"strategies of attrition and exhaustion."47'
The main question of war is not about the intensity of
exertion by state forces, rather about the duration of
that exertion, and this will be found to be completely
dependent on the state's economic order.480
Mikhnevich emphasized that because of the growing military-economic
might of states, "it is impossible to judge a war concluded by
victory over, and even the destruction of, armies," because modern
European states have the capability to absorb army losses and to
replace them with new troops. Therefore, in his judgment, it was
Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, p. 211.
Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, pp. 211-212; citing
Von Wahlde, Peter, "Military Thought in Imperial Russia,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1966, p. 223.
Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, pp. 208-210; citing
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. 3rd ed., (St. Petersburg,
1911), pp. 9 and 43; see also Beskrovnyi, L. G., ed.,
Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX
vekov.. (Moscow, 1960), p. 459.
480 Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),
Book 1, p. 97.
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necessary to destroy the most important centers of
population and state activity, i.e., the economic and
political centers, occupy enemy countries, [and]
completely annihilate his military forces in order to
achieve a conclusive victory.481
Mikhnevich went on to suggest that Russia's vast geographic expanse
made it feasible for the Russian army to conduct protracted warfare
successfully on Russian territory. But, he also rejected this
concept for conducting combat operations because of the likelihood
for extremely heavy Russian economic and population losses, as well
as the potential for domestic insurrection.482
Mikhnevich's analysis of the role of economic and morale
factors on the outcome of wars led him to the view that "victory
already was not only about the numbers and energy of the army, [but]
the speed of economic development and the anticipation of morale."483
In his view, the main wartime morale factors were the talent of
commanders, the combat valor of the army, and the spirit of the
people; as well as the "morale quality of the troops, like energy,
courage, self-control, steadfastness, and perseverance in battle."484
Each of these factors were considered to be dependent on the level of
state social development, which he directly related to the amount of
the state's planned preparation for war. He urged, therefore, that
Russia be prepared well in advance of the onset of hostilities.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovv strategii: Kurs Intendantskoi
akademii. (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 43.
Zhilin, pp. 98-99.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),
Book 1, p. 40.
Mikhnevich, op. cit., pp. 50-57.
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Early on Mikhnevich wrote: "It is necessary to prepare a plan for
economic measures to supply all the necessities for the population of
the country."485
General A. G. Elchaninov also stressed the necessity for
Russian preparation for war "by the exertions of all, both moral and
material, forces of the state."486 He emphasized that: "Especially,
it [advance preparation for war] is relevant to us, Russians, with
our technological backwardness, [and our] dependence on foreign
states."487 Elchaninov described four types of preparation for war:
social, political, economic, and military. Of these, he considered
the social understanding of war aims to be the top priority, after
which all other preparations would follow: "If all the people are to
participate in war, all the people also must understand their
inner-most thoughts."488 Essentially what Elchaninov advocated was
the necessity for creating a unified social opinion concerning war
aims, and hence a unified military doctrine.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovv strategic: Kurs Intendantskoi
akademii. p. 31. For additional detailed analysis of the
impact of economic development on future war, see
Beskrovnyi, L. G., Armiia i flot Rossii v nachale XX v.
Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala. (Moscow:
Nauka, 1986); Rostunov, I. I., Russkii front pervoi
mirovoi voinv. (Moscow, Nauka, 1976); Strokov, A. A.,
Vooruzhennve silv i voennogo iskusstvov pervoi mirovoi
voine. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974); Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiiana rubezhe XIX-XX
stoletii. (Moscow: Mysl', 1973).
Elchaninov, A. G., Vedenie sovremennvkh voiny i boia.
(St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 12.
Elchaninov, A. G., Strategiia.
(St. Petersburg, 1912), p. 148.
Elchaninov, A. G., Strategiia. pp. 151-152.
210
To some members of the Russian military intellectual cohort led
by Neznamov, historical experience showed that the formation of a
'correct' doctrine, with its twin political and military-technical
pillars, but above all an elevated social-political and economic
condition of the state, constituted the guarantee of success in war.
Operational-strategic and tactical mistakes during campaigns and
battles could be corrected during the course of a war, but in the
considered opinion of Neznamov: "Doctrinal errors were unforgiving
and, as a rule, lead its followers to perish."''85 Others, led by
A. M. Zaionchkovskii, argued that a unified military doctrine was not
a necessity and could lead to array passivity. For nearly a year a
lively debate transpired on the pages of Russkii invalid, until
August 1912 when Tsar Nikolas II tired of the turmoil and abruptly
ended the debate by forbidding the publication of any more Neznamov
articles on unified military doctrine. Tsar Nikolas summoned the
Ianushkevich Military Academy Commander to the Summer Palace at
Tsarskoe Selo on the outskirts of St. Petersburg and instructed him:
Military doctrine consists of that which, in order to
fulfill all my duties, I decree it to be. I request that
you tell Neznamov that he may no longer discuss these
questions in the press. I am also telling Russkii
invalid about this.550
The idea of a Russian unified military doctrine did not die by
Imperial Decree, but, as we shall see subsequently, continued to




Voennoe delo. No. 2, 1920; cited in Zhilin, p. 146.
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The most immediate impact of the Tsar's decree was the virtual
cessation of all public discussion about the changing role of society
and the army during war, and the continuation of the entrenched
General Staff policies that favored old forms of combat operations
and seemingly took little note of the imminent revolutionary changes
in the nature of warfare. The General Staff had, however, in their
extensive search for a means to achieve decisive military victory in
a 'short war,' by 1910 seized on the necessity of conducting at the
beginning of any future war a quick, decisive strike fully utilizing
all available state forces and means.491 But, the senior leadership
of the Tsarist government deceived themselves into also believing
that the key factor determining the success of this offensive would
be the moral force of the entire Russian people supporting the war
-- regardless of the quantity or quality of new weapons technology
with which the Russian Army could be equipped.
The Initial Period of War (Autumn 1914): Time Runs Out
The Russian strategic plan for a European war initially called
for a defensive action against Germany and a vigorous dual-purpose
offensive against Austria: first, to save Serbia from annihilation;
and, second, to prevent an Austrian invasion from the south into
Russian-occupied Poland. However, once the French and British forces
in the west began to be overrun by the opening German offensive,
their desperate appeals for a Russian diversion prompted the high
491 Beskrovnyi, L. G., "Proizvodstvo vooruzheniia i
boepripasov dlia armii v Rossii v period imperializma
(1898-1917 gg.)," Istoricheskie zapiski. (Moscow, 1977),
Vol. 99, p. 133.
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command to improvise an offensive into East Prussia. The diversion
operation was planned as a pincer movement by two numerically
superior Russian armies with the objective of encircling the German
army under Von Hindenbflrg.
On August 17, 1914 General E. K. Rennenkampf began to advance
on Konigsberg, while to his south General A. V. Samsonov pushed
westward through the very difficult Masurian Lakes region. The
initial Russian success in dislodging the Germans was deceptive.
Rennenkampf's advance westward was excruciatingly slow while the
Samsonov army, isolated and without communications to either
Rennenkampf or Russian headquarters and short on supplies and
munitions, continued to press forward until Von Hindenburg trapped
Samsonov's army in the Tannenberg-Soldau forest. Two of Samsonov's
corps surrendered; Samsonov committed suicide on August 30; and by
mid-September Von Hindenbtlrg, reinforced with two corps transferred
from the Western Front, drove what remained of the Russian armies out
of East Prussia, with the Russian loss of 300,000 men and 650 guns.
The failure of the East Prussian offensive was a shocking
defeat, both for the Russians and for their allies, because of the
gross ineptitude, mismanagement, lack of coordination, and
unpreparedness of the Russian leadership. Although the Russian Army
eventually was able to stabilize the Eastern Front along the East
Prussian border by October 1914, and even attempted unsuccessfully to
renew their offensive in November 1914 and February 1915, they never
regained the initiative before the 1915 German drive eastward.452
Florinsky, pp. 1322-1323.
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The simultaneous, pre-planned Russian offensive on a three
hundred mile-wide front into Galicia on August 18, 1914 was initially
far more successful in its objective of checking the Austrian advance
into Poland than was the ignominious, unsuccessful Russian offensive
into East Prussia. By September 3 the Russian Army captured
Lemberg (Lvov), the ancient capital of Galicia and a critical rail
junction, and pressed forward to invest the fortress at Przemysl;
seized Czernovitz, the capital of Bukovina; and reached the
Carpathian Mountain passes leading onto the plains of Hungary.
Although the Russian offensive stopped short of one of its main
objectives, Cracow, because the troops and supplies needed to take
the city were tied down in the siege of Przemysl, in three weeks'
time a staggering blow was dealt to the Austrian army, which lost
some 350,000 troops that its much smaller manpower reserves would
have very great difficulty replacing. Whether this success of
Russian arms was the result of superior Imperial Staff long-range
planning, the character of the individual Russian leaders who
effectively coordinated the operation, or the weaknesses of the
Austro-Hungarian Army, which was more comparable to the Russian Army
in terms of staff work, logistic system and communications than was
the more efficient German military system, will long be debated by
historians.493
Following the September 6 to 11, 1914 Battle of the Marne, the
Western Front began to settle into the tedious stalemate of trench
warfare, thus releasing German troops from France for transfer to the
Florinsky, p. 1324.
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Eastern Front, where the Germans had made a pre-war promise to
Austria that they would launch an offensive into Poland upon the
outbreak of hostilities. In anticipation of the arrival of these
reinforcements, Von Hindenbtfrg transferred the majority of his army
from East Prussia to Silesia, and on September 28 launched a major
offensive into the southwestern provinces of Russian Poland.
Russia responded to the German threat by withdrawing twelve
army corps from Galicia to concentration areas behind the Vistula
River, immediately north of Warsaw. With the removal of a large
portion of the Russian Army from Galicia, the Austrians initiated an
offensive to relieve Przemysl, but unwisely overextended themselves,
which forced the Austrians to beat a hasty retreat back to Cracow.
More importantly, from the Russian standpoint, the Austrian defeat
exposed the German southern flank, which forced on Von Hindenborg's
army a 100-mile strategic retreat from the gates of Warsaw in order
to escape encirclement.
The respite for the Russians was illusory, however, because on
November 11, 1914 the Germans, under General Mackensen, renewed their
attack toward Warsaw in coordination with a new Austrian offensive in
Galicia. Despite ferocious fighting and heavy casualties on all
sides, neither offensive made significant progress against the
Russian troop concentrations, and by mid-December 1914 the Eastern
Front drifted into a winter hibernation along a line some thirty-five
miles west of Warsaw.494
Florinsky, p. 1324.
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The first four months of World War I was not a total disaster
for Russia. Certainly the Russian Army suffered a staggering defeat
in East Prussia, but it had not collapsed before the vaunted German
onslaught. Russia had successfully invaded, and now controlled,
Galicia, while Von Hindenbtfrg's offensive against Warsaw had been
stopped.
Strategically, the Russian Army in December 1914 was in a far
better position than it had been at the beginning of the war.
The Russian Army's exposed geographical position in western Poland
had been eliminated by the withdrawal, transfer, and concentration of
forces in the Warsaw region, thus consolidating the front and
shortening the lines of communication. Russian Army mobilization was
now well under way, expanding the standing 1.4-million-raan peacetime
army by 5.2 million conscripts in 1914 alone, and thereby
transforming it."5 The first engagements had revealed, however, what
Michael Florinsky quite succinctly describes as the following
"glaring imperfections of the Russian military machine":
Poor staff work; lack of coordination; shortage of planes,
artillery, rifles, and munitions; helplessness of the
commissariat in providing for the needs of the army; inadequacy
of the communication and railway system and the deplorable
state of the roads. The expenditure of munitions and rifles
during the Galician and Polish campaigns was far in excess of
domestic production and deliverables from abroad and made
dangerous inroads on the modest stores available. Last but not
least, there were ominous signs of declining morale and lack of
confidence in victory.''56
The immense mobilization process, or the lack of preparation






morale. Initially, there were very few draft evaders because the
Russian population patriotically supported a war against Germany.
Thus, the first call-up of draftees actually proceeded in an orderly
manner.4" However, once the inductees reported for duty, the
mobilization process began to deteriorate rather rapidly. At the
beginning of the war the Russian Army had only one million rifles in
its war reserve, and munitions were so scarce that thousands of the
new recruits received only one bullet before they went into combat.
The paltry 525,000 rifles produced annually by Russian factories was
insufficient to maintain the peacetime force levels during a war, let
alone arm the avalanche of new inductees. Perhaps even more urgently
important, in the long run, no government provisions were made to
care for the inductees' families, who suffered inordinately during
the long course of the war from the loss of income and support --
in some cases starving to death.498
Most of the draftees languished in the rear for the lack of
instructors, training facilities, and replacement equipment, while
many frontline Russian combat units were struggling to survive
with only 25 percent of their authorized strength. The Imperial Army
had an acute shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned
officers, rifles, machineguns, artillery, munitions, uniforms, boots,
food, quarters, transportation -- everything was in short supply --






The Russian troops suffered, and died, horribly from this lack
of preparation and from the utter stupidity of inducting so many
million men, when these huge masses of troops were neither needed
against a combined Austro-German army which totaled 1.3 million men,
nor could the new Russian recruits be supplied properly. Still,
these raw, untrained recruits -- predominately peasant former-serfs
pulled directly from their landowners' estates -- were sent unarmed
to the front where, formed as the second and subsequent echelons for
frontal attacks, they were expected to pick up the weapons of their
fallen fellow soldiers, killed in front of them, and continue
forward.499 Therefore, it is not surprising that under such horrific
conditions the Russian peasant conscripts were annihilated by the
thousands; but also frequently surrendered en masse or deserted.500
In 1915 another 5.2 million men would be drafted into the
Imperial Army; 2.7 million more in 1916; and another 600,000 in 1917,
for a total of over 15 million Russian men mobilized to serve for
World War I. As a percentage of the total labor force, this meant
that in 1914 fifteen percent of the Russian working-age male
population was serving in the army; in 1915, twenty-five per cent;
For detailed descriptions of Russian First World War
combat operations, see Golovin, N. N., The Russian Army
in World War I. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969),
reprint of The Russian Army in the World War. (London:
Humphrey Milford/Oxford University Press, 1931); also
Rostunov, I. I., Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voinv.
(Moscow, Nauka, 1976); and Strokov, A. A., Vooruzhennve




in 1916, thirty-six per cent; and in 1917, thirty-seven per cent.501
"In the course of the war the Tsarist government mobilized 47.4%, or
almost half, of all the working men of the country."502 This immense
mobilization of manpower, with its attendant severe dislocations of
peacetime trade, industry, transportation, and agriculture -- when
coupled with the ineptitude of the Russian government in organizing
and conducting the war effort which resulted in tremendous losses of
life, property, and territory -- in the course of the war completely
devastated the Russian economy and contributed significantly to the
intense renewal of the great Russian social unrest that spawned the
February and October 1917 Revolutions which ended, finally and with
finality, the ruling Romanov Dynasty.
Contemporary Lessons from the Imperial Army
In 1854, 1877, and in the Japanese War we lost a great many lives through
ignorance or the erroneous interpretation of Suvorov. Must there be more
casualties? Is it not high time for us to revert to Suvorov's methods of
common-sense, his shrewd appreciation of warfare, and his endeavors to
train the Army on such lines as to render it as efficient in peace-time
as on active service? Is the time not ripe yet to heed his golden rule:
"Wars are fought not with numbers but with knowledge"?503
- General Elchaninov, 1912
During the sixty-odd years between the beginning of the Crimean
War (1853) and the start of the First World War (1914) the Russian
Imperial Army underwent a transformation that took it, admittedly,
Florinsky, p. 1353.
Iakushkin, p. 161.
503 Andolenko, Lieutenant Colonel Serge, "The Imperial
Heritage," in Liddell Hart, B. H., ed., The Red Army.
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), pp. 18-19.
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with numerous false starts and through a series of disastrous, costly-
military defeats, from a feudal conscript army employing, at best,
stereotyped 18th century tactics, to a modern mass standing army.
Under the leadership of a 'professional' officer corps, this new
Russian Army could, if its senior commanders allowed it to do so,
effectively apply many of the emerging technologies available at the
beginning of the 20th century.
In the process of accomplishing this metamorphosis, the
Imperial Army came to the forefront of changing Russian society
itself because the principal factor leading to the transformation of
both the Imperial Army and of Russian society was the education of
the Russian people so that they could understand and adapt to the new
forms of warfare that industrialization and new emerging technologies
wrought. The leaders in this Russian societal education process
included numerous visionary military thinkers -- men like Miliutin,
Obruchev, Neznamov, Martynov, and Mikhnevich -- who General Pavel
Zhilin describes as:
Russian military writers at the end of the XIX and
beginning of the XX centuries left an enormous
theoretical legacy. In their creative investigations of
the complicated questions of mass army military art are
found a visionary understanding of the peculiarities and
character of war, which, for their time correctly defined
the fundamental factors to achieve victory in war. In
their military-scientific works they examined also the
most important questions such as the initial period
[birth] and essence of warfare, the ways to build
military forces, the forms and methods of conducting
military operations, and others.504
Zhilin, p. 234.
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Throughout the Russian military transformation, as still today,
the investigation, development and deployment of advanced emerging
technologies is a driving force behind military change. The
prevailing Russian military intellectual view, especially as World
War I approached, consolidated around the concept still applied
within the Russian military: military-scientific investigations of
past experience employing a dialectic process, which incorporates the
latest emerging technological innovations, can be used effectively to
create an operational framework, or paradigm, based upon the proven
eternal principles of warfare -- such as surprise, speed, space,
time, force, mass, and maneuver -- in order to obtain maximum effect
toward achieving victory in war.
A few of the pertinent lessons, that, based on available
information from this exceedingly rich Russian historical period,
might be accepted as 'laws,' include evidence that the Russian
people, while individually peaceloving, make excellent soldiers and
fight best when directly defending their 'homeland' from a clearly
defined and well-understood external enemy threat, against which the
population patriotically can coalesce. That Great Russian 'homeland'
does not, in any way, include the peripheral republics of the former
Soviet Union. Further, even without such domestic popular support,
the staunch fighting qualities of the Russian soldier are such that
even in defeat -- even in calamitous defeat with horrendous
casualties --he does not break. Rather, the Russian Army suffers,
endures, reorganizes, and perseveres. Patience, persistence, and
long-term planning and preparation toward state goals also take on
the characteristics of a 'fundamental law.'
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From the middle of the 19th century through the First World War
Russian Imperial Army military intellectuals explored in great depth,
while the peasant soldiers and commanders simultaneously learned the
hard way on the battlefield, the critical requirements for defending
the Russian homeland against aggressors. In the process, the Russian
military came to the conclusion that rapid maneuver from secure
strategic bastions along interior lines of communication was a
prerequisite for being able to concentrate superior forces at the
decisive points around the periphery of their vast country during the
initial period of war in order to engage, and to defeat, the enemy at
the time and location of Russian choosing. Russian military thinkers
also determined that numerical (quantitative) superiority alone,
either in manpower or weaponry, was not of itself decisive. Rather,
the synergistic (qualitative) combination of military education,
combat training, leadership, readiness, strategy, operational art,
and tactics, if integrated with the employment of superior (or at
least comparable) weaponry through precise command information flows
to and from disciplined leaders in order to control the pace and
scope of battles, guaranteed decisive victory in war. In this
context, the analysis by Gulevich, from nearly 100 years ago, retains
the characteristics of an 'eternal principle' or 'fundamental law':
The decisive role in the course of wars will be played by
the state social-economic system. Warfare demands the
exertion of the entire country's social and economic
organism. Therefore, the state system must be prepared
for the political, military, financial, and economic
aspects of war.505
505 Gulevich, A. A., Sravnenie ekonomicheskogo stroia Rossii
i glavneishikh evropeiskikh gosudarstv c voennoi tochki
zreniia. (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 36.
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But, as is well known, truth, suitable for all time, does not exist. Truth is
always concrete. The character of modern warfare with its grandiose expanse
and diversity of military technologies in no way can be compared with that of
past wars. It is entirely evident that the achievements of Russian military
thought, despite their gigantic value, cannot be applied mechanically to modern
conditions. ... Soviet military science absorbs all the best that exists from
the past military heritage. It is widely used by applying it to the modern,
currently changing forms and methods of conducting warfare.306
The new technical combat means demanded decisive
transformation (perestroika) of all military systems.b0/
- General N. P. Mikhnevich
Zhilin, p. 235.
Zhilin, P. A., ed., Russkaia voennaia mysi': konets XIX
nachalo XX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982). pp. 91-92.
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process




the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms
The 1921-1923 Interregnum:
The Red Army Demobilization Disaster and
Ideological Conflict over the Role of the Red Army
The army is a copy of society and suffers from all its
diseases, usually at a higher temperature.
- Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed
Decision to Demobilize:
Political, Military, and Economic Reasons
The final defeat of General Wrangel and the evacuation of the
remnants of his Volunteer Army from Crimea on November 16, 1920
"opened a new era for the Red Army, though hostilities continued well
into 1922, "508 particularly in the Ukraine, the Kuban, Central Asia,
and the Caucasus. As early as September 1920, Caucasian Front
Revvoensovet (RVS) member Ordzhonikidzi had received a telegram from
Lenin directing to "most quickly and completely liquidate all
[bandit] bands and remnants of the White Guards in the Caucasus and
von Hagen, Mark, Soldiers in the Proletarian
Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist
State. 1917-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990), p. 127; for well-documented accounts of events
that transpired during the Russian Civil War, see
Budennyi, S. M., Proidennvi put'. Book One, (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1959) and Book Three, (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1973); Beskrovnyi, L. G., Russkoe voennoe iskusstva XIX
v.. (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); Rostunov, I. I., Istorii
pervoi mirovoi voinv 1914-1918. 2 vols., (Moscow: Nauka,
1975); Stone, Norman, The Eastern Front 1914-1917.
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975).
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Kuban -- this matter is of absolute importance to the entire
state."509 Progress in quelling these marauding "enemies of the
Revolution" was slow. The highly maneuverable bands employing
guerilla tactics were exceedingly difficult to eliminate. They
tended to assemble, raid an area, and disperse before Red Army units
could find them, let alone encircle and destroy them in a battle.
Consequently, as late as November 1921 Budennyi's First Cavalry
Army reported the continued existence in the Caucasus of "95
organized bandit groups with a strength of approximately 4500 sabers
[cavalrymen] and nearly 1000 bayonets [infantrymen] with 60-70
machineguns. "510 The 'counterrevolutionary' groups that most
threatened Soviet power in 1921 were, first, Nestor Makhno's 2000 man
partisan band which plundered the Ukraine virtually at will; and
second, the "Army for the Salvation of Russia," organized in the Don
and Kuban regions on June 23, 1921 by Princes Ukhtomskii and
Dolgorukhov with 212 former Imperial army officers and several
thousand soldiers.511 Although the most serious opposition to Soviet
power, the White Volunteer Army, commanded by Denikin and Wrangel,
was gone forever, in 1921 alone there were an additional 170,000 Red
Army battle casualties, followed by 21,000 combat losses in 1922.512
V. I. Lenin, Complete Collection of Works. Vol. 51,
p. 277; cited in Budennyi, S. M., Proidennvi put'.
Book Three, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), p. 248.
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Kliatskin, S. M., Na zashchite oktiabria: organizatsia
regularnoi armii i militsionnoe stroitel'stvo v sovetskoi
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A more recent source using archival materials states that during the
course of the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1922 "the Red Army lost
939,755 in dead and missing and 6,791,703 wounded."513
But already in the summer of 1919, with the defeat of Admiral
Kolchak's forces on the Eastern Front, the Revvoensovet (RVS) had
begun to consider the peacetime structure of the Red Army.5" Under
the direction of the Main Staff and the Field Staff, a series of
commissions were established to prepare proposals for the rapid
transition to a military system based on militia, demobilization, and
restructuring of the central command apparatus. This latter
commission was chaired by P. S. Baluev, a former Tsarist general, who
proposed retaining the existing dual staff system, but with the
General Staff becoming the "supreme operational institution within a
system directed by a State Defense Council."515 However, the Field
Staff report, dated January 1920, proposed the creation of a single
Great General Staff (Bol'shoi General'nyi Shtab) by merging the Main
Staff and the Field Staff under the overall policy direction of the
RVS.516 To help resolve the conflicting and contentious institutional
positions, a January 1920 conference of Party leaders, members of the
RVS, commissars, and military specialists agreed on the formation of
a single, unified General Staff, however, it would not be until
Krivosheev, G. F., Grif Sekretnost Sniat. (Moscow, 1992);
cited in Erickson, John, "Total Warfare: 1918-1989,"
The Scotsman. February 6, 1993, p. 5.
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February 1921 that the Main Staff and Field Staff were actually
merged to create the much more cohesive, and increasingly powerful,
Red Army Staff (Shtab RKKA),517
By the winter of 1920, the most senior members of Lenin's
government who formed the Council on Labor and Defense (Sovet Truda i
Oborony - STO) were hoping to send half of the Red Army's five
million men-under-arms home for spring planting in 1921, "if the
international situation and the transport system allowed."518 The STO
was in near panic over the collapse of the Russian economy, that had
been caused by nearly seven years of continuous warfare on the
territory of the former Russian Empire. By 1920 Russian heavy
industrial production had fallen to only one-seventh of pre-war
levels. Cast iron annual production was at 116 thousand tons -- only
three percent of the pre-war level, while coal was at one-third; oil
at forty percent; and Russian agricultural production was at just a
meager sixty-five percent of the former Tsarist level. Everywhere
there was growing unemployment.519 When the Russian economy failed to
respond positively to military manpower cuts, in October 1921 a Party
Central Committee plenum would order a further Red Army reduction
down to 1.5 million troops; by October 1922 army strength would drop
even further to 800,000 soldiers; and by February 1923 the Red Army
Kliatskin, S. M., "Problemy voennogo stroitel'stva
na zavershaiushchem etape grazhdanskoi voiny,"
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. March 1964, p. 13.
von Hagen, p. 127.
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would reach its provisional peacetime level of 600,000."° Although
"encircled by capitalists," besieged, isolated, and thus only
temporarily at peace, for the Bolshevik leadership the economy became
the number one priority. "No longer were the needs of the army at
the center of the regime's attention.""1
Political pressure to demobilize the Red Army had been building
well before the Ninth Party Conference, held in the March-April 1920
time frame, since the concept of a standing army was anathema to the
Communist Party leaders; but especially to the Left Social
Revolutionaries, who stridently advocated the creation of a
territorial militia and lived in utter fear of a "Bonapartist"
military coup, fueled by the deteriorating Russian economic
conditions. They were the progeny of the European social democratic
movement who, in Jake Kipp's words, carried with them,
... an undying distrust of any ideas coming from
professional soldiers of the old regime. On the one
hand, reformers and revolutionaries shared the strong
antimilitarist thrust of European social democracy, which
viewed the military as the sources of a vile and
poisonous militarism. The professional soldiers' desire
for glory, like the capitalists' search for profits, only
brought suffering to the working class. All socialists
shared a commitment to a citizens' militia as the
preferred means of national defense.522
Berkhin, I. B., Voennaia reforma v SSSR (1924--1925 gg. ) .
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Into the breach at the Ninth Party Conference strode Leon
Trotsky, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) and
War Commissar, who proposed "labor militarization." Trotsky's idea
was that rather than demobilize the Red Army wholesale and return the
quasi-literate, experienced, and indoctrinated conscripts -- nearly
80 percent of whom were peasants -- home into a devastated economy,
the soldiers should be converted into conscripted "labor armies" that
would introduce organization and planning into the rural areas in
order to help build socialism. In his keynote speech Trotsky pointed
to the success of the Third Red Army in rebuilding the Urals rail
network and praised their discipline and self-sacrifice in applying
military organizational methods to what traditionally were considered
to be civilian economic tasks.5"
Although the 103 army delegates to the Eighth Party Congress,
also in March-April 1920, argued strenuously and vehemently against
either demobilization, "labor armies," or transition to a territorial
militia, the Congress resolved to initiate a gradual redeployment of
the regular army into militia units that would be located in Russian
interior areas with large concentrations of industrial workers who
would be able to provide the loyal, "core-tested elements of the
local proletariat." When the Eighth Party Congress authorized the
formation of Trotsky's labor armies, it also "accepted the principle
of mass mobilizations of conscripted labor, along the lines by which
we proceeded in the building of the Red Array.
523
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Lenin's government thus instituted a fundamental change in the
role of the proletarian dictatorship, namely, to "mobilize the
nation's resources for economic and military tasks" using the
organizational principles of the Red Army "to provide, for the less
conscious and more backward peasant masses, natural leaders and
organizers in the persons of the most conscious proletarians...."525
-- many of whom were either former, or currently serving, Red Army
soldiers. Finally, the Ninth Party Conference thought it wise to
caution that implementation of these ambitious military reforms could
be suspended if new international security threats to the Soviet
state emerged. To reflect the importance of this planned transition
to a territorial militia and the new emphasis on civilian economic
matters, in April 1920 the senior-level government Council of Worker
and Peasant Defense, first formed in November 1918, was renamed the
Council of Labor and Defense (Sovet Truda i Oborony - STO) ,526
Demobilization Reprieve:
The Spring 1920 Polish Attack
In late April 1920 the Red Army obtained a reprieve from
demobilization and reform when the Polish Army launched a major
offensive on April 25, 1920 with the immediate objective to "liberate
the Ukraine," and with an ultimate goal being "the total defeat of
Russian imperialism."527 Jozef Pilsudski, head of the independent
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new Polish State and Polish Armed Forces Supreme Commander,
basically sought to restore Poland's eastern frontiers to those that
existed prior to the 1772 partition by seizing the western provinces
of Russia and of the Ukraine.528
After the September 1919 declaration of the 'Curzon Line,'
establishing the 'temporary' new Polish border, Pilsudski decided to
take advantage of the turmoil in Russia to push Poland's border
eastward, before the new border could be defended by the Soviets.525
Pilsudski's preemptive attack on the Russian Southwestern Front with
738,000 men, supported by the Ukrainian guerilla forces of hetman
Simon Petliura, initially succeeded in driving back the Russian
defenders and in occupying Kiev on May 7, 1920.
For the fledgling Soviet state, the struggle to secure its
borders and to preserve the gains of the Revolution suddenly took
precedence once again, and the STO issued an immediate Red Army
mobilization order that yielded some 300,000 recruits from the 1901
birth-year group. A second call-up for multiple-year groups
assembled a total of one million men to augment the existing ranks
and swelled the Red Army to its civil war peak of 5,317,159 soldiers,
who succeeded in containing the initial Polish advance.530
Pilsudskii, Io., Voina 1920 goda. (Moscow: Novosti,
1992). See this reprint of Pilsudskii's book for the
complete Polish description of the 1920 campaigns.
Weygand, General of the Army Maxime, "The Red Army in the
Polish War," in Liddell Hart, B. H., ed., The Red Army.
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 41.
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To compound the Bolshevik difficulties, however, in June 1920
-- just as the Western Front Commander, the twenty-six-year-old
Mikhail V. Tukhachevskii, whom Lenin at times referred to almost
fondly as "the dashing Red lieutenant,"531 was preparing the Red Army
for a massive counteroffensive against the Poles -- Baron General
Petr von Wrangel attacked unexpectedly in the south, out of Crimea
across the Perekop Isthmus, which was defended only by the weak
Thirteenth Red Army, and via landings at Genichesk from the Sea of
Azov. Wrangel's attack took the Bolshevik defenders in the flank by
surprise in an energetic, but desperate, effort to seize the major
grain-producing Northern Tauride region in order to supply and to
relieve his Volunteer Army from entrapment in Crimea. 532 The 40,000
veterans of the April 1920 Volunteer Army evacuation from the Kuban
port of Novorossisk to the Crimea had been reorganized into three
corps, one cavalry division, and one Caucasian brigade armed with 100
cannons and 500 machineguns, 533 that first inflicted heavy casualties
Kipp, Jacob W., "Soviet Military Doctrine and the Origins
of Operational Art, 1917-1936," in Frank, Willard C., Jr.
and Philip S. Gillette, eds., Soviet Military Doctrine
from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991. (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 98.
Denikin, Anton, The White Army. (London: Cape, 1930),
trans, by Catherine Zvegintzov, reprint
(London: Hyperion, 1973), p. 363.
Budennyi provides a somewhat different structure for
Wrangel's Crimean Army: 4 army corps (General Kutepov's
1st; General Slashchev's 2nd; General Abramov's Don; and
General Pisarev's "laughable" summary group), plus
General Barbovich's two division cavalry corps.
Wrangel's army was equipped with 630 machineguns,
108 cannon, 24 armored cars, 12 tanks, 4 armored trains,
and 24 aircraft. See Budennyi, Book Three, p. 19.
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on I. P. Uborevich's 13,000 man Thirteenth Red Army "guard force"
during the Crimean Peninsula breakout, and at the end of June
decisively defeated a counterattack by the Red First Cavalry Corps
now commanded by Zhloba.336 The Revvoensovet rushed some 35,000
fresh Red Army troops to the Crimea during the month of June 1920
-- including many of their last reserves, who were badly needed on
the Western Front against the Polish offensive --in order to try to
contain Wrangel's outbreak by reinforcing the Thirteenth Red Army to
a strength of 41,000 men. 535 But by the beginning of July 1920, the
entire Northern Tauride was in the hands of the White Army.336
This new two-front war, on the Western and Southwestern Fronts,
stretched Soviet military manpower and resources to the limit.
To meet the crisis Budennyi's Konarmiia (First Cavalry Army) was
redeployed from the Caucasian Front to the Southwestern Front to form
a strike group with 18,000 sabers, 52 guns, 350 machineguns, five
armored trains, an armored car detachment, and eight aircraft
directed against a thinly-spread Polish Third Army that had very
limited reserves. 337 With sporadic logistic support and limited
operational cooperation from the Twelfth Red Army, Budennyi's
Konarmiia, fielding four cavalry divisions reinforced with two
infantry divisions, combined surprise and concentration of mass on
June 5, 1920 at the weak juncture of the Third and Fourth Polish
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Armies to break through the Polish front with one cavalry division
into Galicia.538
Budennyi's penetration of Polish lines caused Marshal Pilsudski
to evacuate Kiev on June 10 and to begin a general retreat from his
overextended positions in order to preclude envelopment as Budennyi's
cavalry thrust well into the Polish rear area around Zhitomir and
Berdichev.539 During the following month the Konarmiia pressed on to
participate in heavy fighting around Rovno, which the Konarmiia
captured on July 4 in a flanking attack; lost to a Polish
counterattack on July 9; and regained through a direct assault on
July 10, 1920.
Budennyi's force engaged in forty-three days of intensive
combat without effective logistic support. Cavalry
brigades, which at the start of the campaign had numbered
1,500 sabers, were down to 500 or less by the end of the
fighting. The fighting at Zhitomir and Rovno exemplifies
the combined-arms approach that typified Soviet
employment of strategic cavalry. It also showed its
limited ability to engage in sustained combat.540
Meanwhile, Tukhachevskii continued preparations for an all-out
Red Army offensive to seize the Polish capital.541 By the end of July
1920, when Tukhachevskii launched his across-the-front drive for
Warsaw, his Western Front forces had been reinforced, primarily with
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poorly trained and unwilling returned deserters, from twenty-three
divisions up to thirty-four divisions. The Western Front was divided
by the Pripet Marshes, where General Shrepin's "Group Mozyr" with two
division equivalents sought to maintain a link between two Red Army
main strategic directions: 1) a Northern Front of twenty infantry
divisions and two cavalry divisions forming the Third Cavalry Corps
under General Gay-Khan; and 2) a Southern Front of eight infantry
divisions and the four cavalry divisions of Budennyi's Cavalry Army
-- a total of nearly 790,000 troops.542
Following the success of the initial Western Front attack,
Tukhachevskii's plan called for his stronger Northern Front to pursue
the Polish Army relentlessly back to Warsaw so that the Poles would
have no respite during which to regroup. Then the Northern Front was
to flank the Warsaw defenses on the north occupying positions astride
the Warsaw-Danzig line of communications, thus cutting off Warsaw
from its arms and munitions supply line.
As Tukhachevskii's forces rushed headlong toward Warsaw,
"assuming that the enemy were beaten, even though no real battle had
taken place," in his zeal Tukhachevskii neglected to concentrate his
armies, failed to secure and organize his own lines of communication,
and persisted in trying to out-flank Warsaw, even though the maneuver
badly split his forces. "As a result, the Fourth Army on the
northern flank, and the Twelfth and Cavalry Armies on the southern




All the while the rapidly retreating Polish Army shortened its
interior lines of communication, regrouped, and concentrated its
remaining forces on Warsaw.
Then, between August 14 and 17, 1920 at the Vistula River, the
Polish Army, strengthened with French reinforcements under General
Weygand, halted the overextended Red advance, pinned the Soviet
formations against the Polish-East Prussian border, and went over
into a counteroffensive that has come to be known in history as the
"Miracle of Warsaw."544 Tukhachevskii' s Western Front quickly lost
over 70,000 prisoners, as Pilsudski's forces first encircled the Red
troop concentration between Narev and the German frontier, and then
swept the panicked newly recruited Russian riadovoi (rank and file
line troops) before them, overrunning Brest-Litovsk and eastern
Galicia. Almost unprecedented in Russian history, army morale had
been broken. Most of the Red Army heavy equipment had been captured,
and there were no immediately available trained reserves with which
to stop the Polish advance. "Tukhachevskii's general offensive took
place without adequate reserves, effective command and control, or
logistical support."545
Simple and straightforward as the preceding conclusion may
seem, over the years great obfuscating controversy has continued to
swirl around the failure of Tukhachevskii's offensive, because of the
Communists' bitter ideological disappointment that their Polish
brethren "proletariat did not unite" and arise to overthrow their
544 Kipp, in Soviet Military Doctrine. , , . p. 105.
545 Nikulin, Lev, Tukhachevskii: Biograf icheskii ocherk.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), p. 161.
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"imperialist oppressors"; because the Bolsheviks tarred the lowly
Russian peasant army conscripts as "psychologically unsuitable" for
offensively advancing the cause of "world revolution"; and because
Joseph Stalin, the Political Commissar of Budennyi's Cavalry Army,
sought to cover up the disaster, and especially his own role therein,
by blaming War Commissar Trotsky. Thereby Stalin embroiled the
failure in Russian politics, and later in his "cult of personality."
All the excuses about inadequate communications, lack of
supplies, and battle weariness aside, the fact is that Budennyi's
Konarmiia persisted in attacking independently toward Lvov. Budennyi
ignored Red Army Commander-in-Chief Kamenev's specific orders to
regroup, to join with the Twelfth Red Army, and to attack toward
Lublin in order to relieve pressure on the Northern Front. Had
Kamenev's orders been executed, the Southern Front might -- just
might -- have prevented Tukhachevskii's defeat on the Vistula from
becoming a rout.546
In the process of their retreat and 'miracle' victory on the
Vistula, the Poles, it seems, had learned a valuable lesson from
their nearly disastrous spring attempt to seize all the Ukraine.
This time Pilsudski wisely pursued the more limited objective of
securing Poland's own frontiers. Considering the small size of the
Polish army, their limited supplies and means of transportation, and
the probability that the starving Russians would make an all out
effort to regain the Ukrainian 'bread basket' if the Poles seized any
significant amount of former Imperial territory, in September 1920
546 Triandafillov, V. , "Vziamodeistvie mezhdu zapadnymi
iugo-zapadnym frontami,", pp. 26-27; cited by Kipp,
Jacob, W. , in Soviet Military Doctrine... . p. 106.
the Polish government made its first tentative peace proposals to the
Russians. By October 12, 1920 the Soviet and Polish governments
agreed to a temporary cease-fire and initiated peace negotiations.
The Red Army was now free to concentrate its forces on Wrangel's
Volunteer Army in South Russia -- the only remaining major threat to
the Soviet state and the Bolshevik top priority for elimination."7
Red Army Demobilization
Following an intense and bloody two months of near-continual
fighting, first, to clear the White Army from the Northern Tauride
and then to break through the defenses across the Salkovo and Perekop
Isthmuses into the Crimean Peninsula White bastion, on the bitter
cold day of November 15, 1920, while the last of General Wrangel's
forces were completing their embarkation at Yalta,"8 Budennyi's
Konarmiia and Bliukher's 51st rifle division occupied Sevastopol.
The Southern Front Commander Mikhail V. Frunze rather unctuously,
but no doubt sincerely, telegraphed to Lenin:
Today our units arrived in Sevastopol. The Southern
Russian counterrevolution finally has been played out by
the powerful strikes of Red regiments. Our exhausted
country is open to the possibility for healing wounds
which have been inflicted by the imperialists and the
civil war. The revolutionary zeal, that the Red Army
displayed in past battles, remains such that in the field
of peaceful labor construction Russia can gain a no less
brilliant victory. The Red Army of the Southern Front
sends its regards and congratulations to the victorious
workers and peasants of Russia and to the whole world and






Frunze, M. V., Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. I, p. 425.
238
Harvard University Professor Adam Ulam presents a somewhat more
objective analysis than either the highly propagandized White or
Bolshevik versions of the reasons why the Communists succeeded in
consolidating their hold on the territory of the Russian Empire:
Militarily the reasons usually adduced for the
Bolsheviks' victory stress their domination of the center
of the country, with relatively short interior lines
while their enemies were on the outside, disunited, with
vast distances to travel before they could come to grips
with the main Red forces. The White offensives were not
so much defeated as they were spent in long marches
through partisan-infested territory, the long
communication lines, lack of supplies, and disease
(especially typhus) taking toll of their armies even
before they faced the enemy. Their troops were almost
always inferior numerically to the Bolsheviks', since
there was no practical coordination, and really in the
nature of things there could not be any, between the
major White centers in Siberia, in the south of Russia,
and on the Baltic.550
Meanwhile, the White evacuations at Kerch and Theodosia
proceeded with some considerable confusion and difficulty, as the
White rear guard had trouble separating itself from the Red vanguard.
At Theodosia alone some 30 various White military units were taken
prisoner.551 But on November 16 the entire White evacuation fleet of
126 ships, carrying 145,693 men, women, and children, 552 assembled in
the roads of Theodosia -- and set sail away from their homeland for
the unknowns of Constantinople. Almost immediately within the
Ulam, Adam, The Bolsheviks. (New York: Macmillan, 1965),
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Budennyi disputes the figure of 145,693 White evacuees,
claiming that according to Soviet data the correct number
is 83,000 Russians who fled. Budennyi, Book 3, p. 147.
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European half of Russia effective White resistance to the Bolshevik
government collapsed. The Russian Civil War 'officially' was over,
even though the killing continued for another two years in the
Ukraine, Siberia, the Kuban, Central Asia and the Caucasus."3
Equally quickly, as White armed resistance in European Russia
collapsed, in December 1920 the Red Army's temporary reprieve from a
massive demobilization ended. Marshal Georgii Zhukov describes the
status of the Red Army at that time:
During the civil war the Party and people not only were
victorious over the enemy, but in the process created a
massive regular army; created a central and local
military supply organization; and introduced unified
command of units. By the end of 1920, the Red Army
consisted of 5.5 million men at arms; despite losses
between September 1918 and December 1920 of nearly 2.2
million men, of which 800,000 were killed or wounded in
battle and 1,392,000 perished from serious illnesses.5"
The Eighth Congress of Soviets decided in December 1920 that, with
the heinous counterrevolutionaries vanquished; the end of foreign
assistance to the White resistance, as well as the termination of
direct foreign intervention; and with the Russian economy lying in
total ruins, the proletarian state could no longer afford to maintain
the large standing Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Congress
resolved, however, that because of their "capitalist encirclement"
and the continuing diplomatic crises that could lead to a new foreign
intervention against the Socialist Fatherland, it was essential to
preserve the state's capability to defend itself and urged that local
Luckett, pp. 383-384.
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Soviets should give "all necessary aid" to the army during its
demobilization.5"
As the actual Red Army demobilization began in December 1920,
under the direction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the
Republic (Revvoensovet Respubliki - RVSR), conditions so quickly
deteriorated to near chaos that the Soviet government's still
exceedingly fragile control over the Russian countryside once again
became seriously jeopardized.
The RVSR decreed the release of all soldiers and sailors
according to a strict schedule: first all men aged
thirty-five and older, then men aged thirty-two to
thirty-four, followed by the next three age groups. The
center would then study the feasibility of further cuts,
but hoped to be able to release even twenty-five-year-
olds beginning in late spring 1921.556
The Russian rail system, seriously degraded and in some cases
all but destroyed outright over the long years of war, was incapable
of moving these two-and-a-half-million demobilized soldiers over the
vast distances of the Russian steppe in so short a time frame.
Trains soon backed-up in stations, stranding the frequently ill and
battle weary troops, who so desperately wanted only to go home, with
neither food nor shelter in the bitter winter cold. The stranded
soldiers took matters into their own hands, demobilized themselves,
and began the long walk back to their peasant villages. By the
middle of February 1921, the rail system was so completely
constipated that the RVSR specifically authorized Petrograd and
Moscow military units to leave their garrisons for home on foot.
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Former soldiers --"Heroes of the Revolution" -- trekked homeward, only
to find upon arrival that their homes had been destroyed or pillaged
in the wars; that their property and livestock had been looted or
confiscated; and that they had no means to support themselves or
their families, if indeed their families were still waiting for them.
For survival many thousands of demobilized soldiers chose to join
partisan bands, or outright 'bandit' groups, that roamed the
devastated countryside, inflicting at will even further suffering on
the population. "Armed insurrection swept Tambov and Orel provinces,
the Ukraine, Turkestan, the Crimea, the Caucasus, the entire Western
Front, the Chinese border, and Mongolia."55'
The Red Army of the period 1920 to 1921 was nearly as exhausted
as had been its White opponents before their defeat on the Crimean
Peninsula. Both had lived off the Russian countryside, ravaging it
mercilessly during the course of the civil war, as first one side and
then the other occupied a territory and sucked sustenance from it.
The victorious Red Army in no way resembled the professional
European standing armies of the time:
[The Red Army] was a vast, straggling, loosely organized
force, resembling an overgrown partisan army, with few
common factors binding it together.... It contained
every conceivable type of unit, from semi-barbarous
forest brigands to battalions of fanatical Communist
cadets; and every kind of soldier, from sabre-rattling
ex-NCOs to precise and doctrinaire professors in the
military academies.558
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The depleted Red Army units found themselves surrounded by starving
peasants, rampant disease, crime and brutality of every conceivable
kind, and open rebellion against any authority -- all in areas that
before the wars had been rich, self-sustaining agricultural regions.
In the first twenty days of the demobilization, army priority for
food rationing fell from its wartime second priority -- behind only
defense industry workers -- to sixth place, causing the already harsh
living conditions in army units to become simply intolerable. "Once
the army lost its privileged position, it became less immune to the
hardships that plagued the rest of the country. The fuel shortage
left barracks cold. No repairs could be afforded."539
In the spring of 1921 Budennyi's Konarmiia, located in the
Ekaterinoslav district of the Ukraine, was typical of the sad state
of the whole Red Army. Budennyi wrote:
Its condition worsened catastrophically. Division
reports were successively worse, one to the next. Even
in the Ukraine 1921 was a year of hunger as people and
cattle perished from famine. We fed the horses with roof
thatch. Despite this the horses weakened. We lost
thousands of horses, and this negatively impacted on
troop morale. Maintaining discipline became all the more
difficult. Combat capability of the army fell.560
On April 5, 1921 the RVSR ordered the Konarmiia to reduce itself by
one-third of its strength and recommended the redeployment of its
divisions and regiments to dispersed, "more secure," separate
locations within the Nikolaev, Kremenchug, and Tambov districts
--an action which effectively would have eliminated the First
559
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Cavalry Array. Budennyi protested Trotsky's decision and requested
the transfer of his Konarmiia to the Don, Kuban, and Stavropol'
districts, which, following a 'personal for' letter from Budennyi to
Lenin, was accomplished.561
Meanwhile, throughout the Red Array whole units of chronically
underfed, or unfed, soldiers living in unheated barracks fell ill,
while "civilian organizations simply left the army to fend for
itself, perhaps, in some cases, exacting revenge for the army's
abusive treatment of them in the recent past."562 Not surprisingly,
under such atrocious conditions Red Army morale collapsed -- with no
viable mission, seemingly unwanted, and certainly uncared for by
their country -- the RKKA soldiers who had won the civil war and
preserved the Revolution, for some very good reasons, began to ask
"Pochemu my zdes?" ("Why are we here?")563
The Territorial Militia Debate
That same uncertainty about the fate of the Red Army also began
to permeate discussions at the most senior political levels of the
army and eventually reached into the innermost circle of Lenin's
government as well. One of the initial focal points for the debate
over the army's future was the December 1920 second national assembly
of the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Council of the
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delegates for his lack of leadership and for his failure to defend
army interests. According to the angry army political workers in
attendance at the assembly, Smilga not only had not acted with
sufficient vigor to prevent the creation of a territorial militia by
the Ninth Party Conference and the Eighth Congress of Soviets, but
had allowed the encroachment into army political affairs of the Main
Political Enlightenment Committee (Glavpolitporsvet), headed by
Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia.564 Despite Smilga's strident
attacks on Trotsky's militia army as being incapable of "guaranteeing
'proletarian hegemony' in the army" and his assertion, which echoed
the assessment of General Obruchev fifty years earlier, that "in time
of war, Russia's rail network would hinder the rapid mobilization of
an army that was territorially organized," within two weeks after the
end of the assembly, Ivar Smilga was replaced by Sergei Gusev -- over
Leon Trotsky's strong objection.565
Sergei Gusev, too, had opposed Trotsky's militia plan during
his address to the assembly as "premature abandonment of the regular
Red Army," since a peasant militia army could be "the organized armed
form for the petit bourgeois and anarchist counterrevolution."566
Gusev also argued that, as the recent Polish campaign demonstrated so
convincingly, a peasant "militia army was suitable only for a
defensive war" and was backed in this assertion by the popular and
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very influential Red Army commander, Mikhail Tukhachevskii. 567 It
must be remembered that what many Bolshevik revolutionaries, and some
military leaders like Gusev, ideologically, but rather illogically,
expected imminently to happen was a 'world revolution' in which the
'toiling masses' world-wide would follow the Russian example, arise,
and overthrow their 'hated capitalist oppressors.' The exuberant
Communists, flushed with their civil war victory, fully anticipated
that Karl Marx's dictum -- "Workers of the World Unite" -- must now
certainly be carried forward into fruition. Therefore, the first
ruling Communist government in the world had to be prepared
militarily to take the offensive, to seize the initiative by
promoting and assisting revolution abroad, and to defend and to
secure their own Russian Republic from the anticipated 'inevitable
imperialist assault,' aimed at destroying the Soviet homeland --
"the birthplace of the Socialist Revolution."
With this perceived hostile international political climate as
background, the December 1920 PUR assembly overwhelmingly affirmed
their adamant opposition to any transition of the Red Army into what
they deemed to be an "inferior" territorial militia army.
On the basis of their recent experience in the Civil War,
the political workers declared that 'in a peasant Russia
the implementation of a militia system for the entire
country would meet with insurmountable political and
strategic difficulties.' A militia system would deliver
the army into the hands of the peasantry, and in the
event of war would doom the country to military defeat
because of the poorly developed rail network. They
advocated instead 'a permanent army, not necessarily
large, but well trained in the military sense and
politically prepared, made up of young age groups.'
567
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The delegates repeated the by now ritual insistence that
the barracks become a military and political school for
young citizens, and, accordingly, that the miserable
condition of the existing barracks be rectified
immediately. Finally, if the nation were to experiment
with a militia system, the formation of new units should
not be entrusted to Vsevobuch, but should be left in the
hands of the army itself.568
"Vsevobuch" was the acronym for the Universal Military Training
Administration that had been created in April 1918 when the Soviet
Republic switched from voluntary military service to obligatory
military training. From 1919 to 1923 Vsevobuch was headed by Nikolai
Podvoiskii, who, as a dedicated advocate for a people's militia,
continually sought to expand the Vsevobuch role in forming units,
organizing supply and conducting political work among the military.565
The next round of the continuing debate on the future of the
Red Army was launched with the opening of the Tenth Party Congress on
March 6, 1921 when Vsevobuch Chairman Nikolai Podvoiskii offered a
"Resolution on the question of the reorganization of the armed forces
of the Republic" in which he asserted that a militia army was the
"only genuine socialist military organization" because of the
existence therein of "comradely socialist democracy." Leon Trotsky
seconded Podvoiskii's motion with an impassioned address, as only the
inimitable Trotsky could make, entitled "The Involvement of the
Masses in the Creation of the Army."570 Ivar Smilga, the PUR Chairman
until only a few months before , verbally assaulted the territorial
von Hagen, p. 135.
See von Hagen, pp. 29-34, for further descriptions of
Vsevobuch's role and of Podvoiskii's intrigues.
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militia proposal warning that "soldiers were again demanding the
right to elect officers" and that "the radical proposals being put
forward to reintroduce 'democracy' into the army would destroy what
little fighting ability Red Army units had managed to preserve.""1
Despite Smilga's plea, the Tenth Congress was not ideologically
or psychologically prepared to dispense with their socialist roots
and resolved to initiate experimental militia units in six interior
military districts, while the regular Red Army would continue to
defend the state border districts, but deferred a final decision on
army organization and structure until after further discussion on the
army's future role. 572 As a result of this ongoing debate, it would
not be until 1922 that the first militia units actually would be
organized in Petrograd.573
Gusev-Frunze "Theses" on the
Workers'-Peasants' Red Army (RKKA)
The leaders of the Tenth Congress discussion on the future
structure and role of the Red Army were Sergei Gusev, PUR Chairman,
and Mikhail Frunze, an 'Old Bolshevik' and much decorated Red Army
Commander of civil war fame, who drafted and distributed to the
delegates their "Theses on the Reorganization of the Workers'-
Peasants' Red Army." The Gusev-Frunze "Theses" were among the first
attempts to coherently present the 'lessons of the civil war' by
571
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incorporating the influential views of senior political staff, Red
commanders, and military specialists (voenspets).5"* The "Theses"
focused not only on the most important factors in the civil war
victory and the character of that war, but injected into the debate
the projected nature of future wars, which, the authors judged, were
likely to be considerably different from the wars just concluded.575
- Factors in the Russian Civil War Victory
Gusev presented as his analysis of the situation that in the
future the Red Army would not face a splintered enemy force that was
"shaky, hostile, or neutral to the proletarian dictatorship, poorly
trained and armed, hastily formed," and hence "unreliable because of
the soldiers' hostility toward the officers," as the White armies had
been. Rather, the more formidable "imperialist" standing European
armies confronting and encircling the Soviet state were all "well
armed and well trained," with fully prepared command staffs, internal
cohesion, numerical superiority, and "chauvinistically inclined"
against socialism. European standing armies were not "improvised
peasant armies." The Red Army, Gusev concluded, "in the form that it
has currently taken, is altogether powerless against mighty
imperialist armies" and therefore, "the Soviet state must undertake
to make the Red Army equal to its imperialist counterparts."576
For a thorough discussion of the role of the Imperial
Army voenspets in the formation of the Red Army, see
Kavtaradze, A., "Iz istorii russkogo general'nogo
shtaba," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 7, 1971.
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Gusev proposed to the Congress, first, that Podvoiskii's and
Trotsky's militia armies in the provinces would create the material
basis for "local particularistic strivings to the detriment of the
interests of the Workers'-Peasants' Republic," while he,
viewed the currently existing centralized army
organization as embodying state interests, as opposed to
the regional loyalties that a militia would appeal to.
If the party and government insisted on shifting to a
militia system, Gusev demanded that it be strictly
limited to proletarian and semiproletarian cities and
villages, and that the new units maintain close ties with
the special assignment detachments and with trade unions.
In primarily agricultural areas, ... the 'particularistic
strivings' of the peasantry would reinforce the local
authorities in their inclinations toward autonomy.577
Second, Gusev warned:
The persistence of an overwhelmingly 'petit bourgeois
peasant' majority that remained fully capable of
spontaneously reviving capitalism in the Soviet Republic,
combined with the delay of revolution in the West and the
economic devastation of the country, created a situation
particularly ripe for 'Bonapartist attempts to overthrow
Soviet power.'576
By preserving, and strengthening, PUR oversight of the Red Army
political apparatus, Gusev asserted that the political inclination of
the peasantry could be redirected to make a peasant-based counter¬
revolution impossible. Perhaps the main reason for Gusev's concern
was that in 1921 the peasantry made up 71 percent of the Red Army,
while supposedly loyal proletarian workers constituted only a meager
18 percent. By 1923 the percentage of peasants in the Red Army would
rise even higher, to 73.4 percent -- a level exceeding even the 69.3
percent in the 1913 Imperial Russian Army -- before steadily
577
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declining thereafter as the Frunze Reforms went into effect.3'9
Third, Gusev argued adamantly that "the training of a highly
qualified officer corps, beginning with the reeducation of the Red
commanders" -- while requiring a long period of time to accomplish
-- "was capable of producing a cohort that was not only militarily
competent but also politically conscious." The "bourgeois" armies
that trained their soldiers only in military arts and tactics would
be impotent against this "conscious" cohort. Gusev urged the
Congress to create this superior form of Red Army officer cadre by
transforming "the barracks into a military and political school" that
would also become a "labor school," integrally tying the Red Army to
the "working life of the nation." Thus, far from detracting from
military training, through their labor soldiers could participate
directly in the economic recovery by rebuilding, and expanding, the
national military barracks network.580
- "Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine"
and Future War
Frunze elaborated on Gusev's themes, urging Communist Party
unity and agreement on what he labeled as a "unified proletarian
military doctrine," or "proletarian scientific theory of warfare,"
that would define the nature of the Red Army and its role in society.
In 1921 Frunze wrote an article for Voennoe delo (Military Affairs')
titled "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii" ("A Unified
Berchin, Michel, and Eliahu-Ben Horin, The Red Army.
(New York: Morton, 1942). p. 50.
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Military Doctrine and the Red Army") in which he offered a
comprehensive, if rather convoluted, explanation:
Unified military doctrine is the adoption by the military
of a given state of that learning, which establishes the
character of the country's military force construction,
the methods of war preparation of troops, their
leadership on the basis of the supremacy of state views
on the character of military missions and methods for
their resolution which are formed for them, derived from
the state's class structure and determined by the level
of development of the country's industrial strength.581
Frunze averred that Marxist-Leninist military doctrine was not just a
set of ideas based on "objective military experience" that was to be
codified solely by the General Staff; but primarily a political
statement of the will of the dominant social class. Therefore, in
Frunze's conceptual construct:
The military apparatus must take the organizational form
most fitting to the general state tasks and have armed
forces which are unified on the basis of common views on
the character of military tasks and the means of
accomplishing them.582
As such, Soviet military doctrine, as defined by Mikhail Frunze,
would be both a political and military statement, rather than a
purely military document, independently derived and separate from
official state political ideology.
The conceptual basis for Frunze's "unified military doctrine"
assumed that future war would be a mass war against "imperialists" in
which the Soviet state would have to mobilize all its civilian and
military resources, as had been required during the First World War
Frunze, M. V. , Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 8.
582 Frunze, M. V., "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i
krasnaia armiia," Izbrannve proizvedeniia.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), Vol. 2, p. 7.
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arid the only too recently concluded Russian Civil War. Frunze
believed emphatically that capitalist encirclement constituted a
continuing real threat to the Soviet state:
Between our proletarian state and the rest of the
bourgeois world there can be only one condition --
that of long, persistent, desperate war to the death:
a war which demands colossal tenacity, steadfastness,
inflexibility, and a unity of will.... The state of
open warfare may give way to some sort of contractual
relationship which permits, up to a definite level,
the peaceful coexistence of the warring sides. These
contractual forms do not change the fundamental character
of these relations.... The common, parallel existence of
our proletarian state with the states of the bourgeois
world for a protracted period is impossible.583
Jake Kipp ever so correctly states that this imminent threat, as
defined by Mikhail Frunze, "created a need to study future war
[budushchaia voina], not as an abstract proposition, but as a
foreseeable contingency."584
According to Semen Budennyi, Frunze concluded his unified
military doctrine article with the following four basic assumptions:
1) Military affairs of a given state, taken in
totality, are not independently supreme and purposes are
determined by the social conditions of the state.
2) The character of military doctrine, accepted by the
army of a given state, is determined by the character of
the general political line of the leading class.
3) The fundamental basis for a vital military doctrine
consists of its strict agreement with the social aims of
the state, and with those material and spiritual
resources, which are found in its instructions.
4) Doctrines, capable of being a living organizational
movement for the army, are impossible to invent.585
Frunze, M. V. , "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia
armiia," Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia. No. 2, 1921,
p. 39; in Frunze, M. V. , Izbrannve proizvedeniia.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), Vol. 2, pp. 4-22.
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Other Frunze assumptions included that the proletariat alone
could wage offensive warfare -- which was essential for victory --
since the peasant army (militia) had been proven to be suitable only
for defense of its homeland and that the Soviet state must attain
technological superiority over the "imperialists." To achieve the
"technological revolution" that he considered to be essential for
future military success, Frunze advocated the education of the
political leadership in order to lay the military-political
foundation for a massive industrialization program that would
concentrate on building the most modern defense industries possible.
Frunze's ambitious and large-scale education program dovetailed
nicely with Gusev's focus on "internationalism" and requirements for
expanded industrial production.586
Frunze also proposed that "the General Staff be transformed
into a 'military and political headquarters of the proletarian
state,' mainly by the addition of the army's most senior political
workers," which would ensure the unity of "political and military
leadership ... in one central state institution," thereby ensuring
the defense needs of the Soviet state. With this argument for the
consolidation of military and political power within the General
Staff, Frunze brought forward into the 1920s the debates that had
transpired a half-century earlier, during the Miliutin Reforms when
Prince Bariatinskii and his cohorts vehemently opposed War Minister
Miliutin and proposed the creation of a 'Prussian' General Staff that
586 Frunze, M. V. , "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia
armiia," Armiia i revoliutsiia (1921) reprinted in
Izbrannve proizvedeniia. (1957), Vol. 2, pp. 4-22.
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would effectively restrain the existing civilian bureaucracy and
Imperial household control over state resources.5"
Frunze, as had his co-presenter Gusev before him, also
advocated the assignment of high priority to defense industry
development through a government plan for major investments in
weapons modernization. 588 Because of the projected increasing
technical complexity of future warfare, Frunze stressed the
importance of integrating civilian economic and planning
organizations with the military during peacetime:
If we examine in general those tendencies that are being
created in the realm of military affairs, then we must
recognize that the center of gravity is moving away from
the operator toward the organizer. Successful battle now
depends less on correct operational leadership than on
the correct organization of the rear and on everything
that prepares for the conduct of military operations.589
For this purpose, Frunze proposed placing military officers within
civilian government departments to coordinate defense planning.590
Leon Trotsky, the RVSR Chairman, was absolutely furious at the
impertinence of the Gusev and Frunze proposals, and, according to
Gusev, "attacked them fiercely at the closed session devoted to
military discussion and won Lenin's approval" to keep the provocative
'Theses' out of the public account of Tenth Congress proceedings.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennve reformv 1860-1879 godov v
Rossii. (Moscow, 1952), p. 289.
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For the time being, however, the foundation of the Soviet armed
forces would continue to be the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.
Only in Petrograd, Moscow, and the Urals, the areas with the highest
concentrations of industrial workers, would the territorial militia
system be initiated by assigning "experienced troops" along with
dedicated Party members in "special assignment detachments."
The Congress resolved to continue the demobilization of
the army's oldest soldiers, to slow the release of
workers, and to stop altogether the release of
Communists. Because the government had decreed a
reduction in the size of the army with no loss of its
combat and political effectiveness, the congress resolved
that, as far as possible, the army should be freed from
labor assignments in the civilian economy. At the same
time, it ordered the creation of transitional militia
units in industrial regions, combining the principles of
workers' participation in industry with their service in
militia forces.591
The Tenth Congress declared that the several groups and individual
comrades, who were agitating to alter the current organizational
principles of the Red Army; to introduce the elective principle; and
to subordinate commissars to party cells, as "politically dangerous
and likely to provoke and intensify the breakdown of the Red Army,"
and called on the Central Committee to "take exhaustive measures to
eliminate all such disorganizing agitation."592
What Frunze had done was to propose a settlement, initially and
only temporarily for the Bolsheviks, of the Imperial Russian Army
debate that had erupted within Nikolaev General Staff Academy circles








That successor debate to the 1873 'secret society' investigations of
a Russian national military doctrine had reached a crescendo in 1911
with the brilliantly provocative writings of Neznamov; experienced a
rapid denouement after Tsar Nikolas II personally intervened in 1912
to forbid further discussion of doctrine; and thereafter had lain
dormant until after the 1917 Revolution, when the need for a common
(unitary) military doctrine "as the summary of the leading views
accepted in a given army in a given era ... to secure the mutual
understanding of leaders and executors 1,593 became increasingly
important. Indeed, ideological unity was deemed to be so critical to
the new Soviet state that the Eleventh Party Congress, which opened
on March 27, 1922, promptly would formally approve Mikhail Frunze's
"unified proletarian military doctrine."594
Regarding Frunze's unitary military doctrine, Bruce Menning's
trenchant analysis is most precise:
The enduring significance of Frunze's contribution to a
definition of doctrine lay in its comprehensive nature,
Marxian orientation, and explicit linkage to the military
policy of the Communist Party.595
As a result of Frunze's efforts, Soviet military doctrine, through
its many future iterations, would continue to define the Communist
Domanevsky, V. N., "Edinstvo voennoi doktriny i polevoi
ustav," Russkii invalid. January 6, 1912; cited in
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Party as the leading political force for the whole of Russian
society, and through it, to establish the organic military linkage
and integration with that society which the Communists' Imperial Army
predecessors had advocated as essential to achieving victory in
modern warfare.
Impact of Red Army Demobilization
The resolutions of the Tenth Party Congress, however, not only
did little to stem the continuing deterioration of morale in the Red
Army throughout the remainder of 1921, but actually aggravated the
problem immensely. The decision of the Tenth Congress to implement
Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) created in the Soviet Republic a
limited market economy, legalized private trade, ended forced grain
requisitions from the peasantry, denationalized numerous industries,
and sanctified private property -- a policy which many Communists
ardently believed "betrayed the Revolution." Largely in protest over
this decision, between August 1920 and the end of 1921, the number of
Communist Party members serving in the Red Army dropped from 278,400
to a mere 86,000 members, as the Party rank and file 'voted with
their feet' and left the Red Army in droves.
So disgruntled were the predominately peasant soldiers
remaining in the Red Army over their abysmal living conditions and
lack of a mission, and so very dispirited were the remaining Party
cadres, that PUR Chairman Gusev reported to the August 1921 Central
Committee plenum about the "grave situation in the army." As army
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morale continued to plummet during the waning months of 1921, in
December the RKP(b) Central Committee, in an effort to salvage and
reverse the situation, ordered the first peacetime Communist Party
mobilization which required all members in the age group of 20 to 22
to enlist for military service.596
- Morale: Order and Discipline Destroyed
The induction of more 'proletarian' young men into the army
-- even though on an ideological basis they were the new Party
faithful -- only served to further exacerbate army morale problems.
As the older soldiers were demobilized, the composition of the Red
Army quickly changed from a preponderance of very dedicated, tough,
battle-hardened civil war veterans to mostly 20- and 21-year-old
semi-literate peasants, with barely 10 percent of all soldiers having
any Russian Civil War combat experience. 597 Famine swept through
Russia during the fall of 1921 and on into the winter of 1922, while
the intensely hated private traders, labeled "JVRPmen," became ever
richer, supplying the cities and villages alike with what very
limited food and goods as were available at exorbitant prices.
For the Russian public, after suffering through long years of
war and economic deprivation for the cause of social equality -- or
mainly just trying to survive the chaos -- the new disparity of
wealth between the 'haves' and 'have nots,' created by Lenin's NEP
engendered especially intense jealousies and hatreds that began to
596
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tear the starving Russian society apart. Conscripted soldiers were
definitely in the 'have not' category, and could not help but view
with envy what few goods they saw in store windows that for them were
beyond any reasonable expectation of ever obtaining. Intuitively Red
Army soldiers began asking, "Is this what we made the Revolution for?
For this our comrades had to die?", while senior PUR officials warned
"the Red Army experiences NEP in its most negative aspects and
expresses dissatisfaction with this NEP."59S
Mark von Hagen summarized the significant initial impact of NEP
on the Red Army most eloquently when he wrote:
The denationalization of industry and legalization of
private trade put army supply officials at the mercy of a
chaotic market, where they had to compete with civilian
agencies and individual citizens for often scarce goods.
As the army's budget was slashed and inflation spiraled,
life in the army deteriorated markedly. Dire economic
straits forced many soldiers and officers into the
marketplace to make business deals with NEPmen. Military
delegates to the Tenth Congress of Soviets ... feared the
erosion of unit morale and discipline if servicemen's
attention was distracted, especially by so disreputable
an occupation as trade. Petty trading was deemed
entirely inappropriate for a military man, not to mention
a soldier in a socialist army. After all, soldiers did
not live by a code of material interest, but rather
obeyed a higher ethos of self-sacrifice.599
- Personnel Reductions and Command Restructuring
Living conditions for soldiers in the Red Army ever worsened
throughout 1922. As an extraordinary level of duty and training
requirements piled up due to chronically under-strength units, in
598
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February 1923 the Communist Politburo agreed to reduce the Red Army
even further, to 600,000 men -- "the minimum necessary for the
security of the RSFSR" -- but within a scant few months pressing
state economic difficulties caused the Central Committee to decrease
this 'minimal' number even further, to 562,000.600
To complicate the army's problems yet more, in its infinite
wisdom the Revvoensovet Respubliki (RVSR) simultaneously began a
series of organizational changes and structural reforms that left
commanders and soldiers alike wondering where, and to whom or what,
they belonged as unit identities and loyalties, forged in the
cauldron of civil war battles, were wiped out. Characteristic of the
turmoil these organizational changes caused is the case of the
Kharkov Military District that was formed in January 1919 by the
Ukraine Workers'-Peasants' Government. In February 1920 the
Ukrainian Reserve Army was merged with the Kharkov Military District.
Less than a year later the Reserve Army was disbanded. Next, the
RVSR suddenly dissolved both the Kharkov and Kiev military districts
in April 1922 and placed their units under the command of the
Ukrainian and Crimean Armed Forces; which themselves were
reorganized, yet again, in June 1922 to form a new Ukrainian Military
District. For a common peasant soldier, such continuous uncertainty
and in his mind, irrational and totally unnecessary, change -- coming
on top of all the economic and physical hardship -- led to a virtual
600
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collapse of army morale and rising indiscipline in the ranks during
the last months of 1922 and into early 1923.601
Still, Army Commissar Leon Trotsky, who by his own admission
had been almost totally focused since 1921 on the problem of economic
recovery that "had absorbed my time and attention to a far greater
extent than military matters,"602 took no action to stem the crisis
faced by the vanishing Red Army. With what seemed to the serving Red
Army officers and soldiers to be gross indifference to the fate of
the army, Trotsky neither pressed central government authorities for
a regular peacetime army budget nor became involved with the
intricacies of army reorganization. Instead, he relinquished
responsibility for administering daily army functions to his RVSR
Deputy Chairman, E. M. Sklianskii, and to his Chief of the Red Army
Staff, Pavel Lebedev, who later would be discredited as "an
aristocratic holdover from the Imperial General Staff Academy."603
Trotsky and his comrades on the RKP(b) Central Committee and
Politburo were temporarily basking in the euphoria that accompanied
the end of civil war hostilities and the diplomatic recognition,
recently garnered from the international community. They were
possessed, seemingly, by an elevated sense of relative security for
their hard-won, new Soviet Republic. Therefore, ideologically, they
saw no reason to alter their plan to dispense with the Red Army.604
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As part of the general Red Army restructuring that accompanied
the post-civil war demobilization, the central military command was
also fundamentally reformed. The RVSR made one of the key changes on
July 25, 1921 when it decided to broaden the mission of the General
Staff Academy to include the preparation of field commanders in
addition to staff officers, and to "elaborate theoretical questions
concerning organization and the conduct of battle and the influence
of these factors on troop control . "605 To convey this cardinal
mission change, by order of the RVSR on August 5, 1921 the historic
General Staff Academy was neologized to the RKKA Military Academy.
Then, to implement the expanded curriculum, which was to emphasize
the functional development of both staff and command expertise,
several additional, very distinguished professors were assigned to
the faculty, such as the former Imperial Army officers A. A. Svechin,
A. I. Verkhovskii, and A. E. Snesarev; along with experienced
operational commanders and staff officers such as N. V. Sologub,
N. N. Shvarts, and E. A. Shilovskii. And, on August 27, 1921, the
Western Front commander, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii, took over
the critical future war educational duties as Chief of the RKKA
Military Academy.606
All did not proceed smoothly with the expanded RKKA Academy
mission, due principally to the continual tension between the faculty
and their 'socialist' students. The academy students, almost without
Bulzakov, T. P., ed., Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba.




exception, were civil war combat veterans who believed fervently in
'continuing revolution,' supported Frunze's unified military
doctrine, and wanted their heroic wartime experiences enshrined in
the academy curriculum. The academy faculty, on the other hand, was
composed predominately of former Tsarist officers, who tended to
denigrate the validity of the fluid 'pure civil war experience,'
with its numerous opportunities to maneuver forces, to achieve
frontal breakthroughs, and thereby to bring about a decisive victory.
These military intellectuals, instead, tended to focus on teaching an
updated, and highly controversial, version of the historical lessons
of classic warfare -- much as had their late-nineteenth century
predecessor, teacher and mentor, General A. G. Leer.607
Aleksandr Ivanovich Verkhovskii was one such voenspets faculty
member. He was an experienced military historian and commander, who
served as War Minister of the Provisional Government in 1917. As
head of the RXKA Military Academy Tactics Department, Verkhovskii
became an outspoken advocate for the "creation of a cadre mechanized
force to support an infantry-based militia force and ... a strategy
of attrition ... [for] Russia's geo-strategic situation."608 In this
same period the Deputy Head of the Strategy Department also was a
former Imperial General Staff officer voenspets, N. E. Varfolomeev,
who concluded:
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Objective changes in the nature of warfare associated
with the appearance of million-man armies and
technological innovations had recast the face of battle,
increased its spacial and temporal dimensions, broken
down the conventional forms of combined arms, forced a
rethinking of problems of command and control, and laid
the foundation for the emergence of the operation as the
bridge between strategy and tactics.609
Seven years later, in 1928, Varfolomeev would describe the modern
military operation as "the totality of maneuvers and battles in a
given sector of a TVD [theater of military actions] which are
directed toward the achievement of a common objective that has been
set as final in a given period of the campaign."610
But the Communist Party, flushed with its victories in the
'glorious October' Revolution and the Russian Civil War, was
ideologically totally unprepared to accept the historical lessons of
classic warfare as promulgated by the voenspets faculty members of
the RKKA Military Academy. In April 1922 the Communist Party had
adopted as the foundation of Soviet military doctrine Frunze's
"unified proletarian military doctrine" concept, in which "the idea
of offensive war generally predominated in the military-technical
part.... Although in its declarative political part, Soviet military
doctrine always retained its defensive cast....611
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At the Eleventh Party Congress, one of the principal advocates
for Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" was Mikhail
Tukhachevskii. He did not agree with those who argued that the main
educational task was to train young, inexperienced junior officers,
rather, he wanted to emphasize the preparation of senior commanders
for handling the crucial, and increasingly complex, technical matters
of strategy and tactics. A conceptual foundation of Tukhachevskii's
proposals for Soviet military reform and army reconstruction -- that
clearly bore continuity with his Imperial Army heritage and marked
him as a student of Jomini, the founder of the Nikolaev General Staff
Academy -- was that "maneuverability was the main quality of the Red
Army, derived from its revolutionary spirit."612
During the Russian Civil War, cavalry had been the principal
branch of arms capable of strategic maneuverability. Tukhachevskii
understood, however, that during the course of the First World War
emerging technologies had changed the means for achieving battlefield
and strategic maneuverability. The new weaponry that allowed
defenders to concentrate massive firepower against a cavalry charge
had rendered cavalry obsolete. Aircraft, along with tanks and
armored vehicles, now opened new possibilities for expansion of the
scale of army maneuver within compressed time frames, and therefore
the Red Army, according to Tukhachevskii, had to be modernized to
incorporate these latest technologies and to develop a new military
art, strategies, and tactics for their effective employment.613
612
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Tukhachevskii's military reform proposals, discussed during the
separate military policy caucuses, were incorporated in Frunze's
final report to the entire assembled Eleventh Party Congress on the
evening of April 2, 1922. Consequently, the Congress decided that a
strengthening of the Red Army was essential, despite the "difficult
economic conditions in the country," and ordered an "increase of army
combat capability, defined by a concrete program of military
construction, which paid special attention to strengthening party
influence in the army and the fleet."614
So extremely vigorous and politicized became the split between
the 'revolutionary students' and the unreliable 'Trotskyite' spets
faculty at the RKKA General Staff Academy that in late 1922 a purge
commission, headed by A. S. Bubnov, expelled 348 of the 648 Academy
students from the Party and recommended that more Red Commanders be
assigned to the faculty, a measure that could not be carried out
immediately since the academic qualifications of the 'proletarian'
Red Commanders were virtually nonexistent. P. P. Lebedev did,
however, promptly replace Tukhachevskii as RKKA Academy Chief.615
Yet, as a result of the 1922 split and despite a reshuffling of
the RKKA Military Academy faculty, a dark cloud of doubt and distrust
about the political reliability of the voenspets faculty members
lingered, and intensified, because of their conceptual disagreement
with, and increasingly active intellectual opposition to, the content
Budennyi, Book Three, p. 290.
Radzievskii, 0. I., ed., Akademiia imeni Frunze: istoriia
Voennoi Ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoi Ordena Suvorova
Akademii. (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973), pp. 59 and 62.
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of Frunze's 'unified proletarian military doctrine.' One consequence
of these suspicions was that the teaching of the "new" concept of
"operational art" at the RKKA Military Academy was short-lived and
did not emerge within a military curriculum until 1931, when a
department by that name was formed at the Frunze Military Academy.616
Between 1921 and 1923 the central military command underwent
several other changes and modifications, both as a means of inducing
fiscal economy, as the overall Red Army force structure was being
reduced, and in an effort to create a more effective and efficient
military bureaucracy. The Administration of Armored Forces was
upgraded to the status of independent Administration of the Chief of
Armored Forces, in recognition of the forecast, more important role
to be played by armored forces in future war. Command of artillery
units was consolidated under the Chief of Artillery, while the Chief
of Supply position was created to unify the two independent supply
organizations that had existed during the civil war. Also, unified
military leadership was vested in the new People's Commissariat of
Military and Naval Affairs, and the policy formulation duties of the
Revvoensovet accordingly were expanded.617
By far the most significant, and long lasting, immediate post-
civil war change to the central military apparatus was the creation
of the Red Army Staff (Shtab RKKA). By decree of the Revvoensovet on
January 29, 1921, the unified Red Army Staff was established by
Kipp, in Soviet Military Doctrine.... p. 88.
Danilov, V., "Stroitel'stvo tsentral'nogo voennogo
apparata v 1921-1923 gg.." Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal.
No. 1, 1971, pp. 12-14.
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merging the Main Staff and the Field Staff, thereby making all
military executive departments subordinate to the new, integrated
staff. This same RVSR decree tasked the Red Army Staff to upgrade
training and supply procedures; to develop a system for unit
assignments; to eliminate the destructive high turnover rates of army
personnel, particularly officers; and to formulate new service
regulations.618
The new Red Army Staff, which was headed by the former Chief of
the Field Staff P. P. Lebedev, was organized into eleven directorates
(upravleniia): Operations, Organization, Mobilization, Command Staff,
Combat Training, Internal Service, Military-Topographic, Military-
Communications, Military Schools, the Military-Historical Commission,
and Military Intelligence. Also assigned to the Chief of the Red
Army Staff were the separate Administration of the Chief of Armored
Forces, the General Staff Academy, and the military section of the
State Archives.619 Attached to the Red Army Staff was a "special
administrative department," headed by S. I. Ventsov between 1921 and
1925, for the specific purpose, first advocated by Frunze in his 1921
Voennoe delo article "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii",
of coordinating military defense plans with civilian government
departments and economic enterprises. The dual function of this
secret "special department" was: first, to coordinate with the Main
Administration regarding industrial orders for arms and other
Zakharov, M. V. , ed., 50 let vooruzhennvkh sil SSSR.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 170.
Danilov, V. , "Sozdanie Shtaba RKKA,"
Voenno-Lstoricheskii zhurnal. No. 9, 1977, p. 87.
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military supplies being processed through the civilian central state
planning (Gosplan) agency; and second, to participate in planning
expanded road and railway construction to ensure that military
requirements were anticipated, and fulfilled, to the extent possible
under prevailing financial constraints.620
Although the merger of the Main Staff and Field Staff into an
integrated single staff greatly enhanced the power, authority, and
control of the senior military leadership over purely military
matters, Red Army Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev retained command
of the field armies during the waning months of the civil war and
assumed control of the old Field Staff inspectorates and of the
military district administrations. The Red Army Staff also took over
responsibility for the organization and recruitment of territorial
militia units from Podvoiskii's Universal Military Training
organization (Vsevobuch) .621 Party political control over the Red
Army Staff was guaranteed, however, by the continued practice of
staff dual subordination (dvoinachalie) to the Revvoensovet and to
the Red Army Commander-in-Chief.622
Through the evolutionary changes implemented during this major
staff reorganization the Red Army was at long last bringing into
practice the administrative reforms that had been so hotly and
acrimoniously debated by their Imperial Army predecessors; but
Kalinovskii, P., "Iz istorii voenno-ekonomicheskii raboty
Sheaba RKKA," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 5, 1972,
pp. 66-69.
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effectively blocked from implementation by the vested interests of
the ruling nobility, and successive Tsars, over the course of nearly
a half-century. The Red Army, while theoretically (and in glasnost'
declaratory Soviet statements) constituting an army of a new
"socialist-proletarian" type, clearly was, in fact, marked by the
"scars of the past," which integrally tied it to the heritage of the
Imperial Army.623
Dawn of the Red Army Reform Era: Reasons
- International, Domestic, and Political
Beginning in early 1923 challenging international events
dramatically altered the overall priorities of Lenin's government.624
First, the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, and Romania, bluntly
declined Foreign Commissar Georgii Chicherin's disarmament schemes,
which left the Soviet state with well-armed and hostile neighbors on
its immediate borders. Second, France occupied the German Ruhr
valley in January, which threatened Soviet Russia with possible
involvement in a new European war because Russia was now allied to
Germany through treaties for secret military cooperation as well as
for public trade and commerce. Third, Great Britain declared the
'Curzon ultimatum' in May, which threatened to break off relations
if the Soviet government did not comply within ten days with the
Lee, Kent D., "Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role
of Soviet Military Science," in Soviet Military Doctrine
from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991. p. 269.
624 A comprehensive discussion of 1922-1923 European
diplomatic history is presented in E. H. Carr, The
Interregnum. 1923-1924. (New York: Macmillan, 1954).
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March 1921 trade agreement, and heightened tension by raising the
specter of a new British "anti-Bolshevik" crusade. And finally,
high-level French and British military delegations visited Poland
-- following hard on the heels of a Soviet diplomat's mysterious
assassination in Switzerland -- which created, for the paranoid
Russians, a genuine war scare. So intense was this emotion that the
Communist International (Komintern) decided to postpone its planned
June 10, 1923 scheduled session because of "the danger of war."6"
- Military Impetus
To the Red commanders, who knew how poorly trained their young
and inexperienced recruits were and how the lack of discipline in the
ranks forewarned that the soldiers could not be relied upon to obey
orders, the international events of early 1923 constituted a true
military emergency. How could the raw, undisciplined, and poorly
armed peasant conscripts of the Red Army possibly defend the Soviet
state from modern European armies -- let alone seize the initiative
for a decisive offensive that would lead to victory?
By March 1923 this vibrant image of an imminent military
catastrophe percolated into the Communist Central Committee inner
sanctum, where Trotsky's enemies seized on the military emergency,
accompanied by Lenin's absence due to illness, as the opportune issue
and moment to attempt to remove Trotsky as Army Commissar. The
RKP(b) Central Committee appointed a special commission, including as
members some of Leon Trotsky's most vehement and implacable enemies
von Hagen, pp. 183-184.
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-- Frunze, Dzerzhinskii, Voroshilov, and the former director of
defense industry, Petr Bogdanov -- to review defense preparedness and
to report back on prudent corrective measures.626
Not surprisingly, the commission determined that the army
command had no adequate mobilization plan for war and had
failed ... to make an inventory of the nation's resources
in preparation for such a plan. The Central Committee
ordered the army command immediately to formulate
operational, organizational, and mobilization plans.62'
The Communist Party Central Control Commission had been formed
in 1922 as a means to exercise control and to enforce discipline by
monitoring the conduct of Party members. It quickly was co-opted by
the ruling Party elite as their personal tool for preserving power
and for ensuring compliance with their 'diktat!.' In June 1923 this
mysterious and widely-feared body appointed its special commission to
investigate the condition of the Red Army. Valerian Kuibyshev, a
close political colleague of Iosip Stalin, was designated chairman
and instructed to study four military districts: the Western,
Ukrainian, Moscow, and North Caucasus. Kuibyshev began the six-
month-long investigation, using a team of investigators composed of
Control Commission members, the Red Army and Navy inspectorates, and
various former Tsarist officer voenspets. Very shortly thereafter,
"Kuibyshev was replaced by one of Trotsky's most determined foes,
Sergei Gusev. ... When the results were compiled, Trotsky's ouster
seemed inevitable. A new era was beginning in the Red Army."628
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The 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms
As it is only by means of a well-regulated standing army that a civilized
country can be defended; so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country
can be suddenly and tolerably civilized.
- Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
Background:
International Developments and Russian Politics
Not unlike the mythological Phoenix, the Frunze Reforms would
attempt to raise the Red Army 'from the ashes' of demobilization and
conscious neglect by the Bolshevik rulers of Russia. In the fall of
1923, while the RKP(b) Central Control Commission was completing its
investigation of the condition of the Red Army, developments in
Germany elevated Russian 'war fever' to yet greater heights and
created the critical mass of Russian political and military support
necessary to begin changing the Red Army's social status, priority
for resources, domestic and international mission, and wartime
fighting capability.
German Communists, in cooperation with left socialists,
prepared a general strike and staged an armed coup in Hamburg which,
to many Soviet leaders at least, indicated that the long-awaited
'world revolution' they predicted was about to commence. The Red
Army was put on unofficial alert, but not mobilized, in anticipation
of having to move forward into Central Europe to defend Russia from
the expected 'inevitable imperialist counterrevolution,' while Red
Army military advisors and a small delegation headed by Karl Radek
was dispatched to Germany with offers of assistance to their brother
socialist revolutionaries. By the middle of November, however, the
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German revolution collapsed, internal order was restored, and the
Bolsheviks were left in the very awkward position of needing to
explain ideologically not only why the European proletariat had
failed to follow the Russian example, but why the Russian socialist
revolution had not spread throughout the world. For Lenin's
followers this was a most embarrassing turn of events, but one that
Trotsky's opponents skillfully would employ to discredit him further
and to diminish his influence in a fierce struggle for power inside
the Communist Party.629
- German Revolt: 'World Revolution' Fails
Within the Red Army leadership, the failure of the German
revolution brought a mood of despair and defeatism, reinforced by a
growing dissatisfaction and resentment over developments since the
end of the civil war; but also an even deeper concern about the
reliability of the Red Army soldiers. The overwhelming majority of
army peasant conscripts, despite the aggressive agitation of
Bolshevik political activists within the army units, had been totally
indifferent to the fall 1923 German crisis and unsupportive of any
Russian involvement, whatsoever. The army leadership concluded that
"agitation failed because the peasant soldiers saw little or no
connection between the German events and their own lives and
households. Peasants simply did not support offensive revolutionary
von Hagen, Mark, Soldiers in the Proletarian
Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist
State. 1917-1930. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990), pp. 196-198.
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wars."630 For the senior Red commanders, even the enthusiastic
support for 'continuing revolution' by their naive junior officers
was of little consolation, so few were their numbers in comparison to
the preponderance of peasant conscripts, who formed the bulk of the
Red Army.
- Party Democracy: The 'Forty-six' Challenge
Concurrently with the stillborn German revolution, the Red Army
leadership found itself embroiled in the domestic economic policy
debate, following a summer of intense labor unrest and strikes which
seriously alarmed the Bolsheviks and forced them to consider ways to
alleviate the workers' grievances. On October 8, 1923 Leon Trotsky
sent a letter to the Communist Party Central Committee criticizing
their domestic policy decisions, and only a week later forty-six
prominent party members from across a wide socialist ideological
spectrum signed a statement "demanding that the Central Committee
convene an emergency conference to review the political and economic
condition of the country."631 In addition to Trotsky, among the
'Forty-six' who "demanded that the RKP(b) Politburo devise a
comprehensive economic policy that would allow the state to take a
more direct role through economic planning,"632 were Trotsky's close
personal friends Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, the PUR Director, and
Nikolai Muralov, the Moscow Military District commander.
Kasatkin, Vasilii, "Germanskaia revoliutsiia i russkii
krest'ianin," Krasnaia prisiaga. No. 19, 1923, pp. 3-4.
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Not content just to challenge the Central Committee over
domestic economic policy, the 'Forty-six' also protested the existing
constraints on discussions at party meetings and the now common
practice of directly appointing secretaries, which caused the RKP(b)
Central Committee majority to threaten these 'oppositionists' with
disciplinary sanctions. The last week of October, while
acknowledging the criticisms made by the 'Forty-six' and approving
the expansion of "inner party democracy," an enlarged Communist Party
Central Committee session "censured Trotsky and reprimanded the
Forty-six."633 By further alienating his 'Old Bolshevik' comrades,
Trotsky took one giant step closer to his eventual removal as Army
Commissar, and inadvertently toward the initiation of the essential
army reforms that he so strenuously opposed.
The chain of key events that finally cleared the way for the
initiation of the Frunze Reforms began in late December 1923 when
Trotsky's crony, PUR Director Antonov-Ovseenko, dispatched an army
circular sanctioning "the complete restoration of party democracy in
the army" and set February 1, 1924 as the date for a major conference
of military political workers in an effort to build support for
Trotsky's position -- all without the knowledge, let alone the
approval, of the Central Committee. Antonov-Ovseenko followed these
bold and politically foolhardy actions with his own December 27, 1923
letter to the Central Committee virtually threatening them with an
army mutiny. He wrote quite harshly that,
633
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the army was not a group of 'courtiers to the throne of
party hierarchies,' and that the party feuds had been
harmful to morale in the army. 'This cannot go on for
long,' he warned. 'Only one thing remains -- to appeal
to the peasant masses who wear the uniforms of Red Army
soldiers and call to order the leaders who have gone too
far. '634
Almost immediately after the distribution of Antonov-Ovseenko's
circular sanctioning "democracy in the army," party members within
the army began advocating "permanent military assemblies to decide
all questions of army life," and committees of disgruntled soldiers
began to form -- not at all unlike those formed in 1917 and 1918 to
bring down the Tsar and to launch the October Revolution.635
To the beleaguered Central Committee -- already challenged by
domestic economic chaos, worker grievances, failure of their beloved
'world revolution' to materialize, and a growing internal party
opposition -- this threat of a 'Bonapartist' military revolt was all
too real, especially since it was beginning, however incidentally, to
follow their own very recent path toward revolution, government
overthrow, and seizure of power. Consequently, Central Committee
action was both swift and decisive. On January 12, 1924, "the
Central Control Commission reprimanded the defiant army cells and the
Orgburo demanded the removal of Antonov-Ovseenko from the PUR
directorship.1,636
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On January 17, 1924, Antonov-Ovseenko was replaced by Andrei
Bubnov. Immediately, Bubnov revoked the pernicious circular that had
proclaimed party democracy throughout the army and clarified that,
the elective principle applied exclusively to the lowest
level of party organization (company and regimental
cells) and to party commissions. All the rest of the
political apparatus, because it served functions of
administrative and political control, was to be appointed
from above. The special imperatives of the military
mission did not permit the army's Communists the luxury
of the type of political life that civilians enjoyed;
rather, 'side by side with party discipline there exists
an especially strict and consistently applied military
discipline.
Although nearly a year would pass before Bubnov's new strictures
could be fully enforced and Party discipline in the army restored, in
January 1924 the Communist leadership directed unequivocally that any
"civilianizing deviations" which disrupted army morale, undermined
discipline, threatened the army's combat capability, and especially,
sought to undermine, or overthrow, Communist Party political
supremacy, would no longer be tolerated.
Gusev Commission Report Findings:
"The Red Army is not a reliable fighting force."
Vladimir Ilich Ulianov, the revolutionary leader of the Soviet
Republic whose 'nom de guerre' was Lenin, died at 6:50 p.m. on the
evening of January 21, 1924.638 Lenin's departure from the Russian
political scene dramatically altered the prospects for army reform.
Leon Trotsky no longer had the protection of the 'Father of the
October Revolution' to shield him from his personal enemies or from
637
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his political opponents. These factions immediately set in motion a
most aggressive campaign of 'palace intrigues' and vendettas, first
to increase, and then to consolidate, their own Party powers.
Within a week of Lenin's death, the Communist Party plenum
appointed a new commission, headed by Sergei Gusev, to look into the
condition of the Red Army. This authoritative commission, which
included Mikhail Frunze, Kliment Voroshilov, Mikhail Lashevich,
Aleksandr Orekhov, Aleksandr Egorov, Grigorii Ordzhonikidze,
Iosif Unshlikt, Nikolai Shvernik, I. M. Voronin, Andrei Andreev,
and the new PUR Director Andrei Bubnov, virtually to a man were
strong political opponents of Trotsky's programs --as well as his
bitter personal enemies. 639 The commission's first act was to
resuscitate the previous June 1923 report, that conveniently had been
buried by Trotsky's allies, not only because it was so politically
damning of Trotsky's army stewardship, but because of its alarming
conclusion -- "The Red Army is not a reliable fighting force."640
Berkhin, II'ia, Voennaia reforma v SSR {1924-1925 gg■).
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), pp. 59-60; also in von Hagen,
p. 202, with the caveat that sources conflict over the
exact timing of the appointment of this commission.
Berkhin's end of January 1924 timing from army archives
is confirmed by a Frunze report published in Voenno-
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However, Nikolai Kuz'min in Na strazhe mirnogo truda
(1921-1940 gg.). (Moscow, 1959), pp. 21-22, cites Central
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January 14-15, 1924.
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The Gusev Commission presented the glaring army deficiencies
contained in the June 1923 report findings to the February 1924 Party
Central Committee plenum. This voluminous commission report indicted
Trotsky, by name, as it identified the following critical Red Army
deficiencies:
The absence of any serious strategic thinking at the top
of the military chain of command; ... no realistic plan
for mobilization in the event of war; ... current
organizational structure and personnel at army
headquarters rendered it unsuitable for the tasks of
preparing the country's defense and directing the army;
... army headquarters had no single view about the
purpose and structure of the army and had not approved a
single standardized manual for any of the service
branches; ... the RVSR had yet to introduce a regular
system of units and formations, though the Civil War had
ended three years earlier; ... rear organizations were
still cumbersome and swollen; ... the weapons supply
system was inadequate for any future war; food and
clothing supply also continued to present a deplorable
picture; ... problems of staff morale and low
professional standards; ... the shortage of officers,
in some units reaching 50 percent, and their low
qualifications; ... unsatisfactory political work in
the army; and that organizational chaos at the top made
itself felt in the extreme instability of command
personnel at the bottom.641
Individual commission members took turns excoriating Trotsky's
leadership of the Red Army. Mikhail Frunze accused the Red Army
Staff of mechanically cutting army personnel strength to correspond
to Revvoensovet Respubliki orders without first actually planning a
structure and organization for the peacetime army or deciding the
specific types of combat capabilities and military specialties that
should be retained. Frunze concluded that the Red Army Staff had
failed to provide adequate leadership and said quite bluntly that the
von Hagen, pp. 203-204.
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senior leadership should be changed.642 Another senior commission
member, M. M. Lashevich, castigated the Red Army Staff for being
completely out of touch with the real, everyday problems that the
field army was experiencing and suggested that the reason for this
failure was the continuing dominance of the Staff by former Tsarist
generals. Lashevich, and the Commission, therefore concluded that
the Red Army Staff personnel had to be "renewed" and the central
command apparatus purged of all "unfit and useless" elements.643
Commission Chairman Gusev complained that there were too many
aged former Tsarist military specialists in the command hierarchy and
that Trotsky's Rewoensovet had not acted vigorously to replace them
with younger Red commanders who had civil war experience. Worse,
Gusev charged that the majority of the 'Red Genshtabisti' (General
Staff) veterans from the first graduating class of the General Staff
Academy had been demobilized.644
Perhaps as alarming as anything that the commission found was
the fact that of the 87,000 officers who were graduated from the
Soviet military schools during the civil war, some 30,000 had been
killed and another 30,000 had been demobilized, leaving "not more
than 25,000" Soviet-trained officers on active duty. Of those army
officers remaining on active duty, approximately 45 percent "came
from unsuitable social backgrounds and over five percent were former
Berkhin, I. B., Voennaia reforma v SSSR (192A--1925 gg.).




White officers.'"43 With less than 50 percent of the Red Army officer
corps composed of politically loyal Red commanders, to the Communist
Party hierarchy it was then small wonder that the peasant conscript
soldiers lacked discipline, suffered from poor morale, and had
negligible combat capability -- the Red Army had no loyal leadership.
Mixed Military System:
Territorial Militia and Regular Army
Again the Central Committee acted swiftly and decisively by
ordering the Politburo to correct the most serious army leadership
deficiencies while recommending that a further investigation of the
other Gusev Report findings be conducted. Six years after the
October Revolution the Communist Party thus reversed its civil war
military policy that declared the regular army to be a "temporary
stage in the transition to a genuine people's militia" and adopted a
mixed system of territorial militia and regular army units, "as a
necessary compromise until the nation could afford to maintain a
large standing army."646 By 1924 the influence of anti-militarists,
like Podvoiskii and his Vsevobuch colleagues, had waned to an extent
that made the compromise "mixed military system" politically
acceptable and resulted in "an important, albeit qualified, victory
for the proponents of the regular army."647
On March 3, 1924 Mikhail Frunze replaced Efraim M. Sklianski as
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thereby assuming de facto control of the Red Army from the
politically weakened and discredited Trotsky. Within days of
assuming the deputy positions, Frunze formed a new Revolutionary
Military Council of the USSR (Revvoensovet USSR - RVS) ,6<,s composed
of some of the most prominent Communist Party opponents to Trotsky's
territorial militia, labor army, and economic programs -- including
as members Voroshilov, Bubnov, Ordzhonikidze, Semen Budennyi,
Sergei Kamenev, Shalva Eliava, and Aleksandr Miasnikov -- who would
implement the Communist Party mandated army reform without Trotsky's
participation.649 Then, in April 1924, Frunze replaced the much
maligned Pavel P. Lebedev as Chief of the Red Army Staff as well.6s0
Mark von Hagen notes that "by the time that the Central Committee
formally relieved Trotsky of his duties in January 1925, Frunze
already had been administering the army for nearly a year."651 Thus,
by April 1924, the way was already cleared to restore, to revitalize,
and to transform the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). The
On August 28, 1923 the Revolutionary Military Council of
the Republic, Revvoensovet Respubliki, (Russian initials
RVSR) officially was renamed the Revolutionary Military
Council of the USSR (RVS-SSSR), or RVS for the sake of
clarity, in recognition of the new Soviet constitution,
adopted on October 6, 1922, that created the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The actual "rebirth"
(obnovlenie) of the RVSR/RVS as the supreme Red Army
policymaking body under Mikhail Frunze's leadership
occurred nearly six months earlier shortly after Frunze
was appointed as RVSR Deputy Chairman on March 3, 1924.
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exact date that Mikhail Frunze was named Chairman of the RVS was
January 26, 1925.652 The Red Army reform would be led by a military
theorist who was politically reliable, combat tested, and a proven
effective organizer -- Mikhail V. Frunze.
Frunze and his associates wasted no time as they set out to
restructure the Red Army with a 'troika' of primary goals: first, to
make the peacetime military organization more efficient; second, to
purge the Red Army of most former Tsarist officers and the allies of
Trotsky; and third, and perhaps most important, to restore army
morale, discipline, and wartime fighting capability. Many of the
decisions about how to streamline the central military command were
enacted in March and April 1924.
With the Russian Civil War officially over, in peacetime there
was no longer a need for a position of Army Commander-in-Chief to
direct field forces so Kamenev's job was abolished. 653 The Red Army
Staff itself was reorganized into three separate functional entities:
1) a Main Administration of the Red Army (Glavnoe upravlenie RKKA),
with N. N. Petin as its chief to oversee daily army administration;
2) the Red Army Staff, headed by M. V. Frunze as Army Chief of Staff,
with primary responsibility for long-range military planning; and 3)
a Red Army Inspectorate (Inspektsiia RKKA), headed by former Red Army
Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, with responsibility for the combat








Inspectorate, however, was only a transitionary vehicle for
implementing military reforms that lasted until the end of 1924 when
the Inspectorate functions were divided between the Red Army Staff
and the Main Administration.6" By the beginning of 1925 the Red Army
Main Administration had taken over responsibility for inspections, as
well as for combat training, mobilization, recruitment, the network
of military schools, and the daily administration of the army.656
Under this new arrangement the Red Army Staff gave up
operational control of the Red Army, but gained responsibility for
overall defense policy, to include mobilization and operations plans
and the restructuring of military units.65' The rationale for this
structural alteration was contained in Frunze's dictum:
[The Red Army Staff] must become not only the brain of
the Red Army -- it must become the military brain for the
entire Soviet state and prepare that material which forms
the basis of the work of the Defense Council.658
In order to increase the number of younger Red commanders serving
within the central military command apparatus while eliminating the
"Trotskyites" and most of the "conservative" ex-Tsarist officers,659
Frunze ruthlessly reduced the total number of central apparatus
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personnel by some 23 percent while simultaneously increasing the
percentage of avowedly-loyal Communist Party members assigned to
key staff and administrative positions from 12 percent in 1923
to 25 percent in 1924.660
In close cooperation with the Party Central Committee, Frunze
and his new RVS team initiated the transition to a mixed military
system that would preserve and reorganize an expanded territorial
militia alongside the regular standing army. According to RKP(b)
records, the Central Committee had actually decided in favor of a
territorial militia during the course of discussions in 1923 and
issued instructions to Trotsky's Revvoensovet to carry out the
required peregruppirovka of forces.
On August 8, 1923 the RKP(b) Central Committee, using the
auspices of its Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and Council of
People's Commissars (SNK), had issued a directive titled "About
organizing territorial militia units and the conduct of military
training for laborers,"661 which Leon Trotsky and his RVSR colleagues
evidently intentionally chose to ignore. The Central Committee
rationale for a territorial militia was that the struggling Soviet
economy could not afford a large standing regular military force, and
politically for the Soviet leadership, at this time, there seemed to
be no other viable choice than the compromise solution of a mixed
military system.
Zakharov, p. 176,
KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov. konferentsii
i plenumov TsK. 7th ed., (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953,
p. 858.
Therefore, following assumption of responsibility for military
policy as de facto RVS Chairman in April 1924, Frunze began to
implement the RKP(b) Central Committee's approved concept for a
territorial militia. He sought, with great determination, however,
to preserve the hard-won maneuver capability of the regular army.
Frunze was convinced that army maneuver capability was critical to
the previous Red Army success in the Russian Civil War, and would be
equally critical in any future war.
Frunze insured continuing Red Army maneuver capability by
retaining twelve regular cavalry divisions and only four territorial
militia cavalry divisions; and for the infantry the force mix was
reversed with twenty-nine regular divisions and forty-two territorial
militia divisions. 662 By October 1, 1925 the RVS would further reduce
the army size to 562,000 troops, organized into twenty-six regular
cadre divisions, plus thirty-six territorial militia divisions;
one territorial militia cavalry division; and one regiment of armored
trains. 663 Of these remaining units, 90 percent of the regular cadre
divisions were stationed along the Soviet borders, while all of the
territorial militia divisions were garrisoned in the interior.664
Consequently, the disposition of the reformed Red Army military
districts and divisions at the end of the Frunze Reforms in 1925
through 1929 was as follows:
Mackintosh, Malcolm, in B. H. Liddell Hart, ed.,
The Red Army. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), p. 54.
Kuz'min, N. F., Na strazhe mirnogo truda (1921-1940 gg) .
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 31.
Mackintosh, in The Red Army, p. 55.
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After having the Red Array Staff formulate the 1924 plan for the
reorganization of military units, and following the creation of
several experimental units, Frunze proposed to the RVS that no
further troop organization changes be made for at least a year in
order to provide some stability and to test the effectiveness of the
new system. The Revvoensovet concurred and Red Army structure began
to stabilize.666
Frunze also revised and implemented the 1922 conscription law.
The law mandated two years of service for regular army recruits,
while all remaining twenty-two-year-olds were required to enlist in
the territorial militia for a period of four years; during which time
they were to report for active duty two months a year, usually during
the summer. The initial transition effort did not go smoothly at
all. At the recruitment centers peasant protest meetings blossomed
Mackintosh, in The Red Army, p. 56.
666 Frunze, M. V., "Itogi Dekabr'skogo plenuma Rewoensoveta
SSSR," Voina i revoliutsiia. No. 10, 1926, pp. 109-110.
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during the scheduled spring 1924 call-up. Within the regular army
there arose considerable resistance to the mixed system, since many
regular army soldiers and officers considered a transfer into the
militia to be a "personal disgrace" because the militia units were
considered to be "inferior." 667 Many soldiers and officers complained
bitterly about their transfers to the territorial militia, and Frunze
sympathized with them saying, "we were not given the choice" between
having a large "regular army of 1.5 to 2 million men and the current
system of the militia."668
As a result of these complaints, but also with an eye to the
future when militia unit combat capabilities would have to be
integrated effectively with the regular army units in any war,
Frunze and the RVS made every effort to ensure that service in the
territorial militia resembled service in the regular army in all
aspects, save the shorter terms of active duty and territorial
recruitment. 669 Yet, with the release of large numbers of junior and
middle-ranking officers during 1924, many militia and regular army
units were left so severely undermanned, with minimal training
capabilities and at times with no drill instructors, that Frunze
could only report to the RVS plenum, held between November 24 and
December 1, 1924:
von Hagen, pp. 206-209.
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"I can say with absolute certainty that during the course of this
year we did not have a Red Army, if we mean by this an organized and
trained force. "6'°
Still, through the mixed system compromise, the Red Army
leadership gained significant party concessions that were essential
to the future formation of an effective and revitalized military
force. First, all territorial militia units were assigned directly
to the Army Commissariat instead of being indoctrinated by Nikolai
Podvoiskii's Vsevobuch 'civilianized' training organization, which
was disbanded. Second, all special assignment detachments, called
'chony,' that previously had belonged to the 'Cheka' secret police,
and its successor the GPU, were absorbed into regular army units.
Third, each territorial militia unit was reformed around a cadre of
regular army officers and soldiers, constituting ideally a core of
10-15 percent of the unit strength, who were responsible for all
militia training and preparedness. Fourth, since the predominantly
peasant militia units were considered to have questionable loyalty to
the Soviet regime and inadequate combat capability, all were
garrisoned in military districts that did not border with any foreign
country. Fifth, the Party promised that pre-induction training would
be expanded so that the army would receive better educated recruits,
who would be perhaps even literate and thus a little more politically
reliable, for military training. And finally, a uniform system of
military districts was organized to replace the hodgepodge of fronts
Frunze, M. V. , "Ob itogakh reorganizatsii Krasnoi Armii,"
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 8, 1966, p. 70.
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and autonomous armies that had wreaked such havoc during the
demobilization on the army chain of command and on unit morale.671
Frunze's 'Militarization' Program
Incessant military manpower turnover was one of the critical
problems on which the 1923 military commission had focused special
attention. In order for the reformers' army revitalization plans to
succeed in creating a "homogeneous peacetime force," along with "a
competent method of political control," 672 from the putrid remains of
the post-demobilization Red Army, the first crucial step was to
develop some semblance of organizational stability. To accomplish
this vital objective, the team of Frunze, Gusev and Bubnov, backed by
Voroshilov and Tukhachevskii, instituted a series of measures -- for
glasnost' purposes, called generically, 'militarization' -- that were
calculated to create an army environment in which the authority of
officers would be unquestioningly respected and soldiers could count
on a strict, but fair, disciplinary policy. This program of
'militarization' marked another significant departure from Bolshevik
Party policy during, and immediately after, the Russian Civil War,
at which time a revolutionary "commune model," based on "conscious
discipline" and "comradely relations" between officers and soldiers,
was in vogue -- very much to the detriment of effective Red Army
discipline and unit morale, and to the great disgust of any and all
671
672
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professional military officers.6'3
- One-man Command ('edinonachalie')
The linchpin of the militarization program was the gradual
elimination of the practice of 'dual command' ('dvoinachalie') by
which political commissars exercised direct oversight of the Red
commanders; but mainly were watchdogs over former Tsarist officers
serving as military specialists -- right down to countersigning all
orders before soldiers were required to obey them.
From the earliest days of the Russian Civil War and the
founding of the Red Army, however, the dual command concept of
sharing all authority in a given military unit between a commander
and a political commissar had introduced colossal organizational
confusion, severe tension, and, not infrequently, outright hostility
between the two unit leaders that degraded both men in the eyes of
their subordinates. Political commissars could not seem to restrain
themselves from dabbling in military operational matters that were
supposed to be the exclusive preserve of commanding officers.
Commanders took great umbrage at always having the commissar
watchdogs looking over their shoulders and always questioning their
motives. Neither the commissars nor the rudiments of what would
become the Red Army officer corps were satisfied with this dual
command arrangement which they both disparagingly referred to as
"bureaucratization" -- meaning unnecessary parallelism and tedious
von Hagen, pp. 209-211.
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"paper shuffling had come to replace all meaningful activities."6'''
One-man command (edinonachalie) increasingly came to be viewed
by Soviet military and political leaders alike as the appropriate
solution to "bureaucratization." So severe was the morale problem
and confusion created by dual command that, as early as 1922, PUR
Director Gusev had issued a regulation stipulating that if a Red
commander had been a loyal party member for two years, and "was
sufficiently prepared for political leadership," the full-fledged
political commissar of his unit could be replaced with an "assistant
for political matters." However, very little progress was made in
implementing Gusev's potentially very significant change owing to the
fact that shortly after Gusev issued the regulation, Trotsky shipped
Gusev off to the wilds of Turkestan; the PUR staff bureaucratically
resisted relinquishing any political control to the military; and
very few of the battle-seasoned Red commanders had the subjectively
determined requisite political education.
Then, in March 1923, Deputy Army Commissar Sklianski attempted
to rectify the situation by ordering the introduction of one-man
command in the central military administration, following Gusev's
same 1922 guidelines. This doomed the transition attempt to early
failure for the almost identically same reasons as before. The way
ahead for the introduction of one-man command finally was cleared in
April 1924 when Frunze ordered the "purge of unreliable military
specialists" in the middle and senior ranks from the army's central
administration, thereby opening their duty spaces for assignment to
von Hagen, pp. 211-212.
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veteran Red commanders, whose loyalty the regime could trust."5
- Purge of Military Specialists
Frunze claimed credit for reducing the quantity of 'spets'
in the central army administration by 40 to 50 percent during 1924.
By January 1, 1925 the number of serving former Imperial Army
officers throughout the Red Army declined from 2598 to 377.6,6
The net result of this 'spets purge' was a serious decline, both in
the quantity and the quality, of officers serving in the Red Army.
Soviet military schools and academies could not yet train and
graduate adequate quantities of replacements, despite their efforts
to accelerate the education process and to simultaneously elevate the
professional standards of the graduates. "In 1923 the Army
Commissariat listed 74,910 officers and administrative personnel.
That number dropped to 53,003 in 1924, but rose in 1925 to 76,273
men, 15 percent of the entire army."677
There remained, especially, the continuing problem of obtaining
adequate numbers of militarily 'qualified' officers. The new academy
graduates, while certainly more politically reliable and trustworthy,
and hence more acceptable to the Communist government than were the
military specialists, generally lacked the requisite operational and
field command experience that is so crucial for the development of
von Hagen, p. 212.
Berkhin, I. B., Voennaia reforms v SSSR (1924-1925 gg.).
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 261.
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effective wartime battlefield leaders. The military specialists
(voenspets) and the civil war veterans were the sole repository of
that combat experience in the Red Army -- and they were all but gone.
The initiation of military one-man command and the replacement
of political commissars proceeded very slowly precisely because there
were so few 'fully qualified' Red commanders. The first Red Army
commanders were true warriors, who, with conviction, actively fought
the civil war military battles at the front; not politicians or
academics or 'intelligentsy ' who understood the convoluted
intricacies of the socialist political debate. Hence, generally, the
Red commanders were unprepared to assume the very involved, and at
times rather contradictory, education and political control
responsibilities of the commissars. Conversely, most of the Red
commissars, while fully indoctrinated in the polemics of socialism
and the latest changes of Party line, almost completely lacked the
requisite operational military knowledge and skills to take over
Red Army command responsibilities -- regardless of the Bolshevik
propensity to believe that the commissars could expand their military
skills more easily and quickly than Red commanders could become
politically educated. As for the former Imperial Army military
specialists, they clearly had superior professional military
knowledge and command abilities, but could not be trusted by the
Bolsheviks -- regardless of the extensiveness of political education,
due to the incompatibility of their former loyalties and social
backgrounds with the new reality of revolutionary socialism.678
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Enough progress in exorcising the differences between Red
commanders and Red commissars was made, however, that in June 1924
the Central Committee Orgburo decided to transition the entire army
to one-man command. PUR Director Bubnov was appointed to determine
the appropriate pace and process for the transition. Andrei Bubnov
presented his report at the July 28, 1924 Central Committee meeting.
At that same meeting both Stalin and Frunze enthusiastically
supported making the transition as quickly as possible. A month
later Frunze abolished the titles of Red commander and military
specialist decreeing that one title alone was sufficient for all
officers -- Commander of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.6'9
The decision to transition to one-man command encountered such
intense opposition from Red commanders, Red commissars, and former
Tsarist military specialists {'spets') -- all of whom feared the
uncertainty, loss of power, authority, position, and control that the
process entailed, both for personal and professional reasons -- that
the one-man command reforms could only be implemented in stages,
continuing throughout 1925. Grave reservations about the pace of the
transition and the political qualifications of the new commanders
were expressed by Western Military District political directors in
September 1924. The identical reservations were adopted at the army-
wide political directors' meeting in November of that same year.
While recognizing the totally deplorable condition of the army, the
political directors demanded firm assurances from their leaders that
one-man command would not "in any way diminish the role of political
Berkhin, Voennaia reforma pp. 263 and 293.
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work, or the significance of political organs in the Red Army," and
that the practice of "transforming political departments into
sections of officer's staffs" be banned.680 As a result of such
strong resistance, the RVS decided to slow the transition pace once
more, and hence, "forbade commanders to merge political departments
with their staff organizations, and ordered commanders to preserve
the autonomy of all political organs and to respect the important
role of political work in the Red Army."681
So critical of the transition to edinonachalie were certain
influential military politicians that Frunze elected to delay
indefinitely any changes in the very sensitive national units or for
the navy. Meanwhile, reform in the army was limited to the lower
command echelons, and greater scrutiny of officer "social origins and
party service records" was ordered before officers could be promoted.
Consequently, by October 1, 1925 -- well over a year after the RKP(b)
Orgburo initially decided to transition the entire army to one-man
command -- "only 14 percent of the highest ranking officers exercised
full command."682
Beneath the highest command levels, transition progress was
considerably more rapid. And, since these were the very officers who
would actually lead individual soldiers and units in battle, the
morale and combat capability of the Red Army began to improve: "By




von Hagen, p. 215.
von Hagen, p. 215.
Berkhin, Voennaia reforma pp. 306 and 311.
298
divisional commanders and 26 percent of regimental commanders. Six
months later those figures rose to 44 and 33 percent respectively."683
Another source states that "by 1 October 1925, 73 percent of all
corps commanders, 80 percent of all brigade commanders, and 54
percent of all directors of military educational institutions held
one-man commands . 1,684
Despite delays, Frunze insisted, with the support of the KPSS
Central Committee and the RVS, that "There is to be no turning
back."683 Regardless, it would not be until 1931 -- some six years
after Kliment E. Voroshilov succeeded Mikhail Frunze as RVS Chairman,
following the latter's untimely death on October 31, 1925 -- that the
transition to Red Army edinonachalie would be pronounced as
complete .686
Edinonachalie was conceived by Frunze and the RVS to be only
the first step in restoring the authority of the Russian officer
corps. To ensure the institutionalization of this most important
reform, the RVS altered the 1925 regulation detailing the duties of
political commissars to eliminate "any reference to monitoring
officers' conduct." Commissars' duties were hereby confined by
Petrov, Iu. P., "Deiatel'nost' Kommunisticheskoi partii
po provedenniiu edinonachaliia v Vooruzhennykh Silakh
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regulation to "direct and conduct day-to-day party and political
work" and "to ensure the education and training of the personnel of
the Red Army and Navy in a spirit of class cohesion and Communist
enlightenment."687 In compensation to the disgruntled commissars and
political officers for the curtailment of their positions of
authority, Frunze, with the backing of both the RVS and PUR, launched
a campaign for the "militarization of the political staff," through
which Red commissars who improved their military skills demonstrably
were offered the opportunity for promotion. The main route by which
to acquire this requisite improvement in military skills was through
matriculation and graduation from a military academy. Literally
hundreds of commissars did so. "Almost without exception, they were
promoted to one-man commands after they completed their training."688
- Expansion of the Junior Officer Corps
Expansion of junior officer corps responsibilities and
authority -- and through the junior officers, the reestablishment
of strict army discipline -- was another key element of Frunze's
transformation of the Red Army command structure. With the
exponentially increased number of duties and responsibilities that
the introduction of one-man command entailed for senior officers,
Frunze considered it essential that the chronically under-manned
Berkhin, Voennaia reforma pp. 395-396.
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junior officers corps, that functioned much like non-commissioned
officers in Western armies as the principal interface between the
commander and the line troops, become the officer group responsible
for troop control. Junior officers, much like their Imperial Army
predecessors, were the individuals who had daily, close contact with
the ordinary soldiers while conducting drill and routine training.
And therefore, Frunze reasoned, the junior officers could have the
greatest positive impact on changing soldiers' behavior and
performance, both individually and as a group. Frunze clearly saw
the newly graduated junior officers as "the foundation upon which
rests the entire matter of discipline" and as "the unique transmitter
of all educational influences from above."689
- Restoration of Officer Career Opportunities
Creation and retention of the desired quantity of Red Army
junior officers -- especially ones with the requisite education,
military skills, dedication and loyalty -- was no easy matter, given
the economic constraints under which the Red Army labored. Yet, by
using the growing international tensions as a justification and a
political lever, Frunze and his RVS developed, and won approval for,
a long-range program to improve substantially the material benefits
for junior officers, in particular, and for the entire officer corps
and the Red Army. In the 1924 first Red Army budget, expenditures
were earmarked for officer pay raises, improved housing, and pensions
689 Frunze, M. V., "Kadrovaia armiia i militsiia,"
in Sobranie sochinenii. 3 vols., (Moscow & Leningrad,
1926-1929), Vol. 3, p. 287.
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that, over time, could raise significantly the army's standard of
living, provide more material incentives and rewards for service, and
thereby encourage retention of junior officers.
In June 1924 the RVS raised officers' pay by an average
of 21 percent. Another raise in November increased
officers' pay by one-third and that of regular troops
three and one-half times. Allowances for living quarters
were raised, and the pension program was put on a solid
footing.650
With the implementation of these pay and benefit reforms,
officer retention improved, since a Red Army career now became
attractive. And, with the retirement of "many exhausted veterans"
from earlier wars and the purges of the "politically 'alien' or
'unreliable' military specialists and Trotskyists," promotion
opportunities for new military academy graduates and junior officers
expanded, which revitalized the army officer corps with a "loyal and
increasingly well - trained" cadre of leaders.691
- Order and Discipline Improve Red Army Morale
Restoration of army discipline and combat readiness proved,
however, to be much harder objectives for Frunze to accomplish, both
for ideological and for social reasons. During the civil war and the
Red Army demobilization immediately thereafter, civilian methods of
persuasion and debate -- labeled "trade union methods" by Stalin and
Trotsky -- had seriously eroded, indeed destroyed, traditional forms
and means of military discipline.
690
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In the largely peasant conscript Red Array of 1924, the
"comradely rules of conscious discipline" that initially transformed
the civil war Red Army into a vast volunteer commune simply no longer
sufficed to defend the Soviet state. Consequently, the January 1924
Gusev Military Commission determined that the familiarity between
officers and troops had reached a "state of crisis" with the
systematic refusal by soldiers to obey the orders of commanders.
By the fall of 1924, "Frunze warned that the situation had become
threatening." 692 A contumacious army increasingly was putting the
entire Soviet state at risk.
In a January 1925 address entitled "Lenin and the Red Army,"
presented to the Military Academy of the Red Army on the solemn
occasion of the first anniversary of Lenin's death, Mikhail Frunze
assaulted the barricades of army discipline. 693 To make his point,
Frunze cleverly invoked Lenin's authority, used party discipline as
an analogy, and "posed the army as a model of relations in [Russian]
society," as he applied the dialectic logic of Lenin's April 1920
"Infantile Disorders of Left Communism" to repudiate the left
socialist "commune model" army.69'' Frunze enumerated three conditions
as essential for the restoration of army discipline:
Frunze, M. V. , "Ob itogakh reorganizatsii Krasnoi Armii,"
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 8, 1966, p. 68.
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"Lenin i Krasnaia Armiia," Sputnik politrabotnika 18.
(Moscow, 1925), pp. 1-5.
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First, the officer corps and political staffs must be as
selfless and steadfast as the party itself; second, the
army command must maintain 'living and organic contact'
with the Red Army masses; and third, the soldier masses
must be convinced of the correctness of 'our leadership'
on the basis of the actions and behavior of the army's
elite.695
Frunze then launched into the most controversial element of his
address concerning 'mushtra,' and its diminutive 'mushtrovka' -- the
rhetorical terms describing the "extremely harsh drill-sergeant
discipline" command style associated with the old Imperial Army and
with the military specialists. During the interminable, harsh years
of the civil war, the foolish or frustrated army commander or
commissar who even dared to utter the word 'mushtra' before his
military comrades instantly was in considerable danger of rebuke, or
even serious physical harm; but also at risk of being accused of
reviving 'reactionary' ideology, with possible fatal consequences.
De facto Army Commissar Frunze now brazenly proclaimed that "To
achieve this order we must, and here it is absolutely inevitable,
employ the familiar elements of 'mushtra.'"696
Following Frunze's speech the floodgates of military and
political approbation to restore army discipline opened. By April
1925 PUR Director Bubnov organized and chaired a commission to
replace the 1922 disciplinary code with a new much more strict
version. Also in 1925 a most eloquent and impassioned, if somewhat
pedantic, argument for greater army discipline was published in
Voennvi vestnik by Aleksandr Sediakin, the Volga Military District
695
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Commander. Sediakin effectively summarized the attitude of many
serving military officers:
From the first minute of his army service, a soldier had
to be made aware that he was not just serving time, nor
was army life designed for his entertainment. The army
was 'a severe, often very severe, school of life and
combat.' Never in history had anyone attained military
success 'with sentimentalizing and sugar-and-honey
democratic methods of educating a soldier.' [Instead,]
Revolutionary armies 'come to consciousness only via
mountains of corpses' [and] the only way to ensure
victory in war is to instill the strictest discipline and
to make the most severe demands on soldiers.697
Frunze himself remained on the attack for increased discipline
by proclaiming in May 1925: "Now we are waging a decisive struggle
against all slovenliness, loose discipline, negligence, and
unconscious attitudes toward service." 698 The following week at the
Third Congress of Soviets -- Frunze's first major public appearance
after officially replacing Leon Trotsky as Army Commissar on January
26, 1925 --he dispersed the faltering opposition and critics of
restored army discipline with a barrage of statistics. Far from
causing a mass exodus from the army, Frunze argued that "the tougher
disciplinary measures had produced a sharp drop in desertion, from 8
percent in 1923 to 0.1 percent in 1925," as well as "significant
decreases in the incidence of military crimes" and "less severe
punishments" generally699 -- all of which Frunze claimed to be the
Sediakin, A., "Puti stroitel'stva boesposobnoi armii,"
Voennvi vestnik. No. 8, 1925, pp. 214-215.
Frunze, M. V., "Krasnaia armiia i oborona Sovetskogo
Soiuza," 19 May 1925, in Sobranie sochinenii. Vol. 3,
p. 233.
699 Frunze, M. V. , "Doklad na Ill-em s'ezde sovetov,"
Krasnaia zvezda. May 22, 1925, p. 3.
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result of the recent reforms that were intended to restore
predictability and certainty to military discipline, and to thereby
eliminate the past arbitrary policies that had inculcated feelings of
injustice and discontent within the army ranks.
- Nationwide Industrialization
Required to Modernize the Red Army
Improved army combat capability still remained an elusive goal
for the Frunze reformers. Throughout 1924 they struggled against
ingrained socialist ideological preconceptions derived from the 1917
Revolution, and before, along with the social backwardness of the
peasantry. In February 1925 Frunze found himself compelled to remind
an assembly of territorial militia party secretaries that "an army is
above all an instrument of war," rather than a social experiment, and
that the secretaries therefore had to focus their attention more
directly on military training instead of rural agitation and
propaganda. '00
Increasingly the Red Army leadership came to disbelieve the
Party cant, which, in contradiction to logic, but understandably,
bore a oddly striking resemblance to the 19th century teachings of
General Dragomirov. Many of the now senior local leaders received
their basic military education at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy:
"The mere inculcation of military values in the populace would
suffice to guarantee that the nation could withstand an assault by a
700 Frunze, M. V. , "Territorial'noe stroitel'stvo i rabota v
derevne," 27 February 1925, in Izbrannve proizvedeniia.
(Moscow, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 220-237.
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modern army equipped with the latest technological weaponry."'01
Senior Red Army leaders knew full well that all the major
European powers and Japan were rearming at a rapid pace; that the
disarmament appeals of Soviet diplomats were to no avail; and that as
long as the Soviet Republic remained predominantly a peasant society,
with a national economy based on agriculture, it risked decisive
military defeat by the more advanced industrial powers. Frunze
expressed the majority complaint saying that peasant Russia "could
not sustain an 'army suitable for fighting a war' because a peasant
did not have 'the feeling of strength, faith in himself, or capacity
to make independent decisions, precisely the capacity which life
instills in a worker.'"'02 For the Red Army the only logical
solution was the massive, state-wide industrialization of the
Soviet Union. Mikhail Frunze summarized this Red Army consensus:
Military thought has arrived at the conclusion that in
any future war the outcome of combat will be decided not
by those comparatively small military forces, which in
peacetime every state has in readiness and which can be
filled out in the very first weeks through mobilization,
but the outcome of combat will be decided by the
participation in it of the entire population en masse,
of all countries, of all states in unison, and demands
the decisive exertion of all industrial forces of the
country.703
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Frunze fired the heaviest rounds of the military drive for
industrialization after the April 1925 Fourteenth Party Conference.
At that Conference, Felix Dzerzhinskii, the infamous 'Chekist,'
miraculously now metastasized into the Chairman of the Supreme
Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), successfully defended his
1924 and 1925 economic priorities. He placed the military share of
industrial production in dead last place behind demands of the
peasant market, urban populations, the commune system, and the rail
industry.704
At the RKKA Military Academy graduation breakfast in August
1925, attended by Soviet President Kalinin, Frunze opened fire and
"challenged civilian party and state institutions to fulfill the
promise of the October Revolution by launching an industrialization
program."703 Whereas Kalinin exhorted the graduates to create a
"proletarian October in the field of military science," Frunze
rejoined that "objective conditions" did not exist for such a
"revolution" since "at that moment when we can count on not a
million-man working class, but rather a ten- or fifteen-million
proletariat, both our strategy and tactics will begin to take on an
altogether different character."706
Valentinov (Vol'skii), N., Novaia ekonomicheskaia
politika i krizis partii posle smerti Lenina:
Vospominaniia. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1971); cited in von Hagen, p. 245.
von Hagen, p. 243.
Frunze, M. V. , "Rech M. V. Frunze na torshestvennom
zavtrake, posviashchennom 5-mu vypusku slushatelei
Akademii5 August 1925, published for the first time
in Izbrannve proizvedeniia. (Moscow, 1977), pp. 432-433.
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In Frunze's opinion, only with a true 'revolution' in the whole
Soviet economy, which in Marxian terms 'transformed increased
quantity into an entirely new quality,' could the Red Army itself
begin to be transformed into a modern fighting force. Both Frunze
and his Deputy Chief of Staff Mikhail Tukhachevskii stressed that in
a future war the key economic sectors would be the tractor industry,
communications, and transportation.'07
Finally, after nearly two years of intensive lobbying and the
creation of a nationwide glasnost' campaign, using mass organizations
to build support for the military position by advocating and
agitating for 'industrialization' and 'modernization' of the Russian
economy, in December 1925 the Fourteenth Party Congress -- "the
Congress of Industrialization" -- resolved to "take all necessary
measures to bolster the strength of the Red Army and Navy."'06
Mikhail V. Frunze himself did not live to see the fruition of his
Herculean efforts. Kliment E. Voroshilov took over the position of
War Commissar following Frunze's sudden, untimely, and mysterious
death from a "heart attack" on October 31, 1925, after a medical
operation was accomplished, at the direction of the KPSS Central
Committee, in the Moscow Kremlin hospital on October 30.709
The atrocious extent of the enormous military industrialization
problem against which Frunze had labored, and which Voroshilov fully




von Hagen, pp. 244-245.
von Hagen, p. 247.
Budennyi, Proidennvi put'. Book Three, p. 330.
309
available economic statistics for the period 1926 to 1927 which show
that the feeble Russian automobile industry produced only 500
vehicles and that the Soviet rail system had only 22,000 carriages
and wagons. Yet, both industries were means of transportation
essential to the efficient deployment and maneuvering of the Red
Army. Even in 1928, the Siberian Military District (which stretched
from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean) had only thirty light
tanks and twenty-one armored cars.'10
Although great political turmoil among the party leaders would
attend the fundamental reorientation of Soviet economic policy before
the actual implementation decision was made in 1927 to undertake the
First Five-Year Plan in 1928, the Frunze reform initiatives laid the
conceptual foundation for a legitimate "strengthening of the military
and patriotic elements in the Soviet political culture of the late
1920s and early 1930s."711 The impending 'militarization' of Soviet
society, in many ways, could be seen as a culmination of that
socialization process that had been set entrain over eighty years
earlier with the Miliutin Reforms and had been accomplished
incrementally over the subsequent decades, through a halting
dialectic process, that, nonetheless, continually strove to create a
modern professional Russian officer corps which was integrated with,
and was supported fully by, a patriotic, literate, and enthusiastic
Russian populace.
Mackintosh, in The Red Army, p. 57.
von Hagen, p. 247.
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Changes Institutionalized Through Education:
The Red Army Becomes the "School of the Nation"
The key to institutionalizing the military gains made through
the Frunze 'militarization' reforms, just as during the Miliutin
reforms sixty years earlier, was education -- comprehensive,
nationwide education that included political, cultural, social,
historical, and scientific subjects as well as purely military
training. Effectively, the Communist Party political leadership saw
the Red Army as becoming the "school of the nation" -- that single
educational institution through which all able-bodied male citizens
passed, were indoctrinated, and upon discharge from active military
service returned to civilian occupations and local communities where,
ideally, they too became disciples proselytizing others to the
policies of the Communist leadership. For the military and for the
Soviet state, the PUR was charged to carry out this goal:
Our mission is to destroy the old regime in the hearts
and minds of Red Army men [because] a soldier had to know
why and against which enemies he was fighting, and he had
to want to fight and had to be prepared to give up his
life.712
To this end and regardless of the fact that the last three
lines, as well as the entire general concept, of this 'new' goal were
taken nearly verbatim from General Dragomirov's Taktiki textbook,
used at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy and by the Imperial
Russian Army throughout the last half of the 19th century, in
July 1925 a revised two-year-long political education program was
712
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implemented based on the three bulwarks of "militarization,
sovietization, and internationalization"; with "militarization" as
the overall unifying concept.
The primary task of all education, both in content and
form, was to guarantee combat readiness and soldier
morale. The entire first year of a soldier's education
was designed to transform 'the peasant who was called to
serve in the Red Army into a Soviet soldier who had a
clear idea of the Red Army, its aims, organization, and
history. '713
Throughout the 280 hours of political education scheduled during a
recruit's first year of military training ("militarization"), heavy
emphasis was continually placed on discipline -- defined as the
unswerving obedience to the orders of superiors. During the second
year of service, 190 hours of political education were designed "to
transform him into a loyal, informed Soviet citizen and potentially a
cadre who might enter the Soviet bureaucracy upon release from the
military" by stressing "sovietization" -- "the bond of workers and
peasants under the leadership of the working class and its party."714
The third pillar -- "internationalization" -- although
discussed throughout the entire two-year program, had no formal
course materials or scheduled instruction periods and was left
largely to the discretion of the individual political officers.
These PUR officials complained endlessly that they had a difficult
enough time trying to convince the average peasant conscript of "the
indisputable need for the defense of the Soviet state," let alone to
von Hagen, p. 276.
von Hagen, p. 278.
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sell him on the requirement to perform any "international duty."715
To the average peasant the deeply emotional Russian term 'rodina'
(Motherland) encompassed only his family's village (mir).716 It
therefore required great patience and considerable persuasion by
political officers to convince these often illiterate, and at best
semi-literate, individual peasants that the 'rodina' concept also
applied to the multinational Soviet state as well. Broadening the
concept to include their personal "unity with the proletariat" of
other countries -- let alone with the entire world in accordance with
Karl Marx's dictum -- was quite simply beyond their comprehension.717
What did work in the socialization process, however, was to
build on the peasant's new-found loyalty to the Red Army as the
cornerstone for developing his personal attachment to the new
socialist political order.
The army opened up opportunities for radical state
intervention in society and from its earliest days it
played an important role, as a 'school of socialism' in
sociopolitical training and cadre formation.718
During the 1924 annual military draft, only 24,700 -- or 4.8 percent
-- of all recruits inducted into the Red Army were Communist Party or
Komsomol members; and in 1925 the number of party members was
intentionally increased to 39,000 -- or 12.8 percent of the total.
von Hagen, p. 278.
The Russian word mir has the triple meaning of "village",
"peace", and "world" -- which goes a long way toward
explaining how the Russian peasantry narrowly defined
their "world" as a "peaceful" communal "village."
von Hagen, p. 288.
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After serving two years in the Red Army, the 1924-year group
discharged 66,000 Communist Party or Komsomol members in 1926, while
the 1925-year group discharged 64,500 Party members back into
civilian society.719 Additionally, by 1925 the proportion of Red
commanders who were Party members had risen to 40 percent.'20
In fact, the Red Army -- always under the leadership of the
Communist Party as the 'vanguard of the proletariat' -- was purposely
portrayed as 'the family of workers and toilers,' and as the
liberator, defender, provider, and educator of the peasantry that had
given them entirely new personal opportunities and a conscious memory
of their glorious Russian history.
Stalin described the army as 'the only nationwide
(vserossiiskii) and statewide (vsefederativnyi) place of
assembly, where people of various provinces and regions
come together, study, and accustom themselves to
political life'; furthermore, the army was 'a school' and
'a great apparatus linking the party with the workers and
the poor peasantry'.721
Lopsided though such portrayals might have been, in reality: "The
army played a fundamental role in state building and nation building
as a working environment that brought together representatives of all
social groups entitled to Soviet citizenship, as well as many of the
diverse national groups that made up the Soviet Union."'22
Berchin, p. 54.
Budennyi, Book Three, p. 334.
Stalin, Io. I., "Organizatsionnyi otchet Tsentral'nogo
Komiteta RKP(b)17 April 1923 in Sochineniia. Vol. 5,
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Thus, for many individuals, service in the Red Army became the
high point of peasants' lives -- they never before had lived, nor
afterward would they live, as well as they did in the Red Army; nor
would they share with other civilian village comrades the deep
bonding of a common sense of purpose and mission. But they never
forgot their loyalty to the Red Army, and hence to the Soviet state
-- their mutual, unifying 'rodina.'7"
Mark von Hagen summarizes the main elements and the extensive
impact of the Frunze reforms on the Red Army, and on the entire
Russian society when he writes:
Active-duty soldiers, veterans, and the militarized
political elite were the key actors in the process of the
interpenetration of militarist and socialist values; they
also articulated the intricately intertwined interests of
the Red Army and the Soviet state and its many political
institutions and organizations. The central leadership,
in pursuit of its program of militarized socialism,
placed military needs at the top of its list of economic
priorities by the end of the first five-year plan.
Patriotic and military virtues came to dominate education
and culture."724
Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense
Georgii Zhukov conclusively describes the Russian Civil War lessons
that became institutionalized through the Red Army "School of the
Nation" following the Frunze Reforms, and their lasting influence on
the future course of the Soviet Armed Forces:
The enormous amount of military experience and
theoretical generalizations derived from the Russian
Civil War formed the basis for the development of the
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First is the unity of the army and people. The
Red Army could not have been victorious without the unity
that existed between the troops at the front and the
material and political support that was received from the
rear. This unity allowed the army to expand throughout
the course of the civil war.
Second, the directing role of the Party, both in
advising on military questions and influencing the army
through the party-political apparatus, had a colossal
significance. Because of the Party leadership, it was
possible to concentrate forces and military resources on
the most important military direction; as well as to
transfer enormous numbers of human and material resources
between fronts to the critical point.
Third, the victorious and lasting principles upon
which our armed forces were constructed are strict
centralization, unity of command and control, and iron
discipline. The principles upon which a regular army,
that had to prevail, was created are centralization and
unity of direction in all branches of the army, strict
maintenance of the chain of command, and discipline.725
The Red Army was genuinely an army of a new type that reflected the new social
and political structures of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia. Once the army
had attained a measure of legitimacy in the Soviet political and social orders,
the old military elite that survived in a much expanded Soviet officer corps
was able to exert greater influence in shaping Red Army traditions. They
succeeded in, say, reviving Russian nationalism and Great Power ideology only
to the extent that their attitudes and practices found a resonance in the
political culture of the army and party elites.726
Zhukov, Marshal G. K., Vospominaniia i razmvshleniia.
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Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strateqiia: Toward
"Permanent Operating Factors in Protracted War"
In many respects, including command, the 20th century is closer to the 17th
than the 19th. We mainly wage the limited operations of a strategy of
attrition; the rear and its work are much more important, and the political
and economic fronts of the conflict are frightfully intense. The study of
new forms of warfare is a necessary part of the activity of the high command;
the new course of events in warfare can be understood and evaluated only if
the events are measured by a new yardstick.
- Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia
Dialectics acknowledges the radically contradictory requirements of the art
of war. ... Dialectics cannot be driven out of the realm of strategic thought
because it is the essence of strategic thought./;8
- Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia
The focal point for the Red Army future war debates and for
opposition to the officially approved 'unified proletarian military
doctrine' was the former Nikolaev General Staff Academy, which
Trotsky's Revvoensovet Respubliki (RVSR), as part of the general
post-war army reorganization, on August 5, 1921 renamed the RXKA
Military Academy. Given the long-established General Staff Academy
mission to develop a military science for investigating the nature of
future war; its RVSR assigned task to "elaborate theoretical
questions concerning organization and the conduct of battle and the
influence of these factors on troop control"; 729 and the continuity of
the faculty between the two academies, it is entirely logical that
Svechin, A. A., Strategiia. 2nd Edition, (Moscow: Voennyi
vestnik, 1927), translation, Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy.
(Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), p. 313.
Svechin, A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. pp. 318-319.
729 Bulzakov, T. P., ed., Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), p. 22.
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the new RKKA Military Academy would become the epicenter of
dissension as the voenspets faculty members -- former Tsarist
officers A. A. Svechin, N. E. Varfolomeev, A. I. Verkhovskii, et al.
-- attempted to apply intellectual rigor to the complex problems of
future war.
The stage for odious argument within the RKKA Military Academy
was set in the summer of 1921. Victorious Red operational commanders
and staff officers, such as N. V. Sologub, N. N. Shvarts, and E. A.
Shilovskii, were assigned to the faculty. Veteran Red commanders
began arriving as the first students. And, on August 27, 1921 the
Western Front commander, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii, took over
as Chief of the RKKA Military Academy.730
Former Tsarist Army General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin
was a most outstanding, outspoken, and provocative future thinking
officer, and hence, for the RKP(b) most controversial and politically
'dangerous.' Svechin was a RKKA Military Academy faculty member
during the free exchange of ideas that characterized the exceedingly
turbulent post-civil war military doctrine debates.731 Prior to the
First World War, General Svechin had been one of the 'Young Turks' at
the Nikolaev General Staff Academy whose work attempted to translate
and to incorporate systematically the lessons of military history
Bulzakov, p. 23.
Lee, Kent D., "Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role
of Soviet Military Science," in Frank, Willard C., Jr.,
and Philip S. Gillette, eds., Soviet Military Doctrine
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into then current Russian strategy, operational planning, tactics and
force structure. His investigations amounted to a concerted effort
to create a 'military science' founded on historical experience."'
Although World War I (1914-1918) combat operations and events
of the October 1917 Krasnaia Revoliutsiia interrupted these
intellectual efforts by Svechin and his Academy colleagues, the
Bolsheviks, believing firmly in the validity of 'scientific and
historical Marxism,' ideologically were predisposed to continue, and
to expand significantly, the work to develop a 'military science'
that they considered might be crucial to the survival of their new
state. Therefore, using the 1879 precedent first established by the
War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin to investigate the Russo-Turkish War,733
between 1918 and 1924 the Bolshevik leadership resuscitated the
Military-Historical Commission concept; attached it to the All-
Russian Main Staff as the Commission for the Study and Use of the
Experience of the War, 1914-1918; 734 and specifically tasked the
Commission initially "with distilling the lessons of the First World
War and [later] the Soviet Civil War."735
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- The Red Army Military-Historical Commission
For the majority of its existence, the Military-Historical
Commission (VIK)'36 was headed by Aleksandr Svechin. After First
World War operational assignments as a regimental and division
commander, as well as Northern Front Chief of Staff, beginning in
September 1917, Svechin joined the RKKA in March 1918 and served
temporarily as Chief of the All-Russian Main Staff from August until
October 1918, when he assumed full-time faculty duties at the RKKA
Military Academy.73'
Under Svechin's leadership, the Commission carried forward the
rigorous process, begun in the late-19th century and expanded prior
to the World War, of legitimizing the concept of future war as a
valuable 'scientific' analytical method upon which to base Russian
force structure development. Of this process Aleksandr Svechin wrote
that "problems of military history are especially dear to persons
studying strategy, since, by its very method, strategy is merely a
systematized reflection over military history."738
For a precise account employing archival materials to
document the functioning of, and struggles within, the
VIK, see Polikarpov, V. D., "Poiski 'Ugla zreniia. ' Ataka
kraskomov na nauchnom fronte" (The Search for a 'Corner
Standpoint.' The Attack of the Red Commissars on the
Scientific Front), Nachal'nvi etap grazhdanskoi voinv.
Istoriia izucheniia. (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 120-154.
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Svechin, A. A., Strategiia. (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik,
1927); translation Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy.
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What initially got Svechin and his fellow Commission members
into serious ideological conflict with the Communist Party was their
"absence of a Marxist analytical framework" and their insistence in
the 1919 first volume of Voenno-istoricheskii sbornik. Trudy Komissii
do issledovaniiu i isool'zovaniiu opvta voinv 1914-1918 gg. that the
commission objectively would reveal "the truth, only the truth, the
whole truth."'39 To the Communist Party and to the Red commanders,
increasingly 'truth' was becoming ideologically based and colored,
'subjectively' determined to serve their personal causes, and
beginning to exclude 'objective' interpretation outside the Marxist
conceptual framework.
The four explicit volumes of Trudy Komissii do issledovaniiu i
ispol'zovaniiu opvta voinv 1914-1918 gg.. published between 1919 and
1921, did not at all endear the Military-Historical Commission to the
Communist Party. First, the RVSR issued Order No. 914 of 30 April
1921 assigning the Military-Historical Commission (VIK) to the RKKA
Shtab in an effort to establish control over its work; 740 then by RVSR
Order No. 1148, dated 29 May 1921, the VIK was disbanded; only to be
reformed on 15 July 1921. Finally, with the publication of RVSR
Order No. 1879, dated 2 September 1921, the VIK was designated the
"Commission for Investigation and Use of World and Civil War
Experience," with S. I. Gusev as Chairman and M. N. Tukhachevskii
Svechin, A., Voenno-istoricheskii sbornik. Trudy Komissii
po issledovaniiu i ispol'zovaniiu onvta voinv 191A-1918
gg. . Vol. 1, (Moscow: Tipografiia Sytina, 1919), p. 9.
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serving as his Assistant Chairman."'1
As the commission's task expanded to include analysis of the
Russian Civil War, the "truth" about history became even more
contentious -- and ever more "dangerous.""12 Over the course of the
1920s, within Bolshevik Russia, and then within the Soviet Union,
the Communist Party leadership increasingly was in the process of
settling personal scores based upon interpretations of Marxist
ideology, of burying the civil war errors of aspiring leaders, and
of replacing objective historical analysis with dogma. All of which
Aleksandr Svechin viscerally rejected.
A second issue eventually, and ultimately, placed Svechin,
together with the other members of the Military-Historical Commission
and of the RKKA Military Academy voenspets faculty, in direct
conflict with Communist Party and Red Army leaders, who could
be described as adherents to a 'neo-Russian School' due to their
strong chauvinistic and xenophobic inclinations. That issue was
Svechin's adamant insistence that the only appropriate methodology by
which military art could be taught at the RKKA Military Academy was
through the application of military science. Not just any, so-called
'military science' would do for Svechin. It had to include the study
of the complete international evolution of strategy and tactics as
Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nvi etav.. .. p. 120.
See Erickson, John, "Pens versus Swords: A Study of
Studying the Russian Civil War, 1917-1922," in Wrigley,
Chris, ed., Warfare Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in
Honour of A. J. P. Taylor. (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1986), pp. 120-141, for an accurate English language
description of the "battles" waged over historical
"truth."
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developed, not just in Russia or during the civil war, but in foreign
countries; particularly by applying the military theories contained
within important German works, such as those by Clausewitz, Moltke,
Delbrueck, and von Schlichting.
A. A. Svechin placed at the foundation of the development
of the armed forces a definition of the nature of future
war based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of
the history and prospects of military affairs; ... taking
into account the 'nature of the historical moment' and
economic potentials of the country at each individual
moment.743
Despite Svechin's consistent advocacy of the primacy of
politics, to the Communists and Red commanders bathing in the glory
of their civil war victories and inflamed by their passion for the
imminent socialist 'world revolution,' Svechin's work would become
heresy. His emphasis on the evolution of military art, warnings
"against any effort to create closed systems on the basis of past
combat experience," and urgings that the "proper topic of military
history was the study of those tendencies shaping future war" 744 were
not 'politically correct;' hence both they, and he, became outcasts.
Based on his three part Istoriia voennogo Lskusstva. published
between 1922 and 1923, during the 1923-1924 academic year at the RKKA
Military Academy, Svechin delivered an innovative series of lectures
on strategy -- "the highest level of military art" -- in which, for
the first time, he sought to define for future Red Army leaders the
743 Lobov, V. N. , "The Significance of Svechin's Military-
Theoretical Legacy Today," in Svechin, A. A., Strategiia.
(Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927); trans. Kent D. Lee, ed.,
Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications,
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spatial and temporal expansion of protracted future warfare using the
concept of "operational art," that had been adopted by the German
General Staff prior to World War I, as the essential functional
linkage between strategy and tactics. 745 Svechin's description of
operativnc £ iskusstve (operational art) -- even through it would
eventually be adopted by the Soviet Army in the 1930s -- placed him
in direct conflict with portions of Frunze's 'unified proletarian
military doctrine' and with official Communist Party policy, both of
which were oriented toward an offensive and decisive battle in a
short war to promote the socialist 'world revolution' and thereby to
secure the Soviet state. In contradiction to such dogmatic Communist
Party thinking, Svechin taught:
Tactical creativity, in its turn, is regulated by
operational art. Military action is not something
decisive in itself, but only the raw material from which
an operation is assembled. Only in very rare cases can
one count on achieving the decisive aim of military
action by one act. Normally this route to the final aim
extends over a number of operations: the latter are
separated in time by more or less significant pauses,
extend over separate parts of the territory of the
theater of war, and are especially sharply distinguished
on account of differing intermediate aims, to attain that
which the efforts of the forces are temporarily directed.
We call an act of war, in the course of which forces are
directed in a defined region of a theater of war towards
attainment of an established intermediate objective
without any break, an operation. An operation is a
conglomeration of very different activities....746
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These comprehensive lectures, based upon his entire experience as a
professional officer, military historian, scientist, and theorist,
formed the foundation for Svechin's most controversial and enduring
work -- Strategiia -- which was first published in 1926, and in a
revised 1927 edition by Voennvi vestnik. and ignited an intensely
personal, yet substantive, strategy debate within the Red Army.
Svechin had already fanned the embers of the smoldering Red
Army strategy debate in a March 1924 Voennaia mvsl' i revoliutsiia
article entitled "Opasnye illiuzii" ("Dangerous Illusions"), when, in
support of the recently deceased Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) to
rebuild the devastated Russian economy using market mechanisms,
Svechin wrote:
One must welcome the rejection by Soviet power of any
sort of chauvinism, from the pressure to use the Red Army
for promoting revolution by force of arms. But should
such manifestations of chauvinism appear, then look at a
map, reflect on modern technology and give up any sort of
pleasant but even more dangerous illusions.747
Despite War Commissar Mikhail Frunze's support, up to his death in
October 1925, for Red Army protracted warfare preparations, which
continued to provide Svechin's intellectual endeavors some modicum of
political protection, the Communist Party devotees to 'class warfare'
and destruction of 'imperialists' were incensed by the implications
of Svechin's "Dangerous Illusions." Through this March 1924 article,
coupled with his earlier 'objective' analyses of warfare and later
writings, particularly Strategiia. Svechin began to make implacable
foes of Kliment Voroshilov, Frunze's successor as War Commissar, and
Svechin, A. A., "Opasnye illiuzii," Voennaia mvsl'
i revoliutsiia. No. 2, March 1924, pp. 49-50.
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of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the future Chief of the RXKA Main Staff
(1925-1928), who believed in and advocated for the "complete
militarization" of the Soviet economy so that a technologically
modernized Red Army could be the means for seizing the initiative and
for conducting decisive offensive battle leading to the "total
destruction" of the enemies of the Soviet state that would accomplish
a "revolution from without."748
- "War of Destruction" versus "War of Attrition"
The basic premise of Svechin's Strategiia. which was adapted
from the work by the distinguished German military theorist and
historian, Hans Delbrueck, was that the strategy of all warfare could
be analyzed within a paradigm as being one of two types: 1) "wars of
destruction" (sokrushenie), characterized by the rapid accomplishment
of war aims through the decisive defeat of enemy forces in battle
during the initial period of war; and 2) "wars of attrition" (izmor),
characterized by protracted warfare involving the total political,
diplomatic, military, economic, and population resources of the state
to achieve the war aims -- "the line of least resistance runs through
prolonging the war, which would cause the enemy to collapse
politically. "749
Svechin was particularly critical of "decisive military
operations" during the initial period of war and warned that such
Kipp, Jacob, W., in Strategy. translation of Svechin,
A. A., Strategiia. 1927 edition, by Kent D. Lee, ed.,
(Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), p. 41
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unprepared action could lead to disaster.730 He argued that for
economically backward Russia the only appropriate strategy was a
prolonged "war of attrition," trading time and Russian territorial
space while selectively employing as appropriate both defensive and
offensive military operations, until the entire resources of the
state could be mobilized and united with army actions at the front,
i.e. , "... the effort a state is capable of making on the front and
the rear constitutes a single entity,"751 in order to bring about the
ultimate aim of warfare -- the collapse of the enemy government. In
essence, Svechin's Strategiia elaborated a totally new theoretical
construct for future war, which applied historical experience through
the dialectic methodology of military science, and incorporated those
trends that were altering the nature of warfare, to create a
conceptual system with, as key elements,
the establishment of a political-economic foundation
beneath strategy; a division of strategy into two ideal
types; attrition (izmor) and destruction (sokrushenie);
the delineation of operational art and the assertion of a
radically new understanding of the concept of operations;
a reduction of the role of tactical combat in shaping
force structure; denial of the importance of the single
decisive engagement and the transformation of combat into
an ongoing, episodic process; radical reduction of the
role of march-maneuver as a major strategic factor and
the emerging importance of the meeting engagement;
emphasizing the role of transportation and communications
in strategy and the significance of military-technical
superiority; and the emphasis on theater-specific
conditions in shaping appropriate strategy and
operational art.752
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Svechin's logical analysis and conviction that future wars
necessarily would be protracted "wars of attrition" was sufficient
alone to set him in opposition to Tukhachevskii and the left
Communist Party faithful. However, in the process of detailing his
strategic paradigm, Svechin also used Strategiia as a polemic forum
--a decision that was not politically wise, but one which certainly
displayed Svechin's characteristic intellectual integrity -- to
attack none too subtly the civil war performance of the revolutionary
Red Army leadership. Svechin wrote concerning the wartime
leadership:
One example of irrational organization is the way in
which the Red infantry was organized in the Civil War.
The basic desire to reduce the percentage of
noncombatants led the first organizers to reject the
corps as an organizational unit, which was undoubtedly
correct.... But subsequently the size of a division rose
to 50,000. ... Divisions with a strength of 5000 to 6000
would be most appropriate for the conditions of the Civil
War. ... A ratio of 12 noncombatants to one combatant
was considered good, and the ratio was often much higher.
... In the old Russian army the ratio of noncombatants to
combatants was equal to two men in the rear for one
combatant.... Victory will be won not by unlimited
mobilizations of senior citizens but by a very strict
accounting of every man drafted into the Red Army.753
At the forefront of Svechin's condemnation were the strategic
failures, particularly during the disastrous 1920 Polish campaign, of
Budennyi, Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov, and Stalin. Although Svechin
did not specifically name them, his words leave no question about
where he considered responsibility, and blame, to lie. Svechin's
vivid descriptions of their failures, which these emerging leaders of
Svechin, A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. pp. 190-192.
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the Soviet Union and Red Array were trying their best to bury as
deeply as possible during the Party internal political battles that
followed Lenin's demise, virtually guaranteed Svechin's exile from
responsible positions after 1930, as political power increasingly
consolidated around Stalin's 'cult of personality' -- and eventual
elimination in 1938. Svechin sharply condemned the entire strategy
of the Polish operation:
In 1920 Poland was a more formidable enemy than Wrangel.
From the perspective of destruction, it would have been
correct to direct most of our efforts against Warsaw.
... The decisive point -- Warsaw -- would have decided
the fate of the Crimea. ... In final analysis, Wrangel
won the Warsaw operation, not Pilsudski; the Poles'
Lublin attack was made possible by the divided attention
of the Southern Front and the fact that the latter was
pursuing local goals in Poland rather than an energetic
offensive to the Vistula. As goals of operations, Warsaw
and the Crimea were set in an order opposite the ones
they should have, which had unpleasant consequences.754
Concerning the performance and merit of S. M. Budennyi's legendary
Russian Civil War Konarmiia (First Cavalry Army), Svechin noted
rather sarcastically:
But the enemy's quality is more important than his
strength. ... The laurels of the Red Cavalry can be
ascribed not only to its bravery but to the
disintegration of White and Polish infantry units.
... Certain cavalry commanders left a lot to be desired.
... The economic disintegration of the Civil War years
put the cavalry at the forefront, and its leaders proved
to have the talents they needed. Thus, cavalry, like any
other branch of service, is of value not in and of itself
but rather in connection with the room that the nature of
a war provides for its activity. ... The organizer of an
army can neither be guided by patterns ... nor respond to
fashions like an Aeolian harp responds to the blowing of
the wind.755
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But Aleksandr Svechin reserved his most incisive criticism for
Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the Western Front Commander during the
military failure to seize Warsaw in August 1920, who, now as Red Army
Chief of Staff, sought to 'mechanize' the army in order to implement
his 'deep battle' future war operational concept. Concerning
Tukhachevskii's expansive force structure proposals for the Red Army,
Svechin pedantically pointed out:
We must get a clear conception of the nature of future
operations and be able to determine the requirements they
will make of tactics, and only then will it be possible
to provide a proper solution for problems of organizing
branches of service in the proportions that are actually
necessary. The correct solution could lead to
significant savings, but success will come only to an
organizer who is a master in strategy, operational art
and tactics.756
Further on Svechin continued his assault against Tukhachevskii:
We must above all ensure the stability of the military
high command and the continuity of the work of the agency
responsible for the operational plan, the general staff.
A great deal of attention and profound consideration of
strategic issues are needed in order to avoid drifting
aimlessly. We need leadership with proven views on the
art of war. ... Revolutionary changes in operational
views are hazardous and detrimental.'5'
It was, however, for Tukhachevskii's conduct of the 1920 Polish
campaign itself -- and hence, by implication, for the entire Soviet
and Red Army leadership -- that Svechin amassed his greatest scorn.
The text of Strategiia is spiked throughout with the following
enduring military-strategic lessons and typically very harsh
analytical assessments of the performance of the Red Army leadership:
Svechin, A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 195.
Svechin, A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 219.
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A strategy of destruction characterized most of the Red
Army's offensive from the banks of the Dvina to the
Vistula in 1920. ... Destruction involves not only speed
and linearity, it also involves massiveness. In
approaching the Vistula the Red armies had become so
numerically weak and so cut off from their sources of
supply that they were more phantoms than reality.'58
An analysis of communications yields a large number of
extremely important guidelines for strategic art:
strategic thinking should pay sufficient attention to
logistics; the basic directions for an offensive should
coincide with the most important available trunk lines of
communications, and the pace of an offensive can only
temporarily lag behind the pace of restoration of
railroads demolished by the enemy; the strategist should
keep communications in mind even when he departs from an
analysis of his own logistics and looks ahead at the
enemy; and only attacks on the enemy that will cause him
to lose important junctions and lateral lines should be
given serious consideration, and the only way to destroy
an enemy army is to cut off all the arteries supplying
Our reaction to the carelessness of preparations and
logistics that characterized the Red Army's Warsaw
operation should not impel us to the opposite extreme.
A plan will be sound when it does not leave too much to
chance but also does not get bogged down in details and
or delve too deeply into the various scenarios that may
be encountered in carrying out the plan. ... Operational
art does not allow for rigid decisions.760
Not every movement forward is in essence a strategic
offensive. An offensive at any and all costs, as an
a priori method of operation, leads to a situation in
which our forces are dispersed where the enemy permits,
activity degenerates into weakness, into an offensive
'phase,' into a very dubious location of the front
somewhere ahead and a return to the starting position.761
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Specifically against the 'unified proletarian military
doctrine' promulgated by Mikhail Frunze, and thus in contradiction to
the policy of the Communist Party, Svechin argued:
Of course, it is impossible to get all the members of a
general staff to hold the same views, particularly in our
era of the rapid development of the art of war. Complete
unity of doctrine and the lack of differences in the
interpretation of operational and tactical issues could
be achieved only at the cost of stopping efforts for
further development.762
Contemporary military history, which tries to proceed
from a single, absolute, uniquely correct line of
strategic conduct, is incapable of clarifying the meaning
and relationships in the jumble of military events that
it considers some sort of chaos.'63
However, Svechin very strongly supported Frunze's proposals for the
creation of a powerful Red Army General Staff, urging:
Only a general staff, a collection of persons who have
forged and tested their military views under the same
conditions and under the same leadership, who have been
carefully selected and are bound to one another by mutual
responsibility and concerted efforts to achieve
fundamental improvements in building the army, is capable
of coordinating and harmonizing preparations which are so
extensive, so diverse and run in so many different
directions. A variety of specialists are required in the
military profession; the specialty of the general staff
should be to combine individual efforts into a single
entity, eliminate friction and achieve a high level of
organization.76"
Following the publication of Svechin's Strategiia. First
Edition, so extremely polarized and politicized became the split
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faculty and the RKKA Main Staff, which was under Tukhachevskii's
leadership, that early in 1926 a Red Array 'special conference' was
convened for the specific purpose of debating Svechin's thesis
concerning the strategies of 'izmor' and 'sokrushenie.' Through
these conference discussions an effort was made to reach some
internal consensus about the appropriate Red Army strategy for
contemporary conditions.'65
As a result of this 'special conference,' the details of which
were not published, but which certainly must have included an very
spirited, 'no-holds-barred' debate, Svechin revised his Strategiia.
as he writes in the Preface to the 1927 Second Edition, having
"conscientiously reviewed all the numerous critical comments ... by
certain obscure military men and politicians,"'66 so that now
"wars of destruction" could be undertaken under specific favorable
international conditions.'67 Although in his second edition of
Strategiia Svechin acknowledged that a strategy of "destruction"
Kipp, Jacob W., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 41.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 67.
Svechin's "favorable international conditions" did little
to appease his critics, who advocated a strategy of
"destruction" because, for the isolated and "encircled"
Soviet Union, the following conditions were realistically
unattainable: isolating a hostile state from possible
allies; providing active allies for oneself; engendering
hostile attitudes on the part of neutral countries toward
the enemy and sympathetic attitudes toward oneself;
depriving the enemy of the possibility of getting loans
and acquiring the raw materials and weapons needed to
wage war; and opening up foreign sources of economic
cooperation for oneself. The odium of declaring war
must be directed away from oneself and toward the enemy
if possible. See Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed.,
Strategy, p. 131.
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could be applied in warfare, he remained convinced that future war
necessarily would be a "total war," demanding the "permanent
mobilization" of the state in order to field maximum military
capabilities during the critical initial period of war. 768 The theory
of "permanent," or "three-echelon," military mobilization envisions
the following general concepts: 1) minimum mobilization reserves
gathered by the beginning of the war -- the first echelon of material
support of the army; 2) a second echelon composed of special military
industry capable of supporting the army until the final mobilization
of all remaining industry; and 3) a third mobilization echelon
consisting of civilian industry supporting the army and the country
until the end of the war, after exhausting mobilization reserves.769
Most importantly, the Second Edition of Strategiia continued to
contradict openly and unequivocally the ideological precepts that the
Communist Party leaders now wished to transform into dogma. Svechin
included such biting and ideologically unacceptable comments as:
Strategy is a discipline in which success depends very
little on the memorization of precepts issued by a school
or the assimilation of logical constructs contained in
textbooks on strategy. A unity of doctrine based on the
unity of strategic guidelines is illusory. In strategy
the center of gravity lies in developing an independent
point of view which primarily requires careful
homework.770
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Or later on:
In the spring of 1920, Lenin advocated a policy of
attrition and in his brochure entitled "The Infantile
Disorder of Leftism in Communism" he attacked the
doctrinaires who blindly insisted on politic destruction.
He characterized this leftist dogmatism as an attempt to
ignore limited intermediate goals and achieve the
ultimate goal in a single bound....771
There is no doubt that in future wars, with the intense
class struggles associated with them, there will also
be more favorable conditions for exploiting occupied
territories.... The experience of 1920 indicated the
need to prepare carefully to take advantage of the
existing situation. A great deal of room is opening
up for dreams of making Tamerlane-like thrusts over
thousands of kilometers. But in our era dreams are
more dangerous than they have ever been before.772
Real life does not encourage prophecy or clairvoyancy.
In strategy prophecy may only be charlatanism, and even
a genius is incapable of seeing how a war will unfold.
But he must put together a perspective in which he will
evaluate the phenomena of war. A military leader needs a
working hypothesis. Of course, not every military leader
will take the trouble or have the opportunity to think
about the nature of a future war. Strategic mediocrity
perhaps prefers to proceed from stereotypes and recipes.
Reality will be a cruel disappointment for such a poor
excuse for a leader....773
Therefore, even with the revision of his original Strategiia.
Svechin, and his few remaining voenspets colleagues, increasingly
would be publicly vilified in the Communist Party and Red Army press
as the battle for ideological 'truth' became fully engaged during the
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ineffective in dealing with Russia's immense economic deficiencies,
Stalin, with the support of War Commissar Voroshilov and RKKA Chief
of Staff Tukhachevskii, was by 1927 advocating industrialization,
collectivization of agriculture, totalitarian controls, the
'militarization' of Soviet society, and the need to mechanize the Red
Army in order to pursue a "war of destruction" strategy. Svechin's
Strategiia. with its support for NEP and heavy emphasis on protracted
"war of attrition," was now totally out of step with Stalin's
Communist Party political line -- and would become even more so
following the 1927 war scare with Great Britain.774
Typical of the scathing criticism Svechin's revised Strategiia
received was a review by one A. Vol'pe, published in the May 1927
edition of Voina i revoliutsiia. the main journal of the Red Army
General Staff. Vol'pe wrote that "Strategy. ... despite its obvious
merits, might well be dangerous, imbued as it is with grains of
bitter skepticism"; and "... dangerous because it is abstract"; and
"... Svechin is unwilling to be bound by any ready-made conclusions
or conventional rules." 775 Vol'pe judged that "Svechin gives priority
to politics over strategy rather reluctantly"; took grave exception
to Svechin's idea to create an "economic general staff" -- "no one
needs an extra planning body"; but patronizingly congratulated
Kipp, Jacob, W., in Strategy. trans. Svechin, A. A.,
Strategiia. 1927 edition, by Kent D. Lee, ed., pp. 46-47.
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Svechin for advocating "in a simple and convincing manner ... that a
country should have a strong army." 776 Vol'pe withheld his most
damning political indictment for the inadequacy of Svechin's method
of argument:
Dialectical materialism seeks not only to cognize the
world but also to transform it. But Professor Svechin's
dialectic does not pursue any positive goals, and he
seems content merely to observe changing phenomena and
look for contradictions that make possible the transition
from quantity to quality and negation of negation.777
Then, with only a mention of the last two chapters of Strategiia --
which contain Svechin's most fundamental arguments on the protracted
nature of future warfare and the "line of strategic conduct," along
with the most critical judgments about Communist Party and Red Army
leadership -- Vol'pe offered: "Taken as a whole, Professor Svechin's
book still remains the only fundamental work on strategy." 778 And so
it would remain for over a generation, until the first edition of
Marshal Sokolovskii's Voennaia strategiia would be published in 1962.
In January 1928 Svechin was attacked in Voina i revoliutsiia
again, this time by V. Novitskii, on the grounds that "his exultation
of a strategy of attrition is dangerous. ... After all, is such a
Vol'pe, A., "Critique and Bibliography": A. Svechin,
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strategy really acceptable to us?""9 After explaining very briefly
why the answer to his question was emphatically "No", Novitskii
asserted in a rhetorical question that:
Our strategy undoubtedly is a strategy of destruction.
Our strategy is a strategy of rapid and decisive
attack.... Should not we all turn our attention to
securing the maximum development, accumulating the best
means for a swift and rapid strike and securing the best
economic resources in everything to the end that they
would be set aside for that attack?780
The credibility of Svechin, and his fellow "war of attrition"
advocates at the RKKA Military Academy, sagged even further when the
Communist Party adopted the First Five-Year-Plan at the "Congress of
Collectivization" later in 1928, and became exceedingly tenuous as
they potentially were labeled 'class enemies' and 'wreckers' in the
aftermath of the 'Shakhty Affair' when Stalin charged before the
April 1928 KPSS Central Committee plenum that an "economic
counterrevolution" to sabotage the coal industry was being led by the
voenspets and funded by Western "capitalists." The brutal tone for
the imminent totalitarian 'reign of terror' was set with the
ascendancy of Stalin to power and his paranoid enunciation:
"We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. Comrades,
we cannot forget about this for even one minute."781
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In 1929 the attacks on Svechin and his Strategiia intensified
even further when the Communist Academy sought to infuse the old
'bourgeois' military science with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism by
organizing a Section for the Study of the Problems of War, which
reopened the 1921-1922 Trotsky-Frunze debates on the 'unified
proletarian military doctrine' to which Svechin was so vehemently
opposed. The Military Section of the Communist Academy wanted to
assume the functions of the RKKA Military Academy faculty as the
principal center for the study of the military problems of the USSR.
Hence, the militarily neophyte Communist Academy politicians
presented themselves as dynamic, young 'new thinkers', as opposed to
the old 'bourgeois' voenspets of the RKKA Military Academy, who were
ridiculed and suspected of being 'wreckers' of the new order.782
Tukhachevskii, who was serving as the Leningrad Military
District Commander between 1928 and 1930, continued to proselytize
for a "mechanized mass army as the means to conduct decisive
operations in a total war." 783 Both to promote the credibility of his
own 'deep battle' concept for any future war and, as a former Tsarist
officer (voenspets) himself, to prove his own 'ideological purity' to
the Communist Party leadership, Tukhachevskii openly joined in the
fray, charging that Svechin's writings were infested with "idealism,"
were contaminated with "bourgeois ideology," rejected outright the
Bubnov, A. S., "Voennaia sektsiia i ee blizhaishie
zadachi," in Kommunisticheskaia Akademiia. Sektsiia po
izucheniiu problem voinv. Zapiski. Vol. 1, 1930, p. 5.
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possibility of "decisive operations," and advocated "limited
warfare."78'1 In this manner Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii made a distinct,
duplicitous contribution to the ending of open debate within the
Soviet military, which so uniquely characterized the 1920s.
At the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress in 1930, Soviet War
Commissar Kliment E. Voroshilov arose and defined Tukhachevskii's
army "mechanization" concept as constituting "a qualitative change in
the nature of future wars" which, in Voroshilov's opinion, if not
exactly in Tukhachevskii's, would "bring about the possibility of a
short, bloodless war, carried quickly on to the territory of the
attacking enemy." 785 In that same year Mikhail Tukhachevskii was
elevated to membership in the Revvoensovet, promoted to Deputy
Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, and assigned as RKKA
Director of Armaments, in which positions he effectively ended the
debates over which strategy was appropriate for the Soviet Union
-- sokrushenie or izmor --by ensuring that a strategy of destruction
was adopted through the implementation of his concept for a
mechanized mass army dedicated to decisive offensive action in the
initial period of a future war.766
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- The Strategic Line of Conduct
Aleksandr A. Svechin's most enduring contribution to military-
thought and to strategic art -- that only was recognized by the
Soviet General Staff and Stalin following the Red Army fiascos during
the opening months of World War II and would be labeled "permanent
operating factors in protracted warfare" -- was the identification of
what Svechin called the "strategic line of conduct" leading to the
ultimate goal of warfare -- victory. The principal elements of the
"strategic line of conduct" are: First, the Sequence of Operations
pursues limited goals of attrition, which expose preconditions for
the next operation engendered by the first operation, ultimately
leading to the "overturning of the enemy's military front."'87
Second, the Curve of Strategic Intensity takes into consideration,
not only the forces initially deployed and engaged, but also the
prospect for force deployments to grow and for the balance of forces
to change over time, which necessitates reinforcement, supply, new
manpower mobilizations, and troop movements between fronts in order
to maintain frontal stability (nastoichivost'). Third, the Initial
Moment of an Operation "must be coordinated with political
requirements, ... the overall military situation, ... the completion
of our deployment, ... [and a time] when the balance of forces is
favorable" 788 and, to this end, "awaiting a favorable moment for
beginning an offensive means maintaining a defensive formation.
787
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Operational deployment for an offensive should be completed only at
the last minute."'89 Fourth, the Breakthrough of an Operation places
on the strategist the obligation to "keep offensive operations from
getting drawn out to the last gasp," i.e., "to stop an offensive ...
as soon as our forces lose their tactical advantages...," and to
conclude the offensive operation by an immediate transition to the
defensive. 790 Fifth, Operations on Interior Lines "involve successive
movement of the center of gravity from one theater to another" by
limiting oneself to a minimum of forces for the defense on positional
fronts and by organizing "a powerful strategic reserve whose guest
appearances in each theater of war lead to a favorable break in the
situation" by concentrating superior forces successively on every
front.791 Sixth, Proportioning Operations is the "most critical task
for the strategist" in order to "always ... take advantage of
numerical superiority in the most decisive way possible" and to
ensure that "every operation, including a defensive operation, ...
[is] provided with assets appropriate to its goal." 792 And finally,
A very important task for art is selecting a line of
strategic conduct that represents the harmony of required
coordination; ... it cannot yield a prediction of the
actual course of events on the military front, but at any
given moment it should make it possible for us to react
to military events in accordance with the logic to which
everything should be subordinated for achieving victory
in a given war.793
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Tsarist General-Major Aleksandr A. Svechin's own words best
portray the significance of his underpinning philosophy regarding
"the most important issues of strategic logic" :
The most artful strategic offensive will lead to a
disaster if we do not have enough resources to reach the
ultimate goal, which will secure the peace for us.7"*
A strategist who knows the evolutionary requirements of
the military profession, understands the resources needed
at a given moment and has an idea of the strengths and
capabilities of both sides and the nature of a future war
dwells on a certain way of resolving strategic questions
that should lead him to the ultimate goal of military
front operations, plans a series of intermediate goals
and the sequence in which they are achieved; regulates
strategic intensity and always tries, if not to
subordinate, to tie the interests of the present to the
interests of the future strategic 'tomorrow.' He is not
independent in his decisions, but must coordinate the
solution of the war problems on the military front with
events on the political and economic fronts. ... At the
forefront we have to put harmony in the nation's war
preparations, but it is no less important in the war's
leadership, only the nature of harmony in this case is
immeasurably more subtle. ... This achievement of
harmony, is the essence of strategy, and it forces us
to classify practical work on strategy as an art.795
In a future war, technical initiative will be
overwhelmingly important. But the general staff must
take a favorable attitude toward technical innovations
and conduct the first steps in the deep rear in complete
secrecy. New weapons suitable for combat may be
developed in secret if the technicians and tacticians
involved are highly skilled and military academic
committees, which ... are strongholds of technical
reaction and a graveyard for new ideas, are kept out of
the operation. And the top leadership must be confident
enough to begin mass production without first trying out
the equipment in battle.796
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D.
Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 252.
Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 306.
Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 128.
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In his closing thoughts Svechin offers a most prescient observation:
Modern warfare also leaves room for strategic reserves,
that is, fully trained and mobilized units that are not
tied to an operational goal. ... A strategic reserve is
strategic wealth, which is naturally put aside if the
front is not fighting at full pitch. ... Of course, the
concept of a strategic reserve radically contradicts the
ideas of destruction, which require extreme intensity to
achieve success at a decisive point. But this concept
logically fits within the framework of a war of
attrition. A prolonged conflict is generally impossible
without a strategic reserve.7"
The singular expository and disquisitional writings of
Aleksandr Svechin, about military history, the evolution of military
art, strategy, operational art, and the protracted nature of future
warfare -- along with the prodigious quantity of other astute Russian
military theoretical works about the nature of future war produced
primarily during the 1920s, but also during the decade of the 1930s798
forge a direct, substantive dialectical linkage between past
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 303.
See Zakharov, M. V., ed., Voprosv strategii i
operativnogo iskusstva v Sovetskikh voennvkh trudakh
(1917-194-0 ) . (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965) for an annotated
bibliography of major Russian military theoretical works.
Zahkarov's large collection of excerpts from the writings
of Frunze, Tukhachevskii, Kamenev, Uborevich, Vatsetis,
Shaposhnikov, Svechin, Verkhovskii, Triandafillov,
Belitskii, Vol'pe, Egorov, Isserson, Varfolomeev,
Krasil'nikov, Shilovskii, Melikov, Galaktionov,
Kalinovskii, Kuznetsov, Kryzhanovskii, Ammosov,
Favitskii, Sukhov, Lapchinskii, Khripin, Tatarchenko,
Algazin, Teplinskii, Zherve, Ludri, Dushenov, Iakimychev,
Panteleev, Belli, et al., serves as a teaching mechanism
and as examples for the General Staff about how to write
about strategy and future war. Also, for a previously
classified bibliography of period Russian military
theoretical works, see Appendix III, The Spetskhran
(Special Holdings) of the Russian Military Academy of the
General Staff Library for a listing of 713 titles.
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Russian Imperial Army military thought, the founding of the Red Army,
the 70 years of Soviet military doctrine, the present new-1993
Russian military doctrine, and the future development of Russian
military science. Still, among this crowd of distinguished Russian
military thinkers, Svechin's Strategiia stands out as the seminal
work defining the nature of future warfare --a "completely new
strategic landscape."
A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war; each war is a
special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of
stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be. The more our theory
encompasses the entire content of modern war, the quicker it sill assist us in
analyzing a given situation. A narrow doctrine would probably confuse us more
than guide us./99
Strategy must make a comprehensive effort to predict the future.800
-A. A. Svechin, Strategiia
799
800
Svechin, A. A., Strategiia. Preface to First Edition, in
Strategy, trans., Kent D. Lee, ed., (Minneapolis, MN:
East View Publications, 1992), p. 62.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 78.
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War
PART III
FINDINGS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
Military Science elucidates the nature (essence and qualities)
of military affairs, resulting in the teaching of leading
principles for future activity.801
General G. A. Leer, 1883
Views on the character of future war form a most important
part of the Military Doctrine ... of one state or another and
exercise a significant influence on its practical preparations
for war.802
Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. 1933
Military Doctrine is a system of views on the essence, aims
and character of a possible future war....803
Voennyi entsiklopedicheskyi slovar'. 1986
Integral to the study of Russian military history is
understanding the meticulous detail and momentous depth in which
Russian military scientists explore the ever changing character of
budushchaia voina (future war). Especially noteworthy in their
studies is the driving force of technological change on the nature
future war as well as the impact of the social, political and
economic condition of the Russian state, and that of prospective
Leer, G. A., Entsiklopediia voennvkh i morskikh nauk.
8 vols., (St. Petersburg, 1883-1897), Vol. 2, p. 228.
Nikonov, A., and G. Tummeltau, "Budushchaia voina,"
Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. Vol. 2, (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe slovarno-entsiklopedicheskoe
izdatel'stvo. 1933), p. 834.
803 Akhromeev, Marshal Sergei, chief ed., Voenniv
entsiklopedicheskiv slovar'. 2nd ed. ,
(Moscow, Voenizdat, 1986), p. 240.
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foreign security threats. Upon this complex forecasting foundation
anticipated Russian military capabilities are first determined, and
then illuminated within a military doctrine.
Parts I and II of this study document the laborious and highly
politically charged commission process by which the Russian military
transformed itself and therewith, of necessity, Russian society from
an illiterate feudal standing army during the Crimean War (1853-1856)
into a 'professional', late-20th century military establishment
employing modern weaponry and possessing a systematic methodology --
voennyi nauk (military science) -- to address and to analyze the
probable nature of future war. Although not entirely effective, this
transformation evolved, admittedly haltingly, through the vicious
cauldrons of warfare and the lists of peacetime intellectual
challenge and debate.
Over this 140 year period the Russian military science
intellectual process and the decision-making commission process
derived therefrom were driven, in large measure, by emerging
technological developments, foreign and domestic, in the means of
conducting warfare and by perceived international security threats.
These twin processes were psychologically and intellectually
motivated and orchestrated to attempt to secure the Russian
heartland: First, from European or Asian land invasion; second, in
the mid-20th century, from a global exchange of nuclear weapons; and
third, at the dawn of the 21st century, from an amorphous but
technologically imminent and potentially equal or even more
ubiquitous and devastating, prospect of a global aerospace attack
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employing precision-guided 'conventional' weapons. To the Russian
political and military leadership, the latter clearly presages yet
another 'revolution in military-technical affairs.'
Origins of the Future War Concept:
The Russian Military Strategic Tradition
The genesis of the present Russian military preoccupation with
the nature of budushchaia voina lay in the humiliating combat
failures of the Imperial Army during the Crimean War. At the
initiative of General-Adjutant Count A. F. Ridiger, Tsar Aleksandr II
inaugurated the first Russian military reform commission -- the
Ridiger Commission (1855-1856) -- tasked specifically with
investigating and correcting the causes of the defeat and with
recommending measures to preclude a recurrence of such a military
disaster in the future. The resulting commission process, granted by
fits and false starts depending on the personalities of successive
individual War Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff, and
certainly neither efficiently nor always effectively, has continued
for over 140 years and is institutionalized within the Russian
military as the principal means for achieving consensus and for
reaching major decisions concerning future war.
Intellectually as well as functionally, the key member of the
harbinger Ridiger Commission was General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, the
future Russian War Minister, from 1861 to 1881. General Miliutin
instituted and, despite intense internal political resistance from
the entrenched aristocratic Russian military leadership,
institutionalized comprehensive Imperial Army reforms, particularly
348
in the critical areas of officer education, military district
organization, war planning and the forecasting of future war
requirements .80'*
The most significant and lasting reform carried out by Miliutin
during the 1860s and 1870s was the creation of "a fundamentally new
system of military education." The impact of this reform would alter
the social composition of the Russian Army leading to the inculcation
of a new ideology based on nationalism and an increased emphasis on
the moral influence of words and literature on the military.805
During Miliutin's lengthy tenure as War Minister, his main advisor on
war planning and forecasting matters was the future Chief of the Main
Staff, General Nikolai N. Obruchev. A pathfinder in Russian efforts
to understand the changing nature of warfare, Obruchev authored the
first-ever Russian future war studies -- the 1868 'Russian Strategic
Assessment' report, the 1870 General War Plan, and the background
materials for Tsar Aleksandr II's 1873 'secret society' discussions
about crafting a national military doctrine and decisions to alter,
albeit belatedly, the army structure.
Because the Imperial decision to transition to a cadre army
through universal military conscription was delayed until January
1874, and the financial resources necessary to begin implementing
those changes were withheld until 1875, even with the extensive
Miliutin reforms the Russian Army was very nearly as unprepared for
D'iakov, V. , "0 razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi
mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-
istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 5, 1959, p. 62.
D'iakov, p. 61.
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the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) as it had been for the Crimean War
over twenty years before.
The nature of warfare in the late nineteenth century was
beginning to change with the broadening of the geographic expanse of
combat within a theater of military operations, with the increased
size of engaged armies, with the introduction of emerging
technologies such as railroads, telegraph and, especially, with
longer-ranged and more accurate rifled small arms and artillery.
But, alas, Russian Army infantry tactics did not change appreciably
and continued to rely on Suvorov's 18th century concept of the massed
bayonet charge as the 'decisive' method of attack. As a consequence,
even though the Imperial Army 'won' its war with Turkey on the Balkan
Peninsula, Russian battle casualties were inordinately and
unacceptably high, and the Russian domestic economy was devastated by
the disruptive losses of manpower and material. This ignominious
'victory' thus caused a renewed, and greatly intensified, effort
within the Russian military to divine the nature of modern warfare
and, since financial resources were severely constrained during the
last two decades of the 19th century, to prepare, intellectually at
least, for future war.
The loci of Russian military efforts to debate and attempt to
understand budushchaia voina, and certainly the most important means
for influencing Tsarist military-historical thought, 806 were centered
within the General Staff Military-Historical Commission, first
established in 1879 for the specific purpose of investigating the
D'iakov, p. 62.
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conduct of the Russo-Turkish War, and within the Nikolaev General
Staff Academy where in 1898 the first Russian military art faculty
was established.80'
The General Staff Military-Historical Commission diligently, if
rather bureaucratically, pondered over its investigations of the
failures of Russian arms and valiantly amassed the largest study ever
published in Tsarist Russia -- the immense 97-volume Sbornik
materialov po russko-turetskoi voine 1877-78 gg. na Balkanskom
poluostrove. The reactionary nature of Tsar Aleksandr Ill's regime
that came to power in 1881, the intensified domestic revolutionary
activity, and the study's biting indictments of a Russian military
leadership that was composed almost exclusively of members of the
royal family, however, created a political climate rift with delay.
Thus, the full commission report was not released for publication
until 1911 -- 33 years after the Russo-Turkish War concluded and well
after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) revealed virtually identical
myopic Russian Army leadership deficiencies and command negligences.
- Dragomirov's "Russian School":
Morale and Moral Superiority
Meanwhile, at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, antithetical
schools of military thought were developing. First, the thesis of
General M. I. Dragomirov's strongly nationalistic "Russian School"
emphasized the superiority in combat of troop morale and moral
authority over military technology and equipment. This school of
D'iakov, p. 62.
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thought denied the need for a 'military science' and the need to
fundamentally alter existing Russian 'line' battlefield tactics in
order to adapt to the increasing lethality of new weaponry which were
rapidly changing not only the nature of future military combat, but
also the entire character of warfare itself.
Dragomirov's "Russian School" philosophically insisted that
weaponry "only prepare the battle, but it was decided by man, with
his moral force"; 808 that "wars result from the nature of man himself,
that they are inevitable and eternal"; 809 and that "the permanent
qualities of mankind" lead to the "eternal battle of will and
intellect" which consequently require that special attention be
placed on the study of national character and the "decisive role of
the great commanders in the history of military art."810 In this
latter context Dragomirov echoed his illustrious ideological
forerunner, General Miliutin. He asserted: "The valor of the Russian
soldiers, their steadfastness, is the result of racial peculiarities
of the common Russian man";811 and that "Suvorov had no predecessors;
nor a successor..., truly, one is not soon expected. In the waves of











M. Odinnadtsat' let. 1895-1905. Sbornik..
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M., "Retsenziia na knigi A. F. Petrushevskogo
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- Leer's "Academic School": Fundamental Laws of War
The antithesis to General Dragomirov's "Russian School" began
to develop between 1875 and 1880 with the philosophical view that a
positive "military science" existed for the study of warfare. By the
1890s, what would become at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy under
General G. A. Leer the "Academic School" argued that in warfare there
existed specific "eternal laws" that could be revealed through the
disciplined and rigorous study of classical military history by
applying a "critical-historical research method" to discern the
"facts" from applied tactics and actual strategy.813 The "Academic
School" asserted that there existed in battle a qualitative
superiority of weaponry over the "moral force" of soldiers. But, in
their zeal for historical investigation, especially of great 18th
century Russian military victories, they divorced military theory
from military practice by denying that either emerging technologies
or the changing character of future war altered the "fundamental laws
of war. "614
In reality, the basic world-view of both the "Russian" and the
"Academic" schools of military thought, intellectually, were the
same. Namely, Russian national chauvinist, and therefore,
... they remained idealists, the advocates of the
'Russian school' did not connect the 'nationalist'
element with the social economic structure of given






production. Because of this the possibility was denied
them to understand correctly the essential process of
developing military affairs and to see its general
regularities .815
It was with such hidebound traditional Russian tactical
military concepts, that contained gross factual misinterpretations of
the glorious 18th century Russian military victories of Rumiantsev,
Bagration and Suvorov, that a whole generation of Russian officers
were trained during the 1880s and the early 1890s and then, as field
commanders, went unprepared into a technologically and strategically
different type of broad expanse warfare with the Japanese in 19 0 4816
-- once again with disastrous consequences for the Imperial Army.
The Integrators: Geisman, Neznamov and Mikhnevich
Develop the Social-Economic Foundation
for Protracted Warfare
At the turn of the century, a dialectic synthesis began to
negate the "Russian" and "Academic" schools of military thought
concerning the nature of future war. In the forefront of this
process was the distinguished General Staff Academy faculty member
Colonel Pavel A. Geisman. While agreeing with his Academy
Commandant, General G. A. Leer, that there were 'inevitable' and
'eternal laws of war,' Geisman also supported the "Russian School"
philosophy that "of greatest significance in war and in battle is the
D'iakov, p. 72.
Svechin, Aleksandr A., Strategiia. 2nd ed., (Moscow:
Voennyi vestnik, 1927); translation, Lee, Kent D., ed.,
Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications,
1992), p. 271.
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spiritual element."817 But as Colonel Geisman's synthesis progressed,
incorporating elements of both schools of military thought, he tended
to digress from the "Russian School" emphasis on the importance of
national military experience toward a more "Academic" position that
"first place is occupied by material requirements; thereafter follows
intellectual and, finally, gradually lessening themselves, spiritual
requirements."818 In his later writings, in the last half of the
1890s, Geisman began to integrate the "Academic" investigation of the
material aspects of warfare, i.e., the military-administrative and
military-economic matters, as handled by the great Russian
commanders, while deemphasizing the purely spiritual aspects of
warfare.819
Other Russian "Academic" military theorists at the Nikolaev
General Staff Academy took a different approach to the application of
scientific analysis and thought to problems of future warfare. Among
the most prominent was E. I. Martynov who was the first to assert
that "the development of military art was dependent on the level of
civilized society and showed this using concrete historical
examples." 820 Martynov focused his detailed analytical investigations
on the influence of society's increasing industrial production
capabilities on the conduct of future war, the significance of the
Geisman, P. A., "Opyt issledovaniia taktiki massovykh
armiiVoennvi sbornik. No. 2, 1895, p. 284.
Geisman, P. A., Voina. Eia znachenie v zhizni naroda i




introduction of new technologies into the army, and the size and type
of military force that would be necessary to employ these new
technologies. Martynov was concerned especially by the impact of
emerging technologies on army command and control. He was convinced
that communications would decisively determine the ability of future
commanders to control combat operations. Martynov concluded that, in
order to achieve success in a future war, technological developments
required an overall elevation of the theoretical and practical
educational level of the Russian officer corps.821
Following closely in Martynov's footsteps, Ivan Bliokh's five-
volume seminal study of future war, entitled Budushchaia voina v
tekhnicheskom. ekonomicheskom i politicheskom otnosheniiakh. (St.
Petersburg, 1898), along with a sixth volume of General Conclusions
(Obshchie vvvodi iz sochineniia Budushchaia voina....), presented a
unique analysis of all aspects of warfare. Bliokh ventured to
predict some sixteen years before such a world war happened, "a great
war of entrenchment ... the duration of battle, which may be
prolonged for several days and which ... may yield no decisive
results," and concluded that "perfection" of emerging technologies
would create "entirely new conditions for the wars of the future."822
A. A. Neznamov, in his 1909 work entitled Oboronitel'naia voina
^Defensive War), was among the first to discuss the fact that under
Zhilin, pp. 84-85.
Bellamy, Christopher D., Budushchava Vovna: The Russian
and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of
Future War. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University
Center for Strategic Technology, 1989), pp. 11 and 82.
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the new conditions of warfare, not just the army in isolation on some
remote battlefield, but the entire population of the state would have
to fight a future war. The outcome of war was now becoming
increasingly dependent on the internal economic production of the
whole state and the morale of the entire country. Neznamov used
historical experience to show that the formation of a unified
national military doctrine, with political and military-technical
twin pillars, was an essential component of state security. Above
all, Neznamov emphasized that an elevated social-political and
economic condition of the state constituted the guarantee of success
in war. Strategic and tactical mistakes made during individual
campaigns and battles could be corrected during the course of a war,
but "doctrinal errors were unforgiving and, as a rule, lead its
followers to perish."823 Neznamov was supported in these conclusions
by General A. G. Elchaninov who stressed the necessity for Russian
preparation for war "by the exertions of all, both moral and
material, forces of the state"824 and advocated the necessity of
creating a unified social opinion concerning war aims, and hence a
unified military doctrine.825
N. P. Mikhnevich was a contemporary of Geisman, Martynov and
Neznamov at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. His synthesis of
thinking on military science began with a strong attachment to the
Zhilin, p. 143.
Elchaninov, A. G., Vedenie sovremennvkh voinv i boia.
(St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 12.
Elchaninov, A. G., Strategiia. pp. 151-152.
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"Russian School" viewpoint emphasizing the "primacy of the morale
element of military affairs over the material,"826 and "the physical
and moral elasticity of the Russian soldier which secured for the
Russian Army the capability to escape demoralization even while
suffering incomparably greater casualties than any other army."82'
Mikhnevich initially revealed his priorities by stating that
"... in order to appraise the strength of an army, first of all we
pay attention to the moral quality of the war, then to the quality of
leadership, only afterward to their numbers, then to training and
finally to the weaponry of the troops."828 As an ardent Russian
nationalist, Mikhnevich asserted that "our military art almost never
was inferior to Western Europe, but very often went forward, giving
direction, to new ideas in the areas of tactics and strategy, which
in Europe were taken up from us." 829 It was in the area of
methodology, however, that in 1899 Mikhnevich successfully began to
synthesize the discipline of "critical military-historical
investigation," i.e., "military science," from the "Academic School"
with his "Russian School" propensities when he wrote Voennaia nauka i
stepen' tochnosti eia vvvodov. Mikhnevich affirmed that military
science "concerned itself with the study of wars -- this is the
D'iakov, p. 70.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovv russkopo voennogo iskusstva.
(St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 6.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Istoriia voennogo iskusstva s
drevneishikh vremen do nachala deviatnadtsatogo
stoletiia. (St. Petersburg, 1895), p. 6.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovv russkogo voennogo iskusstva.
(St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 6.
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science about war."830 Mikhnevich was the first Russian military
theorist to recognize in a holistic manner the strict dependence of a
nation's military capability on the level of its social and economic
development (material basis), while positing that laws and principles
of war are "broad empirical generalizations, derived from a multitude
of factors. "831
Especially in his landmark two-volume work Strategiia.
published in three editions between 1899 and 1911, Mikhnevich
developed Neznamov's line of thought to prove that future wars would
tend to become protracted precisely because of the growing military-
economic might of states, since, even with the complete destruction
of armies in the field, modern European states would have the
industrial capability and population reserves to absorb large army
equipment and personnel losses and to generate new armies with fresh
troops. Therefore, Mikhnevich concluded that during protracted
future wars it would be necessary to destroy the enemy's most
important economic, political and population centers; to occupy enemy
countries; and "completely annihilate his military forces in order to
achieve a conclusive victory."832 Mikhnevich also suggested that
Russia's vast geographic expanse made it feasible for the Russian
Army to conduct protracted warfare successfully on Russian territory,
but rejected any advocacy of this strategy due to the probability for
Mikhnevich, N. P., Voennaia nauka i stepen' tochnostL ee
vvvodov. (St. Petersburg, 1899), p. 1.
Mikhnevich, op. cit., p. 16.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovv strategii: Kurs Intendantskoi
akademii. (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 43.
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severe Russian economic and population losses and the potential for
domestic insurrection.833
Analysis of the role of economic and morale factors on the
outcome of wars led Mikhnevich to the synthesis that "victory already
was not only about the numbers and energy of the army, [but] the
speed of economic development and the anticipation of morale. "83/i
He defined the principal wartime morale factors as the talent of
commanders, the combat valor of the army, and the spirit of the
people as well as the "morale quality of the troops, like energy,
courage, self-control, steadfastness, and perseverance in battle."835
Each of these factors were considered to be dependent on the level of
state social development, which he related directly to the amount of
planned preparation by the state for a future war. Mikhnevich urged,
therefore, that Russia had to be prepared well in advance for the
onset of any future war.
Mikhnevich synthesized a new thesis of military thought
predicated on three concepts: 1) Wartime military capability is
dependent on the entire social-economic structure of a state;
2) "military matters progress under the influence, in the main, of
improvements in technology"; 836 and 3) "... the sophistication and
number of fighting machines, skillfully controlled, will be the main
Zhilin, pp. 98-99.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),
Vol. 1, p. 40.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),
Vol. 1, pp. 50-57.
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),




factor in determining the outcome of the [future war] struggle."837
These concepts supported his prescient conclusion that "the new
technical combat means demanded decisive transformation (peresCroika)
of all military systems,"838
General Nikolai P. Mikhnevich, who would serve as the Russian
Imperial War Minister during World War I, became the singularly most
important, influential and, perhaps, greatest Russian military
theorist at the dawn of the 20th century. Tsar Nikolas II's August
1912 mummery decree forbidding the further public discussion of a
unified military doctrine could not quell the momentum of the
intellectual process that was by now becoming institutionalized
within the Russian military through the investigations and teachings
at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, although events of "The Great
War" (1914-1918), the October Revolution, and the Russian Civil War
(1918-1920) certainly would interrupt and then dialectically reshape
the process.
Mikhail V. Frunze:
"Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine"
With the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in October 1917 and the
formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Rabocheikh i
Krest'ianikh Krasnaia Armiia - RKKA) beginning in December 1917 novel
socialist political and military ideological constructs, untried in
practice, came into vogue in Russian government and military
Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia. (St. Petersburg, 1911),
Vol. 1, p. 31.
Zhilin, pp. 91-92.
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leadership circles. However, the reality of the Russian Civil War --
particularly the threat to the survival of the Soviet Republic posed
on the Eastern Front by Admiral Kolchak's Siberian Army during the
summer of 1918 -- disabused many, but not all, of the new Soviet
political and military leaders of their principled notion that a
standing army could be allowed to, or forced to, 'wither away' and be
replaced effectively by a volunteer 'peoples' militia' (Red Guards).
As a matter of expediency, and survival, War Commissar Leon
Trotsky pragmatically turned to and relied upon the only source of
military expertise remaining in the fledgling Soviet Republic, the
'military specialists' ('voenspets'), who had been officers of the
defunct Russian Imperial Army. Trotsky's decision, with Lenin's
backing, to employ the 'voenspets', set in motion a dialectic process
which, through a course of odious political and military doctrinal
debates, fought out through a seemingly unending series of Russian
Communist Party councils, commissions, conferences and congresses,
lasting for the duration of the civil war and beyond, through the
decade of the 1920s, sought to synthesize an original 'unitary'
Soviet military doctrine. This doctrinal experiment would seek to
integrate the 'eternal laws of warfare' and historical experience,
derived through the application of Russian military science, with the
politically correct socialist language and concepts of the vernal
Soviet state. At the leading edge of this process were the former
Tsarist 'voenspets', serving on the RKKA Main Staff and on the
faculty of the RKKA Military Academy -- and especially on the
rejuvenated Military-Historical Commission -- whose operational
military planning
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and academic expertise ensured that the continuity of Russian
military-historical experience would be retained in the formulation
of any new Soviet military doctrine.
One of the most important debates concerning the future of the
Red Army took place at the Tenth Party Congress, which opened on
March 6, 1921. Nikolai Podvoiskii, Chairman of the Universal
Military Training Administration (Vsevobuch) from 1919-1923, offered
a "resolution on the question of the reorganization of the armed
forces of the Republic" in which he asserted that a militia army was
the "only genuine socialist military organization" because of the
existence therein of "comradely socialist democracy." Leon Trotsky
seconded Podvoiskii's motion for the creation of a territorial
militia in an address entitled "The Involvement of the Masses in the
Creation of the Army."839 However, the Tenth Congress members, still
ideologically bound to their Socialist political roots, resolved to
initiate only experimental militia units in six interior military
districts, and deferred a final decision on army organization and
structure until after further discussion on the array's future role.
Meanwhile, regular Red Army units were to continue to defend the
border districts.8'40
Discussions on the future structure and role of the Red Army
were led by Sergei Gusev, PUR Chairman, and Mikhail Frunze, the
famous Southern Front Red Commander who ended the civil war by
defeating Wrangel on the Crimean Peninsula. The talking points used
839
840
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by Gusev and Frunze, titled "Theses on the Reorganization of the
Workers'-Peasants' Red Army," constituted one of the first attempts
to coherently present the lessons of the Russian Civil War by
integrating the expert views of Party senior political staff, the Red
Commanders and the former Imperial Army 'voenspets.' The "Theses"
not only described the fluid character of the Russian Civil War and
the most important factors in the Soviet victory, but, injected into
the debate on the role of the Red Army the projected nature of future
wars, which, the authors judged, were likely to be markedly different
from either World War I or the Russian Civil War.841 That the concept
of future war was included in this first Bolshevik formal debate of
military requirements is clearly indicative of the intellectual
influence of the 'voenspets' within the Red Army; of their profound
ability to utilize Russia's rich historical experience in a military
science analytical methodology; and of the resultant continuity
between past, present and future Russian military doctrine that was
being forged, despite the internal economic and political turmoil.
Gusev's portion of the "Theses" presented his analysis that in a
future war the socialist Red Army would not face a splintered enemy
force that was "poorly trained and armed, hastily formed" and hence
"unreliable because of the soldiers' hostility toward the officers,"
as the White armies had been. Rather, the "imperialist" standing
European armies confronting and encircling the Soviet state were all
"chauvinistically inclined" against socialism and "well armed and
well trained" with fully prepared command staffs, internal cohesion
841
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and numerical superiority over the Red Army. European standing
armies were not "improvised peasant armies." Gusev concluded that
the Red Army "... is altogether powerless against mighty imperialist
armies" and "the Soviet state must undertake to make the Red Army
equal to its imperialist counterparts."842
Gusev then argued, first, that Podvoiskii's and Trotsky's
territorial militia armies would create in the provinces the basis
for "local particularistic strivings to the detriment of the
interests of the WorkersPeasants' Republic," and that he "viewed
the currently existing centralized army organization as embodying
state interests, as opposed to the regional loyalties that a militia
would appeal to."843 Second, Gusev warned that,
the persistence of an overwhelmingly 'petit bourgeois
peasant' majority that remained fully capable of
spontaneously reviving capitalism in the Soviet Republic,
combined with the delay of revolution in the West and the
economic devastation of the country, created a situation
particularly ripe for 'Bonapartist attempts to overthrow
Soviet power.'844
By preserving and strengthening PUR oversight of the Red Army
political apparatus, Gusev claimed that the political inclinations of
the peasantry could be redirected in order to make a peasant-based
counterrevolution impossible. Gusev advocated that "the training of
a highly qualified officer corps, beginning with the reeducation of
the Red commanders, was capable of producing a cohort that was not
only militarily competent but also politically conscious." Finally,
von Hagen, pp. 143-144.
von Hagen, p. 144.
von Hagen, p. 145.
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Gusev speculated, perhaps more wishfully than logically, that the
'bourgeois' armies that trained their soldiers only in military arts
and tactics would be impotent against the "moral and political
superiority" of the Red Army "conscious" cohort.8"
Mikhail Frunze's singular contribution to the Gusev-Frunze
"Theses" was to urge Party unity and agreement on what he labeled as
a "unified proletarian military doctrine," or the "proletarian
scientific theory of warfare," the purpose of which would be to
define the nature of the Red Army and its role in society. Earlier
in 1921 Frunze had written an article for Voennoe delo (Military
Affairs), "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii" (A Unified
Military Doctrine and the Red Army), in which he attempted to
integrate the socialist ideology of the ruling Russian Communist
Party (Bolshevik) -- RKP(b) -- with the historic lessons of Russian
military science. Frunze posited that Marxist-Leninist military
doctrine was not just a set of ideas based on "objective military
experience" to be codified solely by the General Staff, but primarily
a political statement of the will of the dominant social class.
Therefore, Soviet military doctrine, as defined by Mikhail Frunze,
had to be a unitary political and military statement rather than a
purely military document, independently derived and separate from
official state political ideology.8''6
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The conceptual basis for Frunze's "unified military doctrine"
assumed that future war would be a mass war against "imperialists" in
which the Soviet state would have to mobilize all its civilian and
military resources, just as had been required during the First World
War and the only too recently concluded Russian Civil War. Frunze's
construct of total societal mobilization for a protracted future war
was a direct derivative from the analyses of Tsarist military
theorists Mikhnevich, Neznamov, et al., which built upon their work
and reinforced the validity of Imperial Army "military science" by
incorporating the strict "scientific and historical materialism" of
Marxism-Leninism.
Frunze believed emphatically that capitalist encirclement
constituted a continuing, real threat to the Soviet state and that
only a Communist offensive led by the "proletariat" could ensure
victory in the imminent war. He considered the Russian peasantry, as
evidenced by the 1920 Polish disaster before Warsaw, to be reliable
only for the defense of their homeland. Finally, Frunze concluded
that in order to succeed in a future war the Soviet state absolutely
had to attain technological superiority over the "encircling
imperialists." To achieve this essential "technological revolution,"
Frunze advocated accelerated education of the Soviet political
leadership cadres in order to lay the military-political foundation
for a massive industrialization program concentrating on building the
world's most modern defense industries.8''7
847 Frunze, M. V. , "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia
armiia," Armiia i revoliutsiia (1921) reprinted in
Izbrannve vroizvedeniia (1957), Vol. 2, pp. 4-22.
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Frunze also proposed to the Tenth Party Congress significant
organizational changes that effectively would consolidate and
centralize political, economic, and military power. Of particular
importance to Frunze was that "the General Staff be transformed into
a 'military and political headquarters of the proletarian state,'
mainly by the addition of the army's most senior political workers,"
which would ensure the unity of "political and military leadership
... in one central state institution," and thereby guarantee the
fulfillment of the defense needs of the Soviet state. With this
argument for the consolidation of military and political power within
the General Staff, Frunze echoed the debates that had transpired a
half-century earlier during the 1860s and 1870s when Prince
Bariatinskii and his cohorts vehemently opposed the reforms of War
Minister Miliutin and proposed the creation of a 'Prussian' General
Staff that would effectively restrain the existing civilian
bureaucracy and Imperial household control over state resources.848
Frunze rationalized, however, that because of the increasing
technical complexity of future warfare and because "success in battle
now depends ... on the correct organization of the rear and
everything that prepares for the conduct of military operations,"8''9
the integration of civilian economic and planning organizations with
the military during peacetime was of critical importance.
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The desperate Russian domestic and international situation
following the formation of the Soviet government and the conclusion
of the Russian Civil War is paramount to understanding the reasoning
behind the Gusev-Frunze "Theses." Frunze's advocacy of a "unified
proletarian military doctrine" and the increased centralization of
power, in effect for what later would become the "militarization" of
Russian society, was not derived from Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Indeed, such a proposal was contradictory to established socialist
ideology. Nor was it the result of a problem peculiar to the new
Russian Soviet Republic. Rather, during the Communist struggle to
assume power and their subsequent fight to survive during the civil
war, the Party leaders had experienced first-hand the political and
military tendencies of Russian society to fragment into independent,
uncooperative and disruptive entities that, at best, simply ignored
central authority and, at worst, actively opposed it.
The genesis of the Frunze-Gusev proposals should be understood
also in the context of a pragmatic effort to resolve a longstanding
Russian historic difficulty with the decentralization of power and to
provide an effective national defense. Without strong central
governmental controls, local Russian provincial governors and
military district commanders turned their territories into squabbling
satrapies with the result that the national government of such an
immense and ethnically diverse empire tended to devolve into an
indefensible anarchy.
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Therefore, in Frunze's view -- and in the view of the Eleventh
Party Congress which opened on March 27, 1922850 and adopted Frunze's
"unified proletarian military doctrine" -- doctrinal unity between
the political decisionmakers and executors of policy, centralized
political-military power, and control of economic resources were a
logical, indeed, the essential and only, means through which to form
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Typical of policy debates
within Russian intellectual and senior leadership circles, however,
during the freewheeling future war discussions that took place within
the Red Army throughout the 1920s, there was not unanimous agreement.
The debates became intensely politicized following the Communist
Party's official adoption in April 1922 of a "unified doctrine" which
incorporated both political and military aspects. Intellectual
disagreements on the nature of future war became highly personalized
as well because in Russia correct ideology -- ideological 'truth' --
was, and is, the basis for attaining and maintaining political power.
Frank, Willard C., Jr., and Philip S. Gillette, eds.,
Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-
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Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strateqiia:
Attrition (izmor) versus Destruction (sokrushenie)
Dialectics acknowledges the radically contradictory requirements of the art of
war. ... Dialectics cannot be driven out of the realm of strategic thought
because it is the essence of strategic thought.851
- Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia
With striking dialectical continuity, extending back over a
generation to the "Russian" and "Academic" school debates, during the
1920s the focal point for the Red Army future war debates and for
opposition to the officially approved Communist 'unified proletarian
military doctrine' was the former Nikolaev General Staff Academy,
which on August 5, 1921 was renamed the RKKA Military Academy. Given
the enduring General Staff Academy mission to develop a military
science for investigating the nature of future war, its Revvoensovet
assigned task to "elaborate theoretical questions concerning
organization and the conduct of battle and the influence of these
factors on troop control,"852 and the continuity of the faculty
between the two academies, it is entirely logical that the new RKKA
Military Academy would become the epicenter of dissension and open
dialectic debate.
Former Tsarist Army General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin
was a most outstanding, outspoken, and provocative future thinking,
and hence, for the RKP(b), a most controversial and politically
Svechin, A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. pp. 318-319.
Bulzakov, T. P., ed., Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), p. 22.
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'dangerous' RKKA Military Academy faculty member during the free
exchange of ideas that characterized the exceedingly turbulent post-
Russian Civil War military doctrine debates.853 Although World War I
combat operations and events of the Russian Civil War had interrupted
the intellectual efforts by Svechin and his Academy colleagues to
create a Russian military science founded on historical experience,85''
the Bolsheviks, believing firmly in the validity of "scientific and
historical Marxism," ideologically were predisposed to continue, and
to expand significantly, the work to develop a military science that
they considered might be crucial to the survival of their new state.
Therefore, using the 1879 precedent established by the War Minister
Dmitrii Miliutin to investigate the Russo-Turkish War,855 between 1918
and 1924 the Bolsheviks, with a little prodding and considerable
controversy, resuscitated the Imperial military-historical commission.
On May 8, 1918 the former Tsarist military specialists of the
All-Russian Supreme Staff (Vserosglavshtab) took the initiative of
setting up a "military-historical unit" attached to the Operations
Administration. 856 Then, at the suggestion of WS voenspets General
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M. D. Bronch-Bruevich, whose illustrious brother V. D. Bronch-Bruevich
was closely connected with Lenin, on August 13, 1918 by Order No. 688
the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (NarKom or NKVD)
formally approved the creation of a Military-Historical Commission
(VIK) attached to the Vserosglavshtab .85' The first VIK Chairman,
General V. N. Klembovskii, and his most capable assistants, Infantry
Generals N. P. Mikhnevich and V. A. Apushkin, were tasked to
accomplish a comprehensive study of the lessons of the World War. In
December 1918 Klembovskii was relieved as the VIK Chairman, General
A. A. Svechin took over as Klembovskii's replacement, and the VIK was
expanded and redesignated as the "Commission for the Study and Use of
the Experience of the War, 1914-1918"858 and specifically tasked "with
distilling the lessons of the First World War...."859
Aleksandr Svechin headed this Commission for the majority of
its existence. In January 1920 the Commission reverted to its
original designation as the VIK, with broadened responsibilities for
studying the history of the Red Army and the civil war. 860 On May 29,
1921 the VIK was disbanded. At that time Svechin was assigned to the
faculty of the RKKA Military Academy. The VIK, however, officially
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was reformed on September 2, 1921 under PUR Director S. I. Gusev,
with Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii as his Deputy Chairman, with the
mission to evaluate both the World War and the Russian Civil War.861
Under Svechin's leadership the Military-Historical Commission
carried forward the rigorous process, begun in the late-19th century
and expanded prior to the World War, of legitimizing the concept of
future war as a valuable 'scientific' analytical method upon which to
base Russian force structure development. Of this process Aleksandr
Svechin wrote: "Problems of military history are especially dear to
persons studying strategy, since by its very method strategy is
merely a systematized reflection over military history."862 During
the six years that the Commission conducted its investigations,
Aleksandr Svechin, in particular, along with his distinguished
voenspets fellow Commission members, such as A. M. Zaionchkovskii,
E. I. Martynov, A. A. Neznamov, et al., built on their and
Mikhnevich's earlier Russian protracted war studies, along with
military theories contained within German works, such as those by
Clausewitz, Delbrueck, von Schlichting and Moltke, to synthesize an
entirely new dialectical foundation for the Red Army debates about
the nature of future war. However, because studies investigating
historical 'laws of warfare' were inexorably and integrally bound to
For a detailed account and bibliographic sources for the
Communist and Red Army efforts to elaborate a history of
the Russian Civil War, see Erickson, John, "Pens versus
Swords: A Study of Studying the Russian Civil War,
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Soviet political power, ideological 'truth,' and internal Communist
Party politics, Commission members found themselves assigned with a
contradictory, ever-changing, hence dangerous and even potentially
fatal, "major role in the ideological struggle for the construction
of a new Soviet society."863
What initially, and finally, plunged Svechin and his fellow
Commission members into a deep ideological conflict with the
Communist Party was their "non-Marxist" methodology and their
intellectual determination that future wars in the industrial age
would be "wars of attrition." In such future wars the full economic
potential of the state and a strategic defense most probably would,
and could, be more significant than the strategic offensive concept,
or "war of destruction" against "imperialism," and more critical than
the moral fervor of "world revolution," which the Party faithful
increasingly advocated to defend the Soviet state.864 In a March 1924
Voennaia mvsl' i revoliutsiia article entitled "Opasnye illiuzii"
("Dangerous Illusions"), Svechin employed passages from Lenin's 1920
"Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" to support the Party's
adopted New Economic Policy (NEP). But in the process, he sharply
contradicted major elements of Frunze's "unified proletarian military
doctrine" by developing ideas that a military policy based on a
political concept of "ideological superiority" was dangerous and that
inadequately prepared strategic offensive operations in a future war
could lead to disaster. Svechin wrote:
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One must welcome the rejection by Soviet power of any
sort of chauvinism, from the pressure to use the Red Army
for promoting revolution by force of arms. But should
such manifestations of chauvinism appear, then look at a
map, reflect on modern technology and give up any sort of
pleasant but even more dangerous illusions.865
Rather than a quick, decisive offensive "war of destruction"
fought on foreign territory, Svechin foresaw that future wars would
be a series of protracted, severe, and exceedingly costly contests,
fought both on foreign territory and within the boundaries of the
Soviet Union, that would require the total mobilization of enormous
human and material resources in order to prevail, utilizing variable
offensive and defensive strategies, in a "war of attrition." Through
his work with the Military-Historical Commission and the publication
of "Dangerous Illusions", Svechin made implacable foes of Stalin's
crony, Kliment E. Voroshilov, who would succeed Frunze as War
Commissar in November 1925, and of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the
future Chief of the RKKA Main Staff from 1925-1928. Svechin's
article directly contradicted Tukhachevskii, who believed in and
proselytized for the "complete militarization" of the Soviet economy
so that a technologically modernized Red Army could be the means for
seizing the initiative and conducting decisive offensive battle
leading to the "total destruction" of the enemies of the Soviet state
that would accomplish a "revolution from without."866
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The culmination, and most enduring, of Svechin's intellectual
efforts was Strategiia. first published in 1926, in which he defined
and contrasted the differences between strategies of "attrition"
(izmor) and "destruction" (sokrushenie) and specifically advocated
the advantages of the former strategy for the defense of Russia.
Svechin's basic premise was that all warfare could be analyzed within
a strategic paradigm consisting of two types: 1) "wars of attrition"
(izmor), characterized by protracted warfare involving the total
political, diplomatic, military, economic, and population resources
of the state to "cause the enemy to collapse politically"; and
2) "wars of destruction" (sokrushenie), characterized by the rapid
accomplishment of war aims through the decisive defeat of enemy
forces in battle during the initial period of war.867
Svechin was especially critical of "decisive military
operations" during the initial period of war and warned that such
unprepared action could lead to disaster. 868 He argued that the only
realistic strategy for economically destitute Soviet Russia was a
prolonged "war of attrition," trading time and Russian territorial
space while selectively employing, as appropriate, both defensive and
offensive military operations, until the entire resources of the
state could be mobilized and united with army actions at the front to
achieve the ultimate aim of warfare -- victory through the collapse
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Strategiia elaborated a wholly new theoretical construct --
"attrition" (izmor) -- for future war. This theory applied
historical experience through the methodology of military science and
incorporated those trends that were altering the nature of warfare to
create a conceptual system for future warfare that was the antithesis
of Frunze's offensive, i.e., "destruction" (sokrushenie), and his
dogmatic "unified proletarian military doctrine." Svechin's
consistent emphasis on the evolution of military art, warnings
"against any effort to create closed systems on the basis of past
combat experience," and urgings that the "proper topic of military
history was the study of those tendencies shaping future war"8'0 made
his work a heresy to the Communist Party leadership which in April
1922 had adopted Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine,"
was promoting "class warfare" and "continuing revolution," and was
advocating a decisive offensive strategy of "destruction" rapidly to
advance the socialist cause of "world revolution."
Svechin's negation of the Communist Party 'truth,' embodied in
a strategy of "destruction," alone was more than sufficient to earn
him the enmity of Lenin's successors. However, Svechin openly used
Strategiia as a caustic polemic to attack the civil war performance
of the Red Army leaders. The strategic failures of Budennyi,
Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov and Stalin during the disastrous 1920
Polish campaign were at the very pinnacle of Svechin's condemnation,
Svechin, A., Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva. 2 vols.,
(Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1927-1928), Vol. 2, pp. 537 ff;
cited by Jacob W. Kipp in Strategy. Kent D. Lee, ed.,
(Minneapolis, MN: East View Publishers, 1992), p. 24.
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and he left no doubt about where he judged blame and placed
responsibility. Svechin condemned the strategy of the Polish
operation in no uncertain terms:
In 1920 Poland was a more formidable enemy than Wrangel.
From the perspective of destruction, it would have been
correct to direct most of our efforts against Warsaw.
... The decisive point -- Warsaw -- would have decided
the fate of the Crimea. ... As goals of operations,
Warsaw and the Crimea were set in an order opposite the
ones they should have, which had unpleasant
consequences .871
At a time when Tukhachevskii had just become RKKA Chief of Staff,
Svechin expressed his great scorn for Tukhachevskii's leadership
during the 1920 Polish campaign. Svechin wrote:
A strategy of destruction characterized most of the Red
Army's offensive from the banks of the Dvina to the
Vistula in 1920. In approaching the Vistula the Red
armies had become so numerically weak and so cut off from
their sources of supply that they were more phantoms than
reality.872
He effectively accused Tukhachevskii of incompetence:
Not every movement forward is in essence a strategic
offensive. An offensive at any and all costs ... leads
to a situation in which our forces are dispersed where
the enemy permits, activity degenerates into weakness,
into an offensive "phase", into a very dubious location
of the front somewhere ahead and a return to the starting
position.873
Specifically against Mikhail Frunze, and thus against the Communist
Party "unified proletarian military doctrine," Svechin argued:
871 Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 298.
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Complete unity of doctrine and the lack of differences in
the interpretation of operational and tactical issues
could be achieved only at the cost of stopping efforts
for further development.87'*
He continued:
Contemporary military history, which tries to proceed
from a single, absolute, uniquely correct line of
strategic conduct, is incapable of clarifying the meaning
and relationships in the jumble of military events that
it considers some sort of chaos.875
Svechin's vivid descriptions of the Red Army leadership failures
during the Russian Civil War, which these emerging 'infallible'
leaders of the Soviet Union and Red Army were trying their best to
bury, or to 'historically revise,' during the power struggles
following Lenin's death, virtually guaranteed the eventual
elimination of Svechin in 1938. Political power increasingly
consolidated around Stalin's 'cult of personality.'
Publication of Svechin's StraCegiia. First Edition, triggered
an intense split between the RKKA Military Academy faculty and the
RKKA Main Staff, which was under Tukhachevskii's leadership. Early
in 1926 a Red Army special conference convened for the specific
purpose of debating Svechin's thesis concerning the strategies of
izmor and sokrushenie, and, through these discussions endeavored to
reach some consensus concerning the appropriate Red Army strategy for
contemporary conditions. 876 As a consequence of this special
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Second Edition, he suggested that "wars of destruction" could be
undertaken given specific favorable international conditions.8"
Although Svechin acknowledged that a strategy of "destruction" could
be applied in warfare, he remained convinced that future war
necessarily would be "total war," requiring "permanent mobilization"
of the state in order to field maximum military capabilities during
the critical initial period of war.878
Significantly, the Second Edition of Strategiia continued to
contradict the policies that the Communist Party leaders now wished
to make into dogma. Svechin included such venomous comments as:
A unity of doctrine based on the unity of strategic
guidelines is illusory. In strategy the center of
gravity lies in developing an independent point of view
which primarily requires careful homework.879
He persisted:
The experience of 1920 indicated the need to prepare
carefully to take advantage of the existing situation.
A great deal of room is opening up for dreams of making
Tamerlane-like thrusts over thousands of kilometers.
But in our era dreams are more dangerous than they have
ever been before.880
The battle for ideological 'truth' became fully engaged.
Following the revision of his original Strategiia. Svechin
increasingly would be publicly pilloried in the Communist Party and
Red Army press during the last years of the 1920s. Lenin's NEP had
proven ineffective in dealing with Russia's immense economic
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deficiencies, and Lenin was no longer alive to defend his policy.
By late 1927, Stalin, with the support of War Commissar Voroshilov
and RKKA Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii, stridently was advocating
industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, totalitarian
controls, the "militarization" of Soviet society, and the need to
mechanize the Red Army, in order to pursue a "war of destruction"
strategy. Svechin's Strategiia. with its support for NEP and heavy
emphasis on protracted "war of attrition," was now almost totally in
opposition to Stalin's Communist Party political line.881
In 1929 the attacks on Svechin and his Strategiia intensified
even further. The Communist Academy now sought to infuse the old
'bourgeois' military science with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism by
opening afresh the 1921-1922 Trotsky-Frunze debates on the "unified
proletarian military doctrine," based on a "war of destruction,"
which Svechin so adamantly opposed. 882 Tukhachevskii, who continued
to advocate a "mechanized mass army as the means to conduct decisive
operations in a total war," 883 joined in the fray. He charged that
Svechin's writings were infested with "idealism," were contaminated
with "bourgeois ideology," rejected the possibility of "decisive
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operations," and advocated "limited warfare."88'' Then, at the 16th
Communist Party Congress in 1930, Kliment E. Voroshilov, the Soviet
War Commissar arose and defined Tukhachevskii's army "mechanization"
concept as constituting "a qualitative change in the nature of future
wars" which would "bring about the possibility of a short, bloodless
war, carried quickly on to the territory of the attacking enemy."886
The result was that Tukhachevskii, through his political connections
and insistence on the nascent concept of "deep battle," directly
contributed to the end of open debate within the Soviet military,
which had so uniquely characterized the 1920s.
Aleksandr A. Svechin's most enduring contribution to military
thought and to strategic art was the identification of the "strategic
line of conduct" leading to the ultimate goal of warfare -- victory.
The principal elements of the "strategic line of conduct" are:
1) Sequence of Operations; 2) Curve of Strategic Intensity;
3) Initial Moment of an Operation; 4) Breakthrough of an Operation;
5) Operations on Interior Lines; and, 6) Proportioning Operations.886
Svechin believed the latter represented the "most critical task for
the strategist" in order to "always ... take advantage of numerical
superiority in the most decisive way possible" and to ensure that
"every operation, including a defensive operation, ... [is] provided
Tukhachevskii, M. N., "0 kharaktere sovremennykh voin
v svete reshenii VI kongressa Kominterna," in
Kommunisticheskaia Akademiia■ Sektsiia do izucheniiu
problem voinv. Zapiski. Vol. 1, pp. 21-29.
Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. (Moscow:
Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1933), Vol. II, pp. 842-843.
Svechin, A. A., Strategy. Kent D. Lee, ed., pp. 287-297.
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with assets appropriate to its goal."88' Svechin's own words best
describe what he considered to be "the most important issues of
strategic logic":
A strategist who knows the requirements of ... a future
war dwells on a certain way of resolving strategic
questions that should lead him to the ultimate goal of
the operations of a military front, plans a series of
intermediate goals and the sequence in which they are
achieved; regulates strategic intensity and at every
moment tries, if not to subordinate, to tie the interests
of the present to the interests of the strategic
'tomorrow' of the future. ... We have to put harmony in
the preparations of a nation for war at the forefront,
but it is no less important in the leadership of a war,
only the characteristics of harmony in this case are
immeasurably more subtle. This coordination, this
achievement of harmony, is the essence of strategy and
it forces us to classify practical work on strategy as
an art.888
Modern warfare also leaves room for strategic reserves,
that is, fully trained and mobilized units that are not
tied to an operational goal. ... A strategic reserve
is strategic wealth, which is naturally put aside if the
front is not fighting at full pitch. ... A prolonged
conflict is generally impossible without a strategic
reserve.889
Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin was clearly the most outstanding
and influential, yet controversial, Russian military theorist to
participate in the turbulent free exchange of ideas that characterized
the post-civil war military doctrine debates. 890 Indeed, so
Svechin, A. A., Strategy. Kent D. Lee, ed., pp. 301-02.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. p. 306.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 303.
Lee, Kent D., "Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role
of Soviet Military Science," in Frank, Willard C., Jr.,
and Philip S. Gillette, eds., Soviet Military Doctrine
from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991. (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 284.
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controversial, and threatening, to the political and military leaders
of the Soviet Union were Svechin's conclusions that for six decades
his works were banned. They were rescued and restored to their place
of honor only in the late 1980s by Kokoshin and Larionov as the
thesis upon which to base the renewed dialectic process to synthesize
a 'new' Russian military doctrine to replace the offensive strategy
of "destruction" that prevailed, albeit with several modifications,
throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. V. N. Lobov opined:
A. A. Svechin placed at the foundation of the development
of the armed forces a definition of the nature of future
war based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of
the history and prospects of military affairs; ... taking
into account the 'nature of the historical moment' and
economic potentials of the country at each individual
moment.891
Of this renewed search for an appropriate military doctrine,
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov duplicated his Russian
predecessors Miliutin, Dragomirov, Leer, Neznamov, Mikhnevich,
Svechin, et al., in most concisely describing the process:
In its development, Soviet military science has always
been based on the richest military-historical experience.
In studying the history of our country and that of other
states, and in generalizing the experience of past wars,
military history reveals the fundamental laws and
tendencies of the development of military affairs, and in
this way makes it possible for military science to be
correctly oriented in its examination of problems of the
present and future.892
Lobov, V. N., "The Significance of Svechin's Military-
Theoretical Legacy Today," in Svechin, A. A., Strategiia.
(Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927); trans. Kent D. Lee, ed.,
Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications,
1992), p. 17.
Kulikov, V. G., "Aktual'nye problemy voennoi istorii,"
Voenno-Lstoricheskii zhurnal. No. 12, 1976, p. 12.
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As an integral part of this dialectic process, Svechin's prodigious
writings on military history, the evolution of military art,
operational art, strategy, and the protracted nature of future
warfare forge a direct substantive linkage between past Imperial Army
military thought, the founding of the Red Army, the 70 years of
Soviet military doctrine, the new 1993 Russian military doctrine, and
the future development of Russian military science. As such,
Aleksandr Svechin's Strategiia is a seminal work which defines the
nature of future war.
In a future war technical initiative will be over-whelmingly important. But
the general staff must take a favorable attitude towards technical innovations
and conduct the first steps in the deep rear in complete secrecy.893
... Strategy must make a comprehensive effort to predict the future.894
- A. A. Svechin, Strategiia
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 128.
Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 78.
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Tukhachevskii's Budushchaia Voina Study:
The First RKKA Shtab Systematic Investigation
... Our work is an attempt to give a systematic statement of the fundamental
problems of future war and to establish correctly a precise arena for an entire
rank of salient questions about preparations for war and ... future war plans.895
Up to this time neither here nor abroad (as far as we know) has such a work
appeared. 896
- Berzin, Chief, RKKA Shtab IV Upravlenie. 30 June 1928
At the height of the Red Army debate over the appropriate
strategy to be followed in a future war -- izmor (attrition) or
sokrushenie (destruction) -- and following the end of the XIV RKP(b)
Congress "which set the general course ... for the industrialization
of the country," Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the Red Army Chief of
Staff, issued Directive No. 20030 on January 26, 1926 in which he
stated: "One of the essential questions for our preparation for war
is the question concerning a determination of the character of our
forthcoming war -- of primary consideration, of course, in the
European theater."8" Tukhachevskii stipulated in this directive that
"the most important basis for determining the character of war is
characterized by the industrial forces of the enemy, considering
Tukhachevskii, M. N., ed., Budushchaia voina.
Chast' I. Predislovie. Obshchaia obstanovka.,
(Moscow: IV Upravlenie Shtab RKKA, 1928), p. xvi.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xi.
897 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xi.
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possible alliances, etc." 898 and emphasized: "It is especially-
important to pay attention to ... capturing the industrialization
course of the USSR, which must transform it into a self-supporting
economy...." 899 Through Tukhachevskii' s Directive No. 20030, the RKKA
Shtab, with the Fourth Directorate under its chief Berzin in the
lead, was tasked to "create a special work on the character of future
war"; which, over the course of two years and "numerous meetings with
Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii," resulted in the rare and very candid900
classified intelligence assessment titled Budushchaia voina.901
The RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate's, and hence Tukhachevskii's,
explanation of the rationale for the Budushchaia voina study was that
before World War I "the direction of military thought proved itself
only in relation to the broad scale [of future war] in expanse and in
the size of armies; but in relation to the material scale and its
protracted nature it was a complete fiasco."902 The study's authors,
who included la. M. Zhigur, who was Assistant Chief of the Third
Department within the RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate, and the Third
Department Chief Nikonov, judged that,
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xii.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xiii.
"Only 80 copies were made of this extremely candid and
forthright study; and all but the one [copy] maintained
by the Soviet Army Central State Archives (TsGASA) were
destroyed during the 1930s" according to the Introduction
to Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., pp. xi-xii.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. vi.
(Underline in original text.)
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the fundamental mistake, which was made in preparation
for world war, in our opinion, consisted of
underestimating the changes which new conditions of
warfare brought.... The monstrous material scale of war,
the unprecedented persistence of combat, the colossal
losses in the areas of economic and political life
revealed the general essence resulting from conditions of
the contemporary era. . . .903
As a consequence, the Fourth Directorate collective concluded that
"the task of working out the situation and analyzing future war
conditions at the present time must be formed as one of the essential
elements of work by organs for preparing the army and the country for
war"504 and that "... the problem of determining the character of
future war has become entirely real and at the present time the
drawing up of a well thought out and substantiated war plan is
unthinkable without work on deciding this problem."905
There can be no doubt, that for the Red Army there is
seriously substantiated and mature work concerning the
changing conditions of future war and establishing
definite views on its character. We have, as in other
states, this factual work being conducted in recent
years, such as in the lines of our military literature
(for example, the work of A. A. Svechin, Strategiia) and
in the areas of working out official military doctrine
(regulations) .906
Berzin's Fourth Directorate of the RKKA Shtab, with Chief of Staff
Tukhachevskii's approval, opined that the results of works such as
Svechin's Strategiia were,
903 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. vii.
(Underline in original text.)
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. ix.
905 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. x.
(Underline in original text.)
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. x.
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... totally unacceptable, since in order to develop a war
plan the single general and isolated forms of future war
have not been sufficiently determined, except for the
necessity to comprehensively investigate the concrete
conditions of such a war which threatens the Soviet
Union.... From this derives the necessity for a
specific, completely secret work, which would contain
concrete analysis of future war conditions, including its
most accurate variants.907
The 1928 Budushchaia voina study is the RKKA Shtab initial effort t
fulfill that 1926 military science requirement set by Tukhachevskii
The twelve chapters of the study, comprising 734 pages of data,
tables and analysis are remarkable for their detailed assessment
alone, and become all the more compelling as proof of the validity
the Russian military science process based on the accuracy of the
study's conclusions -- which, nearly seventy years later, still
remain pertinent at the end of the 20th century.
For example, the Russian military scientists determined that
"in modern operations the most important problems are the material
scope and 'long-range battle' {dal'noboinost')" because "the
saturation of modern mass armies with technical means, rapid-fire
artillery, and automatic weapons demand during all operations the
provision of great quantities of supplies, particularly
ammunition."908 Concerning the possibility of employing a "strategy
of destruction" (sokrushenie) to "decisively defeat the encircling
Imperialist enemies," which for political purposes Tukhachevskii
advocated in public, the study surprisingly suggested that both
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., pp. x-xi.
Tukhachevskii, M. N., ed., Budushchaia voina.
Chast' VI. Operativnye i organizatsionnye problemy,
(Moscow: IV Upravlenie Shtab RKKA, 1928), p. 638.
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Tukhachevskii and the RKKA Shtab had reached just the opposite
military-technical conclusion; i.e., "contemporary operations,
considering each separately, as shown by the 1914-18 and civil wars,
do not have a decisive character. Approximately nine-tenths of all
operations during previous wars were satisfied without large
quantities of prisoners and military spoils,"509 which were considered
indicative of military "destruction" of the enemy. To prove this
point about the likely protracted nature of future war, with great
candor -- and a political consequences be damned attitude -- the
Fourth Directorate authors quoted and footnoted none other than
Aleksandr Svechin's Strategiia. which Tukhachevskii had determined to
be "unacceptable":
For successful destruction (sokrushenie) hundreds of
thousands of prisoners are required, the total
annihilation of entire armies, the seizure of thousands
of cannons, warehouses, trains.... Such victories have
taken place neither in Galicia, nor in border conflicts,
nor during the 1920 Red Army offensive [against Poland
led by Tukhachevskii].910
Because Tukhachevskii and the RKKA Shtab had reached the
conclusion that a single "decisive" wartime operation would not be
feasible in a future war, Budushchaia voina proposed:
... It is necessary to conduct a series of successive
operations correspondingly distributed [controlled] in
space and time. The combination of a series of
operations necessitates the enemy using up his material
and personnel reserves, or causes the enemy to accept
battle with his main troop mass under conditions
unfavorable to him, and [for us] to liquidate them.911
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 652.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 652;
footnote quoting A. Svechin, Strategiia.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 654.
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The significance of this conclusion is that it proves that the Red
Army leadership, and Tukhachevskii in particular, had not forsaken a
decisive strategy which equated victory with destruction of the
enemy. Quite the contrary, they had employed the dialectic military
science process to alter the operational means by which sokrushenie
could be achieved through a protracted series of combined operations.
There was, however, a critical caveat to Tukhachevskii's and
the RKKA Shtab's proposal for preparing the Red Army for future war:
Modern armies must obtain corresponding weapons,
technical means, and organizational forms in order to
conduct operations with decisive goals. ... The most
decisive operational results can be attained by acting on
the enemy flanks and rear....'12
Therefore, the Budushchaia voina authors considered it vital to
"elevate army offensive means, primarily artillery, tanks, [and]
aircraft, in order to facilitate breaking enemy defenses"'13 so that
the Red Army could "continuously act toward decisive goals,"'14
particularly during the initial period of a future war when
"especially active and decisive operations"915 by the army were both
planned and deemed essential for the defense of the Soviet Union.
Perhaps the greatest concern of the RKKA Shtab, at least as
depicted in this 1928 assessment, was that in future war military
operations would stagnate into positional trench warfare, as they had
during World War I, and become protracted. Tukhachevskii and his
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 655.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 691.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 680.






staff officers saw the possibility of a protracted "war of attrition"
as being highly likely were war to break out in the 1928-1929 time
period since "... the Red Army in the initial period of war does not
possess superior forces which can ensure the lightning destruction of
all its opponents at once."916 The "threat of positional war forms"
was further magnified by the assessment that "saturation of the front
with troops, artillery, and especially machineguns in a future war
will be several times more concentrated than in the Polish-Soviet war
[1920], Completely different conditions for military action will be
created by this."91' As a result the RKKA Shtab officers -- with
considerable similarity to statements made by their Imperial Russian
Main Staff predecessors and with almost verbatim foresight to the
post-Soviet requirements of their Russian General Staff successors --
judged that, "... successful combat action must have large fire
forces, more powerful means of suppression (tanks, armored cars,
rapid-fire artillery, etc.) than it [the army/cavalry] had in 1920,
and has at present...."918 Further, Tukhachevskii considered the
necessity of "increasing the number of bombers and fighters" to be a
matter of "special importance."919
The classified conclusion of the Budushchaia voina assessment
enumerated ten pages of specific politico-military requirements for
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 692.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 716.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 718.






"construction of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" during the
First Five-Year-Plan (1928-1932), which Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii and
the RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate saw as being absolutely critical to
developing the capability of the Red Army to conduct decisive combat
operations. Of the purely military requirements listed, the
following six stand out as germane to the continuity of Russian
military thought and to the Russian military science process,
beginning with the 1860s Miliutin Reforms and extending through the
formation of the Russian Armed Forces in 1992 -- and beyond, into the
21st century.
First, Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii assigned "top priority" to
the "military training of the reserves," with "special attention" to
ensuring that peacetime training corresponded to "the demands of
future frontal armaments." 920 Second, "industrialization of the USSR,
military preparation of our production [facilities], increasing the
technical means of combat and our overall defensive capacity is one
of the most effective means of ensuring peace...."921 Third, "... in
wartime our industry must be prepared to produce significantly
greater quantities of military supplies...."922 The fourth necessity
for constructing the Red Army, which stood in sharp contradiction to
the declared public policy of "continuing revolution" and an
offensive strategy of immediate enemy "destruction," was that




Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 724.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 724.
Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 725.
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entire economy of the Soviet Union will be prepared to conduct
protracted warfare."923 Fifth, Tukhachevskii specified: "... The
near-term general direction for building our armed forces must be
strengthening the technical means of the Red Army and, especially
attack and suppression means ... artillery, tanks, and aviation."924
Sixth, the authors of Budushchaia voina concluded: "Our military
technologies lag behind foreign [technologies] not only because of
our limited production capabilities, but also as a consequence of the
weak military work of scientific-research institutes."925 The final
overall assessment about the nature of future war was that:
In order to reduce the possibility of positional warfare
from arising, it is essential to increase substantially
the Red Army attack means and to guarantee in wartime the
highest attainable quality of armaments, ammunition
supplies, and durable equipment articles for conducting
continuous active offensive operations. Without such a
guarantee we stand before the threat that future war will
take a positional character. To a significant extent the
evasion of this depends on the direction of our armed
forces construction and on the development of our
production capacity and its preparation for war.926
The above conclusion about the social, political, economic and
technical nature of future war originated in late-19th century
Russian military thinking, permeates 20th century Russian military
thought, and will continue to influence the peacetime preparations
and wartime actions of the Russian military leadership well into the
21st century. This fact is a direct result of exclusive senior
923 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI. , , p. 725
924 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI. , , p. 727
925 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI. , , p. 731
926 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI. , . p- 734
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leadership education at the Military Academy of the General Staff,
and the continuity of the military science process learned therein
and subsequently applied by members of the General Staff to the
resolution of military theoretical and military planning problems at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Russian
military science process, which continually undergoes iterative
dialectic revision in order to utilize only the most current, and
hence accurate, data for determining the likely nature of future war,
remains the lynch pin of all Russian military thought.
Every state constructs its own military system and conducts preparations for
war based on its determination of views on the character of future war.
Truthfully, these views very seldom find themselves included in the expression
of an officially codified miliary doctrine. Usually they slip into view only
in departmental remarks expressed by various military authorities or, also, in
the form of isolated instructions in regulations, lectures, and courses of
instruction. Theoretical conceptions of future war often occur, turning up as
the fruit of individual works by separate theoreticians, whose respectability
and substantiation of these conceptions and the influence of them on the course
of preparation for war, depends on the talent and authority of their authors.
However, even this is not systematized, [and] the presentation of an
unsatisfactorily formed view about the character of future war shows its
influence on practical military construction, and this we can substantiate in
every state.9 1
Construction of the Red Army and preparation of the USSR's economy for war must
proceed from the perspective of protracted war.928






Shtab RKKA, 1928), p. v.
928 Tukhachevskii, M. N., ed., Budushchaia voina.
Chast' VI. Operativnye i organizatsionnye problemy,
(Moscow: IV Upravlenie Shtab RKKA, 1928), p. 698.
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The Sokolovskii Nuclear War Anomaly:
Quantitative Analysis Displaces Military Science
Taken as a whole, Professor Svechin's book still remains the
only fundamental work on strategy.979
Some thirty-five years elapsed between the publication of
Aleksandr Svechin's Strategiia. Second Edition; the completion of the
comprehensive, classified Budushchaia voina930 study by the RKKA Shtab
Fourth Directorate under Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii's direction; and
the next major Russian/Soviet work to attempt to define and clarify
the nature of future warfare, Voennaia strategiia. published in three
editions (1962, 1963, and 1968) by Marshal of the Soviet Union
V. D. Sokolovskii. Between 1928 and 1962 numerous 'future war'
treatises were published, especially by gifted authors such as
Tukhachevskii, Triandafillov, Isserson, et al., in the main, these
military theoretical monographs were oriented toward the changing
nature of battles at the tactical and operational level of military
art, rather than toward the changing nature of strategy and of the
overall nature of future warfare. Throughout the Stalinist 'cult of
Vol'pe, A., "Critique and Bibliography:" A. Svechin,
Strategiia. 2nd ed., (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927),
Voina i revoliutsiia. No. 5, May 1927, pp. 182-186;
cited in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN:
East View Publications, 1992), p. 343.
Tukhachevskii, M. N., ed., Budushchaia voina. 7 vols.,
(Moscow: RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate, 1928): Chast' I.
Predislovie. Obshchaia obstanovka, 53 pp.; Chast' II.
Liudskie resursy i ikh ispolzovanie, 40 pp.; Chast' III.
Ekonomicheskie faktory, 134 pp.; Chast' IVa.
Tekhnicheskie faktory (sukhoputnaia voennaia tekhnika),
140 pp.; Chast' IVb. Tekhnicheskie faktory (transport,
aviatsiia i morskoi flot), 201 pp.; Chast' V.
Politicheskii faktor, 61 pp.; Chast' VI. Operativnye i
organizatsionnye problemy, 96 pp.
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personality' from the 1930s to 1953, there existed an intentionally
manipulated determinism about the future that caused the forecasting
of the nature of future war to become a neglected science.
Therefore, it was not until after Stalin's death in 1953 that
military science once again began to investigate seriously the impact
of new weapon technologies on future war.931
Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, who served as Chief of the Soviet
General Staff from 1952 to 1961, set out to explain how the emerging
technologies of "weapons of mass destruction" -- mainly nuclear
weapons -- and the development of the means to deliver them over a
broad geographical expanse using ballistic missiles had
"revolutionized" warfare, "necessitated a fundamental review of many
tenets of military strategy"932 and, in effect, made the "initial
period of war" the only period of war due to the tremendous
destructive power of these new, post-World War II weapons systems.
Sokolovskii's team of authors wrote:
Thus strategy, which in the past had consisted of the
gains of tactics and operational art, today acquires a
potential for achieving the objectives of war by its own
autonomous means, regardless of the outcome of tactical
engagements and operations in various armed combat
spheres. Consequently, even general victory in war is no
longer the crown, the sum total of partial successes, but
the result of a one-time application of the state's
entire strength, accumulated before the war.933
Kipp, Jacob W., From Foresight to Forecasting: The
Russian and Soviet Experience. (College Station, TX:
Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University,
1988), pp. 177-85.
Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia Strategiia.
Third Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 387.
933 Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia strategiia.
Third Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 24.
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In this fundamental manner, while predicting the elevation of
extremely short "wars of destruction" to a new, higher qualitative
level of temporal and spatial intensity which portended the
"revolution in military affairs," in which the side that struck first
would 'win' what essentially was a 'zero-sum' game using quantitative
analysis, Sokolovskii departed from the much more complex Russian
military science tradition that had investigated warfare in depth and
had recognized the predominant role of a state's social-economic
base, moral authority, political morale, and the initiative of the
individual soldier in achieving victory during protracted future
wars. Further, with his rather myopic, but at that time politically
essential, bravado which overemphasized the role of nuclear weapons,
Sokolovskii's team relegated military strategy to "studying the
conditions under which a future war may arise.... In examining the
probable enemy's strategic views, Military Strategy turns its
attention to the sort of political and military aims the enemy might
pursue in a future war."934 The essential task of Soviet military
strategy therefore became focused on developing the means for
"repelling a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor."935
Sokolovskii did stress, however, that the character of future
war was an integral component of the theory of strategy, as had
Svechin before him. In Voennaia strategiia Marshal Sokolovskii
Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia strategiia.
Third Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 18.
Scott, Harriet Fast, and William F. Scott, The Armed




The next important element forming part of military
strategy is the question about the character of future
war. Here, strategy examines the conditions and factors
which, at a given moment in history, determines the
character of future war, the way military and political
forces are distributed, the quality and quantity of
material resources, military and economic potential, the
probable composition and potential of opposing coalitions
and their geographical distribution.936
Therefore, Sokolovskii's emphasis on the initial period of war,
during which the main military action was a mixed counterforce-
countervalue nuclear 'strike' (udar) throughout an enemy's
territory, 937 and reliance on quantitative analysis methodologies to
determine beforehand the nature of that initial 'strike,' should be
understood as an anomaly in the Russian military science tradition.
Sokolovskii did not, however, totally depart from the established
Russian process for investigating the nature of future war. Russian
military planners, since before the beginning of the 20th century,
intentionally had avoided planning operations beyond the initial
period of war, because they were considered to be too unpredictable.
Within the Communist Party and the Russian military
establishment, Marshal Sokolovskii's vision of a nuclear future war
certainly was far from being universally accepted. In 1962 Soviet
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, quoting Lenin as the fountainhead of
enduring wisdom and truth, underscored that: "V. I. Lenin warned that
Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia Stratepiia.
Third Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 18.
Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia Strategiia.
Third Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), pp. 344-368.
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the use of imposing achievements of technology for the mass
extermination of millions of human beings ... would inevitably lead
'to undermining the very conditions of existence of human
society'.""8 One year later Khrushchev pledged that "the Soviet
Union will never use these weapons first." 939 Indeed, it certainly
was not by chance that in 1962, the very same year that Sokolovskii's
Voennaia strategiia First Edition was published, Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal reached back into Russia's history to publish for the first
time M. N. Tukhachevskii's 1931-1932 secret materials, entitled
"Novye voprosy voiny," which dialectically analyzed the impact of
aviation, tanks, radio, chemicals, education, training, command and
control, technology, and the national economy on the state's ability
to conduct a future "war of destruction," employing Tukhachevskii's
"deep battle" operational art concept.9''0 Nor was it an accident that
these same materials on the nature of future war were included in
Volume Two of Tukhachevskii's Izbrannve proizvedeniia by Voenizdat in
1964. The publication of Tukhachevskii's writings in the Soviet
Union was a remarkable event. For nearly two decades after Stalin
executed him as a 'traitor to the state,' Tukhachevskii had become a
'non-entity' and his writings had been banned, publicly at least,
until the 1954 publication of the first volume of his Izbrannve
proizvedeniia.
938 "Rech' N. S. Khrushcheva," Pravda, July 11, 1962, p. 1.
939 "Sovetsko-vengerskoi druzhby," Pravda. July 20, 1963.
940 Tukhachevskii, M. N. , "Novye voprosy voiny (1931-1932) ,"
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 2, 1962, pp. 62-77 in
M. N. Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2,
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), pp. 180-198.
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By the 1960s the broad expanse of Tukhachevskii's analysis
about the nature of future war, even though it was couched mainly in
terms of "battle" and "operational art," was a most useful and
convenient foundation for the traditional Russian military branches
of arms to build an antithesis to Marshal Sokolovskii's narrow
nuclear war vision and the new, dominant role of the Strategic Rocket
Forces. In sharp contrast to Sokolovskii, Tukhachevskii had written:
It is essential to know how to follow up, as new means of
battle and operations reveal themselves that can alter
former operational-battle forms and also the need to
develop one's military in order to achieve greater
effectiveness in the use of military-technical resources,
which the expansion of the country's technology and
production can give.941
Tukhachevskii continued, harkening back to and sounding much like a
rather updated version of the great Russian military theorists --
Martynov, Neznamov, Mikhnevich, and even Svechin -- to emphasize the
importance he attached to having the Soviet Union prepared for war,
because the country
... will be able to return to the former methods of
operational activity and will give a much more decisive
character to the course of the war. In future war the
strongest will be that country which will have the most
powerful civilian aviation and aviation motor production
capability.942
In this same article Tukhachevskii explained his original operational
art concept of "deep battle" (glubokogo boia) as "the simultaneous
engagement of the enemy's military order [of battle] throughout its
Tukhachevskii, M. N., "Novye voprosy voiny," in Izbrannve
proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 181.
Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 184.
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entire depth" and that long range tank groups (tankovaia gruppa
dal'nego deistvlia) were essential to "create in the enemy rear
obstacles ... where his main forces can be annihilated."943 He then
asserted, citing from Engels' Anti-Dluring. that "the most important
task" of the civilian and military leadership was to see that the
"education of soldiers concerning the creation of new forms of battle
constantly was out stripped by the activity of officers and the
organs of military control" so that the "transformation (perestroika)
and modern development" of the army could be accomplished most
expeditiously. 944 Of "supreme importance" to Tukhachevskii, however,
was the "organization and training of [command and] control sections,
which must not only 'know how to manage [administration],' but also
know the technical complexity and diverse activities of modern
armies . "945
It was in the concluding section on command and control
(upravlenie) of Tukhachevskii's "Novye voprosy voiny" article that
opponents of Sokolovskii's quantitative analysis approach to the
initial period of future war found, by inference, their most potent
dialectic arguments. Recalling that the Tsarist army "planned a
battle only up to the moment of their bayonet attack against the
enemy," Tukhachevskii charged that they "did not know the process of




Tukhachevskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 186.
Tukhachevskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 190.
Tukhachevskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 193.
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know communications and [command and] control of the stages of deep
battle" :946
But it is impossible to imagine battle and an
uninterrupted flow of events combined with diverse
technical means of combat. Battle is complicated, ever
changing, and therefore command and control must be
prepared for sharply altered situations, and sometimes
also for radical transformation of the plan designed
earlier. The plan of battle must, as first priority,
coincide with real facts and with those factors which
play a decisive role in the various stages of battle.547
Tukhachevskii's arguments surely were no comfort to Sokolovskii's
operational researchers who saw the future as being dependent on one
branch of the Soviet Army alone -- the Strategic Rocket Forces --
but could not elude the ghosts of past Russian military science.
The main thought that formed Tukhachevskii's conclusion was:
Clearly an established goal, an internally coordinated
plan mobilizes all forces and means, the entire frame of
mind and enthusiasm in one mastered, understood, and
organized direction. Good [command and] control, knowing
how to concentrate all its forces and means for
attainment of the primary task at a given time, must be
capable of quickly transforming this concentration toward
new directions. . . .94e
Thus, after a hiatus of nearly a generation, in 1962 and again in
1964, the Russian intellectual gauntlets were cast as the iterative
military science process sought once more to divine between two
contradictory positions the 'correct' path for the future development
of the Soviet Army.
Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 194.
947 Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 194.
948 Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 196.
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Meanwhile, as nations stockpiled ever-increasing quantities of
nuclear weapons throughout the 1960s and 1970s, some military
theorists in the Soviet Union and the United States, along with a few
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, became
transfixed with the idea of 'winning' a nuclear war, investigated
ad nauseam weapons exchange ratios, and developed intricate,
quantitative mathematical war planning models in an effort to
'optimize' the effectiveness of nuclear strikes. Also, during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, increasing numbers of works seeking to
formalize predictive forecasting techniques began to emerge.949
The purpose of this operational research, which was not
constrained solely to nuclear warfare, was to apply science and
mathematics to derive models of future military phenomena and to
determine their rate of change, primarily in order to establish a
means through which to create stability (ustoichivost') by exercising
control over possible future war outcomes. As General M. M. Kir'ian
would describe somewhat later, these preliminary investigations would
make it possible to model,
For examples, see Konoplev, V. K., "Praktika i nauchnoe
predvidenie v voennom dele," Kommunist vooruzhennvkh sil.
No. 14, 1966, pp. 52-57; Anureev, I. I., and A. E.
Tatarchenko, Primenie matematicheskikh metodov v voennom
dele. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967); Trofimov, V. , and G.
Kadomtsev, "Metodologiia nauchnogo predvideniia,"
Voennaia mvsi'. No. 2, 1967; Bestuzhev-Lada, I. V. ,
Okno v budushchee. Sovremennie problemv sotsial'nogo
prognozirovanlia. (Moscow: Mysl', 1970); Skugarev, V. ,
"Prognozirovanie 1 razvitie voenno-morskikh flotov,"
Morskoi sbornik. No. 5, 1972, pp. 33-39; Konoplev, V. K.,
Nauchnoe predvidenie v voennom dele. (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1974).
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... the direction and tendencies in the development of
armed forces, military technology and military art, both
in one's own country and of the probable real enemy; the
character, course and outcome of future war.9i0
It is important to note that, as Christopher Bellamy so insightfully
points out, mathematically modeling the military-technical aspect of
future war reveals, at best, only half of the Soviet-Russian equation
for the concept of future war. The political aspect of doctrine
comprises the other half of the model. Even the mathematical half of
the equation is subject to gross interpretation since, in the Russian
military lexicon,
'technical' not only refers to technology, but also to
technique. Changes in technique may be associated
directly or indirectly with changes in technology.
... The phrase 'military-technical' as used in Russian
extends to cover 'technical' aspects of military
operations: the integration of infantry, artillery, armor
and air, how operations are planned and controlled. It
is arguably not so much the changes in technology itself
but associated changes in technique, which have altered
and will continue to alter the character of war.951
By the late 1960s, as open Soviet literature on forecasting
became more abundant, even such an influential Soviet military
officer as Marshal Sokolovskii began calling for a change of emphasis
for military strategy to "generalize and analyze the laws and
tendencies of the development of technology" and "to foresee possible
changes in the methods of conducting armed struggle and to spot new
Kir'ian, M. M., Problemv voennoi teorii v sovetskikh
nauchno-spravochnvkh izdaniLakh. (Moscow, 1985), p. 93.
Bellamy, Christopher D., Budushchava vovna: The Russian
and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of
Future War. (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic
Technology, Texas A&M University, 1989), p. 32.
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phenomena in time."'32 James McConnell points out and documents the
very important fact, however, that as early as 1964 Marshal
Sokolovskii and his most senior writing collaborator, General-Major
Cherednichenko, had begun to question in print the nature of future
war as depicted in their own book, Voennaia Strategiia. and actually
were leaders in the opposition to eliminate the distortion to Russian
military art caused by overreliance on nuclear weapons. 953 The Soviet
government meanwhile continued to insist, officially at least, that
the most pressing problem of contemporary military strategy was
working out methods of waging nuclear war.
Simultaneously, during the 1960s and early 1970s, more and more
often Russian military theorists were returning to their roots
seeking to better understand the holistic nature of future war as
something other than a gigantic spastic, virtually uncontrollable,
exchange of nuclear weapons during the initial period of war that
could possibly annihilate the participants, and non-participants
alike around the world. The roots to which Russian military
theorists dialectically turned to solidify an antithesis to
Sokolovskii's digression from the historic orientation of Russian
military science, as well as to counter the stinging conventional
Sokolovskii, V. D., and M. Cherednichenko, "Voennaia
strategiia i ee problemyVoennaia mvsl'. No. 10, 1968,
pp. 37 and 40.
McConnell, James M., "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy." Defense Analysis.
Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1985, p. 246; also Sokolovskii,
V., and M. Cherednichenko, "Military Art at a New Stage,"
Krasnaia zvezda. August 25 and 28, 1964, pp. 2-3.
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force reductions instituted during the Khrushchev regime, were the
debates over military science methodology and the content of unified
socialist military doctrine during the 1920s.
The unlikely genesis of a concerted Russian military effort to
displace quantitative analysis and to restore military science, and
hence restore the Soviet General Staff, the General Staff Academy,
and the conventional branches of arms to the 'rightful,' historic
places was Colonel Ivan Alekseevich Korotkov's 1971 article in
Vestnik voennoi Lstorii. with the seemingly prosaic Communist
academic title, "K istorii stanovleniia sovetskoi voennoi nauki"
("Toward a history based on soviet military sciences"). Behind the
facade of this title and a textual discussion that, to the
uninitiated at least, might seem to deal only with old arguments that
transpired a half-century earlier, Korotkov, in reality, was building
a firm dialectic case for the current adoption of a protracted war
strategy of "attrition." In so doing Korotkov resurrected from the
Tsarist past the legendary Russian military theorists -- Jomini,
Leer, Mikhnevich, Petrov, Puzyrevskii, Bliokh, et al.954 -- and even,
for the first time in over a generation, went so far as to discuss
Aleksandr Svechin's participation in the 1920s doctrinal debates and
to describe favorably Svechin's Strategiia and his "three-echelon
mobilization" proposition, 955 which, of necessity, would require the
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia sovetskoi voennoi
nauki," Vestnik voennoi istorii. Nauchnve zapiski..
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 46-47.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," p. 64.
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complete and total social-political-economic preparation of the
Soviet Union for protracted war.
The masterful crafting of Korotkov's article, its sound
dialectic logic, and its meticulous historical documentation made it
exceedingly difficult for the Communist Party leadership to fault
Korotkov's thesis, even though they might not agree. This was
especially true since Korotkov copiously employed the writings of
Lenin, the 'Father of the Socialist Revolution,' to create the
foundation for recommending a change in current military doctrine.
According to Korotkov, Lenin used works of the 19th and early-20th
century military theorists as the basis for the development of his
ideas concerning warfare. For example, "Today our tasks are
impossible to decide through the scientific study of new methods, if
our experience of yesterday does not open our eyes to the
incorrectness of old methods." 956 Referring specifically to military
affairs Korotkov depicts Lenin as stating:
Speaking about the combat preparation of the country and
its defensive capability, Lenin demanded serious
preparations to defend the homeland, beginning with the
economic problems of the country, putting in order the
railroads, without which 'contemporary warfare is an
empty phrase.' ... 'The military needs to carry on
properly, or it will not carry on at all.'957
In March 1922, in a Krasnaia armiia article entitled "Oznachenii
voinstvuiushchego materializma," Lenin underscored the importance of
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," p. 58;
citing V. I. Lenin. Poln. sobr. soch.. Vol. 44, p. 205.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," p. 49; citing
V. I. Lenin. Poln. sobr. soch.. Vol. 35, pp. 395 and 408.
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military science by emphasizing the "enormous role of the dialectic
method ... in the development of society" and that "the general
scientific method of Marxism is historical materialism."958 Only then
did Korotkov make reference to the May 8, 1922 RKKA Military Academy
discussions of military science, which were organized by Revvoensovet
Chairman Trotsky to "conclusively dethrone" military science as a
holdover from the bourgeois past, but failed to reach any consensus
of view among the distinguished faculty of the Military Academy who,
as we have seen, ideologically were severely divided between former
Tsarist officer 'voenspets' and Marxist Red commanders. What is
unique here is Korotkov's insertion of a quotation of the shunned
Aleksandr Svechin to drive home his main point: "For everyone it must
be clear, that the methods of military affairs and of organization
depend on the overall economic conditions of a given society."959
Korotkov did not stop here in building his case against
Sokolovskii's narrow view of nuclear "wars of destruction." Rather,
he went on to assert that "in order to create a theory of future war,
to foresee its character, it is necessary to study all the changes in
political and economic conditions."960 Then, Korotkov quoted
Frederick Engels' statement that, "over the course of many years,
studying all the branches of military science was one of my main
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 51; citing
V. I. Lenin. Poln. sobr. soch. . Vol. 45, pp. 29-30 and
Krasnaia armiia. March 1922, p. 31.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...pp. 52-53;
citing Krasnaia armiia. No. 14-15, 1922, p. 157.
960 Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 54.
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occupations...."961 Korotkov pointedly concluded in the first section
of his article that,
in conditions of sharp ideological struggle in our
country, in which the beginning Soviet military science
originated, the unsatisfactory philosophical preparation
of military cadres was discovered. Therefore, the
Communist Party took measures to broaden the introduction
of Marxist-Leninist methodology in military affairs.962
In the last section of his article, Korotkov stressed, still
using the seemingly arcane military doctrine debates of the 1920s as
examples, that "the most important military-theoretical problem ...
was determining the technical characteristics of future war" and
quoted the legendary Mikhail V. Frunze's opinion in "Front i tyl' v
voine budushchego" that,
... the necessity of preparation for protracted and
persistent war obliges us always to maintain forces [and
because of this] ... by no means does a strategy of
lightning strikes renounce this absolute necessity. . . .963
Then, opining that Frunze's thinking about military-technical issues
"has not lost its significance even today," Colonel Korotkov noted
that Frunze predicted "future war to a considerable degree, if not in
its entirety, will be a war of machines,"964 judged that technological
developments would lead future war to involve considerable maneuver
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," pp. 55-56;
citing K. Marks i F. Engel's. Soch.. Vol. 28, p. 508.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 56.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 56; citing
Frunze, M. V., Izbrannve nroizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 134.
964 Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 65; citing
Frunze, M. V., Izbrannve vroizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 343.
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at all levels of military art, and concluded with Frunze's
recommendation that "military doctrine must establish decisive action
as the mission of the armed forces, and ... to prepare the army for
large-scale maneuver operations."961 To further dialectically
buttress his case for a protracted "war of attrition" strategy
employing massive maneuver at the operational art level, Korotkov
turned to the writings of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, who concluded
that destruction of an enemy required a "series of successive
operations" :966
Completing one operation, it is necessary at that very
moment to foresee and to prepare for the next, so that no
battle transition, no respite can separate one operation
from another and give even temporarily to the enemy the
possibility to re-group (peregruppirovat'sia) and to
strengthen himself.967
Tukhachevskii judged the success of his theory of "successive
operations" to be dependent on the "decisive steps carried out by the
unseen workers of the rear."968 Thus, according to Korotkov, was laid
the foundation for Tukhachevskii's theory of "deep operations," which
would carry the attack throughout the depths of the enemy defenses
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 66; citing
Frunze, M. V. , Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 18.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 67; citing
Tukhachevskii, M. N., Voprosv sovremennoi strategii.
(Moscow; Voennyi vestnik, 1926), pp. 19-20.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...p. 67;
citing Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev, Shilovskii,
Armeiskaia operatsiia. (Moscow & Leningrad:
Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 91.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia." p. 67;
citing Tukhachevskii, Varfolomeev, Shilovskii,
Armeiskaia operatsiia. (Moscow & Leningrad:
Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 91.
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and for which Tukhachevskii, in 1932, defined the conditions for
success as:
1) Frontal attack. The wider the attack front, the
greater will be the other various conditions and success
of the operation. 2) Successive destruction of the enemy
echelons, dismembering them through the entire depth.969
To Tukhachevskii as well Korotkov assigned the responsibility for
development of the tactical theory of "combined arms battle" that
appeared first in the 1925 RKKA Field Regulations and was expanded
upon in the 1929 Field Regulations "... as a system, which unites the
fires and movement of all branches of troops."9'0
Through his dialectic analysis Korotkov left no doubt about the
new direction he was advocating for the Soviet Army -- essentially,
'back to the future.' Aleksandr Svechin and the other 'ghosts' of
Stalin's 'cult of personality' were not exonerated, but their
theories on the protracted nature and combined arms character of
future war were no longer so 'invisible.' The first public inkling
of an actual Soviet doctrinal shift from Sokolovskii's quantitative
theories of nuclear dominance and a return toward primarily a
protracted conventional warfare orientation against NATO would not
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," p. 68;
citing Voprosv strategii i operaCivnogo iskusstva v
sovetskikh voennikh trudakh (1917-194-0).
(Moscow: VoenizdaC, 1965), pp. 132-133.
Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...pp. 68-69;
citing Tukhachevskii, M. N., Izbrannve proizvedeniia.
2 vols., (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), Vol. 2, p. 62.
413
come until January 1977 during President Brezhnev's Tula speech."1
Perhaps not so accidentally, Brezhnev's harbinger speech coincided
that same year with the appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union
Nikolai N. Ogarkov as Chief of the Soviet General Staff and with the
initial operational capability of the Soviet intermediate-range SS-20
ballistic missile, which created the possibility for an independent
Soviet theater nuclear option."2 However, not until later in the
1970s and early 1980s, did emerging weapon technologies and
potentially changing battlefield conditions allow Russian military
theorists to synthesize yet another completely new estimate of the
nature of future warfare. This new hypothesis was predicated on the
forecast capability to accomplish traditional strategic, operational,
and tactical missions, and perhaps even some new missions in space,
utilizing long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons which
could negate the conundrum of nuclear war theory -- mutual assured
destruction (MAD) -- in which both sides, in a nuclear exchange,
would be utterly destroyed.
In the theory and practice of unleashing war and in the content of its initial
period the compulsion by many to decide questions of troop concentration and
strategic dispersal is new.973
For an excellent and well-documented analysis of this
important shift in Soviet military doctrine, see
McConnell, James M., "Shifts in Soviet Views on the
Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics.
Vol. XXVII, 1985, pp. 317-343.
McConnell, James M., "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy." Defense Analysis.
Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1985, p. 247.
973 Korotkov, I. A., Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.
Kratkii ocherk (1917-iiun' 1941).. (Moscow, 1980),
p. 142.
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Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov:
"The Revolution in Military-Technical Affairs"
Future war would inevitably have a prolonged character
and require maximum exertion of the state's resources.97'1
- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii, 1986
Throughout Russian military history there have been many
"revolutions in military-technical affairs." Perhaps none of these
'revolutions' is any more significant, however, than Marshal
Ogarkov's vision of future war. Not just because his vision formed
the foundation for current and likely future Russian military
doctrine which can directly affect the lives of people and the
national security of countries worldwide, but because Marshal
Ogarkov's new thesis, which was dialectically derived through the
General Staff military science process, synthesized a means to make
conventional warfare -- perhaps even a form of global conventional
warfare -- not only possible once more, but perhaps even a valuable
component of Soviet-Russian security policy. Paradoxically, this
occurred at a time when a whole generation of post-World War II
Western decisionmakers had convinced themselves that the mutual
possession of nuclear weapons produced a stability (stabil 'nost') in
international security relations that precluded outright warfare,
especially between nuclear 'superpowers.' Marshal Ogarkov, who
served with distinction as the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed
Forces from 1977 until 1983, articulated his vision of the nature of
974 Gaivoronskii, F. F., "Prevoskhodstvo sovetskoi voennoi
nauki i voennogo iskusstva v Velikoi Otechestvennoi
voine," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 4, 1986, p. 14.
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future war in his elucidative 1982 book Vsegda v gotovnosti k
zashchite Otechestva (Always Ready to Defend the Homeland') and again
in his 1985 book Istoriia uchit' bditel'nosti (History Teaches
Vigilance). Counterintuitively, these publications accompanied the
ushering in of President Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, glasnost'
and uskoreniia programs to reform peacefully the Soviet body politic.
As early as 1979, however, Marshal Ogarkov obviously had
disavowed the thesis of Sokolovskii's Voennaia strategiia by
indicating, in almost verbatim contradiction to Sokolovskii's
conclusions, that Soviet military strategy was no longer confined to
"a single blow of general significance but would rather consist of a
'series' of strategic operations, each of which would realize one of
the war's 'partial' objectives." 975 Ogarkov's intellectual construct
of future war employing "successive operations" to achieve "partial
victories," the sum of which would lead to the defeat of the enemy,
was derived directly from the writings of Mikhail Tukhachevskii and
the Red Army doctrinal debates of the 1920s. Ogarkov still implied
that the principle form of military action in continental theaters
would be the nuclear strategic operation. However, in 1981 he
apparently altered this formulation so that "strategic operations in
continental and ocean theaters ... could be either conventional or
nuclear. "976
975 McConnell, James M. , "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy."
Defense Analysis. Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1985, p. 248.
976 Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., "Na strazhe mirnogo truda,"
Kommunist. No. 10, July 1981, p. 86; see also McConnell,
James M., "The Irrelevance Today of Sokolovskiy's Book
Military Strategy." Defense Analysis. Vol. 1, No. 4,
December 1985, p. 249.
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Prior to the publication of Ogarkov's two major works, with
their prescient revelations on the synthesis of a new Russian vision
of future war, the antithesis to the nuclear war theory fixation,
dictated by Sokolovskii's Voennaia strategiia. was conclusively
established with the publication of Ivan A. Korotkov's IstorLLa
sovetskoL voennoi mvsli in 1980. Korotkov's chapter entitled
"Osnovnye problemy voennogo iskusstva: Opredelenie sotsial'no-
politicheskogo kharaktera budushchei voiny" was of particular merit
and of very special importance.
Once more Korotkov turned his reader's attention back to the
Red Army military doctrine debates of the 1920s, but this time with
greater emphasis on the lasting wisdom and outcome of the debates
rather than on the origins of the debates themselves. Army Commissar
Mikhail Frunze's May 19, 1925 report to the Third Congress of Soviets
of the USSR was employed to stress that "... not only the armed
forces conduct modern warfare, but the whole country in its entirety,
demanding the exertion of all industrial forces of the state."977
Sokolovskii most particularly was targeted. Korotkov bolstered
his argument using Frunze's statement affirming the protracted nature
of future war: "During a clash of first-class competitors, a decision
cannot be attained by one blow. War will take on the character of a
protracted and fierce (zhestokogo) contest...."978 This conclusion
was supported by former Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov
977 Tretii s 'ezd Sovetov Soiuza SSR. Postanovleniia. .
(Moscow, 1925), pp. 39-40.
978 Frunze, M. V. , Izbrannve vroizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 133;
cited by Korotkov, I. A. , Istoriia sovetskoL voennoi mvsli.
Kratkii ocherk 1917-iiun' 1941.. (Moscow, 1980), p. 121.
417
who harkened back to the thesis of Svechin's Strategiia:
Certainly all future wars will take on the
characteristics of wars of attrition (izmor), but
depending on the measures of the enemy country, on his
internal condition, on the evolution in its class
struggle, the possibility of a strategy of destruction
(sokrusheniia) cannot be excluded.9'9
Ivan Korotkov's primary emphasis, however, was that the most
"important strategic problem" -- the problem of "decisive
significance" -- facing Russian military science during the 1920s and
in the 1980s (using his own italics) was "determining the most likely-
forms of armed combat; "9S0 i.e., the probable nature of future war.
Would the nature of future war be characterized by the vast offensive
maneuvering of forces, as during the Russian Civil War and the 'Great
Patriotic War?' or, would static positional defenses prevail, as they
had during World War I, as the dialectic struggle for dominance
between offensive and defensive forms of warfare continued? The use
of Lenin's unequivocal statement, "'We would be not only fools, but
also criminally delinquent'981 if we would pledge to conduct only
defensive warfare,"982 left no doubt about Korotkov's answer to this
question or about his understanding of the historical 'laws of war.'
Korotkov's conclusion about the maneuver character of future
war was reinforced by citing the 1922 statements of Mikhail Frunze
Shaposhnikov, B. M., Vospominaniia. Voenno-nauchnve
trudv.. (Moscow, 1974), p. 449; cited by Korotkov,
I. A., Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 121.
Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 125.
Lenin, V. I., Poln. sobr. soch.. Vol. 42, p. 173.
982 Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli.... p. 124.
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that "maneuverability must take hold like a weed and be the lifeblood
of our Red Army,"983 and:
... Maneuverability will be the essential principle which
transforms the character of our future operations.
However, maneuverability itself demands a broad and
complete familiarity with the positional forms of
conducting combat.984
The distinguished voenspets military historian A. M. Zaionchkovskii,
who had been a member of Svechin's Military Historical Commission
(VIK) and a fellow RKKA Military Academy faculty member during the
1920s, supported Frunze's position with his analysis. He promulgated
that although "defense is one of the fundamental forms of combat, its
main objective is for preserving and mobilizing forces as a secret
reserve combat source."983 Recalling the directives to the RKKA Shtab
by the RKP(b) and SNK SSSR in the first five-year-plan, as publicly
documented by M. Zakharov in 1970, Korotkov emphasized that in future
war "the decisive types of weaponry will be aircraft, artillery and
tanks."986 This assertion sharply contradicted the then prevailing
KPSS and General Staff exoteric position concerning the supremacy of
the Strategic Rocket Forces and nuclear war.
Frunze, M. V. , Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2, p. 45.
Frunze, M. V., Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Vol. 2,
pp. 46-47.
Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Lektsii po strategii. chitannve na
Voenno-akademicheskikh kursakh vvsshego komsostava i v
Voennoi akademii RKKA v 1922-1923 pp. . Part II, p. 39.
Zakharov, M., "Kommunisticheskaia partiia i tekhnicheskoe
perevooruzhenie armii i flota v gody prevoennykh
piatiletok," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 1, 1970,
p. 3; cited by Korotkov, I. A., Istoriia sovetskoi
voennoi mvsli.... p. 117.
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In the second half of his chapter on "Osnovnye problemy
voennogo iskusstvaKorotkov addressed the highly controversial
"initial period of war" (nachal'nyi period voiny), on which
Sokolovskii's treatise and nuclear warfare theorists placed such
inordinate emphasis. Korotkov went to considerable lengths to
substantiate that the outcome of the initial period of war was
dependent upon the peacetime interrelationship of political,
economic, military and geographic factors, and not purely dependent
upon the conduct of initial combat operations. To prove his
dialectic argument, Korotkov returned to the December 1925 RKKA Shtab
Conference, held in the Ukraine Military District and chaired by the
Mobilization Department Head S. I. Ventsov, for the purpose of
discussing the means to mobilize combat troops, reserve forces and
supplies. The Conference report concluded that the initial period of
war was primarily a mobilization period and that "to attain the
objective of successful mobilization (rapidly and of the entire
country), the report proposed the timely preparation for it, even in
peacetime. "98/
While opining that this fundamental premise of peacetime
preparation remained valid, Korotkov went on to develop the thought
that because of the introduction of new military technologies which
changed the likely character of future war by enabling an enemy to
conduct a "powerful strike during the first days of a war, a covert
Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 130;
for details of the Ukraine MD conference, see Ventsov,
S. I., "Itogi i perspektivy mobilizatsionnoi raboty,"
MobilizaCsionnvi sbornik. No. 2, 1926.
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border defense in depth" should be prepared and "air defense forces
would have to be maintained in full combat readiness."588 Korotkov
stressed that "the most decisive measure against an aggressor"985 was,
quoting from A. M. Zaionchkovskii, "to seize the initiative at the
beginning of the campaign, when the enemy had not yet prepared for
operations during the time which preceded war,"950 i.e., to preempt
offensively against an enemy attack based on strategic intelligence
indications of his preparation to go to war. In 1933 the RKKA Chief
of Staff A. I. Egorov had reported to the Rewoensovet Soiuza SSR
that the General Staff had concluded its investigations about the
initial period of war, at least for that portion of the iterative
military science cycle, and found that:
New means of armed combat (aviation, mechanized and
motorized units, airborne, etc.), their quantity and
quality of growth creates anew questions about the
initial period of war and the character of modern
operations.991
Consequently, to Korotkov and the General Staff, strategic indicators
of enemy war mobilization were, and remain, a critical factor in
Russian military strategy and military art. Russian military
theorists and the political leaders of the Soviet Union came to the
988 Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 131;
quoting from Mezheninov, S., "Voprosy strategic v
prilozhenii k vozdushnym silam," Voina i revoliutsiia.
No. 4, 1926, pp. 65-66.
Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 131.
Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Lektsii po strategii. chitannye na
Voenno-akademicheskikh kursakh vvsshego komsostava i v
Voennoi akademii RKKA v 1922-1923 gg.. Part I, p. 35.
991 Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 135;
citing Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v
sovetskikh voennvkh trudakh (1917-194-0). p. 377.
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conclusion way back in the 1920s that they could not afford to absorb
an enemy attack and thereby lose control over the initial period of
war. This conclusion subsequently was strongly reinforced by their
experience of the German Operation Barbarosa at the outset of World
War II. Therefore, the Soviet Army of the 1980s fully intended to
"attack on warning" in order to seize the initiative.
Korotkov concluded his discussion of future war by stating that
Russian military historians and military theorists had objectively
utilized the military science process very successfully to reveal the
nature of future war; however, for political, economic and personal
reasons, the leadership of the Red Army and of the Soviet Union never
put the documented lessons of military science into practice, as
evidenced by the disastrous initial period of Fascist aggression
during the Great Patriotic War (1941 -1945).992 Warning that it is
impermissible in the future to suffer such terrible consequences for
reason of neglect, Korotkov closed by underscoring that at the
present the "fundamental threat to the concentration of our troops is
enemy aviation and airborne groups which have the capability to
actively disrupt lines of communication to a depth up to 600-800
kilometers . "993
In 1982 further evidence appeared that Soviet military doctrine
was transitioning away from the 'inevitable' nature of a future
nuclear war. Marshal Ogarkov stipulated in Vsegda v gotovnosti k
zashchite Otechestva. as did General M. M. Kir'ian in his book
992
993
Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 140.
Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli.... p. 135.
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Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i Vooruzhennve Silv SSSR. that
conventional warfare was now the basic option of Soviet military
doctrine.59'" Ogarkov, in particular, underscored that the principal
threat to the Soviet Union was now a "general conventional war" which
would involve military operations in all theaters on a geographic
scale similar to that of World War II and that such a war would be
protracted -- "extending over many years."995 Confirmation of this
Russian rediscovery of protracted conventional warfare lay in Marshal
Ogarkov's late 1981 article "Na strazhe mirnogo truda," and again in
October 1982 in his "Tvorcheskaia mysl' polkovodtsa," in which the
Chief of the General Staff emphasized the requirements for improving
Red Army mobilization infrastructure and for increasing war industry
material stockpiles. 996 Ogarkov considered both these actions to be
absolutely critical to forming an independent protracted conventional
warfighting capability. General Kir'ian also pointed out that this
important doctrinal reversion toward protracted conventional warfare
was rooted in the early days of the Soviet regime997 -- a direct
continuation of the Russian military science tradition.
Ogarkov, N. V. , Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite
Otechestva. (Moscow, 1982), pp. 34-35; Kir'ian, M. M.,
Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i Vooruzhennve Silv SSSR.
(Moscow, 1982), pp. 312-313.
Ogarkov, N. V., Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite
Otechestva. (Moscow, 1982), pp. 14-17.
Ogarkov, N. "Na strazhe mirnogo truda," Kommunist.
No. 10, 1981, pp. 89-91; Ogarkov, N., "Tvorcheskaia
mysl' polkovodstva," Pravda. October 2, 1982, p. 3.
Kir'ian, M. M., Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i
Vooruzhennve Silv SSSR. (Moscow, 1982), p. 72.
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It certainly was not that the leaders of the Soviet Union had
forsaken nuclear warfare entirely, because the Strategic Rocket
Forces continued to maintain, and to expand, a most formidable
nuclear weapon delivery capability. Rather, it was that the
Communist Party and General Staff sought to broaden their military
options in an effort to escape the conundrum revealed by their
military science investigations that in a nuclear war there could be
no winners, i.e., nuclear weapons were not a politically useful basis
upon which to conduct military operations. That conclusion was
reinforced by General Rybkin and his associates who wrote:
A world war with the use of nuclear-missile weapons ...
is absolutely unacceptable, not only for pragmatic, but
above all for moral and ethical reasons, since a nuclear
war would be a crime, not only against those living
today, but also against future generations....998
At that time many in the West judged such statements, Ogarkov's
articles, and Leonid Brezhnev's February 1981 report to the XXVI
Party Congress, when he stated -- "To expect victory in nuclear war
is dangerous insanity"999 -- to be only propaganda. Or, worse yet,
such statements were determined to be disinformation to forestall the
planned NATO deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles in the European theater which would allow the Soviets
to maintain a unilateral force advantage.
In retrospect these Russian statements would appear to have
been genuine efforts to escape peacefully, if not to remove entirely,
Rybkin, E., I. Tiulin, and S. Kortunov, "Anatomiia odnogo
burzhuaznogo mifa," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnave
otnosheniia. No. 8, 1982, p. 141.
"Doklad General'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha
L. I. Brezhneva," Pravda. February 24, 1981, p. 4.
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the strategic roadblock confronting their 'national interests.'
Indeed, the primary reason Soviet motives were so very suspect in the
West -- aside from the precedent of some six decades of Russian
duplicity, which had destroyed all possibility of Western trust --
was because the Brezhnev regime had chosen, quite specifically, to
re-couple the European theater to the national territory of the
'superpowers' in late 1981 by declaring the escalation of a theater
nuclear conflict to be "inevitable,"1000 even though in June 1982 at
the United Nations Assembly he caveated this declaration with a
unilateral commitment "not to use nuclear weapons first."1001 Also
in 1982, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov gave one of the most
explicit confirmations of the Soviet doctrine shift -- away from
the 'inevitability' of nuclear war and back toward a protracted
conventional war capability -- when he wrote:
Only extraordinary circumstances -- direct nuclear
aggression against the Soviet Union or its allies --
could compel us to resort to a retaliatory nuclear strike
as the ultimate means of self-defense.1002
The rationale behind the desire of the Russian military leaders to
alter Soviet military doctrine at the beginning of the 1980s was
very clearly stated in James McConnell's important analysis:
"Otvety L. I. Brezhneva na voprosy redaktsii
zapadnogermanskogo zhurnal Shpigel." Pravda.
November 3, 1981, p. 1.
Brezhnev, L., "Vtoroi spetsial'noi sessii General'noi
Assamblel 00NPravda. June 16, 1982, p. 1.
Ustinov, D. F., Sluzhim Rodine. delu kommunizma.
(Moscow, 1982), p. 72; also Ustinov, D. F. "Otvesti
ugrozu Ladernoi voiny," Pravda. July 12, 1982, p. 4.
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The timing of the shift away from counterforce coincided
with new intelligence estimates of Soviet conventional
capabilities, which opened the way for an alternative to
nuclear weapons. To pay the price of entry into the
nuclear club, Moscow had been drawing down on its
conventional strength for a decade; what had once been
its greatest asset had become a source of
vulnerability.1003
On April 8, 1985 the most important, and most controversial,
book of former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov
went to press. Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti (History Teaches
Vigilance) is a concise, information-packed little book that is
especially significant both for its timing and for its content.
Published at the beginning of a 'new regime' in Moscow -- less than a
month after Mikhail S. Gorbachev took over the reins of the Communist
Party -- it signaled a major Soviet policy shift away from direct
confrontation with the NATO allies back toward greater accommodation,
i.e., the initiation of a Soviet "peace" and "defensive military
doctrine" diplomatic campaign. This compact text explicitly stated
that Marxist-Leninist military science had discovered a "revolution
in military-technical affairs"100'1 that superceded the one brought
about by nuclear weapons in the 1960s, i.e., as described in Marshal
V. D. Sokolovskii's three editions of Voennaia strategiia.
Aside from the few true 'gems of wisdom' about the likely
nature of future war buried within a very subjective and accusatory
McConnell, James M., "Shifts in Soviet Views on the
Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics.
Vol. XXXVII, 1985, p. 341.
Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 41 and 88.
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Marxist-Leninist short history of the socialist struggle against
"imperialism -- the highest form of capitalism" and "enemy number one
-- the USA," 1005 it would be all too easy to dismiss this opuscule as
yet another 'Bolshevik propaganda' weapon. However, Ogarkov's work
is unique because he explains in considerable detail about how the
Soviet military science process uses Hegelian dialectic logic --
which entails a radically different intellectual process from that of
commonly used Western deductive logic -- to arrive at its conclusions
about military affairs and the nature of future war. Marshal Ogarkov
enlightens the patient reader about how the Russian military
collectively thinks about military and international security
problems and further documents the continuity within the dynamic
dialectic Russian and Soviet military science process.
For purposes of this study, the heart of Ogarkov's thesis on
the "revolution in military-technical affairs" is contained within
his chapter entitled "Na osnove zakonov nauki" ("On fundamental
scientific laws"), which Ogarkov begins by stipulating:
The history of war and military art testify that the
decisive influence on military affairs is above all the
industrial production level attained at a given moment.
Within this the continuing changes in weaponry and
military technology have special importance in its
development.1006
Based on this historically established premise, Ogarkov proceeds to
specify the contemporary significance of emerging technologies and
their immense significance on the organizational structure of the
armed forces, on the command and control system, and on the basic
1005
1006
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 22.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 40.
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forms of combat:
A profound, in the full sense of the word, revolutionary-
transformation in military affairs presently is going on
in connection with the further development and
qualitative improvement of thermonuclear weapons, the
boisterous development of electronics, and also in
connection with the remarkable qualitative improvement of
conventional means and methods of armed combat.100'
While Marshal Ogarkov only vaguely hinted at the general nature of
this on-going 'revolution' in future war military capability, he
tantalized his readers -- most likely in response to U.S. President
Ronald Reagan's March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, derisively referred to in the Western press by its alias,
"Star Wars" --by asserting:
... The fundamental threat to peace is the United States'
unrestrained development and concentration of nuclear
weapons, the aspiration to conduct an arms race even in
space, and the intensified research on weapons of mass
destruction, based on new physical principles. ... Also,
on a broad front work is being conducted in order that,
in terms of military qualities and effectiveness,
conventional weapons will approach that of nuclear
[weapons ] .loos
In 1985 neophytes about the nature of emerging military
technologies could disregard Ogarkov's message as more bombastic
Russian propaganda, or label it as 'disinformation,' duplicitously
designed to curtail "Star Wars" and Western nuclear weapons
development programs; while socialist 'fellow travellers' could
willingly accept Ogarkov's seemingly simplistic generalizations at
face-value. Reality, as usual, was far more complex -- and perhaps
even more 'revolutionary' -- than even a most knowledgeable military
1007
1008
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 41.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 25.
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leader like Marshal Ogarkov could divine. Indeed, within the inner
sanctums of the Soviet General Staff, the Pentagon and world-wide
scientific research centers, work was underway, and had been for
nearly two decades, to develop a completely new generation of 'smart'
weaponry, utilizing the most recent micro-electronic and computer
technologies available, which would possess incredible accuracy and a
'stand-off' capability to destroy targets from great distances.
This precision-guided weaponry was but a small part of the
'Information Age' revolution in military affairs that Marshal Ogarkov
was predicting -- and, yes, seeking to delay, since the indigenous
Soviet industrial base could not compete in this new micro-electronic
cybernetic arena. In the early 1980s only a handful of individuals
world-wide really knew the military potential of these emerging
technologies. Hence, in Western nations there developed a public
debate -- unfortunately, more often than not, with the Strategic
Defense Initiative as the 'whipping boy' and predicated more on
individual political convictions than on scientific facts -- about
what this distant Marshal of the Soviet Union meant by "weapons of
mass destruction based on new physical principles" and a "revolution
in military-technical affairs," and how he reached such conclusions.
Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti offered little further direct
explanation about 'what' was entailed in a "revolution in military-
technical affairs" in terms of specific military weapons systems or
mission capability changes -- nor was it intended to do so. At the
beginning of the Gorbachev regime, Ogarkov's purpose (and that of the
Russian military) was to accuse the Brezhnev regime of failing to
adequately provide for the defense of the Soviet Union and to
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challenge the Gorbachev regime to provide the expanded economic and
technological wherewithal to allow the Soviet Army to modernize in
order to keep pace with the 'Information Age' revolution that was in
progress in the West. Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti served this
purpose very nicely.
Marshal Ogarkov did provide, however, most valuable insights
into 'how' the General Staff derived such conclusions about the
probable nature of future war through its military science process.
For example:
Dialectics demand the matching of each phenomenon with
the account of its historical development. Through
corroboration of this condition, the development of forms
of conducting military activity and their connection with
the changing organizational structure of the armed forces
can be worked.1009
... It is through this [process that] the highest
military leadership acquires the capability to influence
the course and outcome of warfare in direct and decisive
ways .1010
Ogarkov continued to explain, and in so doing revealed his
frustrations by very strongly criticizing the policies of former
Communist regimes:
It is especially important at the present stage that the
dialectic process realizes the development of military
affairs under conditions of rapid scientific-technical
progress. Noting the transformation (perestroika) of
views, which are deadlocked in deliberations and not
being put into practice, new questions of military art





Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 45.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 47.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 47.
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Further on Ogarkov clarified somewhat more explicitly what he meant
by the "revolution in military-technical affairs," but still only in
vague generalities, by stating that:
... New forms and means of conducting military activity
are being developed and introduced to existing anti¬
aircraft and anti-parachute operations. In other words,
a dynamic antithetical struggle is going on between
defensive and offensive means.1012
Ogarkov judged that the "uninterrupted antithetical struggle between
offensive and defensive means is revealed by the internal historical
development of military affairs"1013 and proceeded to describe in some
detail the significance of this dialectic:
The appearance of new offensive means always led to the
inevitable creation of corresponding means of countering
[it], and of course, to the development of new
capabilities for conducting combat, battles, operations,
and wars in their entirety. Therefore, in present
conditions, when active changes from one generation of
weaponry to another are taking place, it is especially
important that military cadres are not one-sided, but
from all sides proceed to investigate all aspects of the
development of military affairs on the basis of a deep
understanding of the fundamental law, the core of
dialectics -- the law of unity and struggle of
opposites.1014
The law of transformation of quantity into a new quality was
also described by Ogarkov as "leading Soviet military science to
understanding the character and forms of development of the armed
forces, the readiness capability, and the conduct of military
activity."1015 As an example of the practical application of this
1012 Ogarkov, IsCoriia uchit bditel 'nosti . p. 48.
1013 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti . p. 49.
1014 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti . p. 49.
1015 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti . p. 50.
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dialectic law, Ogarkov explained that in the 1950s and 1960s, when
there were a small number of nuclear weapons, such weapons were
looked upon only as a means for increasing combat firepower in
traditional military operations; but, during the 1970s and 1980s,
as the quantity and destructive power of nuclear weapons grew, along
with the distance and accuracy with which nuclear weapons could be
delivered, in warfare and in the conduct of operations their
significance changed, taking on an entirely new quality.1016
On the premise of the dialectic law of "Transformation of
Quantity into a New Quality," Ogarkov next introduced the dialectic
law of "Negation of the Negation," which in military affairs shows
the "growing advanced character of development, its direction, and
the process of creating new [weapons]."1017 About this Ogarkov wrote:
New technology and weaponry generation after generation
inevitably push out [replace], negate old technology and
weaponry. The action of the law of negation of the
negation is revealed in this lesson. ... During the
years of the Second World War and especially during the
period following, for the armed forces and fleet there
began to be deployed progressively throughout their
structure a new type of weapon -- without a barrel
(rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, missiles of
all other types). Through their outstanding accuracy and
maneuver qualities, they already are beginning to change,
and even to some extent replace, conventional weaponry.1018
Ogarkov went on to show the direct dialectic application of
Russian military science in his discussion of military doctrine. To
do this he quoted Mikhail V. Frunze's statement that: "The essential
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conformity to the general aims of the state and to those material and
spiritual resources, which are found in its instructions."1019 After
referencing the legendary Russian military theorists Miliutin,
Dragomirov, and Mikhnevich, the similarity of whose historic views
ostensibly provided legitimacy to his own, Ogarkov explained:
In its contemporary meaning military doctrine is
understood in a given state at a given (operational) time
as a system of views on the aims and character of a
possible future war, on the preparations of the country
and armed forces for it, and on the capabilities in order
to conduct it. Military doctrine customarily defines:
what is the probability level of future war and with
which enemy it will have to be conducted; what kind of
character the war can take, which the country and its
armed forces can expect to conduct; what aims and
missions can be assigned to the armed forces during the
conduct of such a war and what kind of armed forces it is
necessary to have, in order to achieve the assigned aims
by any means; proceeding from this, follows the general
military construction and the preparation of the army and
country for it [future war]; and finally, by what kind of
capabilities to conduct the war....1020
Ogarkov then underscored the "intimate dialectical connection and
interdependence of the social-political and military technical
aspects of doctrine"1021 before asserting the politically obligatory
disclaimer -- widely disabused and disbelieved in the West -- that
"the May 15, 1980 Warsaw Pact Declaration ... distinctly records that
we 'do not have, have not had, and will not have any strategic
doctrine, except defensive.'"1022
Frunze, M. V. , Izbr. proizv.. (Moscow, 1965), p. 47;
cited by Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 59.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 58.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 58.
1022 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti. p. 72; also p. 77.
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The skepticism of Western analysts and policymakers about the
veracity of Ogarkov's statement concerning the "defensive" nature of
Russian military doctrine -- which could be viewed at best as
contradictory, if not outright duplicitous -- can be understood best
within context by comparing Ogarkov's "defensive doctrine" political
assertions with that of his and other contemporary Russian military
authors military-technical analysis about the imminent "revolution in
military-technical affairs" and the looming convergence of offensive
and defensive military capabilities. For wishful Western analysts
and policymakers, who are frustrated by such a confounding and
contradictory dialectical dichotomy, it is most unlikely that such
ambiguous Russian policy formulations will disappear, given the
nature of the continuing process for developing Russian military
doctrine. As Marshal Ogarkov has explained, it is inherent within
the nature of the Russian military science process to develop
contradictory, multifaceted alternatives; while Western science tends
to seek optimum, usually quantifiable, single courses of action to
resolve problems and issues.
Specifically concerning the nature of future war, Marshal
Ogarkov dialectically returned to the origins of Soviet unified
military doctrine in the 1920s by citing Army Commissar Mikhail V.
Frunze's conclusion that the prerequisites for constructing a
military doctrine were: "First, a clear and exact idea about the
character of future war; second, a correct and exact accounting of
those forces and means that will be deployed by our possible
opponent; third, an equally precise accounting of our Soviet
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resources."1023 This initial Soviet military doctrine posited that
future war would require the mobilization of the entire material and
spiritual resources of the country and would be characterized by the
maneuver of forces and offensive forms of combat across broad
expanses of territory.1024 Then, in the 1930s, Ogarkov explained,
because of the "growing danger of a new world war with the
imperialists," it became,
necessary to specify the military-technical aspect of
Soviet military doctrine and based on the new tendencies
in the character of future war and the direction of
development of military affairs to work out substantial
recommendations for the improvement of military
technologies, of capabilities for preparing and
conducting operations, for the strengthening of the
defensive capabilities of the country....1025
Here, without mentioning the shunned former Red Army Chief of Staff
Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii by name, Marshal Ogarkov emphasized that:
"Of supreme importance in those years were the Soviet military
thought investigations of the theory of deep operations and
battle."1026 Continuing his subliminal praise for the brilliant ideas
of the man Stalin had executed as a traitor nearly five decades
earlier, Ogarkov wrote:
Within it [Russian military theory] existed the basic
possibility of simultaneous suppression of enemy defenses
in their entire depth by artillery fires and aviation
strikes, of decisive penetration of the tactical zone of
defenses by massed forces, and means for selecting the
direction and for striving to develop tactical success in
Frunze, M. V. , Izbr. proizv. . (Moscow, 1957), Vol. 2,
p. 342; cited by Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit.... p. 73.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti. pp. 73-74.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti. p. 74.






the operation during the course of battle employing
powerful mobile units of tanks, motorized infantry,
cavalry, and parachute troop landings.102'
Upon this military scientific dialectic foundation, Marshal
Ogarkov drew the conclusion that "modern world war," which would be
unleashed by the "imperialists," would,
acquire an unprecedented destructive character. Military
actions will be conducted simultaneously in broad zones,
will be distinguished by singular violence, will bear a
highly maneuverable, dynamic character and will continue
until complete victory [is achieved] over the enemy. The
most important requirement of Soviet military doctrine is
the maintenance of the Armed Forces of the USSR in high
combat readiness. . . ,1028
Ogarkov then explained that the critical factor in achieving the
required "high combat readiness" is the "provision of the armed
forces and fleet with modern military technology and weaponry"1029
because, since 1945, there has been a "tempest (buria) of scientific-
technological progress, which has proceeded at a dialectic gallop,
toward a genuine revolution in military affairs."1030 In this regard
Ogarkov considered that the "active and decisive" role of the Soviet
state was to ensure the development of a "world-class" economy and of
the country's mobilization preparedness. But it was to the Soviet
General Staff and to the General Staff Academy, in particular, that
Marshal Ogarkov assigned the historically established, crucial
responsibility for armed forces organization and education:
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 74; details in
Tukhachevskii, M. N., ed., Budushchaia voina. 7 vols.,
(Moscow: RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate, 1928).
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 77.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 78.




... Great attention is devoted to the questions of the
organizational structure of the Armed Forces, of the
expedient relationship among their views, branches of
arms and service, combat and support troops and forces,
but also to the composition of staff personnel, their
training, education, and cadre preparation, who direct
improvement of the system and organs of command and
communications .1031
Ogarkov finally insisted, sounding a bit too much like a distant
siren song of Mikhail Frunze during the 1920s unified proletarian
military doctrine debates, and almost certainly alienating some of
his long-term Communist Party comrades, that the "principal basis for
organization of Armed Forces [command and] control (upravleniia) in
peace and wartime" had to be one-man command (edinonachalo):
The principle of unity of wartime political and military
leadership, of centralized army and fleet control with
broad initiative and necessary independent action by all
control organs at their own level is in the interest of
achieving battle, operational, and war objectives. A
great role is allotted to the entire country in providing
active combat troops (forces) and reserves of various
types.1032
In this manner, by challenging over twenty years of ossified
Communist Party 'conventional wisdom' concerning the content of
Soviet military doctrine, the former Chief of the Soviet General
Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov laid the
dialectic foundation for the transformation of Russian military
doctrine away from the narrow spectrum of Marshal Sokolovskii's
Voennaia strategiia and toward a much broader new synthesis.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti. p. 78.
Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel 'nosti. p. 78.
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Makhmut A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze - Voennvi Teoretik:
Destroys the Sokolovskii Voennaia Strateaiia Anomaly
In this military-theoretical work the scientific activity of the outstanding
Soviet commander and military theoretician M. V. Frunze is analyzed, his
role in the development process of Soviet military doctrine and of the most
important conditions of Soviet military science, and the significance of his
military-theoretical legacy to contemporary conditions is revealed.1033
- General-Colonel Makhmut A. Gareev
Proof of the continuity in Russian military thought, and of the
existence of a dialectic military science process through which that
continuity is advanced, can be nowhere more clearly, succinctly and
authoritatively documented than with the above cited description and
the subtitle used by Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General
M. A. Gareev, to introduce his book M. V. Frunze - Voennvi Teoretik.
Vzgladv M. V. Frunze i sovremennaia teoriia (.... The Views of
M. V. Frunze and Contemporary Theory-) . Most directly stated General
Gareev's thesis was that, although the preoccupation of Sokolovskii's
Voennaia Strategiia with nuclear warfare during the 1960s had
developed a "profound and, on the whole, correct analysis"1034 for that
time, during the ensuing decades conditions had changed. These
changes necessitated a restoration of most of the previous Russian
military art concepts and former historically validated principles of
future war which Sokolovskii's operational researchers purposely had
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), contents note of the
catalogue record on the reverse of the title page.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 239.
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rejected.10" In the process of analyzing Frunze's contributions to
the development of Russian military thought in the 1920s and of
synthesizing its relevance to the 1980s, General Gareev unequivocally
and explicitly confirmed in 1985 that the 'Sokolovskii anomaly' was
being replaced by a more expansive and historically justified Russian
paradigm concerning the protracted nature of future war.
What was truly unique in Gareev's work was that rather than
burying his critique of Sokolovskii within the text of what might
seem to some to be irrelevant historical propaganda, as all too often
had been the case in previous efforts to forward the debate of the
nature of future war, Gareev left no doubts about the negation of
Voennaia strategiia by directly citing Sokolovskii's text and
proposing a specific antithesis. For example:
In the '60s and '70s the authors of this and many other
books primarily proceeded from the fact that, in all
cases, wars would be conducted using nuclear weapons,
while military action using only conventional means of
destruction was viewed as a brief episode at the
beginning of war. However, the upgrading and stockpiling
of nuclear-missile weapons have reached such a level that
the massive use of these weapons in war could entangle
both sides in catastrophic consequences. Together with
this, a frantic process of upgrading conventional
weaponry types is going on in the armies of the NATO
countries. The main emphasis is put on developing highly
accurate guided weaponry that approaches low-yield
nuclear weaponry in effectiveness. In these conditions,
it is assumed in the West, there is an increasing
possibility of fighting a relatively protracted war with
conventional weapons, and primarily with new types of
highly accurate weapons.1036
For an excellent and well-documented discussion of the
significance of M. V. Frunze - Voennvi Ceoretik. see
McConnell, James M., "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy." Defense Analysis.
Vol. 1, No. 4, 1985, pp. 243-254.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 240.
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And what is terribly important in Gareev's analysis, building
on Ogarkov's precedent of a "revolution in military-technical
affairs," is that Russian military science reached the conclusion
that in future war precision-guided conventional explosive weapons
would approach low-yield nuclear weapons in effectiveness. No longer
would nuclear weapons be required to destroy 'hard targets' such as
heavily defended installations or reinforced command and control
bunkers, airfield runways, dams, dikes, bridges or fortified gun
emplacements that had proven to be relatively impervious to attack
using conventional explosives during previous wars. Always before,
the destruction of hardened targets had required either the use of a
massive artillery barrage, a huge number of costly aircraft bombing
sorties, or a single nuclear weapon. Now, because of the exceptional
accuracy of a wide variety of emerging precision-guided munitions
(PGM), it was becoming possible, using only one PGM armed with a
conventional high-explosive warhead, to destroy many of these types
of targets -- and to destroy them all if a low-yield nuclear weapon
was mated with a PGM. Furthermore, the low radar cross-section and
maneuverability of PGMs made them virtually impossible to detect in
time for air defenses to react; and the range of PGMs allowed for
their launch at targets within the Soviet Union from virtually all
azimuths. The shock wave that these realizations sent through the
Soviet General Staff, which was particularly dependent on secure
command and control to conduct military operations, was profound.
The vital Soviet command and control system and military
infrastructure were vulnerable to PGM attack in a future war.
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Gareev also saw the possibility of nuclear war developing
without massive nuclear weapons exchanges, and took exception to
Sokolovskii's nuclear war targeting philosophy which focused on "the
economy, system of state control, and strategic nuclear means, along
with groupings of armed forces in the theaters."1037 Instead, Gareev
proposed a global counter-force nuclear targeting strategy in which
"groupings of an opponent's armed forces," wherever located, became
the primary targets:
The virtually unlimited range of the means for delivering
nuclear weapons, which makes it possible to cripple any
groupings of an opponent's armed forces, has changed our
notions of the nature of war. Therefore, in a strategic
sense, a war can take the form of a global confrontation
between two major coalitions of armed forces that has no
historical precedent in spatial scope, ferocity, and
destructiveness .1038
Pressing his argument, Gareev contradicted not only Sokolovskii's
description of the character of future war, but complained that "from
the former theory of military art almost nothing remains"1039 and
challenged the professional understanding of the basic principles and
process of military science by the Voennaia strategiia authors:
... It is stated in this book that a whole series of
well-known principles, norms, and rules which formerly
were considered authoritative for military strategy are
now subject to radical revision or have lost their
importance entirely. The authors included among these
the principles of concentrating forces and means on the
decisive axis, economy of force, and partial victory.
Sokolovskii, V. D., Voennaia stratepiia.
3rd ed., (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968), p. 331.
Gareev, M. A., M. P. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 237.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 239.
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They postulated that strategic deployment, strategic
offense, strategic defense, strategic maneuver and other
basic strategic theory concepts largely have lost their
importance.1040
In keeping with Ogarkov's return to the conventional war
option, while sharply disputing the contents of Voennaia strategiia.
Gareev asserted: "... at the present time the principle of
concentration of forces and means on the decisive axes is required
in the newly specified conditions" and that "the objective of this
principle ... retains its significance."1041 Concerning the importance
of strategic reserves and the historic Russian propensity for
maneuver forces that Sokolovskii dispensed with through the shifting
of nuclear weapon targets, Gareev charged that "the appearance of new
means of destruction not only does not nullify, but all the more
greatly elevates the importance of strategic reserves and the
necessity for them to maneuver in wartime."1042 Nor did Gareev accept
Sokolovskii's proposition that economy of force could be discarded
because the outcome of future war would be decided by inbeing forces
at the time of the initial nuclear strikes. Gareev stated quite
unequivocally:
In contemporary conditions the outcome of wars, to a
significantly greater extent than before, depends on the
quantity and effectiveness of those forces which are
applied at the very beginning of the war, however the
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 239-240 referencing
Sokolovskii, V. D., Voennaia strategiia. 2nd ed.,
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 19-23.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 240.
(Gareev's bold in original text)
1042 Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 240.
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strategic principle of economy of force is retained in
its entirety, as in a war between gigantic coalitions
with their enormous potential capabilities it is
difficult to expect it will have a short duration.
Therefore, it is essential to be ready for protracted,
persistent, and fierce military combat.10''3
Rather than Sokolovskii's strategic concept through which
'victory' was attained by a single nuclear 'strike' that would
destroy simultaneously the enemy's economy, population centers and
armed forces, Gareev advocated a return to Tukhachevskii's future war
concept, wherein partial victory was possible through a series of
strategic operations10'1'' and in which both the strategic offensive and
strategic defensive retained important functions. In Gareev's
judgment, "The strategic content of war is discerned as a complicated
system of integrated simultaneous and successive operations."1045 At
this point, as James McConnell correctly concludes, "There is very
little left of the Sokolovskiy version of military strategy. Indeed,
the only Sokolovskiy amendment still standing is the concept of an
expanded theater of military action...."1046 Thus, with these
judgments about the nature of future war and through his dialectic
discussion of M. V. Frunze's contributions to the development of
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 240-241.
(Gareev's bold in original text).
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 241.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 237.
McConnell, James M., "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy."
Defense Analysis. Vol. 1, No. 4, 1985, p. 252.
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Soviet military science and the Red Army, General Makhmut Gareev
indubitably returned Soviet military doctrine to the legacies of its
Russian Imperial Army and Red Army predecessors.
Gareev's work went beyond just destroying the 'Sokolovskii
anomaly,' however, by clarifying the role of military science in the
development of the Soviet Armed Forces:
If we are speaking from the perspective of the further
development of the theory of military art, then in the
light of examination the problem of maintaining high
military readiness to repel an unexpected enemy attack
acquires especially great importance. ... Therefore,
one of the important tasks of military science is the
research of ways to further elevate the military
readiness of the Armed Forces, their capability to
conduct decisive action by defeating any aggressor under
any conditions at the beginning of a war.1047
In this same time period, General Kir'ian also weighed in concerning
the great importance that the Russian military establishment attaches
to the military science process and described, using ambiguous
generalities, the manner in which research was organized to attempt
to predict the nature of future war:
A superficial analysis ... in modern war conditions will
result in errors ... to solve these problems a system of
organs was created, which are concerned with
prognosticating the possible character of future war and
problems connected with it. It embraces the General
Staff and the headquarters of the Armed Services, and
also other military organizations: corporations,
commissions, institutes, societies, centers. Various
technical means for predicting situations which arise in
operations have been created which play out the various
decisions which may be taken in order to establish the
most expedient [optimum] one.1048
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 242-243.
(Gareev's bold in original text.)
Kir'ian, M. M., Problemi voennoi teorii v sovetskikh
nauchno-spravochnvkh izdaniiakh. (Moscow, 1985), p. 99.
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By far, General Gareev's most important, and perhaps singular
and enduring, contribution to the development of the Russian military
science process and to military art was his conclusion that in future
war there would cease to be a distinction between purely offensive
and purely defensive military operations:
Speaking about the problems of offensive and defensive
operations, it must be taken into account now that all
the more distinctly the tendency of troop activity is
being demonstrated for further merger of offensive and
defensive capabilities.1049
This statement stands in sharp contradiction to the historic
dialectic of warfare as described by Marshal Ogarkov which
counterpoised offensive and defensive military operations as a
continuing bi-polar struggle, during which, over time, due largely to
technological advances, first the offense would prevail over the
defense and then vice versa. In contrast, Gareev's synthesis
postulated that there would be no clear distinction between offensive
and defensive military operations because on the modern battlefield,
dominated by the enormous destructive power of nuclear and precision-
guided weapons, maneuver of forces and fires would become the sine
qua non of both "offensive" and "defensive" military operations:
Enormous significance is acquired from a first strike by
the enemy's nuclear missiles, while his precision-guided
weapons remain the basis for grouping their forces in
initial regions for conducting an offensive and
counterattack.
The basis of modern defenses is also fire and
maneuver in combination with firmly holding on to
occupied positions. It is characterized by the use of
powerful fire means, which permit the destruction of
splendid enemy forces while still at distant approaches,
and high levels of activity by defending troops.
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 245.
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... Modern weaponry permits the attainment of an
uninterrupted attack, unexpected and violent strikes, and
great activity and stability (ustoichivost') of
defenses.10:>0
The implications of this most authoritative Russian military
judgment were, and continue to be, of immense significance, both
politically and militarily. It is worth noting that Russian military
science reached these conclusions about the lack of distinction
between "offensive" and "defensive" force structures at least five
years before the great international political debate about Russian
"defensive doctrine" and "reasonable defensive sufficiency," et al.,
was launched. To the Russian General Staff, the content of that
coming political debate -- but not the outcome of the debate itself
-- largely would be irrelevant because Russian military officers
already knew that a "pure defensive doctrine" was impossible, given
the capabilities of modern weapons technology. It might then be
prudent for Western military analysts to ponder: "For whom was the
Russian glasnost' debate on 'defensive doctrine' staged?"
In his conclusion of M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik. General
Makhmut Gareev once more offered solid, concrete evidence of the
continuity of Russian military thought and of the enduring legacy of
a military science process derived therefrom when he wrote:
In the works of Mikhail Vasil'evich Frunze, the reader
even today finds many profound thoughts and expressions
of opinion about general problems of military science,
theoretical and practical questions of military art,
military construction, training, [and] the political and
military education of personnel. However far forward
military affairs advance, the dialectic of its
development, the methods of creatively arriving at a
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 245-246.
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resolution of vital problems, the penetration into the
depths of the investigative process revealing and
analyzing concrete historical conditions, which M. V.
Frunze so skillfully applied, in scientific work they
will serve further on as reliable guideposts.
... The contemporary achievements of military
science and military art have absorbed into themselves
the entire military experience which preceded it, ...
revealing its continuation to a new qualitative level.1051
Further evidence concerning how the dialectic military science
process for investigation of the nature of future war is used,
employing historical examples to discuss current issues, came in an
authoritative June 1988 Voenno-istoricheskiL zhurnal article by
General-Lieutenant M. M. Kir'ian entitled "The Initial Period of the
Great Patriotic War," which was prefaced by an unsigned article
titled "Remember the Lessons of History: Strengthen Combat Readiness
in Every Way." 1052 In the preface article particular emphasis was
placed on the fact that:
In comparison with previous wars, the command and staffs
now possess significantly less time for organizing an
operation and combat. At the same time the scope of the
work involved in collecting the information, carrying out
various sorts of calculations and issuing tasks to the
troops has substantially increased and continues to grow.
The extensive introduction of automated systems and
facilities makes it possible to free the command bodies
from resolving many technical questions, and due to this
additional time is released for analytical and creative
work.1053
Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 443-444.
See Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 6, June 1988,
pp. 3-10 and Kir'ian, pp. 11-17.
"Remember the Lessons of History: Strengthen Combat
Readiness in Every War," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal.
No. 6, June 1988; in FBIS, JPRS-UMJ-88-012, 7 NOV 88,
p. 4
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At a time when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had emphasized
before the June 1987 Communist Party Plenum: "... We are moving
toward major decisions, particularly important are scientific
soundness, theoretical and ideological-political clarity in
understanding the essence and main sense of the commenced changes as
well as the trend in the restructuring of command and control, "105,i the
preface article stressed:
The level of technical equipment available has always
been and remains a most essential element determining the
combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and is
the material basis of their combat might. This is one of
the main conditions for thwarting the enemy's intentions
of achieving military-technical superiority and at the
same time is a most important prerequisite for
maintaining the combat readiness of the troops and naval
forces on a high level. At the present stage in the
development of military affairs, one of the main factors
in strengthening the country's defense capability is
military science.10"
This important article concluded with the assertion and guidance:
Qualitative changes have occurred in it [military
science] in recent years. ... The unprecedented growth
in the strike force, fire power, and mobility of the
troops have made it possible to fundamentally revise many
traditional ideas as well as work out new recommendations
on the organizational development of the army and navy,
the forms and methods of conducting armed combat and the
readying of the Armed Forces to repel aggression. At
present the primary tasks are the strengthening of the
links of theory and practice and the extensive
involvement of all levels of military personnel in
scientific work. ... Here it is essential to see to it
that the results of the conducted research are promptly






Ibid., pp. 4-5 .
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General Kir'ian dialectically built on this military scientific
foundation. He returned the reader to the late 1920s and early 1930s
--a time when the concept of 'the initial period of war' first
received great attention in Soviet military theory. First, Kir'ian
employed the 1933 report of RKKA Chief of Staff A. I. Egorov to the
RVS which underscored that "new weapons (aviation, mechanized and
motorized formations, modernized cavalry, airborne troops and so
forth) and their qualitative and quantitative growth pose in a new
light the questions of the initial period of a war and the nature of
modern operations 1,1057 to define the then, and current, military tasks:
The destruction of the enemy cover troops; the thwarting
of its mobilization; the capture and destruction of
material supplies; the capture and holding of
strategically important areas; anticipating the enemy in
deploying the main forces and seizing the strategic
initiative. Particular attention was paid to air and
mechanized troop operations.1058
General Kir'ian then brought in the former RKKA Chief of Staff
Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii's work, "The Nature of Border Operations,"
to underscore the likely nature of "fierce large-scale border
operations"1059 during the initial period of war. He ended by
stipulating the contemporary conclusions of Russian military science
concerning the nature of budushchaia voina:
Kir'ian, General-Lt. M. M., "Initial Period of the Great
Patriotic War," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. No. 6,
June 1988; in FBIS, JPRS-UMJ-88-012, 7 NOV 88, p. 6;
citing A. I. Egorov, "Tactics and Operational Art of the
RKKA in the Start of the 1930s," in Voprosv strategiia i
operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennvkh trudakh
(191V-1940 gg.). (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), p. 377.
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 6; citing M. N. Tukhachevskii, Izbrannve
proizvedeniia. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), Vol. 2, p. 217.
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In considering the new trends of the imperialist states
in preparing and conducting initial period [of war]
military operations, Soviet military science worked out
recommendations on preparing to repulse the enemy attack
and these basically came down to the following. Modern
wars start by surprise, by treachery. Here the
concentration and deployment of the invasion army as well
as the mobilization of the main enemy forces will be
carried out gradually under various pretexts (courses,
maneuvers, exercises and so forth). ... The initial
period, as before, will be the interval of time from the
start of military operations to the entry of the main
mass of armed forces into them. Its chief content will
be a retaliatory strike against the aggressor invasion
array with the forces of the border military districts....
The border district troops in the course of the initial
period will repulse the enemy attack and carry military
actions into enemy territory with simultaneous
mobilization, concentration and deployment of the second
strategic echelon, the Soviet Army main forces.1060
conclusion, General Kir'ian sagaciously observed:
There was a clear need for carrying out measures of a
preparatory nature prior to the start of hostilities,
including mobilization and strategic deployment of
the armed forces for conducting the first operations.
There were also trends for increasing the scale and
decisiveness of combat, achieving significant results
in the initial period capable of having a greater
impact on the further course of the war and reducing
the length of the initial period.1061
Military doctrine gives Military Science the task of working out scientific
problems, connected with researching the character of future war.1062
War undergoes a constant evolution. New weapons create new forms of combat.
To foresee this technical evolution accurately, to assess the effect of a new
weapon of the course of battle and to employ it before the enemy does are
essential conditions of success.1063
1060 Kir'ian, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
1061 Kir'ian, op. cit., p. 9.
1062 Kir'ian, M. M. , Problemv voennoi teorii. . . . p. 83.
1061 Miksche, Paratroops: The History. Organization and
Use of Airborne Formations. (London, 1943), p. 7.
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A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov - "Foresight!:
General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War"
The 1920s and early 1930s were a time of stormy development of social thought,
including military-political and military-strategic thought. ... Nothing
interfered with the free exchange of opinions; participants in debates felt
relaxed and believed that they did not all have the right to the absolute truth
— later on this no longer was the case.1064
- A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov, 1990
The continuity of the dialectic Russian military science
process was further reinforced with the publication of the article
"Predvidenie!" by Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin, the future, first civilian
Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, and the former Chief of the
Warsaw Pact and Chief of the General Staff, Army General V. N. Lobov.
This authoritative article emerged at a time of dramatic change and
unrest within Russia -- there was accelerating social turmoil as the
Communist Party was losing its control; the Russian military was
increasingly coming under domestic criticism, for their failed
strategy in Afghanistan and for the heavy-handedness and corruption
of its senior leadership; and young civilian 'democratic reformers'
were advocating wholesale changes in Russian military doctrine.
Dr. Kokoshin and General Lobov adeptly employed the military science
process to illuminate the essential role of the Russian military.
The antithesis upon which these authors chose to base their arguments
was none other than the 1920s "bold conclusions and profound
generalizations" of the former Tsarist General Aleksandr A. Svechin.
Kokoshin, A. A., and Army General V. N. Lobov,
"Predvidenie!" ("Foresight! General Svechin on the
Evolution of the Art of War"), Moskva znamia. No. 2,
February 1990, p. 170.
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First the authors quoted Svechin's writings to establish the
unquestionable "superiority of politics over strategy" --a euphemism
that also applied to the Russian military: "The assertion about the
domination of politics over strategy, in our opinion, is of world¬
wide historical importance."1063 Using Svechin's authority as a
historic military theorist, they then proceeded to strongly criticize
the civilian leadership and 'democratic reformers' who were seeking
to virtually eliminate the force structure of the Soviet Army:
Responsible political figures should be familiar with
strategy ... a politician who sees a political goal for
military actions must realize what is attainable for
strategy given the resources it has and how policy can
influence a change in the situation for better or
worse .1066
The best known, indeed, the 'classic cases' of a Russian
civilian leader not listening to the advice of his military
professionals were attributed to Iosip Stalin during the 1939-40
'Winter War' with Finland and the tragically costly opening days of
the Second World War. Kokoshin and Lobov cited these as a very
thinly veiled warning to the opponents of a strong Russian military
establishment. The authors then concluded:
Today, ... it is all the more important that the top
state and political leadership know the theory and
practice of military strategy and the implementation by
the military mechanism of decisions made by policy.
After all, such decisions on the boundary of politics and
military affairs can lead to the most fatal, irreversible
1065 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!" , Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 172.
1066 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 172.
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consequences. They should especially know, it seems, the
real capabilities of command and control systems and
equipment -- theirs and the enemy's -- communications and
reconnaissance systems, and missile warning systems.
... Otherwise policy will not be able to exercise real,
but only declarative control over military strategy, and
there will be no correspondence between the political and
military-technical components of state military
doctrine.106'
With their political tyl ' (rear) thus secured, Kokoshin and
Lobov turned their attention to their main thesis, and principal
contemporary concern -- the nature of future war -- predicated on the
enduring historical truths contained within Svechin's works from the
mid-1920s:
A. A. Svechin wrote that the world had entered a
transitional period in which not only Europe but the
entire world is beginning to appear as a 'completely new
strategic landscape' and in which the art of war in many
schools is turning to new methods and techniques of
waging war and is acquiring new forms in a situation of
social upheavals coming to a head.1066
After discussing in some depth Svechin's views on the dangerous
nature of an ideologically-based offensive "war of destruction"
strategy, i.e., "the experience of history is not too comforting --
it shows that overestimating the capabilities of strategic offensive
operations can lead to catastrophic consequences for the attacker,"1069
Kokoshin and Lobov emphasized Svechin's convictions about the
protracted nature of future wars and the singular importance of a
Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 173.
Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 173.
Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 174.
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state's industrial base, economic resources and mobilization
capability before reaching their conclusion that "equally decisive
military and political goals can be pursued with a 'strategy of
attrition' as with a 'strategy of destruction.'"1070 They then used
Svechin's emphasis on the "Red Army's infantry and equipping it with
reliable and effective close-combat weapons" as justification for
asserting:
The industrial-economic and cultural level of the USSR,
despite industrialization and development of education,
would not make it possible in the foreseeable future to
be equal to the West in the level of being equipped with
combat equipment and the ability to properly use it on a
strategic and operational scale.1071
With the above horrendous admission of the failure of the
Communist political-economic system, Kokoshin and Lobov moved on to
rationalize the requirement for Russia to return to a "defensive"
strategy by discussing the correlation between the offensive and
defensive on a strategic scale. Here Svechin's Evoliutsiia iskusstva
voina was employed to emphasize:
Defense in strategy has the opportunity of using the
boundaries and depth of the theater, which forces the
attacking side to waste forces in order to strengthen the
spaces and to waste time crossing it, and any gain in
time is another plus for the defense. The defending side
reaps where it sows..., since an offensive is often
stopped by false reconnaissance data, false fears, and
inertness .1072
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The legendary Clausewitz was brought into the argument as well
to emphasize that defense was "the strongest form of waging war for
the materially weaker side" before explaining that Svechin examined
defensive operations as a "dialectical unit with the offensive --
as a means of ensuring conditions for going over to an effective
counteroffensive, resulting in the defeat of the enemy." In other
words, "... in the majority of cases, the effectiveness of a
strategic counterattack far surpasses in scope the initial thrust of
the attacker." 1073 Kokoshin and Lobov judged from this analysis that:
A. A. Svechin's conclusions were confirmed in many
operations of World War II and also have not lost their
importance today -- of course, with all the corrections
for the development of military technology and new
tactical and operational forms of conducting combat
operations.10,4
Concerning those new forms of conducting combat operations,
Kokoshin and Lobov were unusually candid and fiercely critical of the
inadequacy of Russian military education. This was particularly true
concerning strategic defense, which they judged "was the only sure
method of defeating the enemy" because it integrated "a totality of
operations which included counterstrikes and counterattacks at
various pre-prepared lines."1075 The authors explained that the
educational, and operational, consequence of the banning of Svechin's
works was that the theory of strategy was abandoned "as a whole, and
Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia.
No. 2, February 1990, p. 176.
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No. 2, February 1990, pp. 177-178.
455
the strategy of defense in particular" -- so much so that in 1936
when the General Staff Academy was established, "a strategy course
was not included in its curriculum."10'6 "No attention was given to
the dialectics of the correlation of defense and the offense." 1077 The
blame for this gross failure was laid squarely on Stalin, because
"everything pertaining to strategy gradually began to be considered
the exclusive right of the supreme leadership"1078 -- just as had been
the case under successive Tsars prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.
Of special concern, however, to Kokoshin and Lobov were what
Svechin labeled "the great devourers of space" -- the emerging
technologies of radio, aviation, motor vehicles, and all modern
equipment. "Foresight ... is especially valid today, when command
and control and communications equipment, transportation equipment,
and means of delivering ammunition to the target have developed
rapidly." 1079 Dr. Kokoshin and General Lobov concluded their historic
military science lesson with a stern warning based on the experience
of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War:
Oriented on an immediate counteroffensive, shifting to a
general offensive, groupings not covered by a deeply
disposed defense were themselves quite vulnerable to
powerful surprise strikes. The command and control and
communications system proved to be particularly
1076 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia
No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.
1077 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia
No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.
1078 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia
No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.
1079 Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia
No. 2, February 1990, p. 178.
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vulnerable. Its disruption was almost the main factor
that sharply changed the balance of real combat
capabilities in the aggressor's favor. It seems that
this factor has not been sufficiently taken into account
to this day.1080
The rationale for this assertion was that after the Second World War,
... increasingly new political, economic, scientific and
technical, and operational-strategic factors ...
fundamentally changed, using A. A. Svechin's expression,
the 'strategic landscape.' These factors included, above
all, nuclear weapons, as well as the evolution of
conventional weapons. . . .1081
The authors then introduced a third factor, other than nuclear
weapons and the evolution of conventional weaponry, into the nature
of future warfare:
After World War II, conventional arms passed through at
least three stages in their development, which are sort
of permeated by the trend toward an increase in the role
of electronic command and control, communications, and
intelligence equipment and, accordingly, electronic
warfare (EW) equipment. The success of combat operations
of any scale on land and at sea is determined now by
winning superiority not only in the air, but also over
the airwaves.1082
Throughout this important article Kokoshin and Lobov revealed the
dialectic continuity in Russian military thought and contributed
directly to the process of transforming Russian military doctrine.
Now, when these problems of the theory of strategy, [and] the art of war as a
whole, ... are being widely discussed, it is important to consider them in a
historical context and turn to the forgotten or half-forgotten works of Soviet
political scientists and military theorists of the 1920s and early 1930s, a
prominent place among whom belongs to A. A. Svechin.1083
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Gaivoronskii's General Staff Academy Textbook:
Military Science — A Stalwart of State Defense
The basis for preparing [for war] lies in the correct idea about the character
of future war, state objectives in such a war, and the armed forces'
Military science studies and generalizes the military-historical experience
of human society and reveals the path for practically deciding all military
affairs questions in concrete historical conditions.1083
- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii, 1990
The importance of General Gaivoronskii's new Military Academy
of the General Staff textbook, titled Osnovv strategii i operativnogo
iskusstva (The Basis of Strategy and Operational Art), can be
evaluated on several levels.
First, this textbook was written specifically for use by
Academy students in understanding the ever changing character of
future war. The text was compiled under Gaivoronskii's direction by
proven senior professors and former faculty members of the General
Staff Academy -- men such as Generals Grebish, Pelekh, Kasenkov,
Smirnov, et al. Historically, each Academy student was 'hand-picked'
to attend the General Staff's course of instruction. Graduates,
almost always, were assigned to senior leadership and decisionmaking
positions within the Soviet Armed Forces, depending, of course, upon
their demonstrated level of performance, singular capabilities, and
political connections.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovv strategii i operativnogo
iskusstva. (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy,
1990), p. 79.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovv strategii.... p. 79.
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Second, this textbook is indicative of the overall emphases
within the General Staff Academy curriculum and points to the general
thought patterns of the 1990s generation of Russian military leaders.
Third, Gaivoronskii's textbook builds on the 1980s works about
the "revolution in military-technical affairs" and documents the
incorporation of the concept of protracted warfare using advanced
military technologies into the General Staff Academy curriculum.
Fourth, Osnovv strategii i operativnogo iskusstva is a
transition work which evidences the considerable movement within the
Russian military science process from preoccupation with offensive
"wars of destruction" toward a more holistic future war concept of
"wars of attrition," utilizing both offensive and defensive military
art to accomplish military objectives assigned by the civilian
political leadership.
And finally, the text reveals the continuing responsiveness of
the Russian military leadership to directions from their civilian
political leaders. This is apparent through its reluctant discussion
of the supposition that the defense of the Soviet Union is based on
"repelling aggression" -- exactly as proselytized in the 1990 draft
Soviet military doctrine. It is significant to note, however, that
this text displayed very significant differences between the Russian
civilian and military leaders about what operational concept
constituted a "defensive military doctrine." Based on professional
military judgment, the General Staff seriously and rightfully
questioned the validity, if not the sanity, of the civilian analysts'
"purely" defensive military doctrine.
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Osnovv strategii... begins by underscoring the critical
significance of military science as a fundamental process for
discovering the likely nature of budushchaia voina:
Determining the character of future war is one of the
important problems of Soviet military strategy and Soviet
military science as a whole. Correct representation
about the character of warfare has significance for the
entire state, since only on this basis can be answered
the questions: with what kind of enemy, in which theater
of military action, and for what kind of war is it
necessary to prepare the country; what kinds of missions
are expected to be decided during the war, what kind of
armed forces must the state have, and in what direction
must its construction be carried out; what kind of
exertion will the war demand from the entire
population.1086
Predicated on this definitive statement, General Gaivoronskii
stressed the vital importance of state economic development by
dialectically utilizing Lenin to assert that "without serious
economic preparations conducting contemporary warfare against the
leading imperialists ... is impossible"1067 since "in present
conditions scientific-technical progress exerts an especially great
influence on the character of war."1088 That is to say, "The level of
development of science and technology exerts a decisive impact on the
perfection of armaments, military technology, [and] the creation of
new weaponry."1089 Then, just to make sure that Academy students would
not forget the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on
Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , Osnovv strategii.. ., p. 21.
Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , Osnovv strategii.. P- 27;
citing Lenin, V. I • : . Poln . sobr. soch.. Vol. 35, p. 390
Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , Osnovv strategii.. ., p. 28.
Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , Osnovv strategii.. ., p. 28.
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the nature of budushchaia voina, the General repeated himself:
The decisive influences on the character of war and,
principally, on its strategic content, are military-
technical factors. ... The leading place among the
military-technical factors is occupied by armaments and
military technology.1090
Gaivoronskii then enumerated a few of the new military
technologies that were rapidly changing the nature of future war.
Concerning nuclear war, he stated that "owing to the achievements of
basic science there is the possibility to focus the energy of a
nuclear explosion, creating a directed energy nuclear munition of
less mass and power." He noted that conventional weapons with
"greatly increased accuracy, range, rate of fire, and explosive
power" demonstrated a tendency toward a "sharply increased
effectiveness of conventional weapon strikes with highly reliable and
accurate precision-guided munitions," which will lead to a "broadened
zone of possible combat action and a growing role and significance of
the initial period of war and of its first operation. "1091
Of particular significance within Osnovv strategii. . . is
Chapter 4, "The Preparation of the Armed Forces to Repel Aggression,"
which describes the "main trends" (glavnye napravlenia) for the
development of military capabilities required to conduct future war.
Gaivoronskii and his cohorts stressed that "the economy always has a
decisive influence on the conduct of wars, but its role has grown
especially in contemporary conditions, when already in peacetime huge
expenditures ... are required to constantly ensure the required armed
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii.... pp. 28-29.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii.... pp. 29-30.
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forces' military-technical level."1092 And, to make sure the students
did not miss the point about the necessity for civilian and military
leaders to modernize the armed forces, the authors emphasized:
The most important factor, which has a direct influence
on the preparation for the armed forces for war, is the
state's economic condition -- that is the development
level of science and technology, production, agriculture,
transportation, demographic composition, and the extent
of the population's preparation -- but also the physical-
geographic conditions of the countries and the TVD.1093
The peacetime development of the armed forces was described as being
accomplished "in accordance with the overall state economic
development plan, new scientific achievements in weaponry and
military technology, and the character of international
conditions."1094 The authors next listed the "main trends in the
development of military science" as,
all aspect investigation of prospective world military-
political conditions -- military, economic, scientific-
technical, and morale-political potentials of countries,
possible variants of escalating wars by aggressors, their
scale, form and capability of conducting [war];
determination of prospective developments of principally
new types of weapons and military technology, and the
possibility of their production. . . ,1095
This section about military science concluded with the statement:
"The central trend of military science development is the
determination of the possible character of war in the modern era
and the study of fundamental problems of military art."1096
1092 Gaivoronskii, F. F. ed. Osnovv sCrategii.. , p. 80
1093 Gaivoronskii, F. F. ed. Osnovv strategii.. , P- 79
1094 Gaivoronskii, F. F. ed. Osnovv strategii.. , p. 80
1095 Gaivoronskii, F. F. ed. Osnovv strategii.. , p. 85
1096 Gaivoronskii, F. F. ed. Osnovv strategii.. , p. 86
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Increasing the level of combat readiness of the armed forces
was considered by the authors to be a critical task, and the specific
"main trends" for accomplishing this were listed as,
equipage of the army and navy with modern weaponry and
military technologies and their maintenance in constant
readiness for combat use; perfection of the [command and]
control system; preparation of all armed forces personnel
for complicated and various decisive tasks in modern
wartime conditions; perfection of the organizational
capabilities of commanders, headquarters, political
organs, of their knowledge how to practically accomplish
sound and continuous troop command and control in all
conflict conditions; increase the effectiveness of
military-scientific investigations and incorporate their
results in practical armed forces preparations.1097
Almost hesitantly, as if in lament, the authors cautioned that there
are two, mutually interdependent, sides to "armed forces building":
One is the theory of building the armed forces, the other
side is the practical actions by the government and the
highest military leadership organs to accomplish all
measures.... The theory and practice of armed forces
building are based on the conditions of state military
doctrine and are completely subordinate to it.1098
While submitting to the Communist Party "primacy of politics" and
suggesting that both internal domestic and foreign factors played a
role in the ability of the armed forces to modernize, the collective
returned to their primary emphasis, that "in modern conditions, the
influence of military-technical factors continuously increases" and
"the most important factors" in armed forces building are:
The general level of military-scientific development in
one's own country and abroad; the results of military-
scientific investigations and studies; [and] other
scientifically substantiated conditions related to
military affairs.1099
1097 Gaivoronskii, F. F. : , ed. . Osnovv strategii. . P- 90
1098 Gaivoronskii, F. F. , i ed. , . Osnovv strategii.. p. 92
1099 Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , . Osnovv strategii.. p. 94
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In constructing the armed forces, the authors considered that:
"The improvement of technical equipment occupies one of the central
places, since, in conditions of a hurricane of military-technical
progress, matters of force military-technical equipage are one of the
primary indicators of military readiness."1100 Consequently, they
stipulated that the equipage of the armed forces was "determined by
military-technical policy" and,
the most important trends of military-technical policy
are: system integration technologies; improvement of
interaction between various internal complexes of each
type of armed force [and] service branch; unification and
standardization of weaponry, of all military technology,
[and] the reduction of all types of [weapon]
categories.1101
Concluding the section about armed forces construction, the
textbook authors asserted: "The important trend in improving the
capability of weaponry and military technology is the modernization
of already existing weapons systems."1102 With none too disguised
dissatisfaction, they warned the 'democratic reform' political
leadership that: "Military science cries out for decisions on tasks
of a deep investigative character concerning the necessities of
modern war, for clarifying the [decision] mechanism by revealing
their objective laws, the developmental tendencies of armed combat
means, [and] the methods of conducting military action."1103
1101 Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , . Osnovv strategii.. ., p. 104
1102 Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , . Osnovv strategic.. P- 105
1103 Gaivoronskii, F. F. , , ed. , , Osnovv strategii.. ., p. 106
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The nature of budushchaia voina was envisioned only in vague
general terms: "World war ... will have global dimensions" and,
modern operations will be characterized by decisive
goals, highly directed and dynamic action; great expanse
of scale; sharp struggle to seize and to maintain the
initiative; unequal development of military action on the
battlefields and in regions of active engagement; abrupt
and frequent changes of combat conditions, and a large
variety of methods of military action.1104
Further on the authors explained more explicitly that in a future war
the "fundamental method of military action" would be by,
combined arms forces, both with use of nuclear weapons
and also conventional high-accuracy weapons
(reconnaissance-strike system and complex),
simultaneously to strike important military-economic,
military, and other enemy targets, his groups of troops
(forces) throughout the entire depth of their deployment
with their subsequent complete destruction.1105
In an unusually pointed display of the durability of their Soviet
General Staff Academy professional military education, as reinforced
by a lifetime of service within the Soviet Army and the Communist
Party, General Gaivoronskii and his fellow textbook authors were
adamant in their rejection of the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine
based on "defensive sufficiency":
... By defense alone it is impossible to destroy an
aggressor. Therefore, after repelling the attack,
troops and forces must be capable of conducting a
decisive offensive. The transition to it will take
the form of a counterattack. . . .1106
General Gaivoronskii and his co-authors remained convinced,
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through the military science process, that: "The offensive is the
most important type of military action since only by a decisive
offensive can the complete destruction of the enemy's offensive
forces be achieved."1107 They recognized, first, that initial
defensive operations followed by a counterattack (offensive),
employing either nuclear weapons or conventional weapons alone, could
"destroy the enemy's most important frontal groups of forces in the
border regions throughout their depth." Second, that "the anti-air
operation has special significance" because the achievement and
maintenance of air superiority was the key to the success of combat
operations. And third, that "this method of conducting a combined
arms operation takes on a decisive character."1108 Aleksandr Svechin's
"war of attrition" concept had not as yet cast into oblivion the
entrenched Soviet concept of the "decisive offensive," or "war of
destruction;" however, the Gaivoronskii textbook documents the trend
of Russian military science away from exclusive focus on the offense
toward the incorporation of new offensive and defensive concepts in
strategic and operational planning.
The conclusions of Osnovv strategii i operativnoyo iskusstva
are particularly important because, based upon the results of the
1991 Gulf War, the text demonstrates the success of the Russian
military science process in evaluating the changing nature of warfare
and in creating a military theory commensurate to those changes.
This is especially true because in 1990 no evidentiary proof existed
1107
1108
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovv strategii.... p. 119.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovv strateyii.... p. 133.
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of the "revolution in military-technical affairs" in actual applied
combat operations -- it had not yet occurred. General Gaivoronskii
and his colleagues wrote of the growing tendency for future war
combat operations to be characterized by "the increasing role of
operational-level units in decisive strategic missions."1109
In budushchaia voina, the authors opined:
The deployment [of forces] and a strictly designed system
of operational control on the basis of a unitary plan
will ensure the desired destruction of nuclear means and
[command and] control systems; gaining air superiority
and fire superiority in the decisive direction;
simultaneously engaging the enemy from the front, rear,
and in the air; repelling an invasion through defensive
troop activity and destroying his most important groups
of forces by means of a high-tempo counterattack
(offensive).mo
They explained:
Changes are taking place also in the content of the
principles for preparing and conducting operations. The
principle of decisive concentration of forces in the most
important direction at the decisive moment in order to
accomplish the main mission in contemporary conditions is
characterized by the trend for the use by the first
echelon of qualitatively new powerful fire means and the
most capable units in terms of fire and anti-tank
defenses in order to repel the enemy invasion using
reinforced and highly mobile troop (force) groups for a
counterattack (offensive). The changes in quantity and
quality are shown by the [reduced] density of forces and
means, the [increased] capability and [reduced] time
period for creating combat groups. The qualitative side
of this trend is influenced by scientific-technical
progress [which] is becoming predominant. Already at the
present stage the achievement of superiority over the
enemy is realized, mainly, by the means of rapid
concentration of forces, of fire means, and troop







F., ed., Osnovv strategii.
F., ed., Osnovv strategii.





Gaivoronskii underscored that in modern combat operations
further developments were being realized in the principles of troop
maneuver and the maneuver of forces and fires with the result being
the "growing role of fire destruction." The textbook concluded:
Fire destruction of the enemy is of especially important
significance during the transition of troops to the
counterattack, but also the conduct of powerful fire
strikes, effective use of aviation, parachutists, and
mobile units during the development of successful
counterattack (offensive) operations.1112
The authors also determined that:
Reconnaissance is elevated to an extraordinary
significance; as is the constant growth of the tendencies
to advance the importance of [command and] control
(upravlenie) in deciding the operational missions, the
increasing extent and complexity of the control tasks,
the demands of constant readiness of the control organs
to accomplish unexpected tasks, the growing role of
combined arms commanders' staffs in the preparation and
the conduct of operations necessitates a secure, enduring
[command and] control system.1113
This important General Staff Academy textbook, which incorporated the
findings from military-science investigations concerning the
"revolution in military-technical affairs" into the military theory
and military art of the Soviet/Russian Armed Forces, stated:
... Modern operations are marked by the definite
tendencies connected with increased striking power,
mobility, maneuverability, and ensuring the safety of
troops (forces), by seizing and maintaining air
superiority, by maintaining constant high military
readiness through increased deployment and unexpected
troop (force) actions, by routing large enemy groups
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Truly the General Staff had seen the future of advanced technological
warfare through the lens of its military science process and, as was
its historic responsibility, had made a concerted effort through the
publication of Osnovv strategii i operativnogo iskusstva to educate
both future military leaders and the civilian government leaders
about the crucial implications for the security of Russia and the
Soviet Union. The full impact of emerging technologies on future war
was not fully evident in 1990 but, to the professional military
scientists of the General Staff and General Staff Academy, the
evidence was conclusive -- Soviet and Russian military-technical
policy had to be changed and sophisticated advanced military
technologies produced, if their armed forces were to gain and retain
"world class standards" in the ever-accelerating era of technological
progress that constitutes the 'Information/Computer Age.'
The development of military science is becoming one of the most important
directions of building and developing the armed forces. It allows the
attainment of an acceleration of military-technical progress and the
decision of military-technical policy tasks for military construction.1115
The determining factor in the changing character of operations, of their
preparation and conduct, is the means of armed combat.1116
The unity of state interests ... at this time demands agreement about the
strengthening of state defenses, in this matter the sphere of military
science — the theory of military art — is the central stalwart.1117
- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii, 1990
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii i operativnogo
iskusstva. (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy,
1990), p. 106.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii.... p. 114.
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii.... p. 4.
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Igor N. Rodionov: The Military Academy of the
General Staff View of Budushchaia Voina
Military science shows us that there are two forms of military action —
offensive and defensive. In the past, the offensive form of military action
was decisive when the concept of victory was equated with annihilating one's
enemy, occupying his territory and enforcing total surrender. In the era of
nuclear weapons these military goals are no longer possible because they will
lead to mutual destruction. We therefore reject offensive action in the
opening phase of any war.1118
- General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, 1990
While the Soviet Union was in the throes of political
dissolution and economic collapse, some of the most precise evidence
of the dialectic nature of the Russian military science process; of
the authoritative use of commissions and conferences to advance that
military science process; of the continuity within Russian military
thought between the past, present, and future; and of the specific
vision heralded by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's "revolution in military-
technical affairs"1119 began to be openly and candidly discussed.
A total of five military-academic exchanges were held between the
United States' National Defense University (NDU) and the Soviet
Military Academy of the General Staff (MAGS) in Washington, DC and
Moscow, USSR between May 1989 and June 1991.
During the first-ever 'get acquainted' exchange visit held in
Washington, DC in May 1989, only a glimmering of Soviet military
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
United States' National Defense University,
Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.
For a most illuminating discussion of the implications of
emerging new technologies on Russian military art, see
Erickson, John, "Victory Cannot be Computed: Engineers
versus Strategists in Soviet Military Planning,"
Journal of the Royal Signals. Summer 1990, pp. 259-271.
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thinking about future war came from Colonel Aleksandr S. Skvortsov:
Three trends are evidence of the new Soviet 'defensive
doctrine': 1) changes in military art which define how we
will employ forces; 2) the reconstruction of our force
structure which is now in transition; 3) our preparation
and training as shown by our operational and tactical
exercises. Military science has revealed a new
relationship between the offensive and defensive. This
new relationship has created a major problem for us --
reconnaissance ,1120
A few months earlier, however, the Commander of the Military Academy
of the General Staff, Army General G. I. Salmanov, had indicated in a
1988 Voennaia mysi' article that the Soviet Union had to be prepared
for "all types of wars," but with primary focus on a protracted world
war in which "the belligerents will strive to achieve their strategic
and political objectives using only conventional means of
destruction. 1,1121
During the second NDU-MAGS exchange, held in Moscow, USSR in
September 1989, the new MAGS Commandant, General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, set the tone for the visit. He very forcefully stated his
conviction that "emerging technology weapons are approaching nuclear
weapons in effectiveness." Upon agreement with General Rodionov's
assessment, followed by the suggestion that Marshal Ogarkov's 1982
and 1985 books had arrived at the same conclusion, General Rodionov
Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov,
Senior Strategy Professor, Voroshilov General Staff
Academy, in Washington, DC, May 1989. For a detailed
explanation of the political and military-technical
aspects of Soviet "defensive doctrine", see Gareev,
General-Colonel Makhmut A., "The Revised Soviet Military
Doctrine," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
December 1988, pp. 30-33.
1121 Salmanov, Army General G. I., "Soviet Military Doctrine
and Several Views on the Nature of War in Defense of
Socialism," Voennaia mysi'. No. 12, 1988, p. 8.
471
replied, "Does this mean that in the future it will be possible to
accomplish strategic goals without seizing territory?" Following a
thoughtful pause and mutual agreement, General Rodionov concluded,
"Yes, in the next 20-30 years emerging technology weapons will change
the nature of strategic operations."1122
Rear Admiral Viacheslav N. Shcherbakov, the Commandant of the
Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, and deputy head of the Soviet
exchange delegation, expressed great concern about the possible
character of a future war saying that "Soviet offensive forces will
be made obsolete through the deployment of emerging technologies."
This concern was echoed by Captain First Rank Anatoli A. Rimskii, the
Military Assistant for Strategy to Soviet Minister of Defense Iazov.
Captain Rimskii averred that: "SDI, the development of space systems,
and operational concepts for space systems are the most important
factors we must understand as we initiate our defensive doctrine."
Colonel Vladimir I. Slipchenko, a specialist on ballistic missile
defenses and Senior Professor of the MAGS Air Defense Operational
Arts Faculty, suggested that "space is the single most important
factor for understanding and forecasting modern war."1123 Clearly,
from these preliminary discussions, Russian military science had
continued to investigate the nature of budushchaia voina,
dialectically building on the work of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.
Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, Commandant, Soviet Military Academy of the
General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 1989.
Author's conversations with Rear Admiral V. A.
Shcherbakov, Captain First Rank A. A. Rimskii, and
Colonel V. I. Slipchenko, Moscow, USSR, September 1989.
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The extent of that continuity and the predicted nature of the
transformation of future warfare would be revealed during subsequent
plenary exchange and personal discussions.
General-Colonel Rodionov introduced the plenary discussion
topic for September 21, 1989, "The Character of Modern War":
The socio-political and military-technical aspects of
modern war and future war are both critical and
complicated matters. Formerly our assessments were based
on the experience of past wars -- particularly on the
experience of the Great Patriotic War -- but now
fundamental changes in the global political-military and
military-technical situation have created conditions
which make it most difficult to frame the character of
future war due to the length of time between wars.
A mistake in our assessment or in force development could
be catastrophic -- much more grave than during World War
II. We therefore place special emphasis on the
importance of this subject. I would stress, however,
that we no longer consider war to be inevitable.1124
General Rodionov then called upon Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov to
describe the characteristics of modern war and the factors considered
during the Russian military science process in order to reach this
assessment. Skvortsov first explained, "In peacetime, the
possibility of a global war places restraint on political-military
actions; yet, the fundamentally new character of weapons, if put into
wide use, will create a completely new form of combat."1125 Skvortsov
then enumerated the following six factors as the basis of the Russian
military science analytical framework:
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
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1) initial period of conflict;
2) likely intensity and scale of combat;
3) employment means;
4) consequences to our economy and population;
5) duration of war; and
6) influence of US and NATO doctrine.
Colonel Skvortsov continued:
We consider war to be a condition forced upon us -- a
totally irresponsible action by others. We no longer
teach about surprise and preemption at the General Staff
Academy: however, Soviet Army defensive operations will
not be defensive to the end of a war. The Soviet Army
will act decisively to protect the Soviet state if an
enemy does not cease operations immediately.1126
Next he presented his assessment that "the character of modern war,
either nuclear or conventional, will be as follows":
1) extremely high intensity operations that will be
dynamic and at a high tempo;
2) broad global extent, to include operations in space;
3) extremely destructive combat, more so than ever
before;
4) huge expenditure of resources to seize and maintain
the initiative;
5) disappearance of a 'front line' or first echelon so
that an effective FEBA no longer exists; rather 'zones
of combat' up to 100 km wide and deep will be created;
6) no country or area will be safe as no 'deep rear'
will exist;
7) strategic goals will be achieved through combined arms
operations such that no one weapons system, such as
tanks, can be singled out and the effectiveness of
other weapons systems ignored;
8) the destruction of nuclear and chemical plants will be
a disaster during either a nuclear or conventional war.
The Soviet Union, however, does not specifically target
nuclear or chemical plants -- Chernobyl' is too fresh
in our minds; and
9) nuclear war could liquidate the world's population.1127
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
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Following Colonel Skvortsov's very specific presentation when
asked for an explanation of the difference between 'modern'
(sovremennaia) and 'future' (budushchaia) war -- terms which all
Russian discussants seemed to be using interchangeably -- Captain
Rimskii replied that the two terms have very distinct and specific
meanings. He explained that "Eight to ten years ago [around 1980],
we ceased using the term budushchaia voina because it implied the
inevitability of war. Sovremennaia voina studies assess the near-
term period 5-10 years into the future; while military science
forecasts 10-20 years and 20-30 years into the future."1128 Captain
Rimskii's explanations of the terms 'modern' and 'future' may have a
considerable long-term significance because, during the following
NDU-MAGS exchanges, no further mention of sovremennaia voina was made
by Russian military officers -- implying the extension of a period of
peace for the next 5-10 years, i.e., from 1995-2000. Ominously,
however, in all subsequent discussions the Russian General Staff
officers consistently insisted on using the term budushchaia voina,
with its implied inevitability of war some 10-30 years in the future,
i.e., in the 2000-2020 timeframe.
Colonel Evgenii G. Korotchenko, Deputy Director of the MAGS
Operational Arts Faculty, concluded the plenary discussions of the
character of future war with a most provocative, and prescient,
statement concerning the crucial significance of emerging
technologies:
1128 Author's conversation with Captain First Rank A. A.
Rimskii, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
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New weapons now under development will lead to the total
vulnerability of every state during any war. In modern
warfare there is an increased importance of information
systems and automated controls. These improved
information systems increase operational effectiveness.
The side which uses time most effectively will 'win';
and 'winning' could well mean loss of national control,
not the seizure of territory. We believe that on the
battlefield of the 1990s information systems
incorporating artificial intelligence still will be
vulnerable. There could also emerge unexpected
capabilities and systems in the future; we should
consider these possibilities. Even in a so-called
conventional war there could be wide vulnerabilities.1129
The third NDU-MAGS exchange took place at the U.S. National
Defense University, Ft. Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC and the
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI between May 29 and June 5, 1990.
During the opening discussions Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov addressed
the Soviet military "main task in the 1990s" as "the perfection of
new organizational structures." Skvortsov affirmed that:
The focus of our military reorganization has changed
emphasis from quantity to quality -- actually this change
began well before arms control negotiations began to
accelerate toward agreements. Of special importance to
our reorganization is the improvement of all aspects of
our air defence forces -- territorial, anti-ballistic
missile, space, and electronic warfare. While we will
emphasize the improvement of our air defenses, we will
continue the modernization of our naval and army forces
to achieve a 'sufficient' balance.1130
In separate personal discussions throughout the week-long
exchange with General Rodionov, Colonel Skvortsov and Captain
Anatoli Rimskii, each, individually and separately, confirmed that
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
United States' National Defense University,
Washington, DC, May 31, 1990.
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the originator of the Soviet military perestroika (transformation)
concept was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet
General Staff. Each referred to passages from Ogarkov's 1985 book
Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti -- almost verbatim -- when stressing the
critical importance of the "revolution in military-technical affairs"
that was being created by "emerging technology weaponry."1131
Discussions with Colonel Skvortsov were particularly helpful in
reaching an understanding of the dialectic foundation for Marshal
Ogarkov's work, which Skvortsov described as being based on the
unpublished 1919-1922 lectures of General A. M. Zaionchkovskii, the
distinguished voenspets faculty member at the RKKA Military Academy.
Shared unpublished passages from Zaionchkovskii's lecture notes,
which were discussed in some detail, emphasized that "the superiority
of quality over quantity will lead to victory."1132 During these
talks, Colonel Skvortsov explained that while the Soviet military was
attempting to maintain the full range of its capabilities, despite
the domestic political and economic turmoil,
in the General Staff Academy curriculum we no longer are
emphasizing as heavily the works of Isserson,
Triandafillov and Tukhachevskii [the creators of the
offensive 'deep battle' and 'deep operations' concepts
during the late 1920s and 1930s which were applied to
Soviet military art as the Operational Maneuver Group
(OMG) concept during the 1980s]; rather we are now
including the more balanced works of their contemporary
military theorists Svechin and Frunze.1133
Author's conversations with Gen-Col. I. N. Rodionov,
Captain First Rank A. A. Rimskii, and Colonel A. A.
Skvortsov, Washington, DC and Newport, RI, June 1990.
Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
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When asked about how the Russian military concept of "active
operations" was to be integrated into the new Soviet "defensive
doctrine," Colonel Skvortsov's abbreviated response was: "Preemptive
actions were to be excluded from the opening phase of a war, but that
'active operations' would be utilized from a defensive posture in
order to seize the initiative from an enemy."113'' Admiral Shcherbakov,
who had joined this particular discussion in progress, concluded the
conversation by saying: "For the Soviet Navy there is no longer a
clear distinction between offensive and defensive actions, since at
sea there are no clear lines to defend."1135
On June 1, 1990 during the plenary discussion session at the
National Defense University, the newly promoted General-Major Evgenii
Korotchenko gave a most illuminating presentation on Soviet military
actions at the outset of a war. General Korotchenko said:
Since time is the decisive factor during the initial
period of war, there will be a strong temptation by
either side to preempt during the mobilization and
deployment phases. We view the following four critical
missions as the key to successful defense: (1) forming a
breakthrough penetration of the enemy forces through a
massive surprise counterattack; (2) destroying the enemy
command and control, communications, and information
system; (3) eliminating the enemy's military-industrial
base; (4) eliminating the enemy's reserve forces.1136
Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
Author's conversation with Rear Admiral V. A. Shcherbakov
and Colonel A. A. Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, RI, June 1990.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
United States' National Defense University,
Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.
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And concluded his presentation by asserting:
The attacker always has the initiative. We will seize
the initiative first at the operational level and then
develop that action to the strategic scale. We would
assume an unacceptable risk of failure were we to delay
seizing the initiative; thus, on several axes we will
seize the initiative almost immediately. Our
counterattack will make full use of radio-electronic
measures and will begin the first moment that aggression
against the Soviet Union is detected.113'
At this point General-Colonel Rodionov framed a most haunting
question. His inquiry demonstrated the depth of vision developed
through the Russian military science process:
In a future war is it possible that without the use of
ground forces or nuclear weapons, the employment of air,
naval, and space precision-guided munitions could lead to
victory?1138
During a concluding plenary session at the U.S. Naval War
College, General Rodionov answered his rhetorical question and
explained with great clarity his concept of budushchaia voina:
For hundreds of years victory in war was achieved through
the seizure of territory. That stereotype no longer
applies, and we are now examining the concept of military
victory without territorial occupation. This concept
already exists in the General Staff Academy and at the
General Staff. We are developing this capability
especially in space through the use of command and
control systems and precision-guided weapons. We believe
that in a properly executed surprise attack employing
precision-guided conventional munitions, it will be
impossible for an enemy to retaliate. We are entering an
entirely new era of weaponry and weapons effects. Our
experience with the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster taught us
that we cannot send soldiers into, or fight in, areas
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
United States' National Defense University,
Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
United States' National Defense University,
Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.
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contaminated by radiation. Victory in this new type of
warfare will result from destroying the military and the
military-industrial base of the enemy so that he cannot
continue the conflict. The extent of the damage
inflicted depends on the duration of enemy resistance and
political objectives.1139
Rodionov ended with this most thought-provoking statement:
No one wants war --of that I am convinced -- but we
General Staff officers must plan for the worst case
contingency of a general war. Today we cannot inflict on
any enemy unacceptable damage using only conventional
weapons. But, in the none too distant future, it will be
possible to paralyze military forces, a nation's economy,
and its command and control system through precision
attacks on nuclear and chemical plants, as well as on
command and control nodes. Ideological war cannot be won
without the total destruction of the enemy -- of an
entire people -- along with destruction of their economic
infrastructure. In a future war this will no longer be
necessary as the destruction of military capabilities and
the military infrastructure will be sufficient.1140
According to Captain Rimskii one of the principal focal points
for future war planning is the General Staff Military Science
Directorate, which was headed at this time by General-Colonel Makhmut
Gareev, who had broached some of these same future war concepts in
M. V. Frunze - Voennvi teoretik ,1141 In subsequent discussions with
General Rodionov, and with other members of the Soviet delegation, it
became absolutely certain that Russian military scientists and the
military leadership had concluded that victory will be possible in a
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 4, 1990.
(The BOLD of "especially in space" is this author's due
to the emphasis placed by General-Colonel Rodionov.)
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 4, 1990.
1141 Author's conversation with Captain First Rank Anatoli A.
Rimskii, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
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future war without the use of ground forces or nuclear weapons, and
that the General Staff was seriously studying and planning methods to
accomplish this goal -- certainly not in 1990 or in the immediate
future -- but within the projected 10-30-year time horizon of their
budushchaia voina concept.1142
General Rodionov's discourses on the nature of future war were
neither propaganda nor disinformation. Rather, they were a concise
indication of General Staff conceptual thinking on the changing
nature of warfare and of the investigations performed by Russian
military science to develop appropriate offenses and defenses for the
new environment. General Rodionov was deadly serious when he talked
about Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's singular role in identifying the
"revolution in military-technical affairs" resulting from "the
emerging technologies of conventional precision-guided weaponry that
takes on the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction."1143
It is particularly significant to note that in June 1990, such
visions of future war were most provocative and controversial. But,
the content of these proposals was prepared well over a year before
the 1991 Gulf War operationally proved the substance of Ogarkov's
thesis, thereby validating the Russian military science process.
The prescient nature of Russian military science became all the
more evident during the fourth NDU-MAGS exchange, held at the
Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow and the Kuznetsov
Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
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Naval Academy in Leningrad, between September 7-16, 1990. While the
likely nature of future war continued to dominate the discussions,
during the intervening four months between exchanges, a notable shift
in the ideological emphasis of the General Staff Academy officers had
occurred. According to the Soviet officers, this was attributed in
large part to the July 5, 1990 signing of the London Declaration in
which "our leaders have mutually declined to consider our countries
as enemies."11" Gone were the confrontational remarks extolling the
'superiority' of Communist ideology that had punctuated previous
discussions. In their place appeared an almost plaintive repetition
of the need for mutual cooperation. During the opening plenary
discussion session in Moscow, General Rodionov explained:
Overall, I am very optimistic about the future of the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Still, the threat to us posed by Third World
countries is unlikely to disappear, and this fact will
change military art in four ways: 1) increased attention
must be paid to the defense of state borders and of our
national territory; 2) with reduced military budgets and
force structure, the effective employment of both large
and small units becomes critical; 3) force mobility
becomes more important than ever before since defensive
forces must be concentrated within a theater at the
decisive point and time; 4) efficient peregruppirovka sil
[regrouping of forces] is critical to successful
defensive action with limited forces.1145
The Russian military concept of peregruppirovka sil (regrouping
of forces) is an exceedingly important, particularly detailed and
complicated construct that applies individually to branches of arms
Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 1990.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR,
September 11, 1990.
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and to combined arms operations, that is, to Western armed services
and joint operations. It can apply either to the reinforcement of
existing forces or to mobilization of entirely new units, in order to
create conditions for an attack or for the successful development of
a promising operational direction. The peregruppirovka sil concept
also applies to the ability to change an operation that is already
underway to a new direction. In all cases the essential element is
the capability to secretly concentrate the strategic or operational
reserve at the decisive point and time. Historical evidence abounds
from the Great Patriotic War (World War II) of the successful
application of this Russian military art concept at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels.1146 As such, peregruppirovka sil is
a 'fundamental law' of Russian military art that remains as pertinent
today as it was fifty years ago -- perhaps even more so according to
General-Colonel Rodionov.1147
By prior mutual agreement, an entire day of plenary sessions
was devoted to discussion of "The Influence of New Weapons and
Technology on the Military Arts of Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces."
In his opening remarks General-Major Slipchenko focused on the
1146 For excellent descriptions of the peregruppirovka sil
concept in action during preparations for such major
battles/strategic operations as Stalingrad and Kursk, see
Shtemenko, Army General S. M., Sovetskii general'nvi
shtab v godv voinv. 2 vol., (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981);
also, for a full military-theoretical discussion of the
importance of strategic peregruppirovka and Osnovy
peregruppirovok sil, see Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy
strategii i operativnogo iskusstva. (Moscow: Voroshilov
General Staff Academy, 1990), pp. 87-88 and 143-149.
1147 Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, Military Academy of the General Staff,
Moscow, USSR, September 1990.
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importance of the Russian budushchaia voina concept as "the critical
planning framework for future force development, deployment, and
possible operational employment."11''8 At this time General Slipchenko,
a recently promoted air defense specialist, was serving as Director
of the MAGS Military Science Department. He explained:
Our two countries are currently in a nuclear stalemate
which assures mutual annihilation in the event of a war
between us. The emergence of new precision-guided
conventional weapons and real-time reconnaissance
capabilities, however, is creating revolutionary changes
in military art and strategy. The analysis by our
General Staff reveals:
1) The secret movement of forces will no longer be possible.
2) The traditional 'rear' will be as much a battlefield as
the front lines.
3) The destructiveness of these new weapons will negate any
significant role for war readiness material stocks.
4) Large-scale strategic attacks will be possible throughout
the depth of a nation's economy.
5) Command and control functions will be totally destroyed.
6) The economy of combatants will be paralyzed.1149
Slipchenko continued:
War outcome will be determined by a single massed strike
by precision-guided conventional weapons. Consequently,
the traditional role of conventional armed forces
equipped with infantry, tanks, and artillery is virtually
eliminated. The entire territory of the adversaries
becomes the battlefield. There will be no distinction
between the 'front' and the 'rear.' We project that in
the future there will be neither flanks to turn nor lines
of communication [LoCs] to protect. We will retain
strategic nuclear weapons, but at significantly reduced
levels since they will be needed only to eliminate the
most extensively hardened targets. Even these current
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Kuznetsov Naval Academy (until August 26, 1990
designated the Grechko Naval Academy), Leningrad,
USSR, September 13, 1990.
Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR,
September 13, 1990.
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nuclear weapons will be gradually replaced by a smaller
number of modernized 'third generation' [enhanced
radiation, microwave, particle-beam, and nuclear-excited
x-ray laser] nuclear weapons. Finally, warfighting
capabilities can be transferred into space to create
entirely new forms for achieving strategic missions.1150
General Slipchenko's concluding thought, which revealed the
thoroughness of the Russian military science process, will long
remain worthy of consideration and will require concerted mutual
action: "The revolutionary change in military art leading to the
future war concept that I have described is already beginning.
The leaders of both our countries must deal with it."1151
At the end of the day-long discussions on "The Influence of New
Weapons and Technology on the Military Arts of Soviet and U.S. Armed
Forces," Captain First Rank Iuri P. Gladishev, a Senior Instructor at
the MAGS Department of Naval Operational Art, introduced the salient
point that "new technologies are creating a whole new science called
'The Theory of Combat Systems,' through which real-time integration
of intelligence and strike systems is being developed."1152 General
Evgenii Korotchenko then concluded the September 1990 exchange by
emphatically, indeed almost passionately, reiterating the Russian

















approaching the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons in their
effectiveness . "U53
In November 1990 Voennaia mysi' published a Special Edition
in which the key portions of the Ministry of Defense draft Soviet
military doctrine and military reform requirements were discussed.
To a considerable degree this draft reflected the content of the
presentations made by the General Staff officers during the NDU-MAGS
exchanges. The basic premises of the revised military doctrine were:
first, a global nuclear war would be a catastrophe for all mankind,
because it could not be limited and there could be no victors; and,
second, modern conventional warfare could be both global and
protracted with advanced conventional munitions, i.e., precision-
guided weaponry, was becoming the "basic means of warfare."1154
The proposed ten-year-long reform plan specifically called for
an increase in defense spending between 1996 and 2000, apparently in
order to accomplish the plan's stated objective "to reduce the
military-technical lag behind NATO forces -- above all in systems
such as long-range, conventionally-armed precision missiles and
automated weapons control and command and control systems -- and to
concentrate efforts on developing new spheres of military equipment
and advanced technologies."1155 Further, the principal direction of
1153 Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session,
Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR,
September 13, 1990.
1154 "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft),"
Voennaia mysi'. Special Edition, November 1990,
pp. 24-28.
"The Concept of Military Reform (Draft)," Voennaia mvsl '.
Special Edition, November 1990, pp. 3-23.
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military-technical policy was described as being toward "a
qualitative upgrading of arms and military equipment based on the
latest scientific-technical achievements and cutting-edge
technologies, the timely creation of a scientific-technical reserve,
and the exploitation of basic and exploratory research in creating
new weapons of war."1156 The substantive and practical content of this
new military doctrine and military reform, as proposed by the Defense
Ministry in 1990, beyond any doubt bore the engraved imprint of the
visionary thinking of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov about the likely
nature of future war.
In March 1991 at the National Defense University in Washington,
DC, General-Major Vladimir I. Slipchenko presented an important
lecture titled "Impending Changes to Reform Plans for Employing the
Soviet Armed Forces." In this lecture, he elaborated on the nature
of future war in light of the results of the January-February 1991
Persian Gulf War. Slipchenko stated that the continuing development
of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic offensive weaponry was creating
"essentially a new type of war -- the aerospace war."115'
Further, he explained that "third-generation" nuclear weapons
-- a category in which he included nuclear-excited x-ray lasers and
nuclear microwave as well as kinetic energy weapons -- were creating
a means to escape from the "nuclear impasse" of "mutually assured
"The Concept of Military Reform (Draft)," Voennaia mvsl'.
Special Edition, November 1990, pp. 3-23.
Slipchenko, General-Major Vladimir I., "Impending Changes
to Reform Plans for Employing the Soviet Armed Forces,"
Lecture, National Defense University, Washington, DC,
March 15 and 20, 1991.
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destruction" created by existing nuclear weaponry. This was because,
according to Slipchenko, "third-generation" nuclear weapons are
"environmentally clean" and can be employed both from sea-based and
space-based platforms to destroy an opponent's ground-based civilian
and military infrastructure. While stating that the technologies for
these new weapons are available already, Slipchenko reflected that it
was necessary only to accumulate "sufficient quantities" in order to
make "aerospace war" a viable possibility. He predicted that by the
year 2000 the deployment of advanced or emerging technologies weapons
-- reconnaissance-strike complexes, long-range cruise missiles,
precision-guided missiles, "stealth" technologies, space-based and
directed-energy weapons, and "third generation" nuclear weapons --
would make "aerospace war" a reality.1158
General Slipchenko judged that in such a technologically
advanced war it no longer would be necessary to seize an enemy's
territory in order to be victorious. He defined "three criteria for
achieving victory": 1) destruction of the opponent's armed forces;
2) destruction of military-economic potential; and 3) collapse of the
opponent's political system. Slipchenko continued, perhaps just a
little disingenuously since, even in the early 1960s, Marshal
Sokolovskii wrote about the offensive and defensive properties of
"space-based weapons,"1159 that in the past Soviet views about the
nature of future war were primarily "two dimensional," however, now
air-delivered and space-based weapons systems "are giving war a new,
1158 Slipchenko, "Impending Changes...," Lecture, March 1991.
Sokolovskii, V. D., ed., Voennaia strategiia. First
Edition, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), pp. 455-463.
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third dimension." In the meantime, until adequate quantities of
advanced technology weapons are produced and deployed, Slipchenko
concluded that the Persian Gulf War had been a "transitionary war"
-- "a clash between two concepts of warfare" -- with the loser, Iraq,
employing past concepts and the winning coalition, led by the United
States, using "air attack weaponry as the basis for victory."1160
As such, Slipchenko viewed the Gulf War as "the prototype of a
technological operation." Future war would be conducted through the
massive employment of advanced weapon technologies in the form of
robotics, electronic warfare systems, long-range guided missiles,
remotely piloted vehicles, reconnaissance, and space-based weapons.
Each would utilize "artificial intelligence" information systems to
accomplish near-real-time targeting and strikes throughout the depth
of an enemy's territory. On this battlefield of the future, all
borders and flanks, all concepts of 'front' and 'rear' would vanish.
Distinctions between tactics, operational art, and strategy disappear
as well, because, precision strikes can be conducted at will against
the priority targets of the enemy's state -- the military command and
control system and military forces, wherever located. Disturbingly,
according to Slipchenko's vision, "surprise" is "decisive for the
course and outcome" of this new form of war, since non-nuclear
precision strikes throughout the opponent's target set can be planned
in advance and executed at will. Thus, the initial period of war
becomes "essentially the only period in future war."1161
1160
1161
Slipchenko, "Impending Changes...," Lecture, March 1991.
Slipchenko, "Impending Changes...," Lecture, March 1991.
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The fifth, and final, NDU-MAGS exchange discussions took place
at the U.S. National Defense University in Washington, DC and at the
U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, between May 28 and
June 4, 1991. In the decisive aftermath of the Gulf War between the
augmented NATO allies and Iraq, there was a marked attitude change by
the Russian participants.1162 The Gulf War outcome had demonstrated
conclusively to the Soviet General Staff the ability of NATO powers
to implement to an alarmingly great extent, but not fully, the
"revolution in military-technical affairs" predicted by Russian
military science, and specifically enunciated by Marshal Nikolai
Ogarkov over a decade before.
At this same time, the professional military officers of the
General Staff could only stand by and watch the reunification of
Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact alliance and
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the decreasing
quantitative and qualitative strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, the
growing independence movements by republics within the Soviet Union
The following works contain excellent and well-documented
analyses of the marked impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf
War on Soviet General Staff thinking: Blank, Stephen J.,
The Soviet Military Views Operation Desert Storm:
A Preliminary Assessment. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1991);
FitzGerald, Mary C., "Soviet Military Doctrine:
Implications of the Gulf War," International Defense
Review. No. 8, 1991, pp. 809-810; Fitzgerald, Mary C.,
"The Soviet Image of Future War: Through the Prism of
the Persian Gulf," Comparative Strategy. Vol. 10, 1991,
pp. 393-435; Glantz, David M., Soviet Military Strategy
in the 1990s: Alternative Futures. (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
1991); Lambeth, Benjamin S., Desert Storm and Its
Meaning: The View from Moscow. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Report R-4164-AF, 1992).
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(which, in retrospect, would have but a scant six months of remaining
existence), and the accelerating turmoil along the borders of both
Russia and the Soviet Union all of which the General Staff viewed
as very serious threats indeed to the security of the Soviet Union.1163
In early June 1991 Boris Yeltsin had not yet been elected the
first President of the Russian Federation and the mysterious August
1991 coup d'etat attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
was still nearly three months in the future. But the visiting Soviet
General Staff officers obviously were worn down by the political
turmoil, economic deprivations, and continual uncertainty about the
future, and were very concerned about the future of their families
and of their homeland -- be it Russia, Ukraine, or the Soviet Union.
The clearest exposition concerning the nature of future war
occurred in a speech by General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov to the NDU
faculty and students on June 3, 1991 entitled "The Modern Military
and Political Situation and Problems of Soviet Military Art." He
most eloquently stressed how far forward United States -Soviet
relations had advanced since the depths of the 'Cold War,' and how
essential it was that a new security system be established based on
"the principles of cooperation, good-neighborliness, and the
reduction of armed forces and armaments."1164 But, General Rodionov
also singled out "several issues ... that cause our concern":
1163 Author's conversations with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov and General-Major Evgenii G. Korotchenko,
Washington, DC, June 1991.
1164 Rodionov, Gen-Col. Igor N. , "The Modern Military and
Political Situation and Problems of Soviet Military Art,"
Address to the Faculty and Students of the U.S. National
Defense University, Washington, DC, June 3, 1991, p. 3.
491
The first and most important issue is the military-
strategic imbalance in favor of NATO. ... Taking into
account the substantial superiority of NATO in PGM,
reconnaissance assets and means, [and] automated command
and control systems, the total superiority of NATO
unified armed forces could be 1.5 to 2 fold. ... Thus in
operational and strategic terms a basically new situation
has emerged in the distribution of military forces: the
military-strategic parity which is the basis of stability
in the world has been upset. ... Considering the
above mentioned facts, one of the most urgent problems
Soviet military art is to solve now is the task of
finding ways to repel an aggression and to accomplish the
objectives of the first defensive operations, conducted
under conditions of considerable general superiority of
the opposing side. It is a very acute problem and we are
thinking about how to solve it.1165
General Rodionov continued, but this time with particular emphasis on
how the altered international situation would influence the military:
... The second factor of the strategic situation which
now to a great extent determines the directions of
development of Soviet military art ... is the deployment
of our Armed Forces groupings within the Soviet national
territory. ... We will have either to create new basic
combat and support systems or to reconstruct them
significantly. The stationing of troops will change too.
Development of the infrastructure of the territory of the
country will be a rather complicated task. ... We will
have to take into special consideration the fact that
today a considerable quantity of strategically important
groupings and objects will be in the defensive zones of
the first operational echelon's large units.1166
Regardless of the political-military turmoil caused by the
collapse of the 'world socialist system' and the domestic economic
burden of having to recreate a military infrastructure to provide for
Soviet security requirements, General Rodionov carefully placed his
greatest emphasis, and expressed his gravest concern, over the likely
nature of budushchaia voina:
Rodionov, "The Modern Military ....", pp. 4-6.
Rodionov, "The Modern Military ....", p. 7.
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Further development of the means of warfare is another
strong negative factor of the present military-political
situation. There is no doubt about the fact that we are
witness of a principally new breakthrough in the
development of the means of reconnaissance, command and
control, destruction, electronic counter-measures, etc.
These conditions change the notion of the character and
scale of warfare, of how wars and operations should be
prepared and conducted.1167
General Rodionov concluded his address, as personal experience shows
he is wont to do, by challenging the audience with a most thought-
provoking statement which he left unanswered, but which delineated
the future direction of Russian military science investigations and
the desired, eventually deployed Russian military force structure:
Most of all from outer space the territory of the
Soviet Union is vulnerable. We are less preoccupied
with a threat from land directions.... We cannot but
come to the conclusion on the basis of recent experience
that space-based weapons capabilities have increased
considerably.
Preparation of the Forward Task Forces for
repelling the first and following massive fire and
radio-electronic strikes is the task of paramount
importance for our Armed Forces. While resolving this
problem it is difficult to overestimate the importance
of the number of anti-precision-guided weapon measures,
and the level of training of officers and men.
Like you, we consider that success of the first
days and weeks of the war considerably will determine
the progress and the outcome of war in general.
... Ultimately, we will have to decide how to seize
and maintain the operational and the strategic
initiative. . . .116S
Unequivocally, the dialectic Russian military science process
-- as explicitly revealed through the dialogue of the NDU-MAGS
exchanges over the course of three years of interaction -- had
forecast a "revolution in military-technical affairs." And upon that
1167
1168
Rodionov, "The Modern Military




foundation, the transformation of the Russian Armed Forces was in
progress. The Russian goal was, and continues to be, the integration
of emerging technologies with new military missions and new forms of
military and operational art which will create an entirely different,
and exceedingly lethal, new type of budushchaia voina.
The synthesis of offensive and defensive capabilities is leading toward a new
type of warfare that can be waged exclusively from one's own territory. The
goal of this new type of warfare is not the seizure of land; but the attainment
of political objectives through the application of control and counterforce.
- SA Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, 1990
These new weapons constitute a breakthrough in military art.11/0
- General-Major Vladimir I. Slipchenko, 1990
Military Science Fuels the post-Soviet
Russian Military Doctrine Debate
There is no pure offense and no pure defense.
- Aleksandr Pranovich, 1991
Official confirmation of General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov's
concerns about the nature of future war and the security threats
facing the former Soviet Union and Russia was not long in coming.
The 1991 Voennvi vestnik article entitled "On Major Approaches to
Developing the Military Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)" opened with the following statement which substantively
matched, and explicitly expanded upon, the content of General
Rodionov's NDU address:
1169 Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
1170 Author's conversation with General-Major Vladimir I.
Slipchenko, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR,
September 1990.
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Military doctrine is a system of official views and
theses setting the direction of military building, of the
preparation of the country and the armed forces for war
and the methods and forms of its conduct. It is directly
conditioned by the sociopolitical and economic system,
the development of the economy, science, education and
culture of a country and its people. Military doctrine
alters under the influence of such factors as changes in
the military-strategic position of the country, the
creation or prevision of the emergence of new means of
armed struggle, the new military-economic possibilities
and the trends of a certain development of international
relations. ... The need to develop a new military
doctrine for the CIS is indisputable.1171
Aleksandr Pranovich then proceeded to enumerate, in exquisite
detail, the changes in the Soviet global military-strategic position:
The USSR-led world socialist system, which comprised more
that 26% of the Earth's territory, numbered a third of
its population and produced over 39% of its manufacturing
output, has ceased to exist. Gone with it is the
socialist community, which occupied 18% of the planet's
territory, had less than 10% of its population and
accounted for 33% of world manufacturing output and about
25% of world national income. At the same time the
communist movement, on whose support the country relied
more than once, suffered a major defeat.1172
Pranovich continued the litany of his lament:
The former USSR and its successors have lost their
influence in the Third World countries, as well as
military allies.... Treaties on reciprocal military
assistance ... are losing their validity....
The USSR as a single federal state has ceased to exist.
Former socialist-community countries in Europe are
calling for a revision of prewar and postwar
frontiers.... The growth of separatist and extremist
movements turning into armed conflicts, not just in
border areas of the former USSR, but also in its internal
regions.... The emerging world correlation of forces
does not favor the successor to the former USSR.1173
Pranovich, Aleksandr, "On Major Approaches to Developing
the Military Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Independent
States," Voennvi vestnik. No. 18-19, 1991, p. 10.
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 11.
1173 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 11-12.
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And on the domestic condition of the former USSR:
The internal political situation in the former USSR is
characterized by a fierce struggle for power at all
levels, the orgy of so-called pluralism, the growth of
outbursts of inter-nationality, ever intensifying
struggle, failure to observe the Basic Law
(Constitution), and ever-increasing lack of authority,
and growing chaos.11"'
Of special military concern, however, was the fact that:
"The single military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union is
rapidly falling apart, its enterprises, research institutions and
other structures are declared the property of the sovereign
republics...."1175 Further on, Pranovich complained:
One does not need to be a prophet not to foresee a sharp
decline in the level of technological developments in the
military field and their realization in the short and the
long term. This will lead to a lag in supplying not only
the requirements of defensive sufficiency, but also
behind the world level of scientific and technological
development.u'6
But worse still:
The armed forces of the former USSR are going through an
acute crisis. ... Troops are being withdrawn from the
territories of Germany, Poland, and Mongolia according to
an accelerated schedule, [and] have been pulled out from
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The sovereign republics ...
have started establishing their own armies, claiming
jurisdiction over the units of the armed forces of the
former USSR, with a full complement of weapons, military
equipment, assets and infrastructure, stationed on their
territory.1177
Sounding much like the apparitions of Miliutin, Vannovskii, and
Frunze before him, Pranovich wrote:
1174 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches.. .," p. 13
1175 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches.. .," p. 14
1176 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches.. .," p. 14
1177 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches.. .," p. 14
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It will take enormous financial and material resources to
restructure the armed forces and the entire military
organization of the country in accordance with the
concept of defensive sufficiency, conversion, and the
pullout of troops from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and
Mongolia, in the face of a many-billion ruble deficit of
the national budget and the extremely difficult economic
position of the country. The armed forces of the country
are being organized, and as a single structure, have
ceased to exist.1178
Thus, while visualizing the forces of NATO and of the other nations
surrounding the former Soviet Union growing steadily stronger,
Pranovich reiterated General Kir'ian's concern, as well as that of
the leaders of the Imperial Army a century before:
The border troops, in times of war constituting an
important part of the cover echelon, are now a completely
separate force and have been placed under republican
control. The interior forces are subordinate to the
republics. The country's mobilization system as a single
organism has fallen apart.1179
It was within this context of great uncertainty and an
especially disadvantageous 'correlation of forces' that the Russian
General Staff sought to apply its historic dialectic military science
process to develop a new Russian military doctrine capable of coping
with the radically altered political-military-strategic situation of
the former Soviet Union. The Russian civilian press and analysts
roared on about the political aspects of "defensive doctrine,"
"reasonable sufficiency," and "sufficient defense." However, the
professional military officers of the General Staff and General Staff
Academy quietly had set to work, performing their historic
responsibility to the Russian people, regardless of who ruled Russia.
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 15.
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...p. 15.
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Once more, the Russian military diligently began applying their
scientific methodology, historical precedents, and 'fundamental laws
of war' to synthesize a new military defense capability for Russia
and the former Soviet Union. This development process for a new
military doctrine greatly concerned Pranovich:
In short, the elaboration of military doctrine when there
is a total absence of a perception of our potential
adversaries (united under the common notion 'there is no
enemy'), of perceptions about the political and economic
system of the country without profound studies of
possible consequences, of its drastically changed
military-strategic position, is a matter extremely
problematical, if not hopeless.1180
As the thesis for dialectic synthesis of the new Russian military
doctrine, Pranovich reported that the foundation would be the "last
military doctrine of the USSR," that is to say, "the existing
doctrine adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Countries in 1987. "1181 After an
obligatory description of the political aspect of the 1987 Warsaw
Pact military doctrine, which was predicated on "the need to prevent
war in the nuclear age,"1182 Pranovich explicitly listed the contents
of the crucial military-technical aspect as:
In terms of military art the doctrine envisaged: the
intensification of intelligence with a view to the timely
disclosure of the preparation of the potential enemy for
attack; response counterblows from the strategic nuclear
force in repulsing an aerospace attack of the enemy;
a deliberate switchover to strategic defense and the
conduct in all the theaters during the initial period
of strategic defensive operations; repulsing an enemy







"On Major Approaches...," p. 19.
"On Major Approaches...p. 19.
"On Major Approaches...," pp. 19-21.
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measures to raise defense system stability and prevent
the loss of a considerable part of territory (reduction
of the security zone, consolidation of the tactical
zone); fire destruction of the enemy, the use of the
second echelons of armies and fronts to take up defense
or for counterblows; consideration of the influence of
the defensive nature of operations on the combat use of
the air forces, air defense troops, and the operations
of fleets; the struggle for strategic initiative from
the very beginning of the repulse of aggression and
the conduct of vigorous and resolute actions; and the
improvement of the armed forces' control over the
defensive character of military actions.1183
With regard to armed forces development, the military-technical
aspect of the 1987 Soviet doctrine sought to establish a more
equitable balance between offensive and defensive operations and
strategy -- just as Aleksandr Svechin had advocated over six decades
earlier. It would maintain the "military balance and defensive
sufficiency with the aim of reliably repulsing aggression and
inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy."1184 Since a "crushing
defeat" could only be inflicted from the offensive, however, there
continued to exist a major contradiction between the peacetime
political use and meaning of "defensive sufficiency," which implied a
non-hostile "passivity," and the wartime General Staff concept of
obornitel'naia dostatochnost', which required decisive offensive
action to achieve victory following an initial period on the
strategic defensive. Consequently, the Soviet Armed Forces were to
be prepared, i.e., trained,
... for actions in any kinds of war (nuclear and
conventional, general and local); ... fuller assimilation
of the methods of preparation and conduct of defensive
battles (operations) and conduct of counteroffensives;
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 21.
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 22.
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... allocating for preparation for defense not less than
50% of the time, detailed elaboration of defense matters
and the switch to the offensive from a position of
defence; ... and the education of the army and navy
personnel in the spirit of vigorous and resolute actions
both in the defense and in the offense.1185
As the antithesis to the 1987 Soviet military doctrine,
Pranovich charged that, during the "acceleration (uskoreniia)
... of the processes of political, economic, and legal reformation of
society" following the unsuccessful August 1991 coup d'etat attempt,
the civilian press and various military reform committees were
rejecting the previous doctrine and advocating a "purely defensive
doctrine of coalition defense" using a vague "optimal criteria" of
the "reliable defense of the state."1186 Pranovich, and his General
Staff colleagues, found such assertions as "we have no enemies" to
be naive, at best, if not foolhardy. And efforts to base military
doctrine solely on its political aspect were not founded on
"scientific principles," e.g., military science: "From a scientific
point of view, to substitute a 'doctrine of coalition defense' for
the established notion of military doctrine is incorrect."1187
He (i.e., the General Staff leadership) explained:
There occurs in our view a deliberate confusion of the
notions of relaxation of military-political tensions in
the world with that of potential enemy. So long as there
persist the deep, including hidden, temporarily frozen,
contradictions causing tension and conflicts, so long as
armies and military alliances are preserved, one cannot
think that a permanent peace has set in on Earth. That
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 22.
nee Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 23.
1187 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 24.
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is why the assertions that 'if we steadily move along the
road of gradual reduction of the armed forces of the
world community' it is possible to lower the possibility
of crisis situations is a great delusion. The appearance
of crisis situations is caused not by the existence of
armed forces, but by the emergence of political,
economic, territorial, ethnic and other disputes, and the
armed forces, just as wars which they conduct, are only
the consequence of these contradictions.
Therefore, in the elaboration of military doctrine
there should be no avoiding the definition of potential
enemies and possible threats. Avoiding this is a
profound mistake, a self-deception.1188
The Russian General Staff professional military officers,
through the Pranovich article, then proceeded to explain most
eloquently and honestly why, from a soldier's viewpoint, in future
warfare there could not exist a "purely defensive" force structure,
operation, strategy, or doctrine in which weapon firepower would be
reduced and the means for rapid concentration and maneuver on the
battlefield would be excluded.
The question involuntarily arises whether the authors of
this idea conceive what it actually means to deprive a
large unit of mobility, striking power and firepower, to
constantly sit in the trenches, to be without the ability
to quickly disperse and concentrate in the right place,
to rapidly make a maneuver in the conditions when the
opposing side is reconnoitring in real-time, with the
resolution power of reconnaissance of equipment of
several centimeters, day and night, in any weather, with
the readiness of reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-
striking complexes within several minutes and even
seconds to deal a blow with a sniper's accuracy over any
distances. Are these authors not convinced by the
experience of the Gulf War where the multinational force,
or, more precisely, the NATO forces, selectively struck
at urban point targets with a probability of hitting
equal to 0.9, while artillery systems with laser sights
ensured the destruction of targets with equal accuracy at
distance of 26 kilometers.1189
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 25-26.
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 26-27.
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Warming to his lesson, and thereby challenging the credibility of the
civilian leadership of the new Russian government, Pranovich charged:
... We clearly must be aware that in present-day warfare
the battleground is much like a ring for a boxer where
success belongs to those who are more secretive and carry
out a maneuver more quickly and deal a precise and
powerful blow to the opponent -- be it in defense or
attack.
He continued:
... An indispensable element of defense is a counterblow
(counterattack), which is essentially an offensive....
There is no pure offense and no pure defense. Strategic
and operational defense is a system of defensive,
counterattack, offensive actions, retreats, marches,
encounter battles.... One must be a dilettante not to
understand these truths.1190
Before reaching his final conclusions, Pranovich sharply enunciated
two especially grave Russian military concerns. First:
... When speaking of stability (ustoichivost') and the
offensive potential of the sides, one should primarily
take into account the availability of new weapons,
new technology for their manufacturing and use, the
possibilities of reconnaissance and the ability of the
troops (forces) to solve tactical and operational tasks
in the shortest possible time.1191
And second:
... The hasty, ill-conceived disarmament measures,
launched under the pretext of converting the military-
industrial complex. Certainly we do need conversion
[modernization] badly, but it must be undertaken after
the specification of the requirements of the armed
forces.... To carry out conversion with these needs not
yet defined, even the methodology of such calculations
not elaborated and the concept of defensive sufficiency
put forward, but not yet worked out in detail, means to
do enormous damage to the defense of the commonwealth as














The authority with which the Pranovich article was written and
the detail in which it not only explained the role of Russian
military science in the development of military doctrine, but also
precisely revealed the essential technological elements for future
war, resulted in a trinary conclusion worthy of quotation as the
official position of the Russian General Staff:
1. The times are long past when military doctrines
were developed by intuition, proceeding from the moment's
requirements. Now one needs comprehensive systematic
investigations, enlisting the best experts of the
commonwealth, computer technology, cybernetics and
adequate software for these studies. Otherwise the
commonwealth will throw billions to the winds and
undermine, not strengthen, its defenses.
2. Conditions are not yet ripe for the elaboration
of a new military doctrine. The earlier-produced
doctrine, bearing a defensive character, is suitable
enough for the new Commonwealth of Independent States,
just as it was suitable for the Warsaw Treaty. On the
whole it is in line with the tasks and objectives of the
commonwealth and each of its members concerning its
defense, the character of modern war and the methods of
conducting it, and consequently armed forces building and
the preparation of the countries for their defense. It
needs only an adjustment corresponding to the features of
the commonwealth members.
3. One should not destroy the military-economic
base, created by incredible efforts of many generations,
as a single complex -- the foundation of foundations of
the defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States --
without a serious program of conversion including not
only the conversion of military-industrial capacities and
military products, but also the conversion of personnel,
the conversion of research and development, depending on
numerous factors, the most important of which is the
complexity of the switch to a market economy. Without
serious research in this regard damage will be done not
only to the commonwealth members' defense, but also to
the effectiveness which we expect from conversion.1193
Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 30-31.
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In effect, what the General Staff leadership expected from
"defense conversion" was an accelerated "modernization" of the
Russian military-industrial infrastructure. Emerging technology
weaponry could then be produced and would be used to increase the
"effectiveness" of the armed forces, thereby eventually providing the
capability to conduct budushchaia voina at an elevated level, at
least comparable with if not superior to, the technological
sophistication demonstrated during the Gulf War by the NATO allies
and other Western nations.
Given the historic primacy of politics institutionalized within
the Russian system of government, the General Staff chose, however,
a politically untenable position of 'standing in the door' against
the development of a new Russian military doctrine. A new doctrine
was an absolute political necessity and would be forthcoming --
laboriously and eventually -- when the time was 'ripe.'
Machine-building plays the dominant, key role in implementing the scientific
and technological revolution.... Microelectronics, computer technology,
instrument-making, and the entire informatics industry are the catalysts of
progress. They require accelerated development.1194
- Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, June 1985
In the dialectical competition between defense and offense, the center of
gravity is shifting in favor of defensive technologies ... to jump the gap and
create fundamentally new weapons systems that are capable of accomplishing
strategic defense missions.1195
- M. Aleksandrov, October 1990
"Rech' M. S. Gorbacheva," Pravda. June 12, 1985, p. 1.
Aleksandrov, M., "Military Doctrine in Uncertain
Perspective," Literaturnaia Rossiia. October 5, 1990,
p. 9.
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- Russian Military Academy of the General Staff
Military-Science Conference, May 27-30, 1992
We are witnesses and participants of a historic event in the destiny
of a renewed Russia, the creation of its own Armed Forces.1196
- Russian Minister of Defense, General of the Army Pavel S. Grachev
There can be no more conclusive evidence of the Russian
military science process in action, nor more concrete proof of the
continuity of that military science process and its critical role in
predicting the likely nature of budushchaia voina -- from which is
derived the force development and force deployment plans, military
art, strategy, operational art and tactics of the Russian armed
forces -- than the convocation of this most senior-level Military
Science Conference at the Russian General Staff Academy. The timing
was as notable as its stated purpose. The May 1992 Conference
followed quickly the establishment of an independent Russian Ministry
of Defense with Russian President Boris Yeltsin as temporary Defense
Minister on March 16, 1992; immediately after the May 1992 promotion
of Army General Pavel Grachev to the Defense Minister position; and
paralleled the publication of a draft Russian military doctrine.
The stated Conference purpose was: "Discussion of military security
problems and an examination of Russia's military doctrine as well as
basic directions for establishing and reforming the Russian Armed
Forces and employing them in possible military conflicts and wars."1157
1196 Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mysi'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 3.
1197 Erokhin, V. M. , ed., "Forward to Presentations at the
General Staff Military Academy's Military-science
Conference from 27-30 May 92," Voennaia mvsl'.
Special Edition, July 1992, p. 2.
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For this specific purpose Russian Federation Minister of
Defense, General of the Army P. S. Grachev, called upon senior-level
military experts to participate in a discussion process aimed at
building consensus about the future of the Russian Armed Forces.
He summoned together the most "prominent scientists of the Ministry
of Defense military academies and scientific research establishments,
the Russian Academy of Sciences" as well as "representatives of the
General Staff, branches of the Armed forces..., Russian Ministry of
Defense main and central directorates, ... the CIS Joint Armed Forces
High Command, and the chiefs of staff of military districts, fleets,
and large strategic formations...."1198 Among the 55 presenters at
the Conference, most of whom were General Staff Academy faculty
members, were such distinguished contemporary military theorists as
General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Army General Makhmut A. Gareev,
and Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin. Collectively, there was at that time
no more authoritative group of Russian military experts. Nor was
there a more authoritative venue than the Russian Military Academy
of the General Staff, whose Military Science Faculty has the specific
mission of advising the General Staff on the likely nature of
budushchaia voina.1199
In his opening remarks General Grachev underscored that "we are
entering a period of creation of new Armed Forces with new
structures, with new models of weapons, with new strategy, and with
1198 Erokhin, V. M. , "Forward to Presentations...,"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 2.
1199 Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N.
Rodionov, Commander, Soviet Military Academy of the
General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 1990.
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new operational art and tactics...,"1200 and then defined the most
critical tasks as:
We are concerned above all with questions of ensuring
Russia's security, including by military means. The
development of Russia's military doctrine is especially
urgent in this connection. A concept of Russian
Federation Armed Forces force generation must be formed
and practical measures for upgrading them must be carried
out on its basis.1201
Grachev continued, emphasizing that,
... new missions arise for the Armed Forces under present
conditions; adjusting a mechanism for military structures
to interoperate with the Security Council; interoperating
with entities of state authority and management; reviving
the prestige of military service and a system of
military-patriotic values and ideals supported by all
society; and establishing new interrelationships among
servicemen, and chiefly among officers.1202
Then, with a stout warning that could just as easily have been
written over a century before by General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, or
his Red Army successor Mikhail V. Frunze, General Grachev stated
We are faced with the need to form, reorganize and reduce
the Russian Armed Forces in the shortest possible time
periods. There is a strengthening desire in certain
circles of our society to accomplish these tasks
simultaneously, but the economic and sociopolitical
situation in Russia does not allow us to do this. We do
not yet have the necessary material means. A 'landslide'
reduction of the Armed Forces may lead to a sharp rise in
sociopolitical tension in society. A rapid break of
existing military leadership structures may lead to a
loss of command and control.1203
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 3.
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 3.
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 4.
1203 Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl ' . Special Edition, July 1992, p. 4.
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Before concluding his remarks by enumerating the participants,
describing the schedule of discussions, and urging all the
participants "to show more activism and boldly and frankly express
your opinions and suggestions, which we need today as never
before,"1204 General Grachev stressed that: "Another very important
task is to eliminate the existing gap between the present makeup and
structure of the Armed Forces and the real requirements of the
Russian Federation."1205
The first presenter was none other than visionary Commander
of the Military Academy of the General Staff, General-Colonel
Igor N. Rodionov, who began with a very alarmist, and factually
accurate, evaluation of the military-political situation which
would pervade the entire conference: "... The Soviet Union has
disintegrated, ... the Union's unified Armed Forces have
disintegrated, its defensive system has fallen apart, and the
world military-strategic balance essentially has been disrupted."1206
After emphasizing that "the country is on the verge of making very
crucial decisions on defense matters," General Rodionov carried on in
the historic tradition of the Imperial Army and Soviet General Staffs
by defining military doctrine as,
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl ' . Special Edition, July 1992, p. 5.
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992, p. 5.
Rodionov, Gen-Col. I. N., "Approaches to Russian Military
Doctrine," Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992,
p. 6; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 2.
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... a system of fundamental views and provisions on
questions of the defense of the country officially
adopted in a state in a given time period for mandatory
fulfillment by all state, including strictly military,
entities. It reflects a state's attitudes toward war and
defines the nature of possible military missions which
may face it, methods of accomplishing them and primary
directions of military force generation.1207
He explained that open debate was essential during the development of
doctrine. But, once the provisions were incorporated in legislative
and government documents, they become "mandatory for everyone, and
serve as it were as the aims of supreme political and military
authority on national defense questions." Rodionov then asserted:
"Now it is a question of adopting a fundamentally new military
doctrine for Russia."1208
On this premise, General Rodionov proceeded, first, to describe
the requirement for the "political fundamentals of military doctrine"
(the political aspect! to be based upon the principal idea of,
the Russian state's peaceable policy, the fact that
Russia does not plan to attack anyone and will not use
military force first, and that its Armed Forces will be
directed toward protecting the country's national
interests and the state's territorial integrity and
independence and repelling aggression.1209
Second, he elaborated upon Russia's "global and regional national
interests" and the specific threats to those interests:
A military threat to Russia's national interests exists
and hardly will disappear in the near term. This is
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine,"
p. 7; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 2.
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confirmed by conclusions from the analysis of actions by
probable enemies and allies which are very important in
forming the state's military doctrine. That [military
science] assessment is not at all simple and lately has
been distinguished by extremes. Previously it was
considered that almost the entire world was the probable
enemy, but now we declare that we have no probable
enemies nor can there be any, that all former enemies are
friends. That approach is profoundly erroneous.1210
As is customary in all Russian discussions of military
doctrine, Rodionov next turned to what, for the "soldier in the
trenches," is the more important, indeed, crucial consideration,
the military-technical aspect of military doctrine. He described
"the nature of wars which Russia may be forced to wage," i.e.,
budushchaia voina, or perhaps more correctly as defined earlier,
sovremennaia voina, due to the immediate and limited time frame of
Rodionov's projection. This was followed by a four part taxonomy
of war: First, a "global nuclear threat" that, he judged, "will
be preserved as long as other states have nuclear weapons and the
capability of using them." To avert this type of warfare, "all
means (political, diplomatic and military) must be directed toward
preventing it, but the deciding role here will rest with Russia's
capability to inflict damage on the probable enemy in a retaliatory
nuclear strike under all conditions."1211 Second, a "major
aggression against Russia with conventional weapons," most likely
beginning "in air and sea space with the delivery of strikes by
aviation and naval forces, and in the future also from space," as
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine,"
p. 9; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 4.
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"confirmed by the fact that developed countries have powerful,
effective means of precision air attack and have an advantage in
their development."1212 Here General Rodionov cautioned:
Such a war, using precision weapons and enhanced-yield
munitions, can have serious consequences, and if opposing
sides set for themselves the achievement of decisive
goals, it is fraught with the constant threat of
developing into a nuclear war. Because of the reality
of these options, Russia must openly declare that it
has the right to use the entire arsenal of weapons
at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, to repel
aggression.1213
Third, Rodionov envisioned, "local wars and military conflicts" both
near the Russian and CIS borders as well as in other countries as
being "waged with limited involvement of armed forces." Such threats
posed the danger of "developing into major military clashes," either
from escalation or from other countries "using them as a pretext to
carry out large-scale aggression. "1214 And fourth, the intervention of
the armed forces in internal ethnic and religious conflicts or in a
civil war, which, from conversations with General Rodionov, he
believes to be a necessary, but always abhorrent, use of military
force -- just as it was a century before to his Imperial Army
predecessors.
For the Russian officers and civilians present at this
conference, and for Western military officers and policymakers,
wherever domiciled, all of whom have a distinct obligation to
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine,"
p. 10; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 4.
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understand the difference between political-military theory and its
applied practice, General Rodionov's most striking and sagacious
analysis was his dialectic contrasting of the 1987 Soviet military
doctrine with the military-technical requirements of defending the
new Russian state:
Previously the state's military doctrine envisaged only
defensive operations in the initial period. Later it was
presumed that the enemy would be expelled from captured
territory with the help of a counteroffensive and
military operations would cease without invading the
aggressor's territory in case of reaching his state
border. 'Hitting the enemy not on foreign, but on
friendly territory' was intended. The mission of
defeating the enemy was not assigned. ... These
provisions, predetermining defeat in a future war in
advance, essentially are very dangerous for a state.1215
History attests that an indifferent defense, passiveness
and loss of strategic initiative never before brought
victory to belligerents. ... The principal argument in
favor of such a strictly defensive concept was considered
to be the fact that otherwise a contradiction arises
between defensive political and offensive military-
technical aspects of doctrine. In fact, the
fallaciousness of this approach was as follows: political
aspects were transferred to military-technical aspects,
and the time before the beginning of war was identified
with the time after its beginning.
The new Russian military doctrine must precisely,
clearly and unequivocally reflect the proposition that
if an enemy has begun aggression and armed conflict,
its evaluation must proceed from the laws of warfare.
In this case the armed forces must choose and carry out
those forms and methods of military operations most
effective in a given situation: the offensive, the
defense, and the delivery of fire strikes against the
enemy no matter where he is located. This includes
strikes that must be delivered above all against the
aggressor country's territory and against his most
important military and economic installations.1216
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine,"
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This clear delineation of the political and military-technical
aspects formed by the firebreak of the beginning of any hostilities,
to General Rodionov was not only an entirely logical approach to the
formulation of military doctrine, but also an absolute necessity,
given the envisioned character of the first two, most deadly, types
of future war. He explained:
Each state has a geopolitical and strategic position
inherent only to it and has its own features,
capabilities and interests in accordance with which armed
forces force generation must be carried out. It is fully
understandable that one would consider here the economic
and S&T [scientific and technological] capacities for
upkeep and outfitting of the Army and Navy, but they must
be strictly calculated, coordinated and brought into
agreement with missions and national interests for
ensuring the security of society and the state. ... In
establishing the Russian Armed Forces it is necessary to
set a course not toward their quantitative, but toward
their qualitative development. The priority should be
given to new, most effective means of warfare (aerospace
weapons, precision-guided weapons, and modern command and
control and reconnaissance equipment). This will permit
increasing the armed forces' combat capabilities with
their lesser numerical strength.1217
In conclusion, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov issued an
enduring clarion call for the transformation of the Russian Armed
Forces. His predecessor military theorists and reform implementors
-- Ridiger, Miliutin, Frunze, Svechin, and Tukhachevskii --
immediately would have recognized the strategic similarity:
In the makeup of the Russian Armed Forces it is necessary
to have permanent readiness forces of limited numerical
strength; mobile air-transportable reserves capable of
movements to any region of the country in short time
periods; as well as strategic reserves formed in a period
of threat and in the course of war to conduct large-scale
military operations. During a strategic deployment the
Russian Armed Forces must be capable of establishing
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine,"
p. 12; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 5.
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three major groupings -- western, southern and eastern --
which would have the capability of independently
accomplishing strategic missions, if necessary, on their
own axes. They must be built on one-man command, which
is called upon to be strengthened and developed in every
way. ... On the whole, a course must be set toward
creating a professionally prepared, well trained cadre
array.1218
One of the key conference presentations illuminating the
continuity of the military science process within Russian military
thought was given by General-Major A. N. Bazhenov, the Chief of the
Military History Institute. He defined the problem of Russian
national security as,
... above all a question of such problems as foreign
policy support ... (particularly a search for reliable
allies) and domestic political and economic support...,
[and] sociopolitical stability and the necessary level of
military production, which run through all the homeland's
history."1215
Bazhenov characterized the historical Russian concept of "national
security" as "a system of guarantees of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and protection of national interests relying on military
force" and asserted:
Military guarantees have always dominated the process of
development of Russian state history. The desire to seek
a solution to national security problems by geopolitical
and military means --by expanding the territory and
maintaining an army surpassing those of neighboring
states in numerical strength and arms -- was the most
typical. It was believed that the farther off forward
defense lines were, the more reliable security was.1220
Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military ...,"
pp. 12-13; in FBIS, 30 SEP 1992, pp. 5-6.
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After lamenting the military's "spiritual vacuum ... that needs to be
filled," he elegized, "What moral norms and spiritual ideals can
inspire a soldier of the Russian Army that is being formed?" He
proposed reviving "the idea of serving national interests and serving
a national idea purged of any kind of nationalist distortions,"1221
and concluded:
... The Army's strength always has comprised the
foundation of the homeland's national security. Russia
accumulated a very rich experience in resolving the
entire set of questions of its Armed Forces force
generation which merits very thorough research and
consideration in solving present problems. The primary
lesson which can be learned from history is that military
reform is the only tested method of bringing an army
which has fallen behind in its development into line with
demands of the time.1222
The two "revolutionary" military reforms that Bazhenov chose to
equate as being most comparable to the 1990s formation of a new
Russian Armed Forces were the late-17th century initial founding of
the Imperial Russian Army by Peter the Great and the creation of the
Red Army following the 1917 October Revolution. In the latter, "the
Red Army essentially became similar to the prerevolutionary Russian
Army in basic indicators (principle of manpower acquisition, system
of command and control, troop organization and so on)."1223 Bazhenov's
rationale for selecting these two reforms is very telling about the
breadth and depth of the presently intended changes to the Russian
Bazhenov, "Historic Problems of Security," p. 22;
in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 11.
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Army during the 1990s -- "We are not talking about the usual type of
military reform, but about the creation essentially of a new army,
about the revival of what has been lost. It is important here to
take into account everything there was in the past, both positive and
negative."1224 General Bazhenov's final conclusion approaches the
validity of an "eternal law":
Incomplete military reforms which dragged on excessively
in time always did considerable harm to the army.
Nothing has such a pernicious effect on the Army's status
as 'unclaimed' reforms -- those which have objectively
matured but are postponed for particular reasons.1225
Of all the major themes that ran through the May 1992
conference presentations, none rang out more loudly than the
deficiency of domestic military-technical policy and the professional
military concern about the ability of the Russian economy to provide
the technological wherewithal to 'convert,' that is to say
'modernize,' the weapons and equipment of the new Russian Army. In
one way or another each of the participants addressed this complex,
multifaceted question. However, the specific task of defining the
current Russian military-technical policy goal fell to General-Major
Iu. A. Nikolaev, the head of an unspecified "scientific research
institute," who proposed that "[the goal] in the present stage must
be to maintain a defensively sufficient potential at the minimum
necessary level ensuring that the military threat is parried no
Bazhenov, "Historic Problems of Security," p. 23;
in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 11.
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matter from whence it comes...." 1226 General Nikolaev stipulated:
... Today the principal tasks reflecting the essence of
military-technical policy are the following: Creating and
maintaining an effective Russian Armed Forces armaments
system taking into account the conditions of their force
generation in the transitional period and of the state's
economic capacities; not allowing a critical
technological lag behind the most developed countries and
preserving general scientific/technical parity in the
area of creating modern, highly effective weapons;1227
ecologically clean and economically profitable recycling
of obsolete military equipment and equipment being freed
up in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces;
sensible conversion of military production which takes
into account specifics of the defense complex and its
high scientific/production potential.1228
General Nikolaev further explained that the "unchanged
fundamental basis" for meeting these priority tasks was the 1990
State Program for Development of Armaments and Military Equipment
which, for the years 1991 to 2005, specified the five basic missions
of the Russian Armed Forces: "... preserving a nuclear potential for
deterrence under any conditions; repelling an enemy aerospace attack;
repelling aggression in continental TVDs; repelling aggression in
ocean and sea TVDs; and supporting day-to-day activity of the Armed
Nikolaev, General-Major Iu. A., "Russian Military-
Technical Policy," Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition,
July 1992, p. 29; in FBIS, 30 SEP 1992, p. 16.
For a thorough and well-documented description concerning
specific Russian views about emerging technologies;
particularly micro-electronics, automation, and
informatika, see Gordon A. Grant, John H. Lobingier,
Kevin D. Stubbs, Richard E. Thomas, Steve R. Wassell,
Soviet Technological Priorities. STRATECH STUDY SS89-2
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Center for
Strategic Technology, 1989); also Robert Lempert, Ike Y.
Chang, Jr., Kathleen McCallum, Emerging Technology
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Forces and combat operations."1229 It was, however, through his
research about the nature of budushchaia voina that Nikolaev saw:
"The use of conventional weapons is more likely; their effectiveness
is growing by many times with use of precision weapons...." He
therefore determined "the following ... main priorities in developing
the Russian Armed Forces for the next few years":1230
-
... fixed superhardened and mobile ground missile
systems and a backup battle management system and
equipment for active protection as well as for countering
a multi-echeloned ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] defense
system;
-
... continue the work of upgrading the space component
of the missile attack warning system;
-
... protection of force groupings and of the country's
most important installations against air strikes becomes
a special priority.
-
... above all we should develop precision weapons
(ballistic and cruise missiles with precision guidance
systems, strike aviation with a large radius of action)
and upgrade means of combatting aircraft carrier
groupings.
-
... give preference to developing and upgrading
minefield equipment (above all air and missile-artillery
remote minelaying systems), reconnaissance/attack and
reconnaissance/strike complexes, maskirovka [Literally
"camouflage;" however, this exceedingly intricate Russian
concept includes "concealment," "deception," and
"reflexive control."], and electronic countermeasures
equipment.
-
... heightened attention must be given to creating
operational mobility equipment, especially air equipment,
as well as various air-transportable arms.1231
Nikolaev, "Russian Military-Technical Policy," p. 30;
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With remarks which warned of drastically falling military production
and the threatened break-up of large military-industrial enterprises
and scientific-research centers, General Nikolaev cautioned:
Preserving scientific and technological parity in the
military area and not allowing a critical technological
lag behind the most developed countries demands
preventive scientific research along the most important
directions of science and technology having a determining
and fundamental importance for creating advanced weapons
models .1232
Nikolaev concluded his comments with the proposal that: "Today ... it
is necessary to give this activity a more purposeful character and to
elevate the centralizing role of the Ministry of Defense in planning
and financing research and development aimed at creating high-level
advanced technologies."1233
General of the Army Makhmut A. Gareev, a most distinguished
historian and professor at the Military Academy of the General Staff,
presented to the Military-Science Conference a most enlightening
paper entitled "Military Doctrine, Force Generation." This pragmatic
discourse provided a most eloquent example of the dialectic Russian
military science process in action and of its direct linkage -- past,
present and future. General Gareev initially cited the 1920s, when
Mikhail Frunze began work on creating a "network of military-
scientific societies ... and military-scientific conferences ... to
discuss approximately the very same questions we are examining
today." Had he chosen to do so, Gareev just as easily could have
Nikolaev, "Russian Military-Technical Policy," p. 32;
in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 17.
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tied Trotsky's employment of Tsarist military specialists to the
late-19th century explosion of military-scientific societies and
commissions as the foundation upon which Frunze's "unified
proletarian military doctrine" was laid. Instead, General Gareev
elected to emphasize: "We still are living with that doctrine and
with those military-theoretical provisions developed under Frunze's
leadership.... "1234
Like Frunze before him, Gareev was particularly concerned by
the "phenomenon of passiveness and indifference" in the Russian
officer corps: "A mobilizing idea is extremely necessary. That idea
must permeate basic provisions of military doctrine, unite officers,
and provide an impetus for elevating the state of morale of all
personnel." 1235 Looking into the future, rhetorically Gareev asked,
"Just what should we serve?" and answered his own question, "We
should serve that which Russian soldiers have served for centuries:
Rodina [Motherland], the homeland, and to protect the national and
state interests of the Russian Federation. ... It is impossible to
build anything worthwhile in a blank space." 1236 General Gareev then
explained an enduring, cardinal point about Russian society:
I must emphasize that it is impossible to create a modern
doctrine and bring up soldiers in a spirit of readiness
to defend their Motherland without being respectful
Gareev, Army General M. A., "Military Doctrine, Force
Generation," Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992,
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toward our country and toward the history of our people
and Array and without considering experience obtained in
past years. The principal idea uniting all personnel is
that Russia can and must be revived and must develop only
as a great power. This is determined not only by our
wishes, but by a number of fundamental objective factors:
historical traditions, the geopolitical position it holds
in the world, and its economic, political, and spiritual
needs. Any attempt to deprecate Russia's role will
encounter opposition in society and the people will not
understand this.1237
After raising an arcane question, inconclusively debated within the
Russian military since the late-19th century, of whether to introduce
a new "corps-brigade-battalion" organizational structure in place of
the existing "army-division-regiment" system, General Gareev stated
his own preference for the latter, and concluded:
The fact is, in planning the reduction and transformation
of the Armed Forces, we are striving to make our defense
organizational development less burdensome for the
economy. But everything is happening differently in
practice -- expenditures not only are not decreasing but,
conversely, are increasing.1238
General-Colonel V. Ia. Abolins, a retired Military Academy of
the General Staff Strategy Faculty professor, reiterated the long¬
standing revelations of military science that the new Russian Armed
Forces could be capable of defending the state "if qualitative parity
above all and a certain quantitative parity of personnel and
equipment with the probable enemy are preserved in the principal TVDs
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military-economic potential." 1239 General Abolins reasserted that it
was "very important to preserve a military-economic potential (under
all conditions) capable of supporting the development, upkeep and
alert duty of the Strategic Deterrence Troops," i.e., nuclear weapons
delivery capability, while "at the same time creating a space defense
system and developing a system of warning of an enemy missile attack
is necessary, since the danger of a missile strike may arise for
Russia not just from the United States."1240
Abolins then raised the highly controversial -- at least among
Western civilian analysts -- specter of the possibility of a future
war, which by Russian definition lies in the 2020-2030 timeframe,
involving space operations which the Russian military science process
had revealed to be increasingly likely:
The militarization of outer space also requires answering
measures. It is presently impossible to exclude the
circumstance that the emphasis of warfare may be shifted,
or already is shifting into outer space. ... A need has
matured for having Russia's own space defense forces to
oppose the enemy, for creating ABM systems, and for space
surveillance. In our opinion, they can be within the
composition of the Air Forces. It is necessary to
prepare for space warfare.1241
Concerning critical weapons systems development, which the
Russian military includes under the category of "force generation,"
Abolins, General-Colonel (ret.) V. Ia., "Some Problems of
Preparing the Country and Russian Armed Forces to Repel
Aggression," Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, July 1992,
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General Abolins stressed:
A close relationship between military science as well as
natural and technical sciences is assuming more and more
importance in solving military force generation problems.
Improving the state's defensive might and achieving a
qualitative leap in creating weapons and combat equipment
necessitates consolidating efforts of the Russian
academies of sciences, military academies, and other
scientific establishments of the Armed Forces, especially
as problems of creating fundamentally new means of
warfare and tactical automatic robotized systems with
artificial intelligence as well as information support of
military operations already are on the agenda.""
Turning to the problem of training "leadership cadres of ministries
and various departments" about national security issues, and
particularly about "military security, mobilization preparation, and
defense of the country," General Abolins highly approved of General
Rodionov's initiative to admit a select group of senior-level
civilian functionaries to the Military Academy of the General Staff.
The experience of higher defense courses which previously
existed under the Military Academy of the General Staff
and command and staff practical games held there showed
that joint training of civilian and military specialists
not only helps them improve knowledge of fundamentals and
of practical measures for transferring the Armed Forces
and national economy to a wartime footing and for
mobilization training, but also permits fully determining
the 'bottlenecks' in these questions and methods of
remedying deficiencies.1243
After stating that the goal of mobilization is to "preempt the
enemy in establishing force groupings" and therefore advising against
rejection of "the military district structure since it is best to
prepare and establish operational-strategic groupings on the basis of
Abolins, "Some Problems of Preparing the Country...,"
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troops of border military districts, which form corresponding front
large strategic formations," General Abolins reinforced what was fast
becoming the 'new' Russian military litany -- mobility, constant
readiness, qualitative improvement, and "fundamentally new solutions
to space surveillance and warning"1244 -- all of which has a most
familiar historical ring to it. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his
conviction about the importance of military science with this
definitive statement:
Problems of preparing the country and Russian Armed
Forces to repel aggression are presently urgent for all
state entities and the military leadership. Their
resolution will permit increasing the defense capability
of the Russian Federation and combat effectiveness of the
Armed Forces being established. Military science must
play a very important role in this matter. It is on
military science that one should rely in performing tasks
of preparing the country and Russian Armed Forces to
repel possible aggression.1245
General Abolins' candid, and factually accurate, statement about
"increasing combat effectiveness" while numerically decreasing the
number of troops and weapons should come as a surprise to members of
the Western 'arms control mafia', who maintain, philosophically, that
the mutual elimination of weapons and reduction of military personnel
leads to peace. Unfortunately, Russian military science does not
permit such a fallacious, 'subjective' approach.
On the fourth and final day of the May 1992 General Staff
Academy Military-Science Conference, the Russian Federation First
Deputy Minister of Defense, Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin, and the Minister
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of Defense, Army General Pavel S. Grachev, consecutively summarized
conference findings. Dr. Kokoshin, responsible primarily for
military-industrial policy in the Russian Ministry of Defense,
reinforced the significance of this military-science conference in
his opening remarks: "A large number of the ideas and propositions
heard here can be included in the text of the Russian State's
military doctrine and in the Armed Forces force generation
concept."1246 He stressed the fundamental, and continuallv growing,
importance of emerging technologies in budushchaia voina:
Today military doctrine needs a more in-depth study of
many questions of military-technical policy [the primary
role of the military-science process], since military art
largely is determined specifically by the development
level of equipment and arms. This demands coordinated,
joint work by military cadres and civilian specialists
from the defense industry, i.e., by those who create
military equipment for the Armed Forces of the future.1247
In order to accomplish this new integration of civilians within the
Russian Ministry of Defense {Ministerstvo oborni - MO), Kokoshin
stipulated that there was "no acute need to radically transform"
subunits that already existed within the MO and the General Staff.
Instead, civilian specialists gradually would be phased into military
positions following the completion of training "using our best
technical higher educational institutions and the General Staff
Academy." Kokoshin concluded, "Major work is at hand, during which
problems already are arising which demand immediate solution. At the
Kokoshin, A. A., "On Russian Federation Ministry of
Defense Missions and Structure," Voennaia mvsl'.
Special Edition, July 1992, p. 106; in FBIS,
JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 92, p. 58.
Kokoshin, "On Russian Federation Ministry of Defense...,"
p. 106; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 92, p. 58.
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same time it is necessary to think about the future in order to build
really modern, powerful Russian Armed Forces...."12'*8
The final conference summary, delivered by General of the Army
Pavel S. Grachev, displayed the seminal role of the military-science
process in formulating the new Russian military doctrine:
I agree with General Rodionov's briefing, and with the
other speakers, that doctrine must be developed based on
conclusions from an objective analysis [the role of
military science] of the present world military-political
situation and long-range scientific forecasts. Doctrine
must become an integral continuation of the concept of
Russian security in which state policy goals and tasks
are formulated and the Russian Federation's priority
interests are defined. In it our state's attitude toward
war and toward use of military force as a means of
achieving political goals should be expressed; missions
facing the Russian Armed Forces should be confirmed, and
the nature of military danger and possible wars [future
war] in which Russia may be involved; and ways to deter
and repel aggression by military means should be
defined.1249
Demonstrating the dialectical continuity between the Russian
military past, present, and future, General Grachev emphasized that
"one of the most difficult tasks is a determination of forms and
methods of conducting combat operations and their practical
introduction in the process of Armed Forces training" in that "it is
impossible to ignore the objective principles and laws of warfare;"
yet "the state presently does not have the necessary material means
Kokoshin, "On Russian Federation Ministry of Defense...,"
p. 107; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 92, p. 58.
Grachev, Army General P. S., "Basic Content of Russia's
Military Doctrine and of the Russian Armed Forces
Organizational Development Concept," Voennaia mvsl'.
Special Edition, July 1992, p. 108; in FBIS,
JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 59.
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for a radical Armed Forces reform."1250 Therefore, Grachev considered
it "advisable to leave the branch structure of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces unchanged for the period of their formation." However,
he also considered it essential to continue with the development of a
well-equipped force, capable of executing a "mobile defense concept"
of operations, making maximum use of existing military personnel,
because a "radical breakup will require significant material inputs"
involving "a significant transformation (perestroika) of systems for
command and control, orders, procurements, cadre training, etc."1251
For the long-term force generation of this "mobile defense
concept," General Grachev returned to the fundamental issue --
"Could the Russian economy and military industrial base provide the
modernized weapons and equipment deemed essential for budushchaia
voina by the investigations of military science?" He emphasized the
crucial importance of Russian military-technical policy:
Military-technical policy problems should hold a special
place in Russian Armed Forces organizational development.
... It is possible to maintain the minimum necessary
level of Armed Forces technical outfitting only by
determining the priorities for arms and military
equipment development and procurement. In my view,
priority must be given to the development of highly
mobile forces, strategic arms, air defense weapons,
military-space weapons, army aviation, and
reconnaissance, EW [electronic warfare], and command
and control equipment.1252
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," pp. 109-110; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 59.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. Ill; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 60.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 112; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 60.
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Punctuated in distinct and flagrant contradiction of the
commonly accepted Western understanding that 'defense conversion'
relates to increasing the production of Russian civilian consumer
goods, General Grachev then directly tied the Russian military
concept of 'defense conversion' with weapons and force structure
'modernization' by very emphatically stating:
It is also impossible to ignore defense enterprise
conversion questions, which represent a very important
statewide task. I emphasize this in connection with the
fact that an opinion exists that conversion is a matter
only for the Ministry of Defense. That approach is
incorrect. We all have to think seriously how to
preserve the existing scientific-technical potential of
the defense industry within reasonable limits. I
consider it impermissible to lower the level of research,
development, testing and evaluation financing. If we
permit this, then we hardly will be able to accomplish
the task of making a transition to quality indicators of
Army and Navy outfitting with new kinds of arms and
military equipment.1253
Not at all unlike his illustrious Imperial Russian and Soviet
predecessors, General Grachev judged that the "fundamental
transformation of our economic system is the problem of all
problems." He proposed the transition of the Russian Armed Forces to
a new, higher qualitative level. Beginning in 1992 this alembic
process would be accomplished in three stages over a period of 6-8
years. The first stage would initiate the development and approval
of the numerical strength and structure of the Russian Armed Forces;
the sequence and time periods for military reform; their command and
control system; a legal basis for functioning; and "a system of
social guarantees for servicemen, their families, and persons
1253 Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 112; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, pp. 60-61.
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discharged from military service."1"4 In the second stage, 1994-1995,
the withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces from other states to Russian
territory would be completed; force groupings would be established,
the Armed Forces would be reduced to 2.1 million by 1995; and a
"mixed manpower acquisition system" would be implemented. 1255 The
third stage, from 1997 and 1999, would usher in the withdrawal of the
Northwest Group of Forces; the reduction of personnel strength to a
minimum 1.5 million troops; and the completion of the "reform and
transition to new organizational structures with consideration of the
reorganization of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms."1256
Grachev cautioned, however, that these "time periods are tentative"
depending on the "domestic political and economic situation in Russia
as well as [the development of] interstate relations."1257
Citing the "disruption of the previously established systems of
communications, command and control, and the military infrastructure"
and the fact that "the European part of our state previously was
given insufficient attention," General Grachev charged: "Our military
theory largely lags behind today's, not to mention tomorrow' demands.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine " p. 113; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 61.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 113; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 61.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 113; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 61.
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30 SEP 1992, p. 61.
529
Where are the weakest places in the development of military art?"1"8
This very pointed question clearly illustrated the continuity of
problems through which the application of Russian military science
remains trapped. General Grachev enumerated five areas of concern:
1) "Our immediate task is to deter aggression"; 2) "we have
insufficiently thought out and substantiated questions of preparing
and conducting combat operations in local and regional wars"; 3) "we
say much about the increased role of offensive air weapons and others
including precision weapons, and even more about the need to revise
existing forms and methods of waging warfare.... But what practical
recommendations have we developed for the troops?;" 4) "I am troubled
very much by questions about strategic deployment" and concerning the
strategic reserve, "How can it [equipment stored in Siberia] be moved
from there in case of necessity?" and 5) finally, and critically:
It may seem to some that I am excessively emphasizing the
significance of the practical direction of scientific
research, but it must be remembered that we live in a
special time. There are very difficult tasks in the
military sphere, many of which previously were not
accomplished on the scale of Russia. Today the role
of military science has grown considerably. This is
connected above all with the fact that on the one hand we
have a time shortage and consequently science is required
to have a special promptness and a preemptive nature;
on the other hand, as you realize, miscalculations in
solving problems raised are inadmissible now and avoiding
them requires an exceptionally precise assessment of many
objective and subjective factors of the political,
economic, and strategic situation and of all trends
in the development of military affairs. Based on this
assessment, military science must provide a substantiated
forecast in the shortest possible time....1259
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 114; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 61.
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's...," pp. 114-115;
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In concluding his conference summary, General Grachev assigned
specific taskings which, once again, demonstrated the direct linkage
of such conferences to the Russian government consensus-building
process and revealed the continuity of the current Russian commission
process with that first energized over 120 years earlier when General
Dmitrii A. Miliutin set out attempting to create the very first
Russian military doctrine. General Grachev commissioned:
The Ministry of Defense, with the involvement of
specialists of scientific research establishments and
military higher education institutions together with
representatives of Russia's legislature and executive
entities, must generalize all proposals expressed during
the conference, take them in to account in the draft
military doctrine, and pass the modified draft to the
interdepartmental commission by 1 July of this year
[1992] for examination and submission to the President of
Russia.1260
Further, the new Ministry of Defense, through "the General Staff,
military academies, and scientific research organizations" was
ordered to "complete work on ... the Armed Forces development
concept" which, by direction of the Russian Federation President, was
to be submitted to the Minister of Defense prior to August 15, 1992
and to President Yeltsin for approval by September 1, 1992. The
General Staff, staffs of Armed Forces branches, and military
academies were tasked to "assess ... the new trends which now have
appeared in the development of military affairs" for the purpose of
developing new tactics, combined arms regulations, and "fundamental
documents for the strategic and operational levels." Also, the
General Staff was instructed to establish a "provisional commission"
1260 Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine...," p. 115; inFBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L,
30 SEP 1992, p. 62.
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to inspect the Russian Armed Forces, paying "special attention" to
the state of troop affairs, strength levels, combat readiness, and
the level of training.1261
Never departing from the long-established, ingrained Russian
dialectic military science process, General Grachev repeated, one
last time for the benefit of the conferees, that "preserving the
level of the scientific potential will remain one of the principal
tasks." He resolved that simultaneously "we must take account of
Russia's historical military experience and all that is best and most
valuable which has accumulated not only in the former Union's Armed
Forces, but also in armies of other states"1262 during the process of
transforming the Russian Armed Forces to cope with budushchaia voina.
The struggle in the sphere of command and control and delivery of fires comes
to the foreground, and so the priority must be to create systems of command and
control, intelligence, electronic warfare, and conventional and nuclear
engagement. That approach involves changes in forms and methods of waging war
which showed up in the local military conflicts of recent times, especially in
the Persian Gulf. . . ,1263
I would say many of our studies in the area of military art bear an abstract
character. They often are separated from our country's real life and economic
capabilities. Of course, scientific investigations must be directed toward the
future, but they cannot be allowed to go over into the area of fantasy, and
many here specifically fantasized. It turns out as in the familiar saying: "It
went smoothly on paper, but they forgot about the ravines, and that is what you
walk through.1264
- General of the Army Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, 1992
Grachev, "Basic Content of Russia's...," pp. 116-117;
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Certainly the views expressed by the Conference participants
were not the sole opinions concerning Russian national security
requirements -- only the most authoritative military opinions.
Indeed, a quite heated debate transpired between 1987 and 1993,
ostensibly over military doctrine -- but really about economic and
political priorities -- as civilian 'democratic reformers' sought to
curtail the economic and political power of the Russian military
establishment. The influence of the General Staff view, however, is
singular. It is cohesive and predicated on historically documented,
and therefore 'objective,' military-scientific analysis. In sharp
contrast, the conflicting civilian 'military reform' views were, and
are, just that -- conflicting, fragmented, lacking in historical
evidence, and hence can be considered highly 'subjective' by the
professional Russian military establishment and by a Russian society,
both of which prize, perhaps above all, a central unifying idea. For
this reason, over the long term, the coherent national security ideas
and detailed plans of the professional Russian military, now composed
of civilian and military personnel alike, are most likely to prevail
-- just as they have in the past. These ideas and plans are centered
most specifically on the restoration of historic "Russian national
interests" and of international respect for the "powerful" Russian
narod (people), as exemplified during the General Staff Academy
Military-Science Conference.
This is not to predict that the 'transformed' new Russian Armed
Forces in the year 2000 will be identical to, or even resemble, the
1992 General Staff proposals. In point of fact, there are simply too
many economic and political variables that could alter the outcome.
533
Rather, it is to stress that the May 1992 Military-Science Conference
presented a living blueprint --a baseline 'objective' goal -- which,
due to the strong consensus among the Russian military leadership,
will be used flexibly to guide Russian force development toward those
well-defined force generation, technological, and military art
capabilities required to defend Russia and to win a future war.
Official confirmation of the progress in implementing the
guidelines established at the May 1992 General Staff Military-Science
Conference came in a June 1993 interview by Nezavisimaia gazeta
reporter Mikhail Karpov with Russian Federation First Deputy Minister
of Defense, Andrei Kokoshin. While summarily dismissing his "faith
in the all-inclusive document, which will immediately provide an
answer to all the problems that trouble us" and any governmental
efforts to work out a "unified military doctrine," Kokoshin
emphasized that with the passage of the October 1992 Law on Defense,
"the necessity of working out and ratifying a military doctrine was
fixed in law." 1265 Consequently, Kokoshin explained, in distinct
contradiction to his denigration of the concept of a "unified
military doctrine," that the Ministry of Defense and the General
Staff now were making a concerted effort to fit the "totality" of
government and defense ministry documents and plans "into a unified,
integrated whole." This comprehensive effort would "reflect the real
interests of the state and its capabilities and the degree to which
they are based on a correct forecast of the political-military and
1265 Kokoshin, Andrei, "Russia's Military Doctrine: Concerning
it, First Deputy Russian Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin
Reflects," Nezavisimaia gazeta. June 3, 1993, p. 1.
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military-technical situation." 1266 The latter is exactly the historic
role of Russian military science.
In response to the interviewer's question concerning the status
of the integration process, Kokoshin replied that "new operational
plans have been worked out and approved. The Ministry of Defense
presented to the government at the start of this year [1993] new
basic data for a review of the entire industrial mobilization plan."
Kokoshin seized the opportunity to inject a most important point
concerning the likelihood of the Russian military being physically
able to achieve its force modernization goals:
A complete military-technical policy for the armed forces
has been formulated for the first time, it seems. At the
end of December [1992] the MoD approved the foundations
of the program of armaments to 2000-2005. This plan is
based upon the transition to an army of 1.5 million as
provided in the "Law on Defense."1267
The "key issue," according to Kokoshin, was the force generation
problem of "recruiting and elevating the armed forces." And, here
too, he suggested that progress was being made with the passage of
the "Law on Military Obligation and Conscription."1268
Mikhail Karpov asked about the practical application of the
"Foundations of the Military Policy of the Russian Federation"
document, developed under Kokoshin's leadership by "a group of
defense industry leaders and retired generals" at the end of 1991 and
in early 1992. Kokoshin described the process as "quite useful"
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leading systems analysts, experienced General Staff officers --
specialists in strategy and operational art, as well as civilian and
military historians."1265 During this applied military-science
process, Kokoshin praised the "professional cooperation among this
wide range of experts" as crucial "to success in working out not only
military-strategic aspects of war prevention, but also a typology of
potential wars and armed conflicts, an assessment of the degree of
their probability, and the entire specter of military-political
challenges to the national security of Russia." From this analysis
"certain conclusions could be drawn on armaments programs...." The
following "areas were given top priority: reconnaissance/intelligence
systems, target acquisition systems, troop control systems as well as
rapid response and rapid deployment forces which could react on any
axis." 1270 Kokoshin described his vision of budushchaia voina, which
in every way corresponded to that predicted a decade earlier by
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and refined by General-Colonel Igor Rodionov,
and which succinctly demonstrated the Hegelian dialectic concept of
transformation of "quantity into a new quality":
... War has moved away considerably from annihilating
blows of the combat club or the slashing blows of the
two-handed sword to the pricks of the rapier with actions
of selected characteristics. Today the striving to
master high-precision weapons to a large extent is shaped
by the demands of a new type of war with relatively
limited and strictly regulated goals and a corresponding
new understanding of the term 'victory.' The presence of
such weaponry in sufficient quantity also determines the
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Victory in this new type of warfare was defined by Kokoshin
using the novel terms of the uniquely Russian psychological 'science'
of "reflexive control,"12'2 through which in wartime individual, group,
and mass confusion and chaos are to be sown throughout enemy ranks:
For the achievement of real victory it is necessary to
know not just the armed forces of the opposing side but
also its state-political system, the actual functional
mechanisms of decision-making, the particulars of thought
and reactions of state and military leaders and much
else. If it is a coalition war then it is necessary to
understand the correlation of common and private
interests of its members. ... Today after an epoch in
which the concept of a strategy of complete destruction
of the enemy in the physical sense dominated, we must
constantly keep in mind that any armed conflict to a much
greater degree than before is a very exact composition of
purely military measures as well as political and
propaganda measures.12'3
It is most pertinent to note that by Russian definition "reflexive
control" techniques are just as applicable in peacetime as during
wartime, perhaps even more effectively so, given the relaxation of
international political tensions and the absence of a stereotyped
'enemy syndrome.' As if to avoid the possibility of readers drawing
the above conclusion, Kokoshin abruptly shifted gears by insisting
that inadequate attention had been given to the holistic nature of
For a detailed, and quite fascinating, discussion of the
nature of this highly controversial Russian "science,"
see Lefebvre, Vladimir A. and Victorina D., Reflexive
Control: The Soviet Concept of Influencing an Adversary's
Decision Making Process. Vol. I, SAIC-84-024-FSRC-E,
(Englewood, CO: Science Applications, Inc., FEB 1984);
Reflexive Control. Vol. II, SAIC-85/6016&FSRC/E, FEB
1985; Reflexive Control. Vol. Ill, SAIC-86/6113&FSRC-E,
FEB 1986; also Lefebvre, Vladimir A. and Victorina D.,
Psychological Aspects of Military Decisionmaking. SAIC-
87/6018&FSRC/E, (Englewood, CO: Science Applications,
Inc., JAN 1987) .
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the successful NATO strategy in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm
because of the media sensationalism caused by the employment of
advanced technology weaponry. Kokoshin sought to downplay the
singular importance of precision-guided armaments and to return
Russian military art to its fundamental roots, grown at the dawn of
the 20th century in the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, by
emphasizing Aleksandr Svechin's concept of protracted warfare, in
which the mobilization of the entire society in a "war of attrition"
was decisive.
Interviewer Mikhail Karpov, however, was not distracted from
the immense significance of emerging military technologies -- nor
should we in the West be distracted, save at great risk. Karpov
pointedly asked Kokoshin about the priorities for armament and
military equipment development in Russia's new military doctrine.
Kokoshin enumerated the following top priority technological
modernizations:
We are making a significant investment in the development
of means of combat [command and] control, means of
warning of missile attack, on systems of control of
space. ... Development of a wide range of high-accuracy
weapons figures prominently ... to be the means of
deterring aggression and of inflicting destruction on the
enemy in continental and maritime TVDs. ... The problem
of communications at the tactical level demands special
attention and concentrated efforts. What is needed is a
qualitative improvement of the system of processing and
managing information. . . .1274
Concerning the ability of Russian defense industries to deliver these
military requirements by the 2000-2005 timeframe, Kokoshin explained:
Kokoshin, "Russia's Military Doctrine," p. 5.
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The main problem is that the entire system of state
mechanisms for financing defense spending has been
disrupted. Even after the passage of the budget this is
so. It is already clear that such a full-priced program
demands an increase of appropriations for armaments and
military equipment, especially for design bureaus....12'5
In conclusion, Andrei Kokoshin suggested that, in the process
of reducing defense expenditures and defense production "by 65-68
percent in comparison with 1991" and of consolidating defense
industries, a solution had been found to one of the most critical
problems that has plagued the Imperial and Soviet armed forces
throughout their long histories:
In the past we received partial, unfinished systems,
which were accepted by the armed forces under pressure of
industry, and the state and party structures. This was
especially common for the navy, which accepted vessels
that were not in combat-ready condition and even 2-3
years after the acceptance hundreds and even thousands of
factory workers, engineers, and scholars worked on them
although officially they were accepted into the armed
forces and already had crews on board.12'6
If, indeed, the new Russian Defense Ministry has found, at
last, a means of ensuring that defense industry production matches
the budushchaia voina battlefield military requirements generated
through the military science analytical process --a problem clearly
identified at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy at the turn of the
century --an immense, though incomplete, transformation step forward
will have been made toward translating very sophisticated Russian
military theory into practical wartime combat applications.
Kokoshin, "Russia's Military Doctrine," p. 5.
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- Basic Conditions of Russian Military Doctrine:
The May 1992 Draft — A Comparison
... Fundamental significance belongs to continuous perfection of existing
weapons systems and military technology, the development and introduction
of the very latest weapons systems, investigation of the entire spectrum of
capabilities for preparing and conducting operations, the effective use of
the singular and unified views of the armed forces and service branches, the
presence of a distinct system of their combat and operational readiness, the
comprehensive security [and] reliability of troop and weapon [command and]
control during operations.12^
- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii
In a Special Edition of Voennaia mysi'. which was released for
publication on May 19, 1992, the Russian General Staff unveiled its
draft military doctrine for the new Russian Federation.1278 The basic
doctrinal conditions were striking, both for the consensus they
represented within the Russian government and for the changes in
content, which showed considerable movement away from the glasnost'
"defensive doctrine" that had marked its 1990 Soviet predecessor.
A most noticeable change was that the number of perceived
threats to Russian "vital national interests" actually increased.
No longer was supposed Western superiority in nuclear and high
technology conventional forces, based "around the territory of the
USSR," considered to be "the main military danger" to Russian
national security. 1279 Presupposed were underlying new threats from
Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovv strategii i operaCivnogo
iskusstva. (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy,
1990), p. 212.
"Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt)
Voennaia mysl '. Special Edition, May 1992, pp. 3-9.
"O voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt),"
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, 1990, p. 26.
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"territorial ambitions" of the states bordering Russia and the
"proliferation of nuclear [and] other types of weapons of mass
destruction" to other states. 1280 Two "direct" threats to Russia were
described: first, the introduction of foreign troops into contiguous
states; and second, the build-up of air, naval, and ground forces
near Russian borders.1281 Additional sources of conflict were listed
as violations of the rights of Russian citizens within the former
Soviet republics and "local wars" -- the most probable type of war --
which could further escalate into large-scale conventional wars.1282
Finally, the Russian military adjudged that attacks with conventional
weapons on its nuclear forces and facilities as well as "other
potentially dangerous objects," would be viewed as an escalation
equivalent to employing weapons of mass destruction. 1283 From this
assertion it could be implied that any such conventional strikes
would evoke a nuclear retaliation from Russia.
The 1992 doctrinal priorities called for the near-term creation
of Russian "mobile forces and reserves," with the "mobilization and
strategic deployment capability" for dealing with border conflicts
"in any direction (all-azimuth defense)," and for the protection of
the rights of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics.1284
Longer term, the 1992 draft military doctrine stipulated development
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 3.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 4.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 5.
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of the emerging technologies required to fight the projected high
intensity future war and for a "rapid surge production" capability
for these same emerging military technologies.1285
The key to accomplishing these specific objectives is Russian
military-technical policy, which itself was described as having two
top priorities: first, "emerging high-precision, mobile, highly
survivable, long-range stand-off weapons"; and second, "quality
weapons, equipment, and command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems" that would permit the quantitative (numerical)
reduction of the Russian Armed Forces without a loss of combat
capability. 1286 The overall goal of the new Russian military-technical
policy was stated as ensuring that the weapons and military equipment
of the Russian Armed Forces would meet or, most significantly,
exceed, "established world standards."1287
The differences between the 1990 draft Soviet military
doctrine1288 and the May 1992 draft Russian military doctrine included
no less than five major components. First, in 1990 Soviet military
art was touted as being based on a "defensive strategy," such that
the Soviet Union would not strike preemptively and would conduct only
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 8.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl '. May 1992, p. 8.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 9.
"0 voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt)," Voennaia mvsl'.
Special Edition, 1990, pp. 24-28; also "Kontseptsiia
voennoi reformy," Voennaia mvsl". Special Edition,
1990, pp. 3-23.
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defensive operations during the initial period of war. 1289 However, in
1992 both these restrictions were deleted and replaced with a simple
statement that the Russian Armed Forces would conduct "all forms of
military action, either defensive or offensive" as deemed appropriate
and would "seize the strategic initiative to destroy an aggressor"1290
-- just as Aleksandr Svechin had recommended nearly seven decades
earlier.
Second, in 1990 the Soviet "wartime objective" was to "repel
aggression, defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the state."1291 Whereas in 1992 the Russian objective became the more
direct requirement to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent."1292
Third, the 1990 Soviet military doctrine -- at the insistence
of Gorbachev's civilian 'military reformers' -- had sought through
the concept of "sufficiency" (dostatochnost'), that was oriented more
for peacetime international political consumption than for military-
technical implementation in wartime, to preclude the possibility of
conducting large-scale offensive combat operations. 1293 The 1992
draft, while retaining the basic overall concept of "defensive
sufficiency," significantly altered the conventional force
"sufficiency" concept to mean that "without additional deployments,"
"0 voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt)
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, 1990, p. 27.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mvsl'. May 1992, p. 9.
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Voennaia mysi ' . Special Edition, 1990, p. 27.
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that is to say, without mobilization, the Russian Army could not
conduct large-scale conventional offensive operations.1254
Fourth, the Soviet draft posited that nuclear war "can have
irreversible catastrophic consequences ... for life on Earth, ...
will be characterized by catastrophic consequences ... for all
mankind, [and] will transform to a global scale (masshtab)" that
could not be limited to a single region. 1255 The new Russian draft
eliminated the "global" nature of nuclear war, stressing only that
nuclear war "can lead to ... catastrophic consequences for life on
Earth -- for all mankind," which opened the ambiguous possibility for
the Russian Armed Forces to fight a limited nuclear war. The 1992
draft however, retained a "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons
and "other weapons of mass destruction."1256
Fifth, and finally, the 1990 force structure development goal
for the Soviet Armed Forces was to be able to "repel aggression."1257
However, in 1992 this goal became "concentration on strengthening by
optimizing the Russian table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for
all possible wars,"1258 which placed a premium on force modernization.
Clearly, the 1992 draft Russian military doctrine marked a
retreat from the excessive 'defensism' imposed by Gorbachev, et al.,
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mysi '. May 1992, p. 8.
"0 voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt)
Voennaia mysi ' . Special Edition, 1990, pp. 23 and 26.
"Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt),"
Voennaia mvsl '. May 1992, pp. 3 and 5.
"O voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt),"
Voennaia mysl '. Special Edition, 1990, p. 27.





on military doctrine, art, and strategy as promulgated in the 1990
Soviet draft. The reason behind the renewed political-military
assertiveness, documented in the 1992 draft military doctrine, lay in
the revelations of the General Staff military science process that
took into account the full spectrum of changed, and changing, Russian
domestic and international circumstances that had befallen Russia
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union; compared the condition of
the remaining Russian Armed Forces to the advanced military
capabilities displayed by Western states during the 1991 Gulf War;
and projected the material-economic and military art requirements for
Russia to fight and 'win' a possible budushchaia voina.
Because Russian military science had uncovered a new type of
combat action -- the "electronic-fire operation" -- characterized by
surprise and massed, prolonged missile, aerospace, electronic, and
naval strikes with the objectives of "suppressing the opponent's
political and/or military-economic potential" and "ensuring the
victor's supremacy in political or economic arenas," a new priority
strategic mission was assigned to the Russian Armed Forces -- to
repel a surprise "aviation-missile attack."1299
The 1992 draft Russian military doctrine -- as a result of the
military science process -- vividly portrayed the decisive importance
of the initial period of a future war. Unequivocally, the General
Staff had reached a consensus that the employment of precision-guided
air and naval weapons against critical command, control, and
communications nodes and strategic deployments, accompanied by
"Osnovy voennoi. . .Voennaia mysi'. May 1992, p. 7.
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preemptive or simultaneous electronic warfare, could make the initial
period of this new type of future war the only period of war. 1300 For
that reason it was determined that the Russian Armed Forces "must act
with maximum decisiveness and activeness, effectively using all
forces and resources, morale, economic, and military potential" to
"repel aggression"1301 during the initial period of any future war
-- there just might not be another chance to do so.
Both the Soviet and Russian military doctrines were 'draft'
documents which indicates that, although they were approved for
publication, insufficient leadership consensus existed for them to be
officially adopted by the respective governments. As such, both the
1990 and 1992 draft doctrines can be considered as public education
tools of the General Staff and Defense Ministry in an effort to
develop and build domestic consensus about the appropriate direction
for the Soviet/Russian national security posture.
... Because military-technical changes have a decisive influence on the
character of state military-political aims and tasks, both in peacetime and
in wartime, the military forces contribute new elements to the mechanism for
politically influencing military construction for preparing and conducting
war.1302
- "Obshchie polozheniia, voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt)," May 1992
"Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt),"
Voennaia mysi'. May 1992, pp. 5-6.
"Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mysi'. May 1992, p. 6.
"Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt): Obshchie
polozheniia," Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition,
May 1992, p. 2.
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U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference:
The Military-Science Development Process Continues
From September 27-29, 1993, the U.S.-Russian Military-Technical
Policy Conference was held with the objective of promoting a better
mutual understanding of military-technical policy as a driving force
within the future international security environment. Sponsored by
the United States Department of State and National Defense
University, this three-day international symposium took place at the
Hyatt Regency Hotel in Crystal City, Virginia, USA. Under the broad
generic definition of 'military-technical policy,' three topics were
discussed at length by invited American and Russian government,
military and private business representatives: 1) Contemporary
Military Doctrine and Military-Technical Requirements;
2) Defense Industry: Procurement, Conversion, and Cooperation;
and 3) Deterrence, Stability, and Missile Defense.1303
Contemporary Military Doctrine & Military-Technical Requirements
The first presenter, Dr. Jacob Kipp of the United States Army
Foreign Military Studies Office, set up the background for the
discussions through his "Historical Perspective on the Development of
Soviet Military Doctrine." Dr. Kipp explained that after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, its successor, the
For the complete texts of the conference presentations,
along with discussion summaries by Sergei Kortunov,
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Fred Clark Boli,
National Institute for Public Policy, see Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, January-March 1994.
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Commonwealth of Independent States, had failed to reach any consensus
on military doctrine. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine now had
been adopted as Russian military doctrine and the Russian National
Army was to be the foundation for a proposed collective security
alliance on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The new Russian General Staff, as inheritors of the traditions
and information base of their Soviet predecessors, had tendered a
draft military doctrine in May 1992. This proposed doctrine sought
to minimize the changes to be implemented through military reform:
1) by retaining NATO and the West as threats to Russian security
interests, 2) by constraining internal military reforms to preserve
the Russian military's privileged position within society, and
3) by suggesting that the Russian state continued to be in a
"pre-war period of construction." Dr. Kipp concluded that the basis
for these Russian General Staff assertions included their perception
about the nature of future war that first was articulated by Marshal
Nikolai Ogarkov's "revolution in military-technical affairs" in the
mid-1980s and confirmed in 1991 during the Operation Desert Storm
aerospace war, in which the advanced computer/information system
technologies of "reconnaissance-strike complexes" and precision-
guided weapons were employed with devastating effect against Iraq.
Further, the Russian General Staff, as successors of the Soviet
General Staff elite, continues to see itself as the repository for
responsibility to preserve state security interests. Dr. Kipp
suggested in closing that there was an on-going intense internal
debate within Russian military circles in an effort to refine the
nature of the future war threat, as well as the strategy and the
548
force structure required to meet 21st century military challenges.130'1
General-Major Viktor Mironov, of the Office of the Russian
Minister of Defense, then enumerated the political aspects of the
"Emerging Russian Military Doctrine" as:
1) Based on Russian interests in a "stable" international
order; 2) development of the Commonwealth of Independent
States as a voluntary collective security, economic, and
political alliance; 3) the decrease of external military
threats to Russia; 4) the elimination of war as a means
to resolve international conflicts; 5) the protection of
Russian security interests; 6) the political and economic
integration of Russia into the international community;
7) a significant demilitarization of Russian society; and
8) building a democratic government ruled by law.
Concerning the critical military-technical aspect of Russian
military doctrine, General Mironov presented three basic premises: 1)
optimize research and development of advanced military technologies;
2) modernization of the Russian armed forces; and 3)•restructure the
armed forces to achieve a "new quality" of combat capability.1305
Dr. Sergei Kortunov, Head of the Department of Export Control
and Conversion of Military Technologies, Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, examined the "International and Domestic Environment" in
which military-technical policy and Russian doctrine were being
formed. Kortunov opined that a "doctrinal vacuum" continued to exist
in Russia because the new military doctrine, which was not one single
document but a broad collection of pertinent materials, was still in
the process of being formed "with great difficulty" due to the
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, pp. 11-12.
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 12.
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"ambiguity of the present international situation at this turning
point of history." The Russian government was attempting to "clarify
friends, enemies, and threats," but, "without clearly defined borders
and a unifying ideology, the development of a coherent military
doctrine is impossible."
Dr. Kortunov enumerated the following factors as critical
components of any doctrine that had to be evaluated in order to
formulate the new Russian doctrine:
1) The continuing global transition from a bi-polar to a
multi-polar balance of power with the emergence of new
economic and military power centers in Europe, the Far
East, and Central Asia; 2) the new orientation on a
north-south axis versus the previous east-west axis of
security threats, especially those new ideologically
motivated threats from states that potentially possess
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass
destruction; 3) the weakening of the trans-Atlantic link
between the United States and NATO as the latter searches
for a new 'raison d'etre' following the end of the Cold
War; 4) the prospect for forming a 'Common European Home'
is no longer realistic given the extent of the former
Soviet Union's social and economic problems and the
differences between the two social systems; 5) how to
resolve Russia's continuing 'internal command and control
crisis' and the 'failure of Socialism'; 6) how to change
our 'senseless social infrastructure' in which the
'military-industrial complex continues to produce
unneeded, and unwanted, weapons to the detriment of our
national living standard'; and 7) the integration of the
nations of the former Soviet Union into the western
economic community and especially the granting of access
to advanced Western technologies.1306
Concerning this last point Kortunov emphasized that: "Russia requires
access to Western technologies. The proffering of friendship and
promises of access to technologies is fine; but action is essential.
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, pp. 12-13.
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We must now work together in order to make Russia technologically
competitive against her emerging regional security threats."130'
In response to a question about "why no Russian military
doctrine had been approved during the 16 months since the draft was
presented in May 1992," Dr. Kortunov stated that the original draft
doctrine had been forwarded to the Russian National Security Council,
where it was reviewed and returned to the General Staff and Ministry
of Defense for revision. Defense Minister Grachev had sent the
revised draft doctrine back to the National Security Council for
approval in May 1993 and, as of late-August 1993, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin "was ready to accept" the new military doctrine.1308
General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition
and Procurement Office, Russian Ministry of Defense, spoke in
considerable detail about the "Implementation of Russian Military-
Technical Policy" being oriented "most importantly" toward fielding
"quality military equipment that would determine the readiness of our
forces to engage in a future war."1305 To that end General Mironov
said that Russian military procurement was focused on "obtaining the
latest technologies; especially in the area of command and control
communications," because, "based on the trends revealed by future war
models in the 1990s," the Russian Army absolutely "could not allow
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 13.
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 13.
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 13.
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enemies to attain military-technical superiority."131"
To achieve the required qualitative improvements in the Russian
armed forces, including the generation of funds with which to retain
quality personnel as well as improve housing, Mironov said that
beginning in 1988 Soviet weapons procurement was curtailed gradually.
The result was that between 1991 and 1993 the military share of the
total Russian state budget declined from 35 percent to 16.5 percent,
while the percentage of the military budget spent on weapons
procurement declined from 50% to 23% in these same years.
Mironov emphasized that the primary task (glavnaia zadacha) of
the Russian military-industry between 1993 and 2000 would be the
research and development of new, high quality, advanced technology
weaponry and the military art required to employ these technologies.
The decision to deploy the actual weapons systems after the year 2000
would be made toward the end of this decade. General-Colonel Mironov
emphasized: "Technology alone is not a total answer to effective
military capability; rather the desired capability is the result of a
synergism between technology and military art."1311
The implications for future war of the near exponential, and
irreversible, advance of emerging military technologies were
addressed by Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. In his presentation on
"Future Military-Technical Requirements," he predicted that by the
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 13.
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, pp. 13-14.
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year 2000 some 30 countries would possess space reconnaissance
capabilities and warned that the same technologies that were required
to place reconnaissance satellites in earth orbit could be utilized
to deliver weapons of mass destruction worldwide.
Ambassador Cooper cautioned that during the 1991 Gulf War,
described as "the first space war" by the Air Force Chief of Staff
General Merrill A. McPeak, "space was a sanctuary" and "the
technologies employed were 20-30 years old." Ambassador Cooper
suggested that to defend against an expected global weapons
proliferation, "an active defense is our only prudent course."
By the year 2000 and at a reasonable cost, technological advances in
materials and microelectronics held forth the promise of being able
to deploy a global satellite constellation of "Brilliant Pebbles"
anti-ballistic missiles to augment sea-based and land-based regional
missile defenses.1312 Citing Russian President Boris Yeltsin's
historic January 29, 1992 proposal before the United Nations to
create a "Global Protection System" (GPS) to defend the international
community against ballistic missile attack, Ambassador Cooper wryly
and conclusively welcomed the proposal: "... U.S.-Russian cooperation
in creating a Global Protection System can be a cornerstone ... to
assure regional and global geopolitical stability in the new world
disorder "1313
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
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Defense Industry: Procurement, Conversion, and Cooperation
With an insightful presentation on "Military-Technical Policy
and Defense Industry," Dr. Evgeni Fedosov, Director of the Russian
State Institute of Avionics, opened the second day of the symposium.
Academician Fedosov explained that because of the anticipated nature
of future war -- conclusively demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War
-- the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to double the size of its
air forces by the year 2000. As a percentage of the total Russian
military force structure, the air force would increase from the
present 12.5 percent to 25 percent. Of the total 1.5 million man
Russian armed forces, the Russian Air Force is projected to have some
400,000 personnel, with 5500-5700 aircraft, of which 50-60 percent
will be combat aircraft.
A primary mission for the restructured Russian Army and Air
Force will be improved air mobility as a means to deploy forces,
i.e., 'strategic reserves,' rapidly from central military districts
to reinforce local units and contain crises at Russia's borders.
Concerning tactical and strategic combat aircraft, Fedosov emphasized
that the new focus would be "improved quality across the board with
the introduction of all-weather and all-aspect weapons systems,
advanced information and communications systems, and precision
weapons delivery capabilities."131'1
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, pp. 14-15.
554
The development and deployment of these "required weapons
systems" entails the incorporation of advanced technologies utilizing
new materials and metals as well as emerging digital, microelectronic
and optical technologies. To facilitate the introduction of these
advanced technologies, and to hold down costs, "We have decided to
reduce the number of different types of aircraft that we produce and
to concentrate on producing multi-role aircraft instead of the single
function aircraft that we produced in the past; further, we intend to
combine civilian and military production facilities between 1993 and
2000 in order to replace older aircraft systems more quickly."1315
Dr. Robert Stein, Vice President, Advanced Air Defense
Programs, Raytheon Company, presented a startling depiction of
"Military-Technical Requirements: The View from Defense Industry."
He described in expert detail the "information processing revolution"
that now has made -- and continues to make -- "time the essence of
victory." Dr. Stein explained that the implementation of this
technological revolution would enable computers and communications
systems to accomplish of "billions of operations per second."
Offensively, the emerging information system micro-technologies would
make possible the creation of smaller, even more accurate, stand-off
precision-guided missiles with a significantly longer range, as well
as improved electronic counter-measures and means to more effectively
disrupt command and control systems. Defensively, Dr. Stein foresaw
the "information processing revolution" as the foundation upon which
extremely reliable theater defenses can be deployed against both
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 15.
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ballistic and cruise missiles, and the creation of defenses against
the latter being "absolutely essential. "1316
Deterrence, Stability, and Missile Defense
The third day of discussions began with a flawlessly logical
presentation by Dr. Keith B. Payne, President of the National
Institute for Public Policy, entitled "Stability and Ballistic
Missile Defenses." The focal point for subsequent discussions became
Dr. Payne's conclusion, that stability (stabil'nost') -- defined as a
quantitative balance, or bi-polar "parity," between U.S. and Soviet
strategic nuclear forces -- was no longer a valid basis upon which to
center relations in the increasingly complex multi-polar world after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union; nor was a policy of mutual
deterrence (sderzhivaniia) likely to assure future stability. All
agreed that the "new world order" required new approaches for
measuring "geopolitical stability" in terms of "peaceful change and
human progress." The simple quantitative "stability" equations
developed, and enshrined, over the last forty-odd years, were
incapable of defining the unpredictability of the new multi-polar
international security environment and the value systems of
individual nations. Participants acknowledged, however, that the
"theology of 'stability' (stabil 'nost') would continue to have its
devout adherents as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist."
A consensus developed that "ballistic missile defenses can
positively influence 'geopolitical stability' by preserving freedom
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
Strategy. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1994, p. 15.
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of action, dampening incentives to escalate, enhancing international
cooperation, and moderating negative political developments." To
this end the Russian participants called attention to President
Yeltsin's January 1992 proposal for the international development of
a "Global Protection System" (GPS) against ballistic missiles as a
means to advance cooperative international relationships and
"political and technical measures aimed at preventing possible
proliferation and use of ballistic missiles."1317
During the closing question and answer session General-Colonel
Viacheslav Mironov offered singular clarifications to the statements
previously made during the symposium: first, "The development of
advanced technology weaponry is a strategic mission for the Russian
military"; second, "The Russian government will maintain strict
control over the Russian economy, mainly because our experience with
a private economy is that private business hides their profits and
pays no taxes to the state"; and third, "Conversion of defense
industry is directed toward the development of advanced technologies
and a diversification of the Russian defense industrial base."1318 It
is critically important to note that General Mironov's third point is
a far cry from the generally accepted Western 'conventional wisdom'
that Russian defense conversion is a means by which to improve
domestic civilian living standards by shifting away from military
production to the production of consumer goods.
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General-Colonel Mironov also spoke about the most significant,
indeed, perhaps even profound, action that the Russian Ministry of
Defense has taken to date in its effort to bring 'stability'
(ustoichivost') out of the turmoil within its military-industrial
system -- namely, management of all military production has been
consolidated under the Ministry of Defense. Prior to 1992 nine
separate, and highly independent, ministries exercised control over
individual segments of military production. For seventy years the
Soviet Army, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army before it,
essentially had to take whatever weaponry those industrial ministries
could, or would, produce. Now, according to General Mironov, the
Russian military has central control over all military production and
will direct subordinate industrial enterprises to fulfill military
production requirements.
This decisive action initiates a historic, nearly 140-year
long, 'dream come true' for the Russian military leadership. In
theory, at least, military requirements now will drive actual
military production. In practice, however, the technological
limitations of the generally obsolete and decrepit Russian industrial
infrastructure very well may prevent the mass production, but not the
limited building, of the high-quality, advanced technology weaponry
that the Russian military perceives as absolutely essential for any
future war in the "Information/Computer Age."1319
Boli, Fred Clark, "Conference Summary," Comparative
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The U.S-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference was very
successful in improving mutual understanding about the likely nature
of future war and the decisive role that emerging information and
weapons technologies will play in this new form of war. In the
course of the presentations and discussions, the symposium also
provided solid evidence that the dialectic Russian military science
process, as institutionalized within the General Staff, continues to
be a crucial support mechanism for Russian decisionmakers --be they
Imperial Autocrat, Soviet Communist, or 'Democrat.'
The First Russian Military Doctrine:
Presidential Decree No. 1833, November 2, 1993
The text of the 1993 first Russian Military Doctrine (See
Appendix VI) is the result of a continuing process that began over
120 years ago, in the mid-19th century, with War Minister Dmitrii
Miliutin's first efforts to create a Russian national military
doctrine. During the late-19th and early-20th centuries, that
initial process never reached fruition, principally, because of the
extensive interference of successive Tsars, their courtiers, and the
entrenched bureaucracy. After the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian
Civil War, the search for a "unified military doctrine" for the
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was revived, finding substance in
Army Commissar Mikhail V. Frunze's "unified proletarian military
doctrine" in 1921. Frunze's work became the foundation for all
subsequent iterations and political revisions for the military
doctrine of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, up to and
including the last Soviet military doctrine which was declaratively
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"defensive" --at least in its political aspect. Yet the continuity
of Russian military thought remains embedded within the November 1993
Russian military doctrine, with the strong reverberation of Frunze's
advocacy in 1921 for a massive industrialization program "to build
the world's most modern defense industries."1320
Since 1987 Soviet and Russian military doctrines have gone
through metamorphoses having no less than three 'draft' stages
-- 1990, 1992 and 1993 -- in order to reach the form which was
officially decreed by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on
November 2, 1993. It is important to note that, although President
Yeltsin announced the adoption of this first-ever Russian military
doctrine, the text of the new doctrine was never officially
published. Therefore, the November 2, 1993 doctrine also should be
considered, in context, to be a 'final draft' Russian military
doctrine because, as previously documented in this study, the Russian
military collectively considers the present timeframe (1990-2000) to
be a "transition period." The warfighting capabilities of the
Russian Armed Forces are to be 'transformed' through the introduction
and integration of advanced weapon technologies and a refined
military art to be able to accomplish what military science has
revealed to them to be a "revolution in military-technical affairs"
--an entirely new form of 21st century warfare employing
long-range precision-guided weaponry.
The November 2, 1993 doctrine, is presented in Appendix VI in
1320 Frunze, M. V., "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia
armiia," Armiia i revoliutsiLa. (1921), reprinted in
Izbrannve proizvedeniia. (1957), Vol. 2, pp. 4-22.
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five sections: 1) introduction; 2) political basis; 3) military
basis; 4) military-technical and economic basis; and 5) a concluding
section. At the outset the new doctrine explicitly states that it is
for a "transition period" (perekhodnogo perioda) and then proceeds to
set goals and priorities for the Russian state to achieve in order to
attain their desired "revolution in military-technical affairs" for
budushchaia voina.
It is important to note the timing of President Boris Yeltsin's
November 2, 1993 announcement of this new Russian military doctrine
-- less than a month after Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and the
General Staff had abandoned their apolitical stance and had taken
Yeltsin's side against the obstreperous and highly disruptive
'conservative' Parliamentarians by sending troops forcefully to
disband the Parliament on October 4, 1993. Given the Russian
peoples' collective propensity for 'reciprocity' and quid pro quo,
it is most likely very much more than just coincidence that this new
Russian military doctrine 'suddenly' was approved by the Russian
President. There is considerable circumstantial evidence, though no
'smoking gun,' that Presidential approval of the new military
doctrine -- which is heavily weighted toward exactly those capability
goals that the Russian military had long desired -- was exchanged for
the military's support against Yeltsin's political enemies.
This is especially likely because, for public consumption, the
new military doctrine apparently had lain dormant since first being
promulgated in May 1992.1321 But, in reality, it was being revised
"Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt)
Voennaia mvsl'. Special Edition, May 1992, pp. 3-9.
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-- repeatedly --by the Defense Ministry and General Staff over the
course of eighteen months, 1322 and then twice "examined" by the Russian
Federation Security Council on March 3 and October 6, 1993.1323 On
November 2, 1993 the Russian Army received a firm commitment of
singular importance from the Russian government. This commitment to
the technological modernization of the Russian Armed Forces embodied
the military realization of budush.cha.ia voina requirements, predicted
through the military science process well over a decade earlier, and
carried forward an iterative Russian military transformation process
that had begun after the Crimean War.
Evidence of the trend toward implementation, and the growing
domestic popularity, of the highly nationalistic and assertive
Russian national security and foreign policies revealed during
presentations at the May 1992 General Staff Academy Military-Science
Conference and at the September 1993 U.S.-Russian Military-Technical
Policy Conference, and later sanctioned under the aegis of the
November 2, 1993 new Russian military doctrine, appeared in Izvestia
on March 11, 1994. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote:
Russia is doomed to be a great power. A dangerous and
aggressive superpower under communist or nationalist
rule, peaceful and flourishing under democratic rule
-- but still a great power.1324
Boli, Fred Clark, "Summary: U.S.-Russian Military-
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Continuity of the Russian Military Transformation Process
All cardinal political changes in Russian history — both progressive and
reactionary — began with unsuccessful wars: the reforms of Alexander II in the
1860s; the First Russian Revolution of 1905; the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917;
and Mikhail Gorbachev's 'perestroika.' If, following this pattern, another
Russian foray into Central Asia's murderous politics ends in defeat, the
consequences for Russia and the world are bound to be very sad indeed.1320
The very idea of the future was ... in large measure a function of
technological change, and this, as well as the evident and increasing influence
of technology on the possible conduct of war, reinforces the position of
technological change as a key element and catalyst....1326
Russia today must devise means for dealing more effectively with conflicts
designed to restore stability within the country.1327
- Gen-Col. Igor N. Rodionov, Commander, Military Academy of the General Staff
Analogies between long-past and present events should not be
drawn too directly or overstated -- including events that happened
during the 19th century Miliutin reforms; or following the Russian
Civil War during the 1921-1923 Interregnum and the 1924-1930 Frunze
Reforms; or the turbulent military doctrine debates of the 1920s with
the 1990s predicament, in which the Russian military establishment
now finds itself embroiled during the current 'Time of Troubles' that
has followed the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Indubitably, these periods do have great similarities,
and there does exist a considerable continuity of military thought,
Aron, Leon, "Yeltsin's Vietnam: A Central Asian Quagmire
May Wreck Russian Reform," The Washington Post.
August 22, 1993, p. C4.
Bellamy, Christopher D., Budushchava vovna: The Russian
and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of
Future War. (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic
Technology, Texas A&M University, 1989), p. 7.
1327 FitzGerald, Mary C., "A Russian View of Russian
Interests," Air Force Magazine. October 1992, p. 44.
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from which Russians and Westerners alike can learn important lessons
about how relevant past problems were resolved, or the solution of
continuing problems was advanced (or retarded). Yet, there are also
very great Russian societal differences that have occurred between
the early and present late-20th century. These differences tend to
mitigate, or to modify, direct analogies, but do not invalidate the
continuity of the Russian military science dialectic intellectual
process or its inherent usefulness.
Over the course of seventy-four years of Communist rule, the
most significant Russian societal changes -- which have included in
the forefront of that process the political and military leaders and
members of the armed forces -- have taken place in demographic
distribution and the level of education. No longer can Russia be
characterized simply as an illiterate or quasi-literate peasant
society, with the majority of the population living in isolated rural
communal villages (miri), engaged in local agricultural production.
Nor do the Russians any longer constitute the majority of the
population on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Today the
roughly 150 million Great Russians are the minority, albeit still the
largest, single nationality among the newly independent states that
in 1991 formed the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even more
significant, the vast majority of Russians have completed secondary
(some 10 years of instruction) or advanced education, most live in
urban areas and work either in government offices or industrial
production plants, while a scarce few individuals successfully have
launched and sustained private retail and manufacturing enterprises
since the inception of Gorbachev's perestroika program in 1985.
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It is the elevated educational level of Russian society,
coupled with the creation of truly global communications, that now
permit the Russian population to be much better informed about the
issues affecting their lives and far more likely to question
government or political party agendas. Hence, they are much less
susceptible to the agitation and propaganda of any one emerging group
of politicians than were their forefathers to the Utopian designs
foisted upon them by the Social Democratic and Communist activists at
the dawn of the 20th century.
A word of caution is in order, however. The Great Russians,
and their fellow Slavs, historically and psychologically, tend both
to desire and to require a strong central leadership and a cohesive,
central, moral ideological concept in order to affect political and
economic advancement. This basic predisposition, which strongly
contradicts the 'democratic' (in the Western representative political
sense of the word) transformation process that now has been underway
since the Gorbachev regime, tends to greatly exacerbate social
tensions. Yuri Afanasyev, the Rector of the Russian State University
for the Humanities, points out that the Russian people have extremely
limited experience with the concepts of democratic institutions and
personal freedoms, either under the Tsars or under the Communists.
This "double bondage" of totalitarianism has left a legacy of a
"sense of lost -- or rather never acquired -- Russian identity and
the deformed perception of the surrounding world as a threat."1328
1328 Afanasyev, Yuri, "Russia Fails, Again, to Escape the
Totalitarian Trap," International Herald Tribune.
March 1, 1994, p. 7.
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Afanasyev thus concludes that:
Russia, instead of moving along the axis of time, will
continue spinning in the Western vs. Slavic circle
codified in Russian thought by Pyotr Chaadayev in the
early 19th century. This tension promises further
conflicts like the failed coup of August 1991 and the
forced shutdown of parliament last October [1993],1329
For these very reasons, and others such as the longstanding,
unresolved territorial claims and economic differences between the
diverse groups composing the social bouillabaisse of the former
Soviet Union, the present turmoil in Russia, and in the other newly
independent republics, is much more likely to be quite protracted
-- perhaps extending for a generation, or more -- rather than to be
quickly, if ever, resolved.
The most striking similarities between the post-1917 period and
the present are the virtual total economic collapse of Russia; the
market and general policy mechanisms by which the Soviet government
first sought, and the Russian government now is seeking, to resolve
immense and vital economic problems; and the resulting prodigious
impact of the economic collapse, and ineffectual efforts to resolve
it, on the Russian military. The devastating economic collapse that
followed the Russian Civil War was the result of seven years of war
on the territory of the Russian Empire coupled with implementation of
the Bolshevik's 'war communism' policy of nationalizing all private
economic enterprises. In contrast, the horrendous Russian economic
collapse of the 1990s is primarily a self-inflicted wound caused by
seventy-four years of Communist nepotism, abuse, and mismanagement of
1329 Afanasyev, Yuri, "Russia Fails, Again, to Escape the
Totalitarian Trap," International Herald Tribune.
March 1, 1994, p. 7.
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a now discredited, yet still clung to by some, socialist economic
philosophy. Of Lenin's fledgling Soviet government, Kulikov wrote:
After their heroic victory in the civil war the Soviet
people stood face to face with the colossal difficulties
of restoring a destroyed national economy. Almost all
sectors were on the edge of collapse. The critical
condition of industry, agriculture, and transport
demanded the immediate use of all forces of the country
on the economic front. ... But at that very time it was
necessary to preserve and consolidate the defense of the
country.1330
Marshal Kulikov's statement aptly serves to describe the situation
both of Boris Yeltsin in 1991, and of Lenin before him in 1921.
There are, however, very big differences in these two leaders'
approach to the development of a broad commitment to change. Lenin
and the Bolsheviks were victorious advocates of an entirely new
social experiment. They pragmatically sought any means possible to
make the socialist political-economic system work, and thereby to
preserve Soviet power, when they adopted the New Economic Policy
(NEP) that re-introduced limited market mechanisms in 1921.
In marked contrast, from the time of his election in June 1991
as the first Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin has presided
over the break-up of the former Soviet Union into its constituent
independent republics and was at the Russian helm when the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics officially was dissolved in December 1991.
Actually, the Soviet Union already had failed while Gorbachev's
Communist government was attempting to reform itself from within
through a program labeled perestroika, and effectively had ceased to
function on August 1?, 1991 when Vice President Gennady Ianaev and
Zhukov, p. 101.
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his fellow conspirators unsuccessfully attempted a coup d'etat.1331
Inescapable facts, considered derogatory by many Russians,
remain tied to the Yeltsin regime: the Russian Empire (disguised for
over 70 years as the multinational Soviet Union) contracted to a size
not seen since the rule of Catherine the Great, over two hundred
years ago; a global network of economic, political, and military
allies was lost; Russia was eliminated as one of the world's two
'superpowers,' except for the continuing possession of an immense
arsenal of nuclear weapons; dangerous centrifugal forces have emerged
within the Russian Republic as autonomous regions and districts seek
ever increasing, if not outright, independence from Moscow; local
military conflicts along the southern borders of the former Soviet
Union have grown more intense, as strongly nationalistic factions
within the newly independent states seek to reclaim their historic
territorial 'rights;' and a resilient Russian nationalism with strong
Pan-Slavic overtones has been reborn, as evidenced by the stunning
December 12, 1993 Duma election victory of ultranationalist Vladimir
Zhirinovsky's 'Liberal Democratic' Party. 1332 All the while, President
For a well-documented chronology and discussion of
important events surrounding the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the formation of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and the creation of the Russian
Armed Forces, see Rogov, Sergei, et al., "Commonwealth
Defense Arrangements and International Security,"
Center for Naval Analysis Occasional Paper, June 1992.
Seward, Deborah, "Hard-liner's Xenophobia Finds
Constituency in Russian Vote," The Washington Times.
December 13, 1993, p. A14; also Gorbachev, Mikhail,
"Discontent at the Ballot Box in Russia," The Washington
Times. December 19, 1993, p. B1 and Zhirinovsky,
Vladimir, "Growing Up Extremist," The Washington Post.
December 19, 1993, pp. CI and C4.
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Yeltsin and his small cadre of devoted supporters have attempted to
institute sweeping 'democratic' political reforms and a market
economy in the Russian Republic through an uncooperative, fractured,
but entrenched parliament and government bureaucracy, that
ideologically are determined hold-overs from the Communist era,1333
without first developing a coherent, mutually agreed plan of action
for change.
For the Russian population as a whole, the economic collapse
has resulted in a sharply falling standard of living. This has been
accompanied by near hyper-inflation and rising unemployment, along
with an expanding wave of violent crime, 1334 failing public health,
rapidly declining life expectancies for men, which dropped from age
62 in 1992 to age 59 in 1993,1335 and a shrinking population due to the
death rate exceeding the birth rate by 800,000 in 19 9 3 . 1336 According
to David Coleman, a demographer at Oxford University:
For a superb discussion about Communist Party resurgence
and its call for "the restoration of the U.S.S.R." at the
May 22, 1994 conference of party leaders, see Karatnycky,
Adrian, "Back to the U.S.S.R.", The Wall Street Journal.
June 30, 1994, p. A10.
For an explicit description about how some 150 Russian
organized crime gangs extort between 10 and 20 percent of
gross revenues from 80 percent of all Russian businesses
and why violent crime in Russia shot up 36 percent in
1993, see Duffy, Brian, and Jeff Trimble, "The Wise Guys
of Russia," U.S. News and World Report. March 7, 1994,
pp. 41-47; and its companion article by Julie Corwin and
Douglas Stanglin, "The Looting of Russia," pp. 36-41.
Schmemann, Serge, "Russian Reform: They'll Do It Their
Way," International Herald Tribune. February 21, 1994,
p. 4.
Specter, Michael, "Death Rate Rises As Russians Worry,"
International Herald Tribune. March 7, 1994, p. 7.
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A decline in life expectancy this dramatic has never
happened in the postwar world. It is really very
staggering. It shows the malaise of society, the lack of
public health awareness and the fatigue associated with
people who have had to fight a pitched battle their whole
lives just to survive.133'
Russian society also has suffered an extremely severe blow to
its intense national pride and spirit because of the territorial and
political losses that have come about as a result of their own
decades of misplaced beliefs and actions. It is very difficult
indeed for two whole generations of Russians to accept that they
believed in, worked for, and lived, a Communist lie. Some
individuals will never accept that fact. Despite all their
tremendous suffering, and yet some great achievements during the
period of Communist rule, within the Russian collective subconscious,
not unlike a century before, there stubbornly continues to reside the
... image of an outside world perpetually leaving Russia
behind, ... [which feeds] the widespread conviction among
Russians that they are different, that they stand apart,
with a destiny of their own. The notion of 'Holy Russia'
runs deep of a people lacking the German's
industriousness or the American's entrepreneurship, but
endowed with unique spirituality and mission.1338
It is precisely this severe contradiction, between the lofty
Russian self-image and the harsh reality of their destitute economic
condition that engenders and sustains the continuing social turmoil,
that precludes the building of consensus on required political and
economic actions. That contradiction is reflected most clearly in
Specter, Michael, "Death Rate Rises As Russians Worry,"
International Herald Tribune. March 7, 1994, p. 7.
Schmemann, Serge, "Russian Reform: They'll Do It Their
Way," International Herald Tribune. February 21, 1994,
p. 4.
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the cynicism of the popular Russian comedian Mikhail Zhvanetsky, who
sagaciously ponders: "Much has changed, but nothing has happened; or
is it that much has happened, and nothing has changed?"1339
Perhaps the most important difference between the 1921 and 1991
Russian political and economic situation was the existence of
established mechanisms for international cooperation. In the 1920s
Lenin and the Bolsheviks were economically and politically isolated
-- 'encircled by capitalists', as the Communists phrased it -- and
were considered pariahs by the Western governments, and by the
international community in general, because the Communists advocated
and promoted 'world revolution' and sought to subvert and overthrow
the established international order. During the 1920s the League of
Nations was ineffectual in dealing with the modern 'Eastern Question'
of the fledgling Soviet Union, while the United Nations, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and the 'Group of Seven,' et al., did not exist to help nation
states to resolve political grievances or to effect political and
economic development.
Today Boris Yeltsin's Russia need not be isolated, unless the
Russian government itself chooses to withdraw from international
contact -- as the traditionally prideful and xenophobic Russia
society may yet demand. The existence of established international
institutions is a critical difference between the beginning and the
end of the 20th century that has the potential means to preclude the
1339 Schmemann, Serge, "Russian Reform: They'll Do It Their
Way," International Herald Tribune. February 21, 1994,
p. 1.
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turmoil in Russia -- if not on the territory of the entire former
Soviet Union -- from further degenerating into anarchy or open
warfare. These established international public institutions, along
with private business enterprises and personal contacts, can extend
to a transitioning Russian government great assistance and advice in
implementing reforms; financial assistance (with the caveat of
certain restrictions) that can provide a degree of stability to the
Russian economy; and, most importantly, a constant open avenue of
communications with the outside world. This synergistic network
potentially can prevent Russian society from introspectively
festering on its immense, putrid problems, from turning xenophobic
(as Russian society historically is wont to do), and then lashing out
with righteous national indignation around the Russian periphery --
as Russian nationalists historically also have done. Communications
with the Russian government and people are open presently. These
communication channels must be kept open, and expanded, if Russia is
to be groomed for responsible membership in the 21st century global
international community. But, in final analysis, democratic Western
governments, corporations and private individuals can only provide
ideas and suggestions, since only the Russian people themselves can
resolve, and take the necessary decisive actions, to fix their
internal social, economic, and political chaos.
For the Russian military as a whole, the similarity between the
conditions in which the Red Army found itself during the 1920s and
the plight of the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces during the 1990s
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undoubtedly brings about an eerie and most unsettling feeling that
"history is repeating itself; today our situation is like that at the
end of the Civil War" -- which is exactly what a senior Soviet
General Staff officer very bitterly said during the 1990 NDU-MAGS
exchange in Moscow.
Command arrangements, manpower mobilization, and morale
were all major problems that had to be solved by the
Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War; as were
difficulties of supply and transport without which the
Red Army would have ceased to exist.1340
Once again in the 1990s, Russian military and political leaders
unequivocally must resolve these same problems, and many others:
1) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; 2) the disintegration of the
Soviet Union; 3) the rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern
Europe;1341 4) the loss of Russian military prestige following their
defeat in Afghanistan; 5) poor troop discipline, low morale, and
declining combat capability; 6) deliberate draft avoidance; 7) the
need to find additional or to build new housing for those front-line
troops and their families withdrawn from Europe; 8) the simultaneous
requirement to build a new military logistic and communications
infrastructure in order to deploy forces in the Russian homeland; 9)
the precipitous reduction in military force structure, budget, and
Luckett, The White Generals, p. 242.
"Yeltsin Vows to Honor Pullout Date,"
International Herald Tribune. July 12, 1993, p. 6.
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weapons production;13'*2 and, 10) the need to educate a new generation
of officers about how to fight, and win, a new kind of future war
employing the latest advanced technologies. 1343 All of these
prodigious problems of the 1990s have befallen the Russian high
command simultaneously -- just as they befell their predecessors at
the conclusion of the Russian Civil War.
For an excellent summation of the Russian military force
structure, budget, and weapons production reductions,
both already accomplished by 1991 and projected
thereafter, see Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military
and Change" in Willard C. Frank, Jr., and Philip S.
Gillette, eds., Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to
Gorbachev. 1915-1991. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1992), pp. 211-238. In his June 11, 1993 statement
before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, William
Grudman of the Defense Intelligence Agency provided data
concerning falling, but still very large by Western
standards, Russian weapons production.
WEAPONS CATEGORY 1990 1991 1992
USSR USSR Russia
Main Battle Tanks 1300 1000 675
Infantry Fighting 3600- 2100 1100
Vehicles 3900
Artillery Pieces 1900 1000 450
Long-range Bombers 35 30 20
Fighters/ 575 350 150
Fighter Bombers
Attack Helicopters 70 15 5
Submarines/Major 20 13 8
Surface Combatants
Strategic Ballistic 190- 145- 45-
Missiles 205 165 75
Source: Mehuron, Tamar A., "The Drop in Russian Arms
Production," Air Force Magazine. August 1993, p. 10.
For a well-documented and well-written description of the
Russian military vision of budushchaia voina (future
war), see Mary C. FitzGerald, "The Soviet Image of Future
War; The Impact of Desert Storm," in Willard C. Frank,
Jr., and Philip S. Gillette, eds., Soviet Military
Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991. (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 363-386.
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There are, however, very important differences between the two
periods that should work to the advantage of the Russian military as
its leaders work their way through the transformation process from a
stereotyped, armor-heavy post-World War II Soviet Army, with massive
quantities of nuclear weapons, to the 'new' numerically smaller, more
mobile, and technologically modernized 'professional' Russian Army.
First, over the course of Communist rule the Soviet military
became a highly professional, well-educated, established organization
-- albeit somewhat skewed at senior levels with too many deadwood,
unimaginative, bureaucratic hold-over officers from the 'Great
Patriotic War' -- with very precisely defined, dynamic, and evolving
military doctrine and military science concepts that constitute a
foundation upon which its successor Russian military can, and will,
construct a new military system. In the 1920s the RKKA founders had
no such immediate, and readily available, legacy from the Bolshevik
Revolution, the Social Democrats' partisan militia concepts, or the
experience of Red commanders during the civil war upon which to draw
in order to initiate an advance of the professional Russian military
agenda. Rather, the RKKA leaders had to draw initially on the
knowledge and expertise of former senior Imperial Army officers, the
'voenspets', who succeeded -- through a very heated, even personally
fatal, intellectual and political debate process, that spanned the
course of the Russian Civil War, the Interregnum, and the decade of
the 1920s -- in incorporating the rudiments of Imperial Russian
military science as the foundation for 'new' Soviet Army military
thinking and doctrine. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov
explains the critical role of Soviet, now Russian, military science:
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Historical experience testifies: the more that military
doctrine is based on the conclusions of military science,
the more fully it responds to real conditions and posited
requirements. And conversely, the less the principles
and recommendations of military science are used in
militar}' doctrine, the more often are encountered
manifestations of subjectivism, departures from the
requirements of reality, and the pursuit of fleeting
advantages.1344
Second, the 1990s Russian military does not have to engage
ideologically in pitched political battles over the likes of a
"unified proletarian military doctrine," the "territorial militia"
and "labor armies" debates, the 'correct' course for advancing the
cause of "world revolution," or the 'proper' social origins and the
political reliability of its officer corps as did the RKKA leadership
during the 1921-1923 Interregnum leading up to the 1924-1925
initiation of the Frunze Reforms. Nor does the new Russian Army have
to defend itself from the convenient socialist political scalpels of
'socialism in one country,' Iosip Stalin's 'cult of the personality,'
or an offensive short-war "strategy of destruction" that was bitterly
contested up to 1930.
... In the 1920s, soldiers provided crucial aid to the
proletarian dictatorship in its 'primitive accumulation
of legitimacy.' They helped build the state's
institutional structure and shaped the political culture
that would usher in the era of Soviet socialism.1345
Kulikov, V. G., Doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), p. 52; cited by Kent D. Lee,
"Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role of Soviet
Military Science," in Willard C. Frank, Jr., and Philip
S. Gillette, eds., Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to
Gorbachev. 1915-1991. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1992), p. 271.
134b
von Hagen, p. 343
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Furthermore, the Russian military does not have to 'prove' itself in
order to claim membership in Russian civilian society -- even though
the proud, steadfast Russian military image was severely tarnished by
their 1989 defeat in Afghanistan and by scandals concerning the
'illegal' activities of some of the now retired top leaders.
Rather, the new Russian military leaders, 'Afgantsi' all,
perhaps as a result of learning well the lessons of history, have
ostensibly very carefully avoided direct involvement in Russian
domestic politics -- aside from a few minor General Staff skirmishes
with the new civilian military analysts over "reasonable sufficiency"
and "defensive doctrine." 1346 In fact, when the new All-Russian
Officers' Assembly -- which had formed to promote the resolution of
military housing, benefit, and career issues and to defend the
military's social and civil rights, just as similar associations had
coalesced in 1917,134' 1905, and during the 1890s -- became too
vociferous and openly threatening to the Yeltsin regime, Minister of
Defense General Pavel S. Grachev stepped in. On March 26, 1993
Grachev issued an unequivocal warning about Russian military
involvement with political issues and emphasized the need to support
all efforts to "safeguard civil peace and harmony in society."1348
1346 For a discussion of these concepts, see Roy Allison,
"Reasonable Sufficiency and Changes in Soviet Security
Thinking," pp. 239-267; also Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.,
and David M. Glantz, "Soviet Military Strategy: Context
and Prospects (1990), pp. 325-342 in Soviet Military
Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991.
1347 Luckett, pp. 48 and 90.
1348 Erickson, John, "Fallen From Grace: The New Russian
Military," World Policy Journal. Vol. X, No. 2,
Summer 1993, p. 21.
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This is not at all to say that there has been no military-
civilian debate about the substantive content of the new Russian
military doctrine -- far from it. In fact, as previously discussed,
the 'interim' May 1992 draft military doctrine deliberately and
intensely was debated as a means to generate ideological consensus.
Likewise, the November 2, 1993 'final draft' doctrine will continue
to be debated, as the Russian General Staff iteratively applies its
established and proven military science dialectic process.
Third, very much like its Imperial Army predecessor and since
the outset of Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985, the Russian military
has consistently attempted to distance itself from any role in
quelling domestic disturbances. The major exception to this
military policy resulted in the highly controversial, and greatly
propagandized, use of military personnel during the April 9, 1989
"Tbilisi Massacre,"1349 during which some thirty Georgian civilian
During personal conversations during 1989 and 1990 with
the Commander of the Military Academy of the Soviet
General Staff, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, who in
April 1989 commanded the Soviet Army troops deployed to
control the Tbilisi, Georgia civilian demonstrations, he
repeatedly, adamantly, and quite indignantly denied that
Soviet military personnel took part in any killings or
that poisonous gas was used for riot control purposes.
Rodionov claimed that it was the Georgian internal
security forces (MVD), not under his command, who killed
the demonstrators; and that, for Georgian political
purposes, the Russian Army was blamed. Rodionov was
furious with the then Soviet Foreign Minister and native
Georgian, Eduard Shevardnadze, for allowing the Soviet
military to be pilloried. In September 1990 when I
commented to Rodionov that I had seen him on television
testifying before the Supreme Soviet concerning the 1989
events, he replied, "Yes, they investigated the Tbilisi
incident, and have exonerated me, and the Soviet Army."
At dinner that evening Rodionov added that he was still
very upset with "his old friend Shevardnadze" for putting
him personally, and the Russian military collectively,
through such a deluge of negative publicity.
578
demonstrators were killed with entrenching tools and, allegedly, with
poison gas. Since that time the Russian military leadership has been
adamant about avoiding army employment against civilian disturbances.
Within Russia itself the use of military forces for the control of
demonstrations has been minimal -- even during the abortive August
1991 coup d'etat attempt.
For reasons as yet not fully explicable, but almost certainly
in return for an unspecified quid pro quo from Russian President
Boris Yeltsin,1350 the most conspicuous and violent direct Russian Army
involvement in domestic politics took place on October 4, 1993.
Paratroopers from the Tula Airborne Division, units of the
'Kantemirov' 4th Guards Tank Division, and elite 'special forces'
(Spetsnaz) elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (the former
Regarding the price the Russian military-industrial
establishment extracted from Yeltsin's 'democratic
reform' government for putting down the October 1993
Moscow rebellion, fomented by Parliamentary leaders,
Russian historian and former member of the Russian
Parliament Yuri Afanasyev speculates, with no firm
documentation, that "the day after the insurrection
ended, Mr. Yeltsin convened a Security Council meeting
that had only one item on the agenda: a new military
doctrine that expanded Russia's security interests
throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union and
rescinded the 'no first use' nuclear weapons pledge."
Afanasyev further notes: "There are no more vows to
reduce the armed forces by two-thirds." These
concessions would seem, however, to be exceedingly meager
indeed, given the longstanding preoccupation of the
Russian military with force modernization and with the
'revolutionary' nature of future war, which would require
the Russian government to commit enormous economic
resources in order to accomplish to the degree envisioned
by Russian military science. See Afanasyev, Yuri,
"Russia Fails, Again, to Escape the Totalitarian Trap,"
International Herald Tribune. March 1, 1994, p. 7.
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Dzerzinskii Division) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs1351 employed
tank and armored personnel carrier gunfire to drive rebellious and
obstructive members of Vice President Aleksandr V. Rutskoi's and
Speaker of Parliament Ruslan I. Khasbulatov's political faction out
of the Russian Parliament building. 1352 What is abundantly clear,
in Professor John Erickson's explicit words, is that:
The military is no longer dependent on the autonomy
which it virtually filched while the politicians
bickered. Now it can become, if not the arbiter,
then at least the regulator of policy, both internal and
external. It wishes to show itself to be 'a precisely
controlled army' which possesses enormous might,
including nuclear might, and which must not be ignored.1353
The Russian Army leadership, seeking to retain its lofty place above
the political fray, "will claim that it fought neither for Yeltsin
nor against Rutskoi, but for the 'safeguard of civil peace and
Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to
centre stage," The European. October 7-10, 1993. It is
important to note that these same units were the ones
declared as "ready forces" by General-Colonel Leontii
Kusnetson, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head
of the General Staff Main Operational Directorate, on
May 13, 1992. See Nezavisimaia gazeta. May 13, 1992;
also Rogov, Sergei, et al., "Commonwealth Defense
Arrangements and International Security," Center for
Naval Analysis Occasional Paper, June 1992.
Shapiro, Margaret, ".SURRENDER Moscow Hard-liners Give Up
After Military Assault; Dozens Die, and Parliament
Building Is Left in Ruins: Yeltsin Bans Several Parties
and Reimposes Censorship," International Herald Tribune.
October 5, 1993, pp. 1 and 3. For politically self-
serving accounts of events leading up to the October 3-4,
1993 Russian parliamentary rebellion, and of the 1993
'October Revolution' itself, both of which are rather
'economical with the truth,' see Yeltsin, Boris, The View
from the Kremlin, trans, by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick,
(London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), pp. 8-14 and
pp. 241-283.
Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to
centre stage," The European. October 7-10, 1993.
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harmony in society'"1354 --as was one of its traditional roles in
Russian society. Whether or not the Russian military will be able
exclude itself further from the hated, repressive 'police duty' of
quelling internal demonstrations remains an open and unresolved
question. For well over a hundred years, successive Russian milita
leaders have fought strenuously against this role, maintaining
that the primary purpose of the professional Russian military is
external defense.
Between 1991 and 1994 Russian military forces were deployed
operationally along the southern periphery of the former Soviet
Union, and of the Russian Republic. They were engaged mainly in
border security operations in Tajikistan against Moslem Afghan
cross-border incursions; questionably in trying to separate the
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in their continuing fight over the
disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory; arguably in support of the
Abkhazia rebels, who are attempting to break away from Georgia; and
the Fourteenth Army along the Ukraine-Moldova border. 1355 However,
with the creation of local territorial regiments -- the first army
brigade of which will be garrisoned at Omsk, with a regiment at
Tiumen in Western Siberia -- and the assumption of border patrol
duties by conscripted and contract regional Cossack units as part o
1354 Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to
centre stage," The European. October 7-10, 1993.
1355 Gordon, Michael R. , "Russia Wants Troops Over Treaty
Limit," International Herald Tribune. June 12-13, 1993,
p. 2; also "Abkhazia Rebel Gain Leads to Martial Law,"
International Herald Tribune. July 7, 1993, p. 2; and
John Erickson, "Fallen from Grace: The New Russian
Military," World Policy Journal. Vol. X, No. 2,
Summer 1993, pp. 19-24.
581
the now developing "mobile rapid deployment force," and a mobile
forces command that has been set up by the General Staff "to become
fully operational in 1995, "1356 the potential for the Russian Army to
become sucked into the quagmire of local conflicts and disturbances,
within what the Russian government refers to as the "near abroad,"
exponentially increases, unless tight central command and control can
be maintained.
In the aftermath of the December 12, 1993 Duma election victory
of ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's "Liberal Democratic Party"
and the virtually immediate reshuffling of President Boris Yeltsin's
cabinet to reduce the role of 'democratic reformers,' evidence of a
revitalized Russian international assertiveness appeared in early
1994. Russian Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev visited Tbilisi,
Georgia, for talks with Georgian leaders about extending Russian
military base leases in the Caucasus region beyond the current 1995
expiration date. General Grachev explained that, "Russia would like
to keep three bases in Georgia, one in Armenia, and one in Azerbaijan
[and] station about 23,000 troops outside its borders in the Caucasus
Mountain region." 1357 The next day, February 3, 1994, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin arrived in Tbilisi to sign a treaty
of friendship and military cooperation with Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze. Upon ratification, effective July 1, 1994 the treaty
would grant the Russian Army permission to retain the use of three
bases in Georgia for aircraft and marine landing forces of the Black
1356 Erickson, "The New Russian Military," pp. 22-23.
"Russia Seeking To Keep 5 Bases," International Herald
Tribune. February 3, 1994, p. 1.
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Sea Fleet in exchange for Russian assistance in training and
equipping the new Georgian Army.1358
Further, and perhaps even more alarming, evidence of Russia's
potentially revanchist policy was contained in President Yeltsin's
February 27, 1994 speech concerning the 25 million Russian nationals
residing outside the Russian Federation, within territory of the
former Soviet Union, that the Russian government refers to as the
"near abroad." Yeltsin said:
Our duty is to make 1994 a year of close attention
to the problems of people of Russian origin living in
neighboring states. We have numerous facts that clearly
show our fellow countrymen are being discriminated
against. Russia's duty, not in words but in deeds,
is to bring a halt to such practice.1355
This was followed by a major policy statement by Russian Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev, released by the Novosti information service
on March 15, 1994. In defining "the main areas in which action will
have to be taken in 1994," Kozyrev placed particular emphasis on
national security concerns, including:
elimination of hotbeds of armed conflict at Russian
borders; ... an all-round development of the CIS
[Commonwealth of Independent States] and its earliest
transformation into a full-fledged regional organization
with an ever-increasing level of economic integration and
political cooperation; [and], ... protecting the rights
of the Russian-speaking population [in former Soviet
republics ] .136°
Hiatt, Fred, "Georgia Signs Military Pact To Rejoin
Russia Sphere," International Herald Tribune.
February 4, 1994, p. 1.
Trevelyan, Mark, "Concession-making is over, Yeltsin
says," The Washington Times. February 28, 1994, p. A13.
Kozyrev, Andrei, "Russia plans leading role in world
arena," The Washington Times. (Novosti Press Agency,
Moscow exclusive), March 15, 1994, p. A14.
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These thinly veiled threats to the governments of the independent
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan, each of which has within
its borders large numbers of ethnic Russian minorities, coupled with
Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's assertion of Russia's duty to take on the
"heavy burden of peacekeeping," potentially set the stage for
expanded Russian military involvement throughout the "near abroad" in
a concerted effort to restore Russian imperialism.
Disquietingly, the historical precedents within the Russian
Empire for such 'internal security operations' by the Imperial Army
during the reign of Tsar Nikolas II were completely unsuccessful,
either in maintaining the required strict central troop control or in
quelling disturbances. The idea of territorial recruitment itself
harkens directly back to the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms, as does the
continuing employment of irregular army units to guard the Russian
borders. This newly planned Russian Army structure, however, bears a
most striking resemblance to Imperial Army deployment patterns of the
late-19th arid early-20th centuries, which were none too successful in
stopping internal rebellion and, for their efforts, ended up with the
old Imperial Army becoming the object of intense social scorn,
ridicule and hatred throughout the Russian Empire. Only time will
tell if the sordid history of Russian ultranationalism, chauvinism
and imperialism actually is 'repeating itself.' But, in early 1994,
all the factors would seem to be in place for it so to do.
The fourth advantage that the 1990s Russian military possesses,
that its 1920s Red Army predecessor did not have, is an established
and well-developed institutional and industrial base, both of which
throughout the 1920s, as has been discussed previously, were
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exceedingly weak, backward and undeveloped, if not nonexistent.
After 1917 the Bolsheviks faced a problem very similar to
one that had vexed imperial bureaucrats before them, the
'underinstitutionalization' or 'undergovernment' of the
country, especially the countryside. Throughout the
1920s the party remained weak and the soviet
administrative network ineffective.1361
In the 1990s the Russian military not only has a highly developed, if
in some areas technologically obsolescent, military-industrial
complex, but the leaders of that complex remain firmly entrenched
within the Yeltsin government and are exceedingly resistent to any
changes in economic policy that might diminish their individual power
or the funding for their industries, especially proposals for the
conversion of defense industries to the production of civilian goods.
While 25 percent of the Russian labor force in 1994 is employed
by a 'private economic sector' that is wracked with pervasive
organized crime and bribery, fully 75 percent of all Russians remain
employed in large socialist government enterprises, fully nine years
after Gorbachev launched his perestroika reform. 1362 Great Russian
'lip service' has been given to 'defense conversion' in the context
of shifting the proportion of civilian goods produced by the
military-industrial complex from 40 percent to 60 percent of total
output, thus reversing the ratio that existed at the outset of
Gorbachev's perestroika program. However, little real conversion
progress has been made toward this goal. Why? Because, first, there
have been no real incentives for the Russian defense industries to do
von Hagen, p. 341.
Baker, James A., "Will concern over Russia distract us
elsewhere?", Washington Times. February 6, 1994, p. B3.
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so; and second, 'conversion' in Russian has a dual meaning of
'modernization.' For the huge, but generally technologically
backward, Russian defense industries the emphasis has remained on the
'modernization' aspect of conversion. This is an objective that the
Russian General Staff fully supports and encourages in the aftermath
of the 1991 Desert Storm campaign that, in their minds, totally
validated former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolai
Ogarkov's visionary predictions of an imminent "revolution in
military-technical affairs." 1363 Perhaps intentionally, Ogarkov's
vision of future war echoed the views of former Imperial Army officer
and RXKA voenspets N. E. Varfolomeev, who wrote:
... Technical innovations had recast the face of battle,
increased its spatial and temporal dimensions, broken
down the conventional forms of combined arms, forced a
rethinking of the problems of command and control....136'1
Indeed, the Russian military of the 1990s will not have to
'industrialize' before it can begin technological modernization
For an excellent discussion of the importance of
Ogarkov's "revolution in military-technical affairs" in
Russian military thought, see Mary C. FitzGerald, "The
Dilemma in Moscow's Defensive Force Posture," in Willard
C. Frank, Jr., and Philip S. Gillette, eds., Soviet
Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev. 1915-1991.
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 347-362; see
also FitzGerald, Mary C., "Soviet Military Doctrine:
Implications of the Gulf War," International Defense
Review. No. 8, 1991, pp. 809-810; FitzGerald, Mary C.,
"The Soviet Image of Future War: Through the Prism of the
Persian Gulf," Comparative Strategy. Vol. 10, 1991, pp.
393-435; FitzGerald, Mary C., "Update on Soviet Doctrinal
Issues," Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, January 28,
1992, pp. 1-11; or, for the original Russian explanation,
see Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) and Ogarkov, Marshal N. V.,
Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva. (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1982).
1364 Kipp, in Soviet Military Doctrine.... p. 88.
586
because, despite the confusing and often contradictory swirl of
changing managerial relations and economic conditions, many of the
advanced, and emerging, technologies in the areas of information
systems, cybernetics, micro-electronics, robotics, electro-optics,
high-energy physics, metallurgy, and artificial intelligence, et al.,
are currently under development in Russian research centers. These
technologies will, however, have to be applied within the existing,
or newly created, industrial production facilities before sufficient
quantities of high-technology weapons systems and equipment can be
produced to actually deploy a Russian military force that is
operationally fully capable of accomplishing the type of warfare
predicted by Marshal Ogarkov.1365
Perhaps the best available evidence of the quid pro quo,
obtained by the Russian General Staff in exchange for their support
of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in October 1993, was Yeltsin's
following clear confirmation that the defense sector of the Russian
economy was going to receive the renewed emphasis long sought after
by the Russian military: "In 1994 we must put an end to the flawed
practice of unilateral concessions. This particularly concerns the
defense budget. Let us not forget that spending for defense is not
at all the same as spending on war."1366 On May 10, 1994 Yeltsin's
commitment to strengthening the Russian defense industrial sector
Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., IsCoriia uchit bditel'nosti.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) and Ogarkov, Marshal N. V.,
Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982).
Trevelyan, Mark, "Concession-making is over, Yeltsin
says," The Washington Times. February 28, 1994, p. A13.
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also was confirmed by "a member of the lower house of parliament's
defense committee," who stated that President Yeltsin and Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "had agreed to increase defense spending
from 33 trillion rubles to 55 trillion rubles in the 1994 budget"1367
--a whopping 66 percent spending increase! That same day Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin defended the military spending increase by
asserting that despite a Russian Federation inflation rate raging at
10 percent a month and a planned 1994 budget deficit pegged at 9
percent of gross domestic product: "We cannot sanction mass closures
of our exhausted plants since that would usher in an unsupportable
rise in unemployment and sharply worsen both the political and social
situation in the country."1368
The fifth advantage the current Russian military possesses is a
highly developed and structured military educational system that has
its tentacles throughout the armed forces, starting with the Russian
Military Academy of the General Staff at the pinnacle and progressing
downward through the branches of service academies to the newly
reborn local 'junker' academies. This latter portion of the military
education system is designed to provide a basic literacy, to motivate
individuals toward a military service career, and to train badly
needed junior officers in basic tactics. The 1990s Russian military
educational structure and system has a striking, and intentional,
resemblance to that utilized by the Imperial Army following the
Boulton, Leyla, "Russian defence spending to surge,"
Financial Times. May 11, 1994, p. 2.
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, "No exits on the road to market,"




implementation of the Miliutin Reforms in the late-19th century. The
reason for this resemblance is because 'it worked' back then to help
build a cohesive 'professional' officer corps and to unify the entire
Russian military in support of its armed forces.
In the 1990s the Russian military, once again, must create a
'modern,' well-trained, and professional officer corps. Once again,
it must educate the Russian population and a new generation of
officers and soldiers about the most current military technologies
and the most likely emerging future technologies; about how to employ
those technologies at the tactical, operational, and strategic level;
and about the impact of those technologies on the new Russian
military doctrine. Soviet doctrinal revisions were under development
since well before 1987, but only thereafter became the focus of
heated public debate. So contentious were, and still are, some
aspects of this new Russian military doctrine that the Yeltsin
government delayed its public announcement until November 2, 1993.1369
In 1991, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov revealed his personal
innovation for the Russian military educational system, which
entailed the implementation of a practice, that returned the system
toward its 19th century origins. Beginning in 1990, the Russian
military leadership made a significant conscious effort to explain,
and to teach, young civilian defense analysts and the 'democratic'
reformers within Boris Yeltsin's government about the rationale and
1369 Schmemann, Serge, "Russians Drop 'First-Use' Vow On Atom
Arms," International Herald Tribune. November 4, 1993,
pp. 1 and 8; see Appendix VI for the full text of the
November 2, 1993 Decree No. 1833 of the President of the
Russian Federation titled "Osnovnye polozheniia voennoi
doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii."
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requirements for maintaining a sound Russian military combat
capability. The educational program was accomplished by initiating a
special four-month-long course of instruction at the Military Academy
of the General Staff.1370
This type of Russian military glasnost' (publicity) campaign
has a long heritage dating back to the 19th century Miliutin Reforms,
the military science debates of the 1890s, and the promotion of the
1920s Frunze Reforms, when the Russian military took the lead in
educating both Russian society and members of the armed forces about
national security requirements. Here there is an exceedingly strong
continuity between past and present that has, over the last three
years, appeared to succeed splendidly -- from the Russian military
leaders' viewpoint. The most radical, and distasteful, civilian
proposals that would have all but eviscerated Russian military combat
capability, by the adoption of concepts such as "reasonable
sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine," have subsided into oblivion.
General Rodionov's civilian leadership education program should
be understood as fulfilling one of the key historic responsibilities
of Russian military science. As Julian Lider's insightful analysis
points out:
A comprehensive assessment of the character of future
war, i.e., of its social and political essence, probable
methods of waging war and the appropriate measures which
General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Commander, Military
Academy of the General Staff, explained the purposes of
this new civilian course of instruction to the author in
a personal conversation in June 1991 that occurred during
the fifth exchange meetings between the United States'
National Defense University and the Soviet Military
Academy of the General Staff.
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need to be taken to prepare the country and its armed
forces for it, are made on the basis of the conclusions
and recommendations selected and presented by military
science. It is the latter which ought to examine all
possible means, methods and forms of conducting future
war taking into account the socio-political and techno-
military development and to present to the leadership
various ways of solving military tasks in future wars.13'1
Sixth, the Russian military leadership generational change that
has transpired during the tenure Gorbachev and Yeltsin is potentially
an exceedingly important development that seemingly has been all but
unnoticed, or at least inadequately analyzed, in the West.13" Gone
-- completely gone -- from the top Russian leadership positions and
throughout the armed forces ranks is the 'Great Patriotic War'
generation of Russian military leaders. As young men they commanded
victorious, massive armies and fronts in the offensive against
Germany during World War II. Others participated in the victory as
junior officers. And then, with few exceptions, this generation of
leaders became entrenched within the Soviet/Russian Army seniority
system in positions where their vision, military intellectual
development, and understanding of scientific and technological
advancement ossified.
The new Russian military has swept the slate clean by retiring
from top to bottom within the Russian Army the 'Great Patriotic War'
Lider, Julian, Military Theory. Concept. Structure.
Problems. Swedish Studies in international relations,
(Aldershot: Gower Press, 1983), p. 340.
For an organizational outline and biographical sketches
of the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces see:
Mehuron, Tamar A., with William F. Scott and Harriet Fast
Scott, "Russian Military Almanac," Air Force Magazine.
July 1993, pp. 64-69.
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generation in an effort to rejuvenate the officer corps, to open up
military thought and military science to original ideas, and,
especially, to eliminate resistance to incorporation of new, advanced
forms and means of decisively conducting battle in a future war.
This current rejuvenation of Russian military personnel is not
totally unlike the purge of the military specialists during the
Frunze Reforms, which had the long-range effects of opening passage
for the development of Tukhachevskii's "deep battle" tactics and for
Svechin's "operational art" and "war of attrition" concepts. The
1990s generation of Russian military leaders is twenty years younger
than its predecessors, and is new and untried, save for their common
command and warfighting experiences in Afghanistan, which did not
entail frontal or TVD scale military operations. Beyond that these
new leaders are united by their advanced military education at the
General Staff Academy, where, throughout the 1980s, the teachings of
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov concerning future war and the "revolution in
military-technical affairs" predominated. 1373 As a result, the new
generation of Russian military leadership -- with great correlation
to the Russian legacy of political-military transitions -- is
strongly motivated to develop a new Russian military doctrine and a
new force structure that will incorporate the very latest technical
advances.13,4
1373 Author's conversation with Gen-Col. Igor Rodionov,
Soviet General Staff Academy Commandant, June 1991.
This information concerning Russian military leadership
attitudes and the General Staff Academy curriculum
emphasis is the result of the author's personal
discussions in June 1991 with Gen-Col. Igor Rodionov,
Soviet General Staff Academy Commandant.
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As a consequence of this generational turnover, within
the Russian military establishment institutional and intellectual
opposition to change itself, once again, has been overcome. There
is a general consensus within the Russian military leadership about
force modernization -- if only the concerted political will and
economic wherewithal can be found with which to implement the
desired, perhaps required, force structure 'revolution.'
Seventh, and finally, the Russian military of the 1990s indeed
has inherited a rich historical legacy, both from its Imperial Army
and Red Army predecessors, upon which to further investigate, on the
basis of the established dialectic principles of military science, a
new and living military doctrine that will be the conceptual
foundation upon which 21st century Russian military art and force
structure will be developed.
Eventually, as the recovery and technological modernization of
the Russian economy allows, and, based on historic precedent, most
likely well in advance of any marked improvement in the Russian
civilian economy, that new force structure will be deployed for the
purpose of defending the rodina against the military threats
projected through the enduring Russian General Staff budushchaia
voina analytical process. Here, at this crosspoint, the continuity
between Russian past, present, and future is most clear, precisely
because the historical, analytical, and forecasting process is so
well integrated into Russian military thought. In the considered
opinion of Russian General Staff Academy General-Colonel F. F.
Gaivoronskii:
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Military art, in the process of its development, has
trodden a road of many centuries -- from the most simple,
primitive forms and methods of using armed forces to
those, which are declared, or are used in practice in
contemporary wars. It is important to clarify that this
process did not unfold in a chaotic fashion, not in a
disordered way. Its study and deep reflection permit one
to identify firm laws and trends in military art and
constantly recall them while constructing forecasts of
its further development. ... Although modern conventional
weapons have moved far ahead in effectiveness, range and
destructiveness, the parameters for their use remain, all
the same, within the confine of rational bounds. ... The
process of establishing the trends and laws of military
art is unfinished. The analysis which has been conducted
only serves as a step in its turn along this road.1375
While this Russian military science historical analytical
process has long been disputed, and argued over, in the West --
mainly because Western military establishments do not approach the
questions of military policy and force structure requirements in the
same highly integrated and centralized manner as do the Russians --
the fact that the Russian Army does not accomplish its analysis of
state military requirements in identically the same manner as do
Western military establishments is moot. Some analysts would point
out that over the last 140 years the Russian military consistently
has failed to translate their prodigious military theoretical works,
developed through the military science process, into applied military
action on the battlefield. Essentially, this is true -- at least
during the initial period of warfare. The Russian military, and
consequently Russian soldiers and the Russian people, have suffered
repeatedly, egregiously, and ignominiously, from the unconscionable
1375 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva:
etapi, tendentsii, printsipi. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988),
p. 245.
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disconnect between military theory and practice. However, this fact
alone does not invalidate the military science process itself, which,
quite accurately has predicted, and continues to predict, the likely
nature of budushchaia voina.
Rather, primarily because of economic, technological, and
political restraints, that were beyond the direct control of military
leaders, despite their concerted efforts to remedy the deficiencies,
the Russian Armed Forces did not receive the timely financial and
material resource allocations required to accomplish the essential
structural reforms and force modernizations dictated by their
military science. Therefore, what is critically important is that
the Russian Army, over time, has developed and continues to utilize a
highly systematic and fully integrated analytical, consensus-building
and decisionmaking process that can -- given the political will of
Russian civilian leaders and adequate allocation of economic
resources -- effectively accomplish the translation of future war
military theory into deployed force structure.
The guarantee that the Russian Army analytical process for
deriving budushchaia voina military requirements, utilizing the
voennyi nauk dialectic methodology, will continue regardless of the
domestic Russian social turmoil, lies in the fact that, over the last
140 years, these concepts and the process for their implementation
have been institutionalized within successively the Imperial, Soviet,
and Russian military education systems -- especially within the
hallowed grounds of the General Staff Academy -- wherein generation
following upon generation of Russian military leaders has been, and
continues to be, imbued with the precepts of budushchaia voina.
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In Russia ... every major transformation in the political and social structures
was inextricably bound up with changes in military affairs, especially in the
sphere of service requirements. The process of enserfment, Peter the Great's
reforms, and the Great Reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century all
bore the imprint of military exigencies, and each of them redefined the
obligations of military service and, by extension, of social status in
fundamental ways.1376
They [the Russian military] forgot nothing and learned nothing. They dream of
washing off with blood what they consider the 'shame' of the 1989 'defeat.'1377
Our closest neighbors have an interest in seeing a stable and strong Russian
state. A strong Russia is the most reliable and real guarantor of stability
throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. ... The world community
needs a strong Russia, for otherwise it will be a constant source of threats
to the security of mankind.1378
- Russian President Boris Yeltsin, February 1994
Until recently, even the remote possibility of the restoration of the U.S.S.R.
seemed unthinkable. That it remains an option should set off alarms throughout
the democratic world.1379
It is a fact, that admissible theoretical activity cannot yet decide the
questions concerning practical expediencies.1380
- Vladimir Ilich Ulianov
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